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Executive Summary 
Changes in climate create diverse challenges across the U.S. 
energy system. Some energy infrastructure assets have 
already suffered damage or disruption in services from a 
variety of climate-related impacts, such as higher 
temperatures, rising sea levels, and more severe weather 
events. In the absence of concerted action to improve 
resilience, energy system vulnerabilities pose a threat to 
America’s national security, energy security, economic well-
being, and quality of life.  
Building climate change resilience into our energy 
infrastructure planning is a challenging and complex 
undertaking. Planning horizons can span several decades 
(the typical service life of most energy assets), associated 
investments can extend into the billions of dollars, and 
relevant technologies can change rapidly. Some climate 
change impacts may trigger cascading effects on natural 
resources, energy demand, and supply chains. Challenges 
are compounded when addressing climate risks at the 
regional or local level, where climate change projections are 
subject to less certainty than at the national scale.  
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has proactively 
launched numerous initiatives to support and facilitate 
energy sector climate preparedness and resilience at 
national, regional, and local levels. In addition to enhancing 
resilience to climate change, these actions may also have 
co-benefits that accommodate non-climate resilience needs 
(e.g., aging infrastructure, cybersecurity, physical attacks, 
geomagnetic storms). To assist infrastructure owners and 
utility planners, DOE has compiled this report on region-
specific energy vulnerabilities to climate change (see Figure 
ES-1) and current resilience solutions. 
 
Figure ES-1. Potential climate change impacts on the U.S. energy infrastructure vary by region. Energy subsectors considered most 
vulnerable to projected climate impacts are listed first for each region.1 
1 “Thermoelectric” generally refers to power plants that use a steam turbine to generate electricity. Examples of thermoelectric power plant fuel sources 
include coal, natural gas, oil, nuclear, biomass, geothermal, and concentrated solar power. “Oil & Gas E&P” refers to upstream oil and gas operations, primarily 
exploration and production (E&P). “Fuel Transport” refers to movements of energy resources by rail, truck, marine vessel, and pipeline, and it includes 
associated facilities such as ports, pumping stations, terminals, and storage facilities. Hurricane impacts in Hawaii refer to a projected increase in the frequency 
of all hurricanes striking the islands, not just intense hurricanes; see Chapter 10 for specific projections. The order of subsector vulnerabilities shown in the 
figure is based on judgments by the report authors as well as experts from government agencies, national laboratories, and private sector energy companies.
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Key Climate Impacts and Regional 
Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities to climate change vary across regions 
depending upon the nature of the climate impacts (see text 
box), the types and age of energy systems present, and the 
projected combined impacts on operations, energy 
demand, and energy supply chains. Major energy systems 
affected by regional climate impacts include the following:  
 Oil and gas upstream operations are most vulnerable in 
the Southeast, Southern Great Plains, and Alaska. 
 Fuel transport in every region is vulnerable to a variety 
of climate impacts, including increasing heavy 
precipitation, heat waves, drought, hurricanes, and sea 
level rise-enhanced storm surge. 
 Thermoelectric power generation is vulnerable to 
increasing temperatures and reduced water availability 
in most regions, particularly in the Midwest, Great 
Plains, and southern regions. 
 Hydropower is vulnerable to reduced snowpack, earlier 
melting, and changes to precipitation patterns, mainly 
in western regions. 
 Bioenergy crops in the Midwest and Northern Great 
Plains may be harmed by higher temperatures and 
more frequent droughts and floods.  
 Electric grid operations and infrastructure in every 
region is vulnerable to a variety of climate impacts, 
including increasing temperatures, heavy rainfall 
events, wildfire, hurricanes, and storm surge. 
 Electricity demand is affected by increasing 
temperatures and is a key vulnerability in nearly every 
region. 
Critical regional vulnerabilities are summarized below. 
Northwest: Hydropower 
provides more than 70% of 
the Northwest's electricity 
and is an important export 
to California and Canada 
(EIA 2014a, EIA 2014b). 
Warmer temperatures and 
less mountain snowpack will shift peak streamflow in the 
region from summer toward spring (BPA 2011, CIG 2009, 
DOE 2012, Doppelt 2009, USGCRP 2014). Meanwhile, 
warmer temperatures will likely increase electricity demand 
for cooling in the summer, when available hydropower 
generation is reduced (BPA 2011, DOE 2012, DOE 2013, 
USGCRP 2014). Warmer and drier summers may also 
increase the threat of wildfires, which have the potential to 




systems in the 
Southwest are 
already designed 
for hot and arid 
conditions, but 
system reliability 
is increasingly threatened by higher temperatures, declining 
water availability, and greater risk of wildfire (DOE 2013, 
NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). More frequent and severe heat 
waves are likely to amplify demand for cooling energy 
(NOAA 2013, Sathaye et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014). Higher 
temperatures and reduced water availability may limit the 
ability of natural gas-fired, coal-fired, and other 
thermoelectric power plants in the region to meet demand 
(DOE 2013, Sathaye et al. 2012). Hydropower resources will 
be affected by reductions in streamflow and shifts in 
streamflow timing (AEG and Cubed 2005, Cayan et al. 2013, 
NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). Electricity transmission lines 
essential to connecting remote generation assets to 
demand centers are vulnerable to projected increases in 
wildfire as forests and shrub lands become drier (DOE 2013, 




Key climate impacts projected by region 
Climate impact Regions with energy 
systems that are most 
affected 
Increasing temperatures 







Western and southern 
regions 
Increasing wildfire  Western regions 
Increasing sea level rise 
and storm surge                       
Nearly all coastal regions 
Increasing frequency of 
intense hurricanes 
Gulf and Atlantic 
regions, including  
Puerto Rico 
Permafrost thaw Alaska 
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Northern Great 
Plains: The Northern 
Great Plains produces 
coal, crude oil, and 
biofuel for use across 
the nation (EIA 2012, 
EIA 2014c). Delivery is 
mainly by railroad and 
pipeline, which are vulnerable to damage or disruption 
from increasing heavy precipitation events and associated 
flooding and erosion (USGCRP 2014). Summer heat waves 
could also damage railroad tracks and are likely to reduce 
thermoelectric power plant and transmission line capacity 
(DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). Higher temperatures could 
lower the yields of crops used for biofuels while expanding 
northward the range in which certain biofuel crops (e.g., 
corn) can be cultivated (NOAA 2013, Roberts and Schlenker 
2011, USGCRP 2014). 
Southern Great Plains: The 
Southern Great Plains is home 
to substantial oil and gas 
production, refining, and 
transportation assets, with an 
especially high concentration 
near the Gulf Coast. Projected 
increases in the intensity of 
Atlantic hurricanes and 
associated rainfall, combined 
with rising global sea levels 
and subsiding coastlines, escalate the risk of coastal 
flooding and wind damage to many of these assets (DOE 
2013, USGCRP 2014, DOE 2015). Heat waves and higher 
temperatures are also projected for the region, increasing 
electricity demand for cooling while reducing the 
generation capacity of thermoelectric power plants and the 
transmission capacity of power lines (DOE 2013, NOAA 
2013, USGCRP 2014). Drought and increased competition 
for water could limit the water available for power plant 
cooling and oil and gas operations (Cook et al. 2013, DOE 
2013, USGCRP 2014).  
Midwest: More than 90% 
of the region’s electricity 
is generated by coal-fired 
and other thermoelectric 
power plants, which are 
vulnerable to increasing 
temperatures (DOE 2013, 
EIA 2013). Warmer 
temperatures reduce the 
generation capacity of power plants and the transmission 
capacity of power lines, while simultaneously increasing 
electricity demand for cooling (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
Energy-related infrastructure, including roads, railroads, 
and electric grid equipment, may also be at increased risk of 
damage due to flooding, as heavy precipitation events are 
projected to occur more frequently (DOE 2013, NOAA 2013, 
USGCRP 2014). Increased risk of floods and droughts may 
disrupt fuel transport on inlands waterways. Changing 
water availability and increasing temperatures may also 
affect biofuel production and refining capacity in the 
Midwest (NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
Northeast: The Northeast 
region is comparatively 
cool, so as temperatures 
rise, increased electricity 
demand for cooling is 
likely to be driven in part 
by increasing market 
penetration of air 
conditioners 
(Auffhammer 2011, DOE 
2013, NOAA 2013, 
USGCRP 2014). Warmer temperatures and more intense 
heat waves also reduce the capacity of thermoelectric 
power plants and electric grid transmission during periods 
of peak electricity demand (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). Sea 
level rise and storm surge increasingly threaten coastal 
energy infrastructure, including ports, electric grid 
equipment, and power plants (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
Farther inland, low-lying infrastructure, such as roads, 
railroads, refineries, and power lines, is vulnerable to more 
frequent flooding from heavy precipitation events (DOE 




the northern Gulf 
Coast, hosts a large 
amount of energy 
infrastructure in low-
lying coastal plains 
that are vulnerable to 
increases in flooding 
(DOE 2013, USGCRP 
2014). High winds, coastal erosion, flooding, and large 
waves from hurricanes and sea level rise-enhanced storm 
surge threaten oil and gas production, ports, pipelines, 
refineries, and storage facilities, as well as electricity 
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generation and transmission assets (DOE 2013, USGCRP 
2014, DOE 2015). Higher temperatures and more frequent, 
severe, and longer-lasting heat waves are also projected for 
the Southeast, potentially increasing peak electricity 
demand for cooling while reducing the capacity of the 
thermoelectric generation and transmission systems 
needed to meet the increased demand (DOE 2013, NOAA 
2013, USGCRP 2014).  
Alaska: Northern 
latitudes, 









northern coastlines is at risk of thawing (USGCRP 2014). 
Thawing permafrost causes underlying land to shift and 
soften. These structural changes can potentially damage the 
foundations of pipelines as well as roads and airstrips used 
for fuel shipments to Alaska's remote rural communities 
(USGCRP 2014). Thawing permafrost and declining sea ice 
have already accelerated the erosion of coastlines in rural 
communities, resulting in damaged or destroyed 
infrastructure for fuel transfer and storage (Alaska AAG 
2010, DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). Warmer temperatures are 
likely to shorten the season during which ice roads can be 
used to reach oil and gas operations in the North Slope 
(DOE 2013). Alaska's extensive energy assets may also be 
vulnerable to projected increases in wildfire (USGCRP 
2014).  
Islands: Hawaii and 
Puerto Rico share 
many similarities in 
their energy systems, 
including reliance on 
imported petroleum and other fuels. In both of the island 
regions, projected sea level rise and hurricane-driven storm 
surge threaten ports and other essential coastal energy 
infrastructure with flooding, wave damage, and erosion, 
while hurricane winds pose a danger to structures and 
power lines (DOE 2013, Murakami et al. 2013, PRCCC 2013, 
USGCRP 2014). Higher temperatures reduce the efficiency 
of oil-fired and other thermoelectric power plants, 
significantly restricting electricity supply if such losses are 
not offset by reduced demand or supplies added elsewhere 
in the system (DOE 2013). Other U.S. islands in the Pacific 
and in the Caribbean are not separately examined in this 
report but are likely to have climate impacts and resilience 
solutions similar to those in Hawaii and Puerto Rico. 
Challenges and Opportunities to 
Accelerate and Expand Resilience  
Building a reliable and resilient 21
st
 century U.S. energy 
sector will require a concerted effort to overcome an array 
of challenges, including those that are technological and 
financial, informational and behavioral, institutional, and 
policy-related. Informational shortcomings, for example, 
may prevent energy sector owners from making an 
attractive business case for resilience actions. The public 
and private sectors are working together to overcome these 
challenges and better understand the implications of 
projected climate impacts and the suitability of various 
resilience solutions.  
The private sector, which owns and operates the majority 
of energy assets, holds central responsibility for identifying  
and implementing appropriate measures to ensure the 
climate resilience of those assets. However, DOE fills an 
important role by facilitating basic scientific discovery; 
enhancing research, development, demonstration, and 
deployment; providing technical information and 
assistance; designing, analyzing, recommending, and 
fostering enabling policies; and convening and partnering 
with stakeholders. As a result, a range of organizations are 
sharing their experiences, conducting research to identify 
vulnerabilities and evaluate resilience strategies, and 
incorporating projected climate impacts into risk 
management decision making.  
While government, academia, and technical institutions 
continue to provide supporting research, data, and tools, 
energy system planners, owners, and operators are already 
identifying vulnerabilities, monitoring resources, investing 
in resilient technology, and planning for rapid recovery. 
Continued and expanded efforts by states, localities, and 
tribes will build regional energy resilience capabilities. This 
proactive approach will improve access to critical 
information for decision making and assist in building the 
body of knowledge required to cope effectively. Smart 
decisions today will help to provide a robust and resilient 
energy system for tomorrow. Working together, the private 
and public sectors can make sure that the United States 
continues to deliver the reliable, affordable, and 
increasingly clean power and fuels required to maintain a 
healthy economy and comfortable standard of living. 
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Changes in the global climate system will profoundly affect 
the U.S. energy sector, which powers the nation’s economy. 
The energy sector provides the electricity and fuels that 
underpin every facet of the economy, including commerce, 
manufacturing, transportation, communications, health 
care, water supply and treatment, and other critical 
infrastructure and systems. The clear potential for 
disruptions to the energy sector raises concern for normal 
economic operations and American’s quality of life.  
In addition to efforts to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions that cause climate change, the Administration 
recognizes the importance of adapting to and preparing for 
climate impacts that can no longer be avoided (see 
sidebar). This report is part of a broad U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE) effort to inform preparedness, resilience 
planning, and response initiatives (see sidebar on following 
page).  
While this report focuses on resilience to climate change 
impacts, DOE is also pursuing resilience initiatives that 
address other energy sector risks not related to climate 
change (e.g., aging infrastructure, cybersecurity, physical 
attacks, geomagnetic storms, etc.) that will increase 
resilience, reliability, safety, and asset security of U.S. 
energy infrastructure. For example, the Administration 
recently released the first installment of the Quadrennial 
Energy Review (QER) that addresses this broader set of 
challenges and recommends policies and investments to 
modernize energy transmission, storage, and distribution 
infrastructure that will promote economic competitiveness, 
energy security, and environmental responsibility.
1
  
Previously, DOE’s 2013 report U.S. Energy Sector 
Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather 
provided a national perspective on U.S. energy system 
vulnerabilities to potential climate impacts, including 
increasing temperatures, decreasing water availability, and 
increasing storms, flooding, and sea level rise (as 
summarized in Table P-1).
2
 That report identified 
vulnerabilities in the system and highlighted opportunities 
to enhance preparedness and resilience at a national level.  
                                                                
1
 Quadrennial Energy Review: Energy Transmission, Storage, and 




 U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and 
Extreme Weather. U.S. Department of Energy. 
http://www.energy.gov/downloads/us-energy-sector-
vulnerabilities-climate-change-and-extreme-weather.  
This new report builds upon the 2013 report, the QER, and 
other DOE preparedness and resilience initiatives by 
examining energy sector vulnerabilities to climate impacts 
at the regional level. To improve understanding of the 
vulnerabilities in each region, this document reviews the 
composition, operation, and management of regional 
energy systems—including regional energy resources, 
private and public infrastructure, imports and exports, and 
energy consumption patterns. It also examines regional 
energy planning efforts, state and local regulations, and 
measures taken by energy sector owners and operators to 
enhance climate resilience.  
Federal leadership on climate change resilience 
initiatives 
In June of 2013, President Obama announced the 
Climate Action Plan, which identifies activities to 
prepare for a changing climate—impacts of which are 
already evident across the country. Executive Order 
(EO) 13653: Preparing the United States for the Impacts 
of Climate Change (November 2013) directs federal 
agencies to take steps to help American communities 
strengthen their resilience to extreme weather and 
prepare for other impacts of climate change. EO 13653 
also instructs agencies to provide the information, data, 
and tools that local, state, and private sector leaders 
need to take timely and informed actions to improve 
preparedness and resilience in critical systems, 
including energy systems. 
EO 13653 created the Council on Climate Preparedness 
and Resilience, which led to the development of 
national principles for adaptation and is leading to 
crosscutting and government-wide adaptation policies. 
The Council is also facilitating development of 
information, data, and tools for climate change 
preparedness and resilience to support federal, 
regional, state, local, tribal, private sector, and 
nonprofit sector efforts to prepare for the impacts of 
climate change. For example, see 
http://www.data.gov/climate/energy-infrastructure/. 
EO 13653 also established a short-term task force of 
state, local, and tribal officials to advise on key actions 
the federal government can take to better support local 
preparedness and resilience-building efforts. In the fall 
of 2014, this task force recommended removing barriers 
to resilient investments, modernizing grant and loan 
programs, and developing information and tools to 
better serve communities.  
 
 
Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Preface xiii 
 
Energy infrastructure has always been vulnerable to many 
natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, extreme heat, 
thunderstorms, high winds, ice storms, landslides, erosion, 
and floods. This report focuses on potential energy 
infrastructure impacts of weather-related hazards that are 
likely to worsen because of climate change. These hazards 
include changes in average and extreme temperatures; 
changes in average, seasonal, and extreme precipitation 
and hydrology; more intense hurricanes; increasing sea 
level rise and storm surge; and changes to ecosystems, 
which could increase the risk of wildfire. Some of these 
phenomena have already become more frequent or severe 
because of climate change—and these trends are expected 
to continue. The introduction of this report describes these 
trends, and their national and regional implications in more 
detail. 
Analyses of the changing climate and impacts on energy 
systems at the regional level are valuable for several 
reasons: 
• Energy systems are designed for and often depend upon 
regional features, such as the historical climate and 
presence of natural resources. 
• Projected near- and long-term climate change threats 
and vulnerabilities to energy systems vary considerably 
by region. 
• Interdependencies between regions and energy 
subsectors may exacerbate or, conversely, reduce 
energy sector vulnerabilities. 
• Appropriate resilience strategies for energy systems 
depend on regional and local circumstances, such as 
available resources, population trends, energy demand, 
and the mix of projected climate impacts. 
This report is intended as a resource for private entities, 
institutions, governments, and other decision makers in 
need of regional and localized information and insights to 
assist in assessing risks and developing effective resilience 
strategies for energy systems vulnerable to climate impacts. 
The aim is to provide decision makers with a base of 
regional information that they can use to (1) further explore 
what the projected changes in climate might mean for their 
specific energy assets and (2) evaluate a range of strategies 
for effectively increasing local, regional, and national energy 
system resilience to climate change.
Examples of DOE initiatives that address preparedness, resilience planning, and response 
• Climate Action Champions: DOE conducted a national competition to identify local and tribal community organizations pursuing 
preparedness and resilience activities that can serve as models for other communities. The agency initially selected 16 organizations 
working on a range of ambitious activities at the frontier of climate action—from creating climate-smart building codes to installing 
green infrastructure. Federal agencies facilitate peer-to-peer learning and mentorship, provide targeted support, and foster 
coordination and communication across agencies and organizations. See http://www.energy.gov/epsa/climate-action-champions. 
• Preparedness Pilots: In cooperation with the State of Colorado, DOE and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory are leading a 
pilot program that connects local communities with key federal agencies (e.g., NASA, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Departments of 
Defense, Interior, and Agriculture) to assess and plan for region-specific interdependencies and climate change vulnerabilities. This 
effort promotes preparedness planning and helps create models for other communities. 
• State Energy Assurance Plan Assistance and Risk Assessment Initiative: DOE works with state and local governments on energy 
resilience, developing information and tools and conducting forums, training, and tabletop exercises with energy officials, 
emergency managers, policy makers, and industry asset owners and operators. DOE initiatives include support to State Energy 
Emergency Assurance Coordinators (EEACs) on information sharing and coordination protocols, as well as grants to help state and 
local governments develop or refine their energy assurance plans and develop in-house expertise on infrastructure 
interdependencies and related vulnerabilities. DOE is also leading a State Energy Risk Assessment Initiative, in collaboration with 
the National Association of State Energy Officials, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, National Conference of 
State Legislatures, and National Governors Association, to increase state officials' awareness of risk considerations and be prepared 
to make informed decisions related to energy systems and infrastructure investments, energy assurance planning, resilience 
strategies, and asset management. See http://www.energy.gov/indianenergy/downloads/tribal-energy-system-vulnerabilities-
climate-change-and-extreme-weather. 
• Strengthening Tribal Energy Systems: In September 2015, DOE released a report on Tribal Energy System Vulnerabilities to Climate 
Change and Extreme Weather (DOE 2015b). The report describes climate-related events that threaten the economic and energy 
security of Indian Tribes, who are among the nation’s most impoverished communities. The report is part of a broad DOE effort to 
support tribal climate preparedness that includes technical assistance to help tribes identify, assess, and respond to specific 
vulnerabilities and resilience options.  
• Partnership for Energy Sector Climate Resilience: On April 21, 2015, the White House and DOE announced the establishment of the 
Partnership for Energy Sector Climate Resilience with initially 17 companies representing a range of utilities, including investor-
owned as well as federal, state, municipal, and cooperative organizations. Through the Partnership, DOE works with the private 
sector to develop and deploy effective strategies for enhancing resilience to extreme weather and climate change. The Partnership 
will assist in the dissemination of user-friendly climate data and decision tools; assessment of costs and benefits of climate 
resilience actions; and identification of gaps, opportunities and metrics for developing and deploying climate-resilient energy 
technologies, practices, and policies. See http://www.energy.gov/epsa/partnership-energy-sector-climate-resilience. 
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Table P-1. Potential effects of climate change on the energy sector 
Source: Adapted from DOE 2013 
                                                                
3
 Energy demand is often reported as a function of heating degree days (HDDs) and cooling degree days (CDDs). Degree days measure the 
difference between mean air temperature and a standard baseline temperature at which buildings would begin using air conditioning on warm 
days and heating on cool days; this standard baseline temperature is typically 65°F. On an annual basis, HDDs and CDDs measure the time-
integrated difference over a year between the mean daily temperature and the baseline temperature (DOE 2013).  
Energy sector Climate projection Potential implication 
Oil and gas 
exploration and 
production 
 Thawing permafrost in Arctic Alaska  Damaged infrastructure and changes to existing operations 
 Longer sea ice-free season in Arctic Alaska  Limited use of ice-based infrastructure; longer drilling season; new 
shipping routes 
 Decreasing water availability  Impacts on drilling, production, and refining 
 Increasing frequency of intense hurricanes, 
and increasing sea level rise and storm surge 
 Increased risk of physical damage and disruption to offshore and 
coastal facilities 
  Increasing intensity and frequency of flooding  Increased risk of physical damage and disruption to inland facilities 
Fuel transport  Reduction in river levels  Disruption of barge transport of crude oil, petroleum products, and 
coal 
 Increasing intensity and frequency of flooding  Disruption of rail and barge transport of crude oil, petroleum 







and solar CSP) 
 Increasing air temperatures  Reduction in plant efficiencies and available generation capacity 
 Increasing water temperatures  Reduction in plant efficiencies and available generation capacity; 
increased risk of exceeding thermal discharge limits 
 Decreasing water availability  Reduction in available generation capacity; impacts on coal, natural 
gas, and nuclear fuel supply chains 
 Increasing frequency of intense hurricanes, 
and increasing sea level rise and storm surge 
 Increased risk of physical damage and disruption to coastal facilities 
 Increasing intensity and frequency of flooding  Increased risk of physical damage and disruption to inland facilities 
Hydropower  Increasing temperatures and evaporative 
losses 
 Reduction in available generation capacity and changes in operations 
 Changes in precipitation and decreasing 
snowpack 
 Reduction in available generation capacity and changes in operations 




 Increasing air temperatures  Increased irrigation demand and risk of crop damage from extreme 
heat events 
 Extended growing season  Increased production 
 Decreasing water availability  Decreased production  
 Sea level rise and increasing intensity and 
frequency of flooding 
 Increased risk of crop damage 
Wind energy  Potential variation in wind patterns  Uncertain impact on resource potential 
Solar energy  Increasing air temperatures  Reduction in potential generation capacity 
 Decreasing water availability  Reduction in concentrated solar power (CSP) potential generation 
capacity  
Electric grid  Increasing air temperatures  Reduction in transmission efficiency and available transmission 
capacity 
 More frequent and severe wildfires  Increased risk of physical damage and decreased transmission 
capacity 
 Increasing frequency of intense hurricanes, 
and increasing sea level rise and storm surge 
 Increased risk of physical damage 
Energy demand  Increasing air temperatures   Increased electricity demand for cooling; decreased fuel oil and 
natural gas demand for heating
3
 
 Increasing magnitude and frequency  
of extreme heat events 
 Increased peak electricity demand  
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1. Introduction 
Across the country, energy systems are increasingly 
vulnerable to the effects of a changing climate. This section 
describes the key climate change trends, including rising 
temperatures and sea levels, changing precipitation 
patterns, and more frequent and severe episodes of 
extreme weather, that are already forcing energy systems 
to operate outside of the conditions for which they were 
designed and are threatening to damage or disrupt critical 
energy infrastructure.   
Climate change and extreme weather can damage 
equipment and facilities, disrupt supply chains and 
operations, and cause shifts in energy supply and demand. 
Disruptions in energy services can have serious 
consequences at the local and regional level and can hurt 
the national economy. U.S. competitiveness and economic 
health depend upon an energy system that is prepared to 
meet the demands and threats of the 21st century. The 
climate and weather impacts that are evident today are 
expected to become more frequent and more intense in the 
decades ahead. Planning and investment will be required to 
ensure that the nation’s energy systems can continue to 
deliver high performance while anticipating and reducing 
vulnerabilities to climate change and extreme weather.  
Influence of climate on energy systems  
Energy production, transport, and delivery infrastructure 
and operations are typically tailored either to take 
advantage of or to address regional differences in climate 
conditions, available resources, and demand for energy (see 
Figure 1-1). A region’s resources, including water availability 
and energy resources (fossil and renewable resources), are 
primary considerations in the design of energy systems. For 
example, the Northwest has high volumes of water flowing 
through mountainous terrain, making the region well-suited 
for hydroelectric power generation. Similarly, the 
Southeast, Midwest, and Northeast are served by navigable 
waterways, so marine vessels are used extensively in these 
regions to transport energy products such as petroleum and 
coal. Regional differences in water availability are also 
reflected in technologies used in power plant cooling water 
systems. In the Southeast, many large generating stations 
incorporate once-through cooling technologies that rely on 
an abundant supply of fresh surface water. In the 
Southwest, where fresh surface water is scarce, most power 
plants rely on alternative sources of water (e.g., municipal 
waste water), or they use water-efficient cooling systems 
(e.g., recirculating systems or dry cooling). In fact, less than 
1% of Southwest generating capacity uses once-through 
surface water for cooling (UCS 2012). 
  
Figure 1-1. Energy systems are designed for regional climate 
conditions, resources, and energy demand 
Beyond the available resources, which tend to influence the 
type of energy systems used, energy demand typically 
drives the amount of energy system infrastructure needed 
in an area. High demand centers require numerous high-
voltage transmission lines. Across the country, natural gas 
and crude oil pipelines have been built to serve energy 
supply centers such as power plants and refineries, which, 
in turn, are located in proximity to large demand centers for 
electricity and fuel. 
The climate (historical norms) influences multiple factors, 
including many of the resources that are available for 
generating energy (e.g., water, solar, wind, and biomass) as 
well as the level of energy demand (e.g., requirements for 
heating and cooling). For example, precipitation patterns 
and temperatures affect the amount of water and biomass 
resources available for bioenergy. Additionally, ambient 
temperatures and humidity are among the biggest factors 
in determining energy demand; more than 40% of U.S. 
household energy is used for heating and cooling (EIA 
2013).  
In addition to influencing natural resources and energy 
demand, climate also directly influences the technology, 
design, and operations of regional energy systems. For 
example, thermoelectric power plants design and operate 
their cooling water intakes and effluent systems based, in 
part, on an expected range of air and water temperatures. 
In addition, utilities typically equip their transformers with 
cooling systems that are adequate to prevent overheating 
in regions that historically experience extremely hot 
weather. Similarly, pipelines constructed on permafrost in 
Arctic Alaska are designed for an expected range of historic  
temperatures. 
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The energy used for space heating and cooling is also 
affected by climate and varies by region. In the northern 
states, more energy is used for winter heating (often in the 
form of natural gas or oil) than for cooling; in the southern 
states, the opposite typically holds true. In parts of the 
Northeast, many homes use electric window air 
conditioners to address the limited need for cooling but rely 
on natural gas for heat. In the Southeast, by contrast, many 
homes are equipped with electric heat pumps for efficient 
summer cooling and rely on electricity for winter heat (EIA 
2013).   
Weather and climate patterns—including the prevalence of 
storms, wildfires, floods, and drought—have long shaped 
energy system design and operations. Hurricanes can have 
devastating impacts on local or regional energy systems. 
Companies operating oil and gas infrastructure along the 
Gulf Coast in the Southern Great Plains and Southeast, for 
example, typically incorporate the historical likelihood of 
severe hurricanes into risk management planning. 
Transmission line operators in wildfire areas incorporate 
vegetation management and other techniques to mitigate 
fire risk. Utilities in tornado-prone regions are commonly 
prepared with emergency response and recovery plans. The 
QER examines these and other hazards that impact energy 
transmission, storage, and distribution systems. Figure 1-2 
from the QER shows the regional distribution of certain 
natural hazards. 
The annual frequency of billion-dollar weather events and 
associated costs from these events has increased during the 
last 30 years (Figure 1-3). These storm-related damages 
affect the energy sector and many other sectors. 
 




Data source: NOAA 2015 
As climate change progresses, energy infrastructure that 
has been designed to perform across the known range of 
historical conditions in a region may not be designed to 
withstand the projected changes to temperatures, 
precipitation, hurricanes, wildfire, and sea level rise. A 
regional climate’s departure from the historical averages 
could significantly impede energy system performance and 
expose the system to much greater risks, particularly with 
aging energy infrastructure. Geographic variations in 
climate change and energy infrastructure underscore the 
value of a regional approach to analyzing infrastructure 
                                                                
4
 Number of events exceeding $1 billion using 2014 consumer 
price index (CPI) adjustment 
 
Figure 1-2. Regional distribution of hazards, of which fires, hurricane intensity, and storm surge are projected to intensify because of 
climate change 
Source: DOE 2015a 
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vulnerabilities and developing and implementing effective 
climate resilience solutions. 
Regional variations in projected climate 
impacts 
Projected changes to local and regional climates differ from 
national or global average projections. In general, the 
United States is expected to become warmer, and periods 
of extreme heat are likely to become more severe, more 
frequent, and more extended. However, the degree of 
projected warming varies; Alaska and the northern and 
interior areas of the nation are expected to experience 
more rapid warming, while the Pacific, South Atlantic, and 
Gulf coastal areas are likely to see their warming trends 






Figure 1-4. Increase in annual mean temperature by mid-century
5
 
Source: NOAA 2013 
Annual average precipitation is generally expected to 
increase across the northern United States but decline in 
the southern states (NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). Other 
                                                                
5
 Simulated difference in annual mean temperature (°F) for 2041–
2070 compared to 1971–2000 under a high (A2) emissions 
scenario. Climate projections for Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico 
are based on different sources and can be found in Chapters 9 and 
10. 
changes in precipitation patterns, such as increased 
frequency or severity of heavy precipitation events and 
changes in the length of dry spells, are also projected to 
vary across regions. The largest increases in heavy 
precipitation events are projected for the northern regions, 
including the Northern Great Plains and the Northeast, as 
well as interior areas of the West (Figure 1-5), while the 
largest increases in consecutive dry days are anticipated in 
the Southern Great Plains and Southwest (Figure 1-6) 
(NOAA 2013). 
 




Source: NOAA 2013 
 




Source: NOAA 2013 
                                                                
6
 Simulated percentage difference in the mean annual number of 
days with precipitation of greater than one inch for 2041–2070 
compared to 1980–2000 under a high (A2) emissions scenario. 
Climate projections for Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico are based 
on different sources and can be found in Chapters 9 and 10. 
7
 Simulated difference in the mean annual maximum number of 
consecutive days with precipitation of less than 0.1 inches for 
2041-2070 compared to 1980-2000 under a high (A2) emissions 
scenario. Climate projections for Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico 
are based on different sources and can be found in Chapters 9 and 
10. 
Certainty of regional climate projections 
Climate models have improved dramatically over 
the last several decades, particularly at a national or 
global scale. However, the complexity of climate 
systems and scientific uncertainty about some 
aspects of climate mean that small variations in 
inputs and assumptions can produce a range of 
outcomes. Small differences at the global scale can 
create large changes to projected climate impacts 
for a region. Figure 1-4, Figure 1-5, and Figure 1-6 
show averages from multiple models. Hatched lines 
indicate areas with the greatest agreement among 
models. 
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The severity of climate change impacts on a region or locality 
will depend on baseline climate conditions as well as the scale 
of the projected change. In colder parts of the country, for 
example, higher winter temperatures may reduce net energy 
consumption, as reductions in energy demand for winter 
heating may more than offset increases in energy demand for 
summer cooling, at least in the near term. In western forests, 
higher temperatures and reduced precipitation are projected 
to increase the risk of wildfire, while forests in the East are less 
likely to see an immediate increase in fires than those in the 
West—despite also experiencing increases in temperatures 
and summer drying (USGCRP 2014).
8
 Increases in sea level rise 
and hurricane intensity are most likely to affect regions with 
low-lying coastal energy infrastructure, high rates of land 
subsidence, and gently sloping continental shelves, such as 
parts of the Gulf and Mid-Atlantic Coasts (USGCRP 2014). 
Figure 1-7 illustrates the projected exposure of a portion of the 
Gulf Coast to sea-level rise and storm surge from a Category 1 
hurricane. 
 
Figure 1-7. Storm surge inundation zones from a Category 1 




Source: DOE 2015a 
Key sources 
Projected climate impacts in this report are primarily based 
on assessments by the U.S. Global Change Research 
Program (USGCRP) and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The projections 
represent an average of multiple climate models, as 
presented in in the 2014 Third National Climate Assessment 
(NCA) and its supporting analyses. The NCA, conducted 
                                                                
8
 Although both western and eastern forests may experience 
increasing disturbances caused by climate change, western forests 
are already more vulnerable to large-scale die-offs resulting from 
drought, disease, and pests than eastern forests, so climate 
impacts on western forests are expected to be more severe. 
9
 Baseline vulnerability corresponds with sea level in 1992. Future 
vulnerabilities correspond with a high-end sea level rise scenario 
of 10 inches in 2030, 23 inches in 2050, and 32 inches in 2060. 
under the auspices of the Global Change Research Act of 
1990, assesses the effects of global climate change on 
human and natural systems, analyzes current trends in 
global change, and projects major trends for the next 25 to 
100 years. The NCA provides the United States' most 
comprehensive scientific assessment of how climate change 
affects each region of the country. 
This report also draws upon valuable studies and resources 
from several federal agencies, including the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT), U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (USACE), and NOAA, among others. 
Supplemental resources used in this report include state, 
regional, and local publications and planning documents; 
regulatory filings; and peer-reviewed studies and datasets 
published in major scientific journals. News articles and 
press releases are used to illustrate climate change impacts 
and resilience solutions. 
Using this report  
Each of the next nine chapters of this report focuses on a 
single region of the United States. These nine regions 
broadly correspond with the geographic breakdown used in 
the Third National Climate Assessment (Figure 1-8).
10
 By 
aligning the regional boundaries of this report with the 
NCA, this report is able to better leverage the scientific 
findings of the authoritative NCA and its series of 
supportive analyses. Each of the chapters in this report is 
structured as a stand-alone regional profile and includes a 
brief overview of the regional energy infrastructure and key 
vulnerabilities, a more detailed description of the critical 
energy subsectors that are most vulnerable to the impacts 
of climate change, a one-page description of regional 
climate change trends and projections, and its own 
references section. The final chapter provides crosscutting 
observations relevant to multiple regions. 
 
Figure 1-8. Regions of the United States addressed in this report 
                                                                
10
 Report chapters correspond to the regions in the Third National 
Climate Assessment with two main exceptions:  the Great Plains 
region, which is separated into two regions in this report, and the 
Islands region, which discusses Hawaii and Puerto Rico. 
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The Northwest has a diverse topography with rocky shorelines, 
lush forests, mountains, farmlands, and arid regions. Major 
climate change impacts projected to increasingly threaten the 
region’s energy infrastructure include the following:  
 Higher temperatures may increase the amount of 
precipitation falling as rain rather than as snow and cause 
mountain snowpack to melt earlier in the spring. 
Combined with projected declines in summer 
precipitation, these changes may lead to reduced summer 
streamflow.
a
 The Northwest is highly dependent on 
hydroelectric power to supply its electricity. Together, these 
changes may contribute to higher streamflows in the winter 
and spring and decreased streamflows and hydropower 
generation in the summer.
b
 
 Average temperatures are projected to increase by 3°F–
10°F over the course of the century, and annual cooling 
degree days (CDDs) for some areas could increase by 400 
by mid-century. The region is also projected to experience 
longer and more severe heat waves and higher overnight 
low temperatures.
c
 Greater seasonal demand for electricity 
for cooling could occur simultaneously with reduced 
availability of hydropower in the summer.
d
 
 Wildfire activity is projected to increase, with median burn 
area projected to quadruple by the 2080s.
e
 Wildfires in the 
region’s forests threaten to disrupt or damage critical 
transmission infrastructure. Fires can burn poles, and smoke 




 Sea levels are projected to rise more slowly in the 
Northwest than in other regions because of tectonic uplift, 
which has elevated much of the Northwestern coast.
g
 The 
uplift is not consistent, however, and infrastructure in the 
Puget Sound may be more vulnerable than in other areas. 
 
Table 2-1. Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Northwest 
Subsector Vulnerability Magnitude Illustrative Resilience Solutions 
Hydroelectric 
Power 
Reduced availability of summer 




Summer hydropower generation 




Water conservation, integrated water 




Electricity Demand Increased summer demand 




Peak load may increase by almost 




Capacity expansion, energy efficiency, 
demand management, energy storage
m
  
Electric Grid Increased risk of damage from 




Recent wildfires have burned 
through transmission and 
distribution lines
o
 and threatened 
the critical Pacific Intertie
p
  
Vegetation management, improved 






Threats from rising sea levels 




Four power plants are at or below 
four feet above sea level
s
 
Hardening and elevating structures, 
incorporating sea-level rise projections 
into infrastructure project planning 
QUICK FACTS       
Northwest States:   Washington, Oregon, Idaho 
Population (2013) 
 
13,000,000  (4% of U.S.) 
Area (square miles) 245,000 (7% of U.S.) 
Energy Expenditures  $49 billion 









Electric power                     TWh 193 163 n/a 
Petroleum            million barrels 0 232 <1% 
Coal                           million tons 0 5 89% 













Natural gas 19 10% 9 39 
Coal 6 3% 2 4 
Nuclear 9 5% 1 1 
Hydroelectric 140 72% 32 209 
Wind  15 8% 7 87 
Biomass 3 2% 1 48 




Electric Power   
Wells (>1 boe/d): 0 Power plants (> 1 MW):  394   
Refineries:  5 Interstate transmission lines:  10 
Liquids pipelines: 5 Coal 
 
  
Ports (>200 tons/yr): 6 Mines:  0 
Natural Gas 
 
Waterways   
Wells:  27 Coal and petroleum routes:   10 
Interstate pipelines: 3 Railroads 
 
  
Market hubs:  3 Miles of freight track:   7,200 
Note: Table presents 2012 data except number of oil wells, which is 2009 data. 
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW. 
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2011, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013d, EIA 2013f, EIA 2014a, EIA 2014e, 
EIA 2014f, EIA 2014g, EIA 2014h, EIA 2014i, EIA 2014j, USACE 2014, U.S. Census 
Bureau 2014  
 
Chapter 2: Northwest 
Climate Change and the Energy Sector 
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities 
and Resilience Solutions 
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of 
resilience solutions in the Northwest are discussed below. 
System components that are most vulnerable to climate 
change are described first. 
Hydroelectric Power 
Subsector Vulnerabilities  
Hydroelectric power dominates the Northwest’s 
electricity generation mix, providing 72% of the region’s 
power (Table 2-2). Washington is the leading producer of 
hydroelectric power in the United States, followed by 
Oregon. The region supplies both Canada and U.S. 
markets
1
 with significant electricity (EIA 2014l). Oregon 
and Washington both produce more electricity than they 
consume, while Idaho is a net power importer and 
dependent on interstate transmission lines (EIA 2014a).  
Table 2-2. 2012 net electricity generation (percentage of total 
electricity generated) 
Generation Type OR WA ID Total 
Region 
Natural Gas 19% 5% 12% 10% 
Coal 4% 3% - 3% 
Nuclear - 8% - 5% 
Hydroelectric 65% 77% 71% 72% 
Other Renewables 12% 7% 16% 9% 
Source: EIA 2013f 
Federal agencies—including the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the 
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)—and private 
owners operate 203 hydroelectric facilities in the region, 
which produced almost 140 TWh in 2012. Hydroelectric 
power is generated from multiple dams in the Columbia 
River Basin, which provides more than 40% of the nation’s 
total hydropower (Figure 2-1) (EIA 2014k). The Grand 
Coulee Dam in Washington is the largest electric power 
plant in the United States and sixth largest in the world, 
with a capacity of over 6,800 MW (EIA 2014k). The nation’s 
largest privately owned hydroelectric facility is located in 
Idaho, at the Hells Canyon complex on the Snake River (EIA 
2013a, EIA 2014a).   
Climate change is expected to affect hydropower in the 
Northwest in a number of ways, including: 
 Decrease in summer hydropower production from a 
combination of earlier spring snowmelt, reduced 
snowpack, and declining summer precipitation (BPA 
2011a, CIG 2009, DOE 2012a, Doppelt 2009, USGCRP 
2014). 
                                                                
1
 Three Northwest states are discussed here; however, it is 
recognized that the vulnerabilities could substantially affect the 
electricity supply in Canada and California. 
 Increase in winter/early spring hydropower production 
and spills at dams (BPA 2011a, USGCRP 2014). 
 Decrease in water available for hydropower production 
as competition for water increases (USGCRP 2014). 
Climate change is affecting the supply of water for 
hydropower. Projected changes in the timing of snowmelt 
and streamflow in the summer would reduce hydropower 
generating capacity due to reduced available water (see 
Figure 2-2 for one scenario’s projection of changes in 
streamflow). One recent study simulated streamflows in the 
Columbia River watershed for historical and future climates 
under two scenarios,
2
 and found that annual hydropower 
production could decrease by 3.0%–3.5% by the 2080s 
compared to 20
th
 century levels. This is the net effect of a 
projected increase of 7%–10% in the winter and a projected 
decrease of 18%–21% in the summer (CIG 2009).  
At the same time, increasing temperatures are causing 
larger percentages of precipitation to fall as rain instead of 
snow, reducing snow water equivalent in mountain 
snowpacks (CIG 2009, Doppelt 2009, USGCRP 2014). For the 
winter through early spring (January through April), 
increased winter rainfall would provide more power 
generation due to increased streamflows, but also increase 
occurrences of dam spilling due to exceeding available 
generation, most notably in April and May (BPA 2011a, BPA 
2011c). Streamflows in some watersheds are expected to 
increasingly be driven by rainfall rather than snowmelt (CIG 
2009), and with summer precipitation expected to decline 
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 B1 (low emissions) scenario and A1B (medium emissions) 
scenario 
Figure 2-1. Federal and non-federal dams in the Columbia River Basin 
Source: EIA 2014k 
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Figure 2-2. (Left) Projected increased winter flows and decreased summer flows by the 2020s, 2040s, and 2080s in the Yakima River Basin 
under the A1B emissions scenario (compared to 1916–2006). (Right) Projected changes in local runoff (shading) and streamflow (colored 
circles) for the 2040s summer (compared to 1915–2006) under the A1B Scenario.  
Source: USGCRP 2014 
by as much as 30% by the end of the century (USGCRP 
2014), the availability of hydropower at periods of higher 
demand could be further diminished.  
Reduced availability of hydropower generation in the 
summer coincides with anticipated greater demand for 
cooling energy due, in part, to temperature increases 
during the same period (see Electricity Demand section).  
Abundant and low-cost hydropower has helped maintain 
what have been historically low regional wholesale power 
prices. If hydropower becomes less dominant, prices in the 
region may be increasingly determined by the cost of 
natural gas generation (EIA 2014c). 
Changes to the supply of water in the Northwest due to 
climate change not only affect hydropower but other 
competing consumers of water reservoir supplies, including 
irrigation, municipal, and industrial uses; flood control; 
water quality; navigation; recreation; and aquatic species 
habitat preservation. In the summer (especially during drier 
years), not all competing water needs can be met all of the 
time. By the 2080s, it is projected that hydropower 
production could be reduced by as much as 20% in order to 
preserve Columbia River Basin in-stream flow for fish 
(USGCRP 2014).  
Hydroelectric Power 
Resilience Solutions  
A comprehensive resilience approach to climate change will 
need to include strategies for optimized hydropower 
production as part of an integrated water management 
plan. The approach should also consider options for 
electricity supply diversification and demand management 
to reduce reliance on hydropower. 
Actions to enhance resilience will need to take into account 
formal agreements, such as those regarding hydropower in 
the Northwest, including the Columbia River Treaty and the 
agreement between Canada and the United States that 
addresses Columbia River Basin flooding and water 
resources regulation. While the agreement is due to expire 
in 2024 and would have to be renegotiated, the U.S. Bureau 
of Reclamation, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and BPA 
are integrating climate change data in their review of the 
treaty (BPA 2011a). A significant amount of the Columbia 
River Basin storage capacity is located in Canada (USACE and 
BPA 2013a). As a part of the treaty, Canada is entitled to 50% 
of power generated downstream in the Columbia River; this 
power is delivered to British Columbia and either used in 
Canada or re-sold to the western United States (USACE and 
BPA 2014). Renegotiation of the Columbia River Treaty that 
affects the dispensation of water rights in the region could 
also affect future levels of available hydropower production 
(Dalton et al. 2013). 
For the Columbia River Basin, recommendations from the 
United States for modernizing the Columbia River Treaty 
post-2024 will consider competing interests for water in 
Canada and the Northwestern United States and the 
possibility of reduced hydropower generation capability and 
other effects due to climate change and other factors. 
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Additional hydropower capacity, either through new 
facilities or through increased turbine efficiency and/or 
capacity at existing dams, could help address some issues 
related to reduced water availability. However, recent 
assessments of capacity expansion at existing federally 
owned dams found minimal opportunity for economic 
expansion in the Northwest (DOI et al. 2007, USBR 2011). 
Engineering solutions to control water supply for 
hydroelectric power production must be balanced with 
potentially competing requirements for flood control and 
wildlife conservation (USGCRP 2014). Water conservation 
measures in other sectors may help to reduce conflicting 
demands on water resources, and improved planning can 
help to better manage competing demands (DOE 2013, 
Doppelt 2009). Increased deployment of technologies such 
as pumped storage can improve short-term response to 
changes in power demand; however, alternative sources of 
power generation may be more economically efficient (DOE 
2013, MWH 2009, NPCC 2010). 
 
The provision of accurate information about future 
resource availability and demand is critical for avoiding 
shortfalls. Forecasting snowmelt timing based on snowpack 
and temperature trends gives system operators critical 
information in predicting seasonal availability of 
hydropower generation, which can be used to prepare and 
execute contingency plans if shortfalls are projected. 
Forecasts of snowmelt timing are provided by the 
Northwest River Forecast Center, operated by the U.S. 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 
(EIA 2014c). Utilities, such as Seattle City Light, have 
projects underway to assess climate change impacts on 
hydropower generation and characterize present and 
future glacier contribution to summer streamflow, update 
streamflow projections with multiple climate scenarios and 
glacier runoff, and develop regional climate model 
projections of changes in windstorm and convective storm 
frequency and timing (Seattle City Light 2012, Raymond 
2014a, Raymond 2014b). 
 
Greater supply diversification may also be an effective 
strategy to increase system resilience to climate change. 
Since the western power crisis in 2000, the region has relied 
on natural gas and wind power to supply additional capacity 
needs. Those two sources accounted for 96% of new 
capacity added between 2000 and 2012 (EIA 2013d). If 
shortages in hydropower lead to increased dispatch from 
these new sources, electricity prices in the region (currently 
at a historic low) may also increase. In addition, the recent 
significant expansion of wind generation capacity will 
require grid system operators to explore options to 
appropriately balance supply from variable wind energy 
production with other energy sources, such as hydropower, 
to optimize supply and demand and enhance resilience. 
Frequent cycling of hydropower to compensate for wind’s 
intermittent supply is a sub-optimal generation practice and 
causes significant wear on hydroelectric turbine gates (BPA 
2011c). 
Storage systems could allow intermittent renewable 
generation sources such as wind power to store energy and 
then deliver it when needed. This ability could prove 
especially useful in the Northwest, as wind power 
generators have faced curtailments in the past due to the 
availability of lower-cost hydropower (McKenna 2011). A 
recent study of pumped hydropower storage in the 
Northwest found that wide-scale deployment could allow 
economic integration of intermittent generation. Over 
13,000 MW of pumped storage projects have received 
preliminary permits in the region (MWH 2009).  
Electricity Demand 
Subsector Vulnerabilities  
The changing demand profile for electric power is critically 
important to the region’s energy sector. Historically, the 
Northwest’s electricity prices have been the lowest in the 
nation, and a substantial amount of built infrastructure, 
such as building heating, has come to rely upon low-cost 
electricity (CIG 2009, EIA 2014a). Climate change is only one 
of several factors (including population growth and 
changing technologies, such as electric vehicles) that may 
drive changes in electricity demand (DOE 2012a). While 
Examples of recent hydropower shortages 
2015: Above average temperatures and below average 
precipitation in the winter led the Northwest River 
Forecast Center to project lower-than-average runoff in 
the Columbia River Basin for the summer of 2015. 
Runoff projections are below historical averages for 
almost every measurement site, including major dams 
such as The Dalles (projected to see only 67% of 
average runoff), John Day (69%), and Grand Coulee 
(74%) (Hernandez 2015, NWRFC 2015). 
2010: BPA experienced basin-wide precipitation and 
streamflows well below normal during the first half of 
2010. By year’s end, runoff at The Dalles Dam was 16% 
below normal (BPA 2011b).  
2001: The second-lowest flow of river runoff ever 
recorded led BPA to declare a power emergency and 
stop spills along the Columbia and Snake rivers. Power 
shortages led to industrial plant shutdowns and rate 
increases (Harrison 2008).  
2000: A summer water shortage in the Northwest helped 
spur a power crisis and soaring market prices on the 
West Coast. In response, BPA deployed a power trading 
strategy to keep reservoirs full by restricting 
hydropower production during the day while importing 
power from the Southwest and sending power to 
California utilities at night (Harrison 2008). 
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these factors are likely to increase the region’s demand for 
electricity, existing constraints on water usage and 
ecological considerations mean that relatively little 
potential hydropower capacity remains untapped to offset 
demand increases (CIG 2009, DOE 2012b).  
Climate change is projected to have the following impact on 
electricity demand in the Northwest: 
 Higher maximum temperatures, longer and more severe 
heat waves, and higher overnight lows are expected to 
increase electricity demand for cooling in the summer 
(BPA 2011a, DOE 2012a, DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
Climate change is projected to increase the annual number 
of CDDs in the region by up to 400 degree days, depending 
on the emissions scenario (NOAA 2013).  
Several studies indicate that the region’s peak load and 
total electricity demand may increase significantly as a 
result of rising temperatures. The Northwest Power and 
Conservation Council (NPCC) estimated that, by 2030, 
increases in peak load due to temperature alone would 
exceed 2,800 MW in July and approach 3,200 MW in August 
under a scenario of a 2°F increase in annual average 
temperature. The study also found declines in December 
and January of over 1,000 MW (NPCC 2010). Another 
study—the 2009 Washington Climate Change Impacts 
Assessment—found that, by 2080, Washington’s demand 
for cooling energy alone may be 11 to 20 times higher than 
demand in the 1980s, depending on the emissions scenario, 
population growth, and air conditioning market penetration 
rates (CIG 2009). The assessment also found that, while 
heating energy demand would likely fall significantly under 
a warming climate, population growth could more than 
offset this effect, leading to increased energy demand for 
both heating and cooling (CIG 2009).  
Excluding population growth, warmer winter temperatures 
are expected to decrease demand for heating energy due to 
less frequent extremely cold nights and a decrease in the 
number of heating degree days (HDDs) (DOE 2012a, DOE 
2013, USGCRP 2014). 
Increasing summer demand for power can also affect other 
regions that rely on power exports from the Northwest. 
California depends on power imports to supplement its 
generation during periods of peak demand, much of which 
comes from hydropower in the Northwest (DOE 2012a, EIA 
2014d). In addition, California—where summer electricity 
demand is greater than in the Northwest—could face CDD 
increases that are more than double those in the 
Northwest, as well as declines in water availability that 
could affect California’s in-state generation (EIA 2014d, 
NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014).  
Electricity Demand 
Resilience Solutions 
Measures to address increasing electricity demand include 
adding new electric generating capacity and implementing 
technologies, policies, or measures to reduce overall 
demand or reduce consumption at peak hours. New 
generating capacity can be designed to operate year-round 
(baseload) or only during periods of greatest demand 
(peaking). Likewise, overall demand can be reduced by 
improving the energy efficiency of buildings, appliances, 
and other significant loads, and peak demand can be 
reduced by incentivizing large industrial and commercial 
consumers or groups of residential consumers to turn off 
equipment or reduce their cooling energy consumption 
(e.g., by turning up their thermostats) during peak hours. 
Because the Northwest exports electricity outside the 
region, demand management measures being implemented 
in other states, particularly California, may help mitigate 
potential supply shortages during summer season peaks 
(FERC 2013). 
Decisions to invest in new capacity are typically made in the 
context of integrated resource planning, a process that may 
consider a number of factors affecting future demand, 
including population change, technology change, policy risk, 
and climate change, as well as existing and future 
resources. The NPCC considered a number of scenarios in 
its Sixth Power Plan (in 2010) and proposed a near-term 
strategy to 2030. The plan involves an additional 4.5 GW of 
new wind capacity (assumed to produce an average of 1.45 
GW), 1.0 GW of combined-cycle natural gas capacity, and 
expanded energy efficiency measures. The primary factor 
driving wind development in the strategy is the mandate for 
new renewables in state renewable portfolio standard (RPS) 
policies. In scenarios considered by the NPCC that did not 
consider RPS policies, new wind development is 
considerably lower (NPCC 2010). NPCC’s analysis finds that 
in scenarios that involve greater retirements of existing 
capacity, natural gas capacity would be deployed to fill the 
gap.  
Although hydropower provides the large majority of 
generating capacity in the region, capacity expansion at 
federally owned dams in the Columbia River basin is not a 
strategy currently under consideration (BPA 2012).  
Moreover, the most recent assessment of all federally 
owned dams in the region found only two dams with 
potential for economic expansion of capacity. Together, 
these projects could add 17 MW of capacity (DOI et al. 
2007).  
Renewable energy development is a means of expanding 
clean energy capacity and diversifying generating resources 
to enhance resilience, which are goals supported by the 
federal government. For example, DOE issued a $1.3 billion 
partial loan guarantee to finance one of the largest wind 
farms in the world. The Caithness Shepherds Flat wind 
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project is an 845 MW wind-powered electrical generating 
facility located in eastern Oregon. To leverage the region’s 
low-temperature geothermal resources, DOE issued a $97 
million partial loan guarantee to USG Oregon LLC for the 
construction of the Neal Hot Springs geothermal power 
plant (Figure 2-3). This technology more efficiently extracts 
heat from lower-temperature geothermal wells, allowing 
energy generation from previously untapped locations (DOE 
2011, DOE 2014). 
 
Figure 2-3. Neal Hot Springs 20 MW geothermal power plant in 
Malheur County, Oregon 
Source: DOE 2015 
Energy efficiency, load management, and other programs 
administered by regional power producers have already 
helped reduce total and peak electricity demand in the 
Northwest. For example, to delay the construction of new 
peaking facilities, Idaho Power has implemented a number 
of energy efficiency and load management programs. The 
program strategy includes incentives for residential 
customers who implement home upgrades and install 
energy efficient appliances and remote-controlled 
thermostats, and incentives for commercial customers 
participating in the FlexPeak load-shaving program that 
allows businesses to customize which load reductions they 
will make at what times. Together, Idaho Power’s demand 
reduction programs cut summer peak load by 101 MW, 
with a total demand reduction capacity of 438 MW in 2012 
(EIA 2013e, Idaho Power 2013).  
In the Northwest, a total of 37,000 residential customers, 
3,100 industrial customers, and 170 commercial customers 
are participating in price-responsive, incentive-based 
demand-side management programs, while more than 
46,000 residential customers, 600 industrial customers, and 
680 commercial customers are in time-based rate demand-
side management programs (EIA 2013e). By 2012, a total of 
almost 800 MW in peak load reductions had been achieved 
from existing demand management programs across 
residential, commercial, and industrial customers, with 
approximately 700 MW achieved through energy efficiency 
programs and 100 MW achieved through load management 
(EIA 2013e). 
The NPCC identified almost 7,000 MW of technically 
achievable conservation potential by 2029 (NPCC 2010). 
Although not all technically achievable efficiency measures 
were identified as cost-effective, almost 6,000 MW were 
estimated to be achievable at a levelized cost of less than 
$200/MWh (with more than half of that estimated to be 
achievable at a price of $30–$40/MWh), including 2,600 MW 
from residential buildings and appliances, 1,400 MW from 
commercial buildings (especially from lighting), 800 MW 
from consumer electronics, and 800 MW from industry. 
Additionally, while the plan assumed 1,500 MW and 1,700 
MW of available demand response by 2030 in the winter 
and summer respectively, the NPCC found that the region 
lacks sufficient experience with demand response to 
provide a detailed estimate of potential resources. Looking 
forward, the NPCC anticipates that the levelized cost of 
efficiency developed in its resource strategy is $36/MWh 
(NPCC 2010). 
Grid-scale energy storage systems can also contribute to 
meeting the region’s changing demand profile (see the 
Hydroelectric Power section for a discussion of the use of 
pumped hydropower storage). Other potentially feasible 
grid-scale energy storage technologies include compressed 
air, flow batteries, and sodium-sulfur batteries (NPCC 2010). 
Electric Grid 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Northwest is part of the Western Interconnection, the 
wide-area AC power transmission grid that stretches from 
Western Canada southward to Baja California and eastward 
to the Great Plains (EIA 2014a). The region is also the 
northern terminus of the Pacific Intertie, a high-voltage DC 
(HVDC) power line that connects Columbia River 
hydropower resources to demand in the Los Angeles-area  
(EIA 2014a). About three fourths of the region's 
transmission infrastructure is owned and operated by BPA 
(BPA 2013a). 
Climate change is expected to have the following impacts 
on energy transmission, storage, and distribution in the 
Northwest: 
 Increased risk of physical damage from wildfires—
including associated heat, soot, and fire retardants— 
causing damage to transmission infrastructure and 
disruption of power supply (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
 Increased transmission and distribution equipment 
losses, damage to transformers, and reduced capacity 
due to higher temperatures (Bérubé 2007, DOE 2013). 
Energy transmission, storage, and distribution 
infrastructure are vulnerable to physical damage from 
increasing wildfires. Fires can damage wooden transmission 
line poles, and the associated heat, smoke, and soot can 
affect transmission line capacity (Figure 2-4) (DOE 2013, 
 
Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Northwest 2-7 
 
SDG&E 2008). For example, following the Soda Fire in 2015, 
Idaho Power Company had to replace 129 poles and 2.5 
miles of power lines (Kahn 2015). Soot can also reduce the 
electrical resistance of the air, increasing the risk of 
transmission lines arcing to other lines or to nearby 
vegetation (DOE 2013). Other lasting effects from wildfires 
that can impact the energy system can include increased 
soil erosion and risk of landslides and changes in water 
quality (through increased amounts of sediment) (Dalton et 
al. 2013, FS 2014, USGS 2015). 
 
 
Figure 2-4. Transmission lines following wildfire in Washington 
Source: BPA 2014 
Since the 1970s, wildfires have increased in number and 
extent in the Northwest, with the trend expected to 
continue (USGCRP 2014). Under one scenario, the median 
area burned each year by wildfires in the Northwest would 
quadruple (to 2 million acres, with a range of 0.2 million 
acres to 9.8 million acres for the entire region) by the 






Higher temperatures can reduce the efficiency and capacity 
of power lines and other power grid components, such as 
transformers, and can increase the risk of disruption to 
transmission lines (DOE 2013). Increased temperatures can 
also cause conductors to expand, leading to sagging power 
lines that are more likely to strike trees and automatically 
close, shutting off the power line (DOE 2013). Tree strikes 
can cause power outages if sufficient redundancy is not 
available and can ignite brush fires, which may cause even 
more damage. Temperature-related risks are exacerbated 
by the relationship between temperatures and summer 
peak energy demand; the greatest demand for electricity 
typically occurs during periods of highest temperature and 
thus is when temperature effects on grid capacity are 
greatest. Increased temperatures also shorten the lifetime 
of transformers. At higher temperatures, transformers age 
at accelerated rates, typically up to 100 times faster than 
normal during emergency overloading conditions (Bérubé 
2007). On very hot days, grid operators must reduce 
                                                                
3
 Under the A1B scenario; 20
th
 century baseline includes the 
period covering 1916–2007 
transformer loading or risk causing additional damage 
(Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000).  
Electric Grid 
Resilience Solutions 
Strategies to improve the resilience of new and existing 
transmission infrastructure will rely upon improved 
technology, designs, and planning, as well as improved 
vegetation management practices to reduce the build-up of 
hazardous fuels near key power lines (DOE 2013). 
Increasing redundancy in the transmission grid can also 
improve system resilience to climate change impacts (DOE 
2013).  
Strengthening power lines and towers to resist physical 
damage—e.g., replacing wood towers with steel towers for 
the most vulnerable lines—can improve individual lines’ 
resilience to wildfires, limiting damage and expediting 
restoration (Figure 2-5) (SDG&E 2008). Approximately one 
third of BPA’s transmission line circuit miles are supported 
by wood poles, many with aging and outdated equipment 
(BPA 2013a). Other technological measures may include 
development of new compounds safe for use around active 
power lines that may improve firefighting crews’ ability to 
protect key lines without causing disruptions.  
Figure 2-5. Structural failure of wooden power poles  
Source: BPA 2013b 
Proactive vegetation management is also an important 
practice for increasing resilience against transmission and 
distribution line damage resulting from increased wildfires, 
as well as for reducing the risk of wildfires caused by 
transmission line tree strikes. Management practices 
include tree trimming, forest thinning, and prescribed 
burning to reduce fuel buildup, as well as reducing potential 
ignition points (SDG&E 2008, USGCRP 2014). In 2008, an 
overgrown tree struck one of BPA’s 230 kV feeder lines, 
resulting in $20 million in damages (BPA 2013a). In 
response, BPA has redeveloped its vegetation management 
practices, including establishing metrics for the program 
and reaching agreements with stakeholders, and has since 
achieved zero “grow-in” outages (outages caused by 
vegetation growing into the path of a line) (BPA 2013a).  
Expansion of regional transmission capacity can address 
capacity reductions resulting from higher temperatures and 
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increasing summer demand for cooling energy. To facilitate 
coordinated grid planning, the region’s utilities have formed 
two regional planning groups: ColumbiaGrid, oriented 
around BPA and Washington utilities, and Northern Tier 
Transmission Group, which extends from the Northwest 
into Montana, Wyoming, and Utah. Recently, ColumbiaGrid 
implemented a significant number of projects based on 
BPA’s innovative queuing process for analyzing, costing, and 
financing transmission expansions (NPCC 2010). Load 
management measures that reduce peak demand on hot 
days can also improve grid resilience (see Electricity 
Demand section). 
Operational practices can also help prevent physical 
damage to overheating power transformers. By monitoring 
temperatures and managing loading of transformers on 
hotter days, operators can prevent excessive damage and 
premature aging. Physical measures to prevent damage to 
transformers include upgraded insulators capable of 
handling higher operating temperatures and installation of 
cooling fans to reduce thermal loading on hot days (Bérubé 
et al. 2007, USBR 2000). 
Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Electricity from thermoelectric power plants represents 
approximately 18% of the generation mix in the region 
(Table 2-2). Washington has 21 natural gas-fired power 
plants, eight biomass-fired power plant, one nuclear power 
station, and one large coal-fired power plant. The coal-fired 
plant is scheduled to shut down in 2025, while the nuclear 
plant is licensed through 2043 (EIA 2014a, NRC 2012). In 
Oregon, a coal generating station in Boardman is the state’s 
only coal power plant, and it is scheduled to close in 2020 
(EIA 2014a). In Idaho, coal is used for two industrial co-
generation facilities but not for any commercial power 
production (EIA 2014a). There are 39 natural gas power 
plants across the region, many of which are simple-cycle gas 
turbines (EIA 2014a). 
The region also has several geothermal generating stations, 
including the 20 MW Neal Hot Springs plant, Oregon’s only 
commercial unit (Oregon Dept. of Geology and Mineral 
Industries 2013). Washington has fewer high-temperature 
resources, which are located in the volcanic Cascade Range. 
Idaho has 13 MW of commercial geothermal generation at 
the Raft River facility in the southeastern portion of the 
state (EIA 2014a). 
Climate change could have the following impacts on 
thermoelectric power generation in the Northwest: 
 Higher average temperatures and extreme 
temperatures that lower thermoelectric plant 
efficiency, reducing generating capacity (DOE 2013, 
Sathaye et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014). 
 Increased height of storm surge and tidal action due to 
sea level rise, resulting in a higher rate of coastal 
erosion and higher risk of flooding for coastal 
infrastructure (including the Puget Sound) (USGCRP 
2014). 
Higher average temperatures are expected to reduce the 
efficiency of thermoelectric power generation, reducing the 
total amount of power a plant can produce (DOE 2013). As 
thermoelectric power plants are increasingly relied upon to 
provide peaking power during periods of maximum demand 
on the hottest days, reduced peak capacity may increase 
the risk of generation shortfalls. One study of natural gas 
power plants found that most plants are designed to 
operate optimally at 15°C (59°F) and that a 1°C increase in 
ambient temperature above the design point could reduce 
capacity 0.7% for a combined-cycle gas plant and 1% for a 
simple-cycle plant (Sathaye et al. 2012).  
Coastal power plants in the Northwest are also vulnerable 
to the impacts of rising sea levels. However, along much of 
the region’s coastline, sea levels are expected to rise more 
slowly than in other regions, as much of the Pacific 
Northwest coastline is undergoing tectonic uplift, which 
reduces the rate of relative sea level rise compared to the 
global average (USGCRP 2014). The rate of local tectonic 
uplift varies significantly, and some areas (including the 
Puget Sound) are more vulnerable to sea level rise than 
others (Verdonck 2006). For example, over the last century, 
tide gauges in Seattle show sea level rise at a rate of 2.1 
mm per year (over the period 1900–2005), while in Astoria, 
Oregon (on the mouth of the Columbia River), sea levels 
have been falling at a rate of 0.3 mm per year (1925–2005) 
(Verdonck 2006).  
Although most of the region’s thermoelectric power plants 
are well above sea level, four plants in Washington’s Puget 
Sound are situated on properties in which at least part of 
the land is at or below four feet above sea level—the upper 
end of expected increases in global average sea levels by 
the end of the century (Climate Central 2014, USGCRP 
2014). In addition, three more plants, as well as one of the 
region’s oil refineries, are at or below seven feet above sea 
level (Climate Central 2014). Coastal flooding is typically the 
product of storm surge and wave action on top of average 
Examples of recent wildfire events 
2014: The Carlton Complex Fire, the largest fire in 
Washington State history, led to several weeks of 
power outages (Burns 2014, La Ganga and Muskal 
2014).  
2009: An Oregon wildfire damaged a transmission line 
and left 25,000 customers without power (Crombie 
2009). 
2006: Wildfires threatened the Pacific Intertie, which 
transmits power from the Pacific Northwest to Los 
Angeles, California (AP 2006). 
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Figure 2-6. Movement of gasoline in the Northwest, 2010 
Source: WDOC 2013 
sea levels, and increasing sea levels in the Puget Sound can 
make flooding during storms more likely (USGCRP 2014). 
The record highest tide in Seattle occurred on December 
17, 2012, when a storm combined with an especially high 
tide to produce tide levels of 14.5 feet (Broom 2012).  
Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Resilience Solutions 
Reduced available generation capacity due to higher 
average or extreme air temperatures can be addressed 
primarily by building new dispatchable capacity or by 
ensuring adequate transmission infrastructure exists to 
import additional power during peak hours. Capacity 
reductions can also be ameliorated by demand-side 
efficiency and load-shedding programs (discussed in the 
Electricity Demand section), and storage systems are 
another option to accommodate the Northwest’s changing 
demand profile (discussed in the Hydroelectric Power and 
Electricity Demand sections). 
Engineered barriers such as levees can effectively protect 
vulnerable thermoelectric power plants from flooding. 
Utilities may also elevate critical equipment to protect 
against flooding. Planners can protect new capacity by 
locating new generators at higher elevations that are not at 
risk of flooding due to sea level rise.  
Fuel Transport 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Washington serves as the principal refining center for 
regional markets and is ranked fifth in the nation for crude 
oil-refining capacity. The largest refinery is the Cherry Point 
Refinery operated by British 
Petroleum, followed by Shell’s 
Anacortes Refinery, Tesoro’s 
Anacortes Refinery, Phillips’ Ferndale 
Refinery, and U.S. Oil’s Tacoma 
Refinery. Refineries receive crude oil 
primarily from Alaska but are 
increasingly receiving imports from 
Canada (EIA 2014a, EIA 2014b). The 
regional network of petroleum 
refining and distribution systems is 
illustrated in Figure 2-6. 
Oregon and Idaho do not have any 
refineries; most petroleum is 
imported into these states by 
pipeline and barge. The three main 
pipelines in the region are the 
Olympic, Yellowstone, and Chevron 
Pipelines. The Olympic pipeline is 
operated by Enbridge and provides 
Oregon with refined petroleum from 
refineries in northwest Washington. 
The Yellowstone pipeline, operated 
by Phillips 66, runs from Montana 
into Washington through northern Idaho. The Chevron 
pipeline transfers petroleum products from Utah to 
southern Idaho, northeast Oregon, and southeast 
Washington (EIA 2014a, EIA 2014b, WDOC 2013). 
Idaho, Oregon, and Washington rely primarily on natural 
gas supplied from Canada and receive natural gas by three 
pipelines (the Mist gas field in Oregon is the only producing 
natural gas field in the region, but production has declined 
during the past 30 years) (EIA 2014a). The Northwest 
pipeline runs from Canada southward into western 
Washington and Oregon and turns eastward from Oregon 
into southern Idaho. The Gas Transmission–Northwest 
pipeline runs southward from Canada through northern 
Idaho and into eastern Washington and Oregon. The Ruby 
pipeline runs along the southern border of Oregon (EIA 
2014a). Two proposed LNG export terminals in Oregon are 
seeking federal permits (EIA 2014a). 
In recent years, a number of shipping terminals for coal 
export have been proposed in the region. Current proposals 
include two ports in Washington (Cherry Point and 
Longview) and one in Oregon (Boardman) (ODOEQ 2014, 
WDOE 2013). All of the proposed terminals would export 
coal transported from the Powder River Basin in Wyoming 
via new or existing rail lines and barge routes. There are no 
active coal mines in the Northwest (EIA 2014a), nor are 
there any estimated coal resources (USGS 2014b). Coal is 
shipped into the region from Montana, Utah, and Wyoming 
(EIA 2014a).  
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Climate change may have the following impacts on 
petroleum refining and fuel transportation in the 
Northwest: 
 Increased height of storm surge and tidal action due to 
sea level rise, resulting in more damage, a higher rate of 
coastal erosion, and higher risk of flooding for coastal 
infrastructure, including refineries, terminals, pipelines, 
and railroads (CIG 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
 Increasing precipitation increases the risk of inland 
flooding for riparian infrastructure in rain-fed and 
mixed-source basins, including railroads and pipelines at 
river crossings or that follow river courses (CCSP 2008, 
CIG 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
Coastal infrastructure, including petroleum ports and 
refineries, coal terminals, and pipelines may be threatened 
by the effects of rising sea levels, including heightened 
wave action and storm surge during storms. Along much of 
the region’s coastline, sea levels are expected to rise more 
slowly than in other regions, as the underlying land is rising 
(USGCRP 2014). However, as noted above in the 
Thermoelectric Power Generation section, local rates of 
relative sea level rise vary significantly, and the Puget Sound 
is expected to experience greater sea level rise than other 
coastal areas in the region (Verdonck 2006). For example, 
low-lying rail yards in the Port of Seattle are vulnerable to 
permanent inundation if sea levels rise more than three 
feet (CIG 2013). 
Most of the region’s refinery facilities are well above 
sea level, with the single exception of U.S. Oil’s 
Tacoma Refinery, which is located in the Port of Tacoma 
(Figure 2-7). Coastal equipment, petroleum ports, and 
pipelines located at sea level may be exposed to heightened 
sea levels and coastal flooding as well as greater rates of 
erosion (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).  
 
Figure 2-7. Aerial image of U.S. Oil's Tacoma Refinery 
Source: WDOE 2015 
Inland flooding of river valleys and flood plains can affect 
pipelines, railroads, and other infrastructure at river 
crossings, or that follows river courses (DOE 2013). Flooding 
can wash-out rail track beds and cause disruptions, and 
increased streamflow can erode riverbanks, undercutting 
railroads and scouring bridge piers (CCSP 2008, DOE 2013). 
Buried pipelines are less vulnerable to flooding impacts, but 
may be subject to damage from flood-borne debris if high 
streamflow erodes the soil and exposes pipelines buried in 
riverbanks or under a riverbed (CCSP 2008, GAO 2014). 
Projected increases in precipitation are more likely to 
increase the risk of flooding in river basins that are primarily 
rain-fed and mixed rather than those that are primarily 
snow-fed (USGCRP 2014). However, as winter precipitation 
shifts from snow to rain, more watersheds in the region are 
expected to become primarily rain-fed (CIG 2013).  
Fuel Transport 
Resilience Solutions 
As the threats of coastal flooding, heightened storm surge, 
and increasing erosion mount, coastal hardening measures, 
including the construction of sea walls or natural barriers 
such as wetlands to reduce the impacts of storm surge, may 
be necessary for existing infrastructure, (CCSP 2008, DOE 
2013). Planning future infrastructure—including LNG or coal 
export terminals—for higher sea levels is also critical to 
build resilience (DOE 2013). For example, the Army Corps of 
Engineers directs analysts to consider what effect changing 
relative sea level rates could have on designs, and agency 
reports are required to contain scenarios that include 
accelerating future sea level rise (USACE 2011). 
Railroads can be protected from wash-out from flooding 
with engineering solutions and track upgrades such as 
elevating rails and bridges; however these can be costly 
(CCSP 2008, DOT 2009). Additional resilience solutions 
include upgrading drainage systems and ensuring culverts 
can handle increased runoff from heavy precipitation 
events (DOT 2009). Policy measures that restrict new rail 
line development in floodplains or revised standards for 
drainage capacity or elevating tracks can also improve 
resilience.  The risk of erosion can be reduced through the 
use of manmade or natural barriers along vulnerable 
riverbanks. At crossings, bridge piers can be protected with 
riprap, and vulnerable buried pipelines can be protected by 
using horizontal drilling techniques to bury the pipe 
significantly deeper than traditional trenching methods 
(Brown 2013, DOT 2009, Miller and Bryski 2012). Pipelines 
at risk from erosion can also be replaced with materials that 
are less likely to leak or rupture from impacts (e.g., coated 
steel rather than cast iron or bare steel).   
 




Oregon has more than 3,000 MW in operational wind 
farms, and Washington has an installed capacity of more 
than 2,500 MW. Idaho has substantial wind energy 
potential, and wind-generated electricity in the state was 
almost six times greater in 2013 than in 2010 (EIA 2014a).  
There is not yet substantial agreement among sources as to 
how a changing climate will ultimately affect wind 
resources in the United States in general, and in the 
Northwest in particular (DOE 2013). One study of the 
Northwest region found significant seasonal declines in 
wind speed in parts of the Northwest, but this result has 
not been confirmed by additional studies (DOE 2013). It is 
uncertain how wind power production may be disrupted by 
climate change-driven changes to wind patterns, or if wind 
power will see an increase in available capacity.   
Despite the uncertainty of potential climate impacts on 
wind speeds, additional wind capacity has created the need 
for new transmission lines, often in remote locations 
(Durbin 2010). Compared to other sources of power, wind 
generators may be especially vulnerable to wildfires 
threatening power transmission infrastructure. 
Wind Energy 
Resilience Solutions 
When siting wind farms in the Northwest, the threat of 
wildfire on power lines connecting the wind farms to the 
grid should be considered in the risk management of the 
projects and in long-term asset planning.   
Ensuring adequate transmission capacity to optimize the 
use of available energy sources, including renewable 
energy, is also important for resilience. For example, states 
such as Montana may have relatively large wind energy 
resources that exceed energy demand in the state, and 
could serve a role as a major exporter of wind energy, 
helping other western states to meet their energy demand 
(NREL 2014). However, transmission infrastructure is 
needed to tap this resource and transfer the electricity out 
of Montana, while states like California and Nevada have 
the demand, but may not have the wind capacity. 
As noted in the Hydroelectric Power and Electricity Demand 
sections, energy storage systems could allow wind power, 
an intermittent renewable generation source, to store 
energy and then deliver it when needed.   
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Regional Climate Change Observations 
and Projections in Detail 
Higher Temperatures 
Historical observations 
 Average temperatures have increased 1.3°F from 1895 
to 2011 (USGCRP 2014). 
Future projections 
 Average temperatures are projected to increase at a 
faster rate: Increases of 3.3°F–9.7°F
4
 are projected by 
2070–2099, compared to 1970–1999 levels (USGCRP 
2014). 
 Extremely hot days are projected to become slightly 
more common: Under a higher emissions scenario (A2), 
across most of the region, 0–6 more days with a daily 
maximum >95°F are projected by mid-century (2041–
2070) compared to 1980–2000; southern Idaho may see 
up to 15 more hot days per year (NOAA 2013). 
 Extremely cold nights are projected to become much 
less common: Under a higher emissions scenario (A2), 
across most of the region, 10–30 fewer days with daily 
minimums <10°F are projected by mid-century (2041–
2070), with inland regions seeing the largest decrease; 
the coasts may see 0–5 fewer cold nights per year 
(NOAA 2013). 
 CDDs are expected to increase, but less so than in other 
regions: Under a higher emissions scenario (A2), an 
increase of 0–400 CDDs is projected across the region by 
mid-century (2041–2070) compared to 1980–2000, 
although this increase is large when compared to 
relatively low historical averages (NOAA 2013). 
 Heating degree days (HDDs) are projected to fall more 
severely: Under a higher emissions scenario (A2), 
declines of 700–1,100 HDDs along the coasts, and up to 
1,600 HDDs in the mountains, are projected by mid-
century (2041–2070) compared to 1980–2000 (NOAA 
2013). 
Drier Summer Seasons and Changing Water Patterns 
Historical observations 
 Average annual precipitation has increased, but the 
trend is small from 1895 to 2011 (USGCRP 2014). 
 Spring snowpack has decreased: Area-averaged 
snowpack in the Cascades, as measured on April 1, has 
fallen 20% since 1950 (USGCRP 2014). 
 Spring snowmelt has been occurring earlier: Since 1950, 
spring snowmelt has occurred 0–30 days earlier 
depending on location, late winter/early spring 
streamflows have been a 0%–20%+ greater share of 
annual flow, and summer flows have decreased 0%–15% 
(USGCRP 2014). 
                                                                
4
 Range largely dependent on total global heat-trapping gas 
emissions 
Future projections 
 Future changes to total annual precipitation are 
uncertain: Changes of -11% to +12% are projected by 
2030–2059 and -10% to +18% by 2070–2099, compared 
to 1970–1999 (USGCRP 2014).  
 Seasonal changes are expected to be much larger:  
Decreases in summer precipitation as great as 30% 
below 1970–1999 levels are projected by the end of the 
century under a higher (A2) emissions scenario, while 
average projected decreases are 10% (USGCRP 2014). 
 Snowmelt is projected to occur much earlier, 
decreasing summer flow: By 2050, snowmelt may occur 
three to four weeks earlier than the 20
th
 century 
average, even under a lower-emissions scenario 
(USGCRP 2014). 
Extreme Precipitation, Wildfires, and Sea Level Rise 
Historical observations 
 Dry spells are projected to increase: The maximum 
number of consecutive dry days with <3 mm of 
precipitation are projected increase up to 9% by mid-
century (2041–2070) compared to 1980–2000, with 
increases of 9%–15% along the coast (NOAA 2013).  
Future projections 
 Increasing fire activity is projected to continue in the 
future: By the 2080s, the median annual area burned in 
the region is projected to be four times greater than the 
20
th
 century median (1916–2007), increasing to 2 million 
acres under the A1B scenario (USGCRP 2014). 
 
Figure 2-8. Increases in area burned that would result from 
regional temperature and precipitation changes associated with 
1°C warming, relative to 1950–2003 
Source: USGCRP 2014 
 Increases in extreme precipitation are projected in 
some areas: The number of days with precipitation >1 
inch is projected to increase by an average of 13% by 




 Relative sea level rise is not as severe in the region as 
elsewhere in the United States: Tectonic uplift across 
most of the Northwestern coastline is countering the 
                                                                
5
 For the high emissions (A2) scenario  
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effects of sea level rise, meaning local sea levels are 
rising more slowly than elsewhere in the country, 
although uplift is varied. However, a major earthquake 
(as is expected in the region in the next several hundred 
years) may lead to rapid sea level rise of 40 inches or 
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The large and geographically diverse Southwest region includes 
mild coastal climates, an arid interior, and mountain ranges that 
store critical water supplies as snow. The region is home to a 
large and growing population. Key energy infrastructure includes 
oil and gas refineries and large amounts of power plant capacity. 
Major climate change impacts projected to increasingly threaten 
the region’s energy infrastructure include the following: 
 Average temperatures and cooling degree days (CDDs) are 
projected to increase across the region, with hotter, more 
frequent, and longer-lasting heat waves.
a
 Increases in 
CDDs, extreme temperatures, and heat waves result in 
expanded air conditioner use. These projections are also 
expected to increase both average and peak demand for 
cooling while reducing the efficiency and available capacity 
of power plants and transmission lines.
b
  
 Average and summer seasonal precipitation is projected to 
decrease, droughts are projected to intensify, and 
streamflow in major river basins is projected to decline.
c
 
Power plants that rely on surface water for cooling may face 
shortages and ecological or safety-related curtailments that 




 Spring thaws are projected to occur earlier, and a greater 
fraction of precipitation is projected to fall as rain rather 
than as snow, reducing mountain snowpack.
e
 Alongside 
reduced overall precipitation, less snowpack could reduce 
total potential hydropower production at high-elevation 
dams. Changing streamflow timing, decreased precipitation, 
and increased evaporation may impair hydropower 
production during peak summer electricity demand.
f
  
 The risk of wildfire and the annual average area burned is 
expected to increase across the region.
g
 Wildfires threaten 
physical damage to power lines, including fouling of lines 
and increased risk of arcing.
h
  
Table 3-1. Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Southwest 
Subsector Vulnerability Magnitude Illustrative Resilience Solutions 
Electricity Demand Increased demand for cooling energy 




Increases of up to 1,000 CDDs by 
mid-century, with peak demand 




Capacity expansion, increased 




Reduced power plant capacity due to 
higher temperatures and reduced 
water availability, and coastal plants 
vulnerable to sea level rise
k
  
Capacity reductions of up to 4.5%, up 
to 12 coal-fired power plants 
vulnerable to water shortages, and 




Capacity expansion and 
diversification, water-efficient 
technologies, coastal hardening 
Hydropower 
Generation 
Reduced capacity in some seasons 
from earlier peak streamflow, and 
declining snowpack and precipitation
m
  
Snowpack reductions of up to 43% in 
California by the end of the century
n
 
Integrated water planning to 
optimize water use, upgraded 
equipment to increase efficiency  
Electric Grid Reduced capacity from higher 
temperatures, and threat of 
disruptions from increased wildfires
o
 
Transmission line capacity losses of 
1.5%–2.5%, substation losses of 1%–
3% from rising temperatures
p
 
Transmission capacity expansion 
and redundancy, improved 
vegetation management 
QUICK FACTS       
Southwest States:   




58,000,000  (18% of U.S.) 
Area (square miles) 686,000 (19% of U.S.) 
Energy expenditures  $208 billion 









Electric power                     TWh 474 476 n/a 
Petroleum                     MMbbls 362 948 <1% 
Coal                           million tons 76 75 96% 













Natural gas 202 44% 84 398 
Coal 136 30% 24 42 
Nuclear 50 11% 9 3 
Hydroelectric 38 8% 19 347 
Wind  19 4% 9 147 
Geothermal 15 3% 3 57 
Biomass 7 1% 2 119 




Electric Power   
  Wells (>1 boe/d): 64,400   Power plants (> 1 MW):  1,346 
  Refineries:  29   Interstate transmission lines:  32 
  Liquids pipelines: 21 Coal 
 
  
  Ports (>200 tons/yr): 6   Mines:  26 
Natural Gas 
 
Waterways   
  Wells:  68,500   Coal and petroleum routes:   5 
  Interstate pipelines: 30 Railroads 
 
  
  Market hubs:  5   Miles of freight track:   14,000 
Note: Table presents 2012 data except number of oil wells, which is 2009 data.  
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW. 
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2011a, EIA 2013a, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013d, EIA 2014a, EIA 
2014b, EIA 2014c, EIA 2014e,  EIA 2014h,  EIA 2014i,  EIA 2014k, US Census Bureau 
2014, USACE 2014 
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities 
and Resilience Solutions  
The following sections discuss key energy subsectors and 
illustrative examples of resilience solutions in the 
Southwest. System components that are most vulnerable to 
climate change are described first.  
Electricity Demand 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Electric power demand in the Southwest is dominated by 
end-use in California, accounting for more than half of the 
region’s electricity consumption (EIA 2013c).
1
 Interregional 
electricity flows are oriented towards serving California’s 
load. In the Western Interconnection (shown Figure 3-1), 
hydropower resources in the Northwest and mixed 
generation in the interior Southwest supply almost 25% of 
California’s electricity (EIA 2011b). Power imports from the 
Northwest peak during spring and early summer (DOE 2012, 
EIA 2011b, EIA 2014d). Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah are 
net power exporters, producing 48%, 58%, and 33% more 
power than they consume, respectively (EIA 2013c).  
 
Figure 3-1. Annualized net electricity flows within the Western 
Interconnection in 2010 (Million MWh) 
Source: EIA 2011b 
 
                                                                
1
 On a per capita basis, California's electricity consumption is 
about 40% lower than other states in the region (EIA 2013c). This 
is partly due to the relatively low number of CDDs experienced in 
California’s coastal cities, as well as the lower rate of air 
conditioning use in California households. In California, 56% of 
households are air conditioned, while the average rate is 71% for 
other states in the region and 91% in Arizona, the region's second 
most populous state (EIA 2013c, EIA 2013g). 
Climate change is expected to affect the region’s electricity 
demand in the following ways:  
 Higher average temperatures will increase the number 
of CDDs, increasing demand for cooling energy (NOAA 
2013, USGCRP 2014). 
 Hotter summer temperatures and an increase in the 
length, intensity, and frequency of heat waves are 
expected to increase peak electricity demand, 
potentially exceeding current generation and 
transmission capacities in some areas (NOAA 2013, 
Sathaye et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014). 
Changes to temperature and to the total annual number of 
CDDs are expected to be largest where temperatures are 
already highest. For example, southeastern California and 
southwestern Arizona could see an increase of up to 1,000 
CDDs per year (Figure 3-2). Important changes in electricity 
demand may also occur where populations are 
concentrated and the percentage of homes currently with 
air conditioners is low, such as coastal California. In these 
areas, large scale adoption of air conditioners may result in 
significant increases in electricity demand (EIA 2013g, NOAA 
2013). 
 
Figure 3-2. Increase in annual CDDs by mid-century under an A2 
emissions scenario 
Source: NOAA 2013 
Under a higher emissions scenario, higher temperatures 
alone could increase average per capita peak energy 
demand in California by 12%–24% by the end of the century 
(compared to 2003–2009), according to an analysis 
conducted by the California Energy Commission (CEC) 
(Sathaye et al. 2012). This study supports the findings of an 
earlier CEC study that estimated end-of-century increases in 
peak demand due to temperature increases alone could be 
4%–19% (compared to 1961–1990), depending on 
emissions scenario (Miller et al. 2007). When population 
and economic growth are considered, increases in peak 
electricity demand could be even larger, as regional 
population is projected to increase 68% by 2050 (DOE 
2015a). Almost half of California households do not 
currently have air conditioning; cooling energy demand may 
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grow at a faster rate than increases in CDDs if efficiency 
improvements do not offset additional air conditioning 
penetration (Auffhammer 2011, EIA 2013c). In states with 
already-high air conditioning use, such as Arizona and 
Nevada, increases in demand for cooling energy may 
increase faster than the rise in average temperatures 
(Aroonruengsawat and Auffhammer 2009).  
The effects of extreme temperatures on electricity demand 
will be exacerbated by the influence of urban heat islands 
since air conditioning use is focused in urbanized areas. The 
three most extreme urban heat islands in the previous 
decade, as measured by the temperature difference 
between urban centers and surrounding areas, are located 
in the region: Albuquerque, Denver, and Las Vegas (Figure 
3-3) (Climate Central 2014b).  
 
Figure 3-3. Satellite images showing population growth in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, from 1982 (left) to 2013 (right), which 
contributes to increasing electricity and water demand 
Source: USGS 2015 
The seasonal timing of peak energy demand and the 
potential for reduced availability of power imports from the 
Northwest may compound the effects of increased energy 
demand from temperature alone. California relies heavily 
on power imports from the Northwest during the summer 
(EIA 2011b). The Northwest, which generates more than 
70% of its power from hydroelectric plants, is projected to 
experience shifts in the timing of snowmelt and peak 
streamflows away from the summer and towards the early 
spring, potentially making less power available to export to 
the Southwest region in the summer (USGCRP 2014). 
In the winter, the region is expected to experience a 
decrease in the number of heating degree days, reducing 
the demand for heating energy (USGCRP 2014). Heating 
energy is provided by electricity and other fuels, such as 
natural gas. Southwest states with cold winters, including 
Colorado, use primarily natural gas as a space heating fuel; 
while states with mild winters, including Arizona, use mainly 
electricity for space heating (EIA 2013g). On average, 
electric utilities in the region have a summer demand peak 
about 25% higher than their winter peak, and warmer 
temperatures in the Southwest are likely to increase the 
summer electricity peak more than they will decrease the 
winter electricity peak (ANL 2008, EIA 2013h). 
Electricity Demand 
Resilience Solutions 
Strategies to address increasing electricity demand include 
capacity expansion, energy efficiency, and implementation 
of measures that reduce demand at peak hours. New 
generating capacity can be designed to operate year-round 
(baseload) or only during periods of greatest demand 
(peaking). Demand can be reduced through improved end-
use energy efficiency and demand management strategies.  
Because of economic and population growth trends, new 
technologies such as electric vehicles, as well as climate 
change-driven reductions in existing generation capacity, 
new capacity may be a necessary part of a comprehensive 
response strategy to increases in peak demand.  Evolving 
emissions regulations and existing water constraints 
suggest that new baseload thermoelectric plants in the 
region may employ water-efficient combined-cycle natural 
gas turbines similar to the Public Service Company of New 
Mexico’s (PNM’s) Afton plant, which uses hybrid cooling 
technology (PNM 2011). A study of demand growth and 
capacity changes found that gas-fired peaking generators 
may be required to meet peak electricity demand (Sathaye 
et al. 2012). New solar power can also contribute to 
meeting growing peak demand.  
Efficiency standards reduce total energy demand, and most 
states in the region have integrated energy efficiency into 
statewide electric sector planning and regulations (ACEEE 
2014a). In the past decade, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
and New Mexico state legislatures have all passed new 
energy efficiency resource standards (EERS) with 
quantitative targets for investor-owned utilities requiring 
that they achieve consumption reduction goals. In addition, 
both California and New Mexico have policies in place that 
decouple utility profits from the amount of electricity sold 
to customers (ACEEE 2014a). In 2008, California adopted a 
strategic plan for energy efficiency that ensures that energy 
efficiency is the highest priority resource for meeting 
current and future energy demand (CPUC 2008). CEC also 
approved new building codes that exceed International 
Energy Conservation Code (IECC) standards by 25% for 
residential buildings and 30% for nonresidential 
construction (CEC 2014a). Many regional utilities offer 
rebates for energy efficiency measures. For example, 
Colorado Springs Utilities offers rebates to residential 
customers of up to $250 each for upgraded windows, 
appliances, and other improvements (CSU 2014). In 
response to energy savings goals set by the Public Utilities 
Commission of the State of Colorado in 2008, the state's 
largest investor-owned utility, Xcel Energy, has spent almost 
$320 million on energy efficiency incentives through 2013 
(SWEEP 2014). Similarly, Pacific Gas and Electric Company 
(PG&E) has an energy efficiency program that covers a 
diverse array of programs and services, some of which 
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helped customers save more than $155 million in 2013 
(PG&E 2014a). 
 
Demand response is another method for reducing peak 
demand. California’s demand response resource represents 
slightly more than 5% of California’s 2012 peak load (FERC 
2013). In addition, the California Public Utilities 
Commission, CEC, and the state’s independent system 
operator (CAISO) have been working to allow residential 
ratepayers to participate in demand response, potentially 
expanding the resource (FERC 2013). Arizona Public Service 
(APS) offers a cooling energy load management program 
with financial incentives that allows APS to control 
customer thermostats to reduce air conditioning load 
during summer peak demand periods (DOE 2014b). 
Similarly, Las Vegas utility NV Energy offers commercial 
customers rate incentives for use of remotely controllable 
thermostats that reduce cooling during peak demand 
periods. Tucson Electric Power offers its commercial, 
institutional, and industrial customers a year-round 
program that compensates participants for reducing 
electricity usage during peak demand events (DOE 2014b).  
Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Power in the Southwest is generated from diverse sources; 
natural gas, coal, nuclear, biomass, and geothermal power 
plants produced 87% of the region’s net electric generation 
in 2012 (EIA 2013c). The efficiency of thermoelectric power 
plants is sensitive to ambient air and water temperatures, 
and the plants need large amounts of water to generate 
steam and to cool process components. The Southwest is 
predominantly arid, and much of the region has 
traditionally experienced water constraints. For this reason, 
few thermoelectric plants in the region use freshwater-
intensive once-through cooling systems and instead employ 
recirculating cooling and, increasingly, advanced 
technologies such as wet–dry hybrid and dry cooling (UCS 
2012). Climate change is projected to further reduce water 
availability in some seasons and parts of the region, and 
increasing temperatures may exacerbate the impacts of 
water scarcity by reducing the efficiency of power 
production and increasing the volume of water required for 
cooling. Additionally, many thermoelectric plants along the 
coast that use seawater for cooling are vulnerable to the 
threats posed by accelerating sea level rise. 
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on thermoelectric power generation in the Southwest:  
 Increasing average temperatures and more frequent 
and severe extreme temperatures are expected to 
reduce the efficiency and available generating capacity 
of thermoelectric  power plants (DOE 2013, Sathaye 
et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014). 
 Reduced availability of surface water resources and 
changing seasonal flow patterns of some sources of 
cooling water may increase the risk of thermoelectric 
power plant de-ratings (Cayan et al. 2013, DOE 2013, 
USGCRP 2014). 
 Accelerating sea level rise increases the vulnerability of 
coastal energy infrastructure to inundation (Climate 
Central 2014a, NRC 2012, USGCRP 2014). 
As temperatures increase, efficiency of thermoelectric 
power plants will decrease and, in turn, reduce available 
capacity. Plant equipment is typically designed for optimal 
operation at a set ambient temperature; deviation from 
those conditions can affect both efficiency and available 
capacity. The standard design conditions for air-breathing 
combustion turbines are 59° F (15°C) at pressure at sea 
level , and a 1°C increase in ambient temperature above the 
design point could reduce capacity by 0.7% for a combined-
cycle gas plant and 1% for a simple cycle plant (Sathaye et 
al. 2012). Based on these rates, climate change-driven 
temperature increases could lead to reductions of 1.7%–
4.5% of peak capacity across California's natural gas power 
plants by the end of the century (2070–2099), depending 
on emissions scenario (Sathaye et al. 2012). 
Electric impedance in assets also increases with higher 
temperature, which leads to higher electric losses, and 
hotter processes require more cooling water to operate, 
meaning more power is required to pump greater volumes 
of water (DOE 2013). Higher air temperature also leads to 
warmer water temperature, which exacerbates the need 
for pumping. In some cases, hotter sources of cooling water 
can lead to mandatory plant shutdowns for environmental 
reasons (DOE 2013).  
Only about half of the installed generating capacity in 
the region uses water-intensive once-through cooling, and 
of the plants that do, very few use freshwater sources 
(Figure 3-4) (UCS 2012). Most thermoelectric plants use 
recirculating cooling or use ocean water for cooling, and 
many of those that use freshwater for once-through cooling 
are set to retire or are inactive. Groundwater is a significant 
water source, although 74% of groundwater withdrawals 
for thermoelectric cooling are saline and do not currently 
compete with fresh groundwater users (UCS 2012, USGS 
2005).  
Salt Lake City actions for greater climate resilience 
Salt Lake City, Utah, which has been recognized as a 
Climate Action Champion by the White House, is 
working to improve resilience in part by reducing its 
energy consumption (White House 2015). As outlined 
in Sustainable Salt Lake–Plan 2015, goals for 2015 
include reducing city-wide building energy use by 5%, 
increasing the number of LEED and EnergyStar 
buildings, and converting all city facilities to “net-zero” 
energy use (SLC 2014).  
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Figure 3-4. Types of cooling systems for U.S. plants (note limited 
once-through cooling systems that use freshwater sources in the 
Southwest) 
Source: EIA 2012  
Coal power plants in the interior may be particularly 
vulnerable to declining water supplies. One 2010 study 
found that, without taking future climate change into 
account, the water sources for 12 coal-fired power plants in 
the Southwest’s Great Basin and Colorado River watersheds 
are already vulnerable to decreasing supply or increasing 
demand (Figure 3-5). Several of these plants have since 
reduced generation or closed (NETL 2010, PNM 2011).  
 
Figure 3-5. Coal power plants identified as vulnerable to water 
supply and demand concerns 
Sources: EIA 2014c, NETL 2010 
Coal-fired power plants are facing increasing economic 
pressure and may be retired before their lifetimes expire 
because of higher coal prices, lower wholesale electricity 
prices, increasing deployment of natural gas and renewable 
capacity, and environmental regulations that require 
investment in emissions reduction (EIA 2014l) (see side bar: 
The changing face of Southwest coal). For example, 
following passage of Colorado’s Clean Air, Clean Jobs Act, 
which requires that utilities reduce emissions by 30% by 
2020, Xcel Energy announced that 702 MW of coal-fired 
generation would be retired and replaced with new natural 
gas-fired generation (Xcel Energy 2015). Retirements of 
coal-fired generation may reduce the burden on the water 
supply. One study that considered aggregate thermoelectric 
water demand in the region found that in the reference 
case, freshwater withdrawals are estimated to fall 30% by 
2050 (Macknick et al. 2012).
2
 These declines are primarily 
due to the retirement of older thermoelectric units and 
introduction of natural gas-fired combined-cycle plants, 
which require significantly less cooling water than existing 
coal and nuclear plants (DOE 2013, Macknick et al. 2012).  
Consumption of freshwater for thermoelectric power 
generation is projected to decrease in the Lower Colorado 
Basin, though total region-wide water consumption for 
power generation is not projected to change significantly 
(Macknick et al. 2012).  
 
 
Sea level rise poses a threat to low-lying coastal power 
plants in California. Rising sea levels accelerate erosion and 
can increase the risk of inundation during high tides and 
storm surges. Approximately 25 coastal power plants have 
been classified as at risk of inundation from a 100-year 
flood with a 1.4-meter sea level rise, although site-specific 
analyses are required in order to establish actual risk 
(Sathaye et al. 2012). 
                                                                
2
 Estimate does not account for increased demand due to climate 
change but does include economic and population growth as well 
as the retirement and replacement of older plants.  
The changing face of Southwest coal 
During the last decade, a number of large coal power 
plants in the region shut down, reduced their output, 
or secured new sources of water to cope with 
developing regulations and changes to water supplies 
(PNM 2011). 
2013: PNM announced the decommissioning of two of 
four coal-fired units at the San Juan Generating Station, 
replacing the capacity with new natural gas plants and 
uprated nuclear capacity (EIA 2013d). Also, in response 
to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) 
Regional Haze Program, three of the five coal-fired 
units at the APS Four Corners Power Plant closed 
(Randazzo 2013).  
2005: The 1,580 MW Mohave Generating Station 
closed after Southern California Edison was unable to 
secure necessary water and coal contracts to fulfill its 
obligations under a consent decree with the EPA 
(Edwards 2009).  
2002: In response to drought conditions, PNM sought 
additional water sources for its San Juan Generating 
Station and entered into shortage sharing agreements 
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Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Resilience Solutions 
Strategies to increase power plant resilience include the 
addition of new capacity (including low-water renewables 
such as wind or solar photovoltaics [PV]), deployment of 
water-efficient technologies and non-traditional water 
sources for cooling, and coastal hardening for plants 
vulnerable to sea level rise.  
Reduced available generation capacity is primarily 
addressed by building new capacity or by importing 
additional power. Capacity reductions can also be 
ameliorated by demand-side efficiency and demand 
response programs (discussed in the Electricity Demand 
section).  
Declining water availability can be addressed through 
deployment of technologies that increase water efficiency, 
use non-traditional water sources, or provide alternative 
generation sources that inherently require less or no water. 
Many thermoelectric power plants in the region already use  
recirculating cooling technology, and almost all plants in the 
region that use once-through cooling are supplied by ocean 
water (Table 3-2) (UCS 2012). In 2010, California opted to 
phase out once-through systems in coastal power plants, 
which will reduce withdrawals and the impact of discharge 
on California estuaries (CEC 2014c). Under a previous CEC 
policy, new power plants in California are essentially 
prohibited from using freshwater for cooling (CEC 2003). 
Table 3-2. Southwest thermoelectric capacity by type of cooling 
technology, 2005 
   
Once-through cooling  51.4% 
Ocean water  50.3% 
Surface  0.9% 
Municipal  0.2% 
Recirculating/cooling pond  42.9% 
Groundwater  14.5% 
Surface  13.7% 
Wastewater  8.3% 
Municipal  6.2% 
Unknown  0.2% 
Dry cooling  4.4% 
Unknown/other  1.3% 
Source: UCS 2012 
Some new plants in the region are being built to use 
extremely water-efficient hybrid wet–dry cooling 
technology, which allows the plant to use cooling water 
when it is available but, in case of a shortage, to operate on 
dry cooling or with advanced dry cooling technologies that 
use minimal water. PNM’s Afton Generating Station is a 
natural gas combined-cycle (NGCC) plant that uses hybrid 
cooling to reduce water intensity by 60% compared to 
PNM’s other NGCC plant (PNM 2011). Three of PG&E’s 
natural gas-fired power plants rely on dry cooling systems 
that minimize water use and discharge. The Humboldt Bay 
Generating Station uses minimal amounts of water by 
implementing a closed-loop liquid coolant cooling system 
with air radiators (PG&E 2014a). Compared to a plant with a 
traditional once-through cooling system, PG&E’s Gateway 
Generating Station’s air-cooled condenser requires about 
97% less water and discharges about 98% less wastewater, 
and PG&E’s Colusa Generating Station has a zero liquid 
discharge system that recycles wastewater (PG&E 2014a).  
However, plants with dry cooling systems are more 
susceptible to decreasing efficiency due to high 
temperatures than those with wet cooling systems (GAO 
2014, Garfin et al. 2013). Plants with dry cooling systems 
can lose 0.5% of capacity for every 1°F increase in peak 
temperature, about twice the capacity lost in plants with 
wet cooling systems under the same conditions (Garfin 
et al. 2013, Gordon and Ojima 2015). 
Switching to non-traditional water sources, such as saline 
groundwater, municipal and industrial wastewater, and 
recycled brown water from landscaping, also present viable 
options for resilient water supplies (PNM 2011). For 
example, the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in 
Arizona has been converted to use municipal wastewater 
(Figure 3-6) (PNM 2011).   
 
Figure 3-6. The Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, which 
uses municipal wastewater for cooling 
Source: USNRC 2015 
Expanded deployment of renewable technologies such as 
wind and solar PV could significantly reduce water demand 
for energy. In low-carbon scenarios with wider deployment 
of solar PV and wind technologies, 2050 water withdrawals 
and consumption could decline up to 90% and 72%, 
respectively, depending on technology assumptions 
(Macknick et al. 2012). To support clean renewables in the 
region, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has granted a 
number of loan guarantees for solar PV and wind projects. 
For example, DOE issued a loan guarantee to support the 
550 MW Desert Sunlight solar PV project in California, the 
nation’s largest solar project on public lands. Deployment of 
solar PV projects near thermoelectric power plants can 
provide additional benefits by shading water supply for 
these plants, potentially reducing evaporation from the 
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water supply and decreasing the temperature of the intake 
water.  
DOE has also supported expanded deployment of solar 
thermal technologies that employ low-water strategies in 
the Southwest. One such project is the 392 MW Ivanpah 
Solar Generating Station in California (Figure 3-7). The plant 
employs advanced dry cooling technology for its steam 
condensers to reduce its burden on freshwater resources, 
and it uses groundwater to supplement evaporative losses 
as well as to wash its mirror array, while it also recycles on-




Figure 3-7. Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating System 
Photo Credit: BrightSource Energy 
Beyond technology changes, operations and planning can 
also improve resilience to water shortages. For example, 
the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado 
requires that generators bidding to serve new power to 
investor-owned utilities must disclose information about 
the source and cost of their water supplies (WWA 2011).       
For coastal impacts from sea level rise and erosion, 
resilience solutions include hardening shorelines and sub-
sea infrastructure (such as water intakes) to resist erosion 
and scouring, installing engineered barriers such as levees, 
raising vulnerable equipment, ensuring critical equipment is 
submersible, upgrading plants with watertight doors, and 




Hydropower is a significant resource in the Southwest, with 
approximately 19 GW of installed capacity providing 8% of 
electricity generation (EIA 2013c, EIA 2013d). More than 
70% of the region’s capacity is located in California, where 
most dams are powered by highly seasonal melting 
snowpack from the Sierra Nevada mountains (Figure 3-8). In 
addition to its own hydropower generation, California also 
relies on hydropower imports from the Northwest to meet 
its peak summer power demands.
3
 The Colorado River 
watershed hosts a smaller number of large dams, including 
the Glen Canyon and Hoover dams (Figure 3-9).  
 
                                                                
3
 Northwest hydropower production and climate vulnerabilities 
are discussed in the Northwest regional profile. 
Figure 3-8. Hydroelectric facilities (blue) in the Sierra Nevada 
Source: DOE 2015b 
Figure 3-9. The 1,312 MW Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado 
River watershed in Arizona 
Source: USBR 2009 
Hydropower production in the region is vulnerable to the 
following climate impacts: 
 Declining April 1 snowpack and earlier spring snowmelt 
is expected to shift peak streamflow timing in 
snowmelt-fed rivers, potentially reducing summer 
water availability and hydropower generation (AEG and 
Cubed 2005, Cayan et al. 2013, NOAA 2013, USGCRP 
2014). 
 Winter precipitation is expected to increase, with a 
greater fraction expected to fall as rain rather than as 
snow. Overall, annual average precipitation is expected 
to decline (Barnett et al. 2008, NOAA 2013, USGCRP 
2014). 
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Climate impacts affecting hydropower generation are 
expected to result from changes to both the total amount 
of water available in the region and to the timing of 
seasonal snowmelt and water flows. These changes could 
diminish the availability and capacity of hydropower 
resources.  
From 2012 through 2014, California experienced historic 
drought conditions and a reduction of approximately 
34,000 GWh of hydroelectricity compared to average water 
years. The cost of reduced hydroelectricity production and 
the use of additional natural gas to meet energy demand 
was estimated at $1.4 billion dollars (Pacific Institute 2015). 
The drought has continued in 2015, and is projected to 
contribute to a 10.4% decrease in annual hydropower in the 
United States in 2015 compared to 2014 (EIA 2015b). 
Changes in regional precipitation and increasing 
evapotranspiration are generally expected to reduce water 
availability across the region. During the last decade, 
precipitation declines compared to the historical average in 
both the Sacramento–San Joaquin and Colorado River 
basins have been correlated to significant declines in 
streamflow (Garfin et al. 2013).
4
 In the Colorado River 
watershed, reduced precipitation may exacerbate water 
management issues already being faced by the basin’s 
major dams. One study estimates that without taking 
climate changes into account, there is already a 50% chance 
that the lakes could hold insufficient quantities of water to 
produce power by 2021 (Barnett and Pierce 2008).  
Of California’s fleet of dams, high-elevation dams are the 
most important for hydropower generation,
5
 but they 
typically have much smaller reservoirs than low-lying dams 
and are more reliant on snowpack to supply water in the 
spring and early summer (AEG and Cubed 2005). For 
California’s hydropower resources, changes to total annual 
precipitation may be less important than a number of 
factors affecting the accumulation and timing of winter 
snowpack, including increases in winter precipitation, shifts 
from snow to rain, and earlier spring snowpack melting.  
Winter precipitation is projected to increase by mid-century 
(NOAA 2013). But as winters become warmer, more winter 
precipitation is expected to fall as rain rather than snow, 
decreasing snowpack (Barnett et al. 2008, USGCRP 2014). 
The trend toward increased winter rainfall is strongest in 
                                                                
4
 During the last decade (2001–2010), streamflow in the 
Sacramento–San Joaquin basin was 37% lower and precipitation 
7% lower than average amounts for the period 1931–2000. On the 
Colorado River, streamflow was 16% lower and precipitation 4% 
lower than the average levels for 1901–2000. 
5
 The primary purpose of many low-elevation dams in California is 
flood control and water supply, not power production (AEG and 
Cubed 2005).  
California’s Sierra Nevada range, where most of California’s 
high-elevation hydropower is located (EIA 2014c, Knowles 
et al. 2007). Furthermore, the annual pattern of spring 
snowpack melting is expected to occur earlier across the 
region as winter and spring temperatures increase (USGCRP 
2014). Earlier peak melting presents problems for power 
planning since greater hydropower production is desirable 
during the summer when electricity demand is the highest. 
The total amount of snowpack available on April 1 has fallen 
at measurement sites across much of the region since 
1955.
6
 In 2015, April 1 snowpack was 6% of the long-term 
average, the lowest water content on record, owing to high 
temperatures and dry conditions that a recent study 
suggests are more likely to co-occur in the future (CDWR 
2015, Diffenbaugh et al. 2015). Climate change is expected 
to lead to significant continued reductions in snowpack 
(EPA 2014, USGCRP 2014). Under a higher emissions 
scenario (A2), California snowpack could fall to 43% of 
recent levels by the end of this century (2070–2099) 
compared to 1971–2000 (USGCRP 2014).  
It is uncertain how these changes will interact to affect the 
total accumulation of high-elevation snowpack, and thus 
the region's ability to produce hydropower, but the effects 
could be substantial. One study estimates annual 
streamflow changes could drive changes in generation in 
California's American River Watershed ranging from a 13% 
decrease to a 14% increase by 2070–2099, depending on 
emissions scenario and other modeling uncertainties 





Operational measures to increase hydropower resilience 
will require consideration of a larger integrated water 
management approach, as seasonal and extended water 
scarcity continues to have an impact on the region. In the 
face of competing demands, and depending on available 
alternatives, hydropower may not be seen as the highest-
priority user. Reducing spill and better utilizing or storing 
early-spring runoff can improve hydropower resilience but 
may conflict with other water management goals, such as 
flood control. Expanding and diversifying non-hydro 
capacity would help ensure reliable electricity delivery 
during dry periods. 
                                                                
6
 In the southern Sierra Nevadas, the recent historical trend has 
not followed the regional pattern of earlier melting, as wetter-
than-average conditions have acted to increase April 1 snowpack 
(EPA 2014, Pierce et al. 2008). Long-run warming is expected to 
reverse this trend and lead to declines in snowpack in the 
southern range (Cayan et al. 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
7
 The study examined the 11 reservoirs and 8 hydroelectric 
facilities that compose the Sacramento Municipal Utility District's 
Upper American River Project and modeled system impacts under 
the A2 and B1 climate change scenarios. 
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PG&E has actively engaged with state and local 
stakeholders and developed strategies to adapt to 
reductions in snowpack in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. 
These strategies include maintaining higher winter 
carryover reservoir storage levels, reducing discretionary 
reservoir releases, and developing new modeling tools for 
forecasting runoff (GAO 2014, PG&E 2014a). 
For dams facing declining water availability, technological 
options to increase resilience include overhauling and 
upgrading plant equipment to minimize water leaks and 
increase turbine efficiency. In 2001, in response to falling 
water levels in Lake Mead, ongoing work by the Bureau of 
Reclamation to overhaul the Hoover Dam’s 17 turbine-
generator pairs shifted focus to increasing efficiency and 
regaining lost capacity. By reducing water leaks and 
overhauling the turbines, efficiency is now 3%–4% higher at 
each overhauled unit, and more water is being conserved 
for power generation (HydroWorld 2009). On a much 
smaller scale, the City of Boulder replaced the nearly 50-
year-old turbine and generator at its Boulder Canyon 
Generating Station with a significantly more efficient 5 MW 
unit, increasing capacity by 30% (City of Boulder 2014).  
To reduce the impact of decreasing hydropower production 
in dry years on customers, Sacramento Municipal Utility 
District (SMUD) has implemented a rate-stabilization fund, 
which uses savings from high-production years to buy 
power during drought years (Kasler 2014).  
Electric Grid 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The operational structure of the electric grid varies within 
the Southwest region. In California, the grid is operated by 
CAISO, while interior states mainly have vertically 
integrated utilities that plan and operate generation and 
transmission capacity internally (DOE 2014a). In some parts 
of the Southwest, including parts of Arizona and New 
Mexico, there is less redundancy built into the grid system 
compared to other parts of the country (BLM 2013).  
 
Figure 3-10. Power flows between the Southwest and Mexico, 
including a synchronous tie between California and Mexico 
Source: EIA 2013i 
small amount of power flows internationally between 
Mexico and California (EIA 2013i). The Comisión Federal de 
Electricidad (CFE) Baja California Control Area is connected 
by two 230 kV transmission lines to the Western 
Interconnection (Figure 3-10) (CEC 2008). The CFE Baja 
Control Area transmits power generated at two plants in 
Mexico with a combined capacity of 1,120 MW to supply 
demand in the San Diego area (CEC 2008). The tie in Baja 
California is the only synchronous cross-border tie between 
Mexico and the United States (EIA 2013i). 
Interstate power flows in the region are generally oriented 
toward California (discussed in the Electricity Demand 
section). Several major power corridors, including the 
Pacific DC Intertie, the California–Oregon Intertie (Path 66), 
and the Intermountain Power Project DC line, supply 
significant peaking capacity to California from neighboring 
states (CAISO 2012). Across the region, construction of new 
transmission lines has accelerated in recent years, as 
electricity flows need to keep up with changing demand and 
distribution of existing generation, including upcoming 
retirements and new generating capacity (DOE 2014a). 
Climate change could have the following impacts on the 
electric grid: 
 Increasing frequency and size of wildfires and 
associated heat, soot, and application of fire retardants 
may damage and disrupt power transmission 
infrastructure (DOE 2013, Sathaye et al. 2012, USGCRP 
2014).  
 Increasing average and extreme temperatures reduce 
the capacity of power lines and substations and 
increase the risk of damage to power transformers 
(Bérubé et al. 2007, DOE 2013, Sathaye et al. 2012, 
USGCRP 2014). 
 Rising sea levels increase the exposure of low-lying 
coastal substations to inundation during storm surges 
(Sathaye et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014).  
Projected increases in the frequency and extent of wildfires 
heighten the risk of grid outages and safety shutdowns. 
Both tree mortality and wildfires have increased 
dramatically in the past several decades, with the area 
burned in western mid-elevation conifer forests increasing 
almost sevenfold during the late 20
th
 century (USGCRP 
2014).
8
 Wildfires can burn and destroy wooden power poles 
that typically hold smaller transmission lines, and the 
associated smoke, soot, fire retardants, and heat from fires 
can damage and disrupt larger grid assets by fouling lines 
and insulators, increasing risk of arcing and reducing 
transmission capacity (DOE 2013, Sathaye et al. 2012, 
SDG&E 2008). For example, in early September 2015, the 
Valley, Butte, and Rough Fires damaged grid infrastructure 
                                                                
8
 The measurement period is 1970–2003. 
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and knocked out power to more than 15,000 PG&E 
customers in Northern and Central California (DOE 2015d). 
Wildfire models have estimated the impact that climate 
change, in concert with other changes such as future 
development, may have on the extent of wildfires in the 
Southwest. In the southern Rockies, the average area 
burned each year may double by mid-century (Litschert 
et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014).
9
 In California, projections 
indicate that under a higher emissions scenario, wildfires 
could increase in all forested areas by the end of the 
century (Sathaye et al. 2012). In the Sierra Nevada, fires are 
projected to increase by almost 75% by the end of the 
century (compared to 1960–1990) (USGCRP 2014). 
Models estimating the probability of wildfire impacts on 
transmission lines in California have shown that lines in two 
regions—the state’s northern border and the region north 
of Los Angeles—are particularly vulnerable to wildfire under 
higher emissions scenarios (Sathaye et al. 2012). 
Compounding the vulnerability of northern California is the 
                                                                
9
 Increases are for the period 2041–2070, compared to 1970–
2006. 
lack of alternate or redundant routes to the Northwest 
power market and the projection that Path 66—the artery 
that connects northern California loads to low-cost 
Northwest hydropower and the Diablo Canyon nuclear 
plant—will become significantly more vulnerable to wildfire 
(Sathaye et al. 2012). Southern California relies on even 
greater amounts of power imports to meet peak demand in 
the summer, although with a larger number of transmission 
corridors; about one-third of peak capacity is provided via 
transmission lines connecting to interior states (Sathaye 
et al. 2012).  
Higher temperatures may result in decreases in the 
available current-carrying capacity of power lines and 
substations and exacerbate vulnerabilities of the broader 
energy system in the region, particularly during peak 
demand periods (Figure 3-12) (DOE 2013). High 
temperatures cause thermal expansion of power line 
materials, and greater sag in transmission lines increases 
the risk of widespread power outages when lines arc to 
trees, the ground, or other power lines (DOE 2013). 
Furthermore, when transmission lines arc, they may ignite 
overgrown vegetation. To prevent damage to lines, 
operators may reduce the capacity on transmission lines. By 
the end of the century the combined effects of higher 
demand and temperature could increase total loss factors 
for the transmission and distribution grids by 1.5%–2.5%, 
 
 
Wildfire disrupts electricity in San Diego 
In 2007, wildfire knocked out the Southwest Power 
Link, a transmission line connecting San Diego to 
distant generation, requiring 500 MW of load shedding 
in San Diego by San Diego Gas & Electric and Southern 
California Edison. Over the next week, fires took out 
two dozen additional transmission lines, destroying 35 
miles of wire and 1,500 poles. Nearly 80,000 
customers in San Diego lost power, some for more 
than two weeks (PPIC 2008, SDG&E 2007). 
Figure 3-11. The Witch Creek/Guejito wildland urban 
interface fire of October 2007 
ce 2013 Source: U.S. Department of Commer
Impacts of higher electricity demand are compounded 
by efficiency reductions in power sector 
A CEC study found that increasing energy demand and 
capacity losses across power sector infrastructure 
could, under a higher emissions scenario, require a 
38.5% increase in the nameplate capacity of gas-fired 
peaking generators by the end of the century (Sathaye 
et al. 2012). Figure 3-12 shows how efficiency penalties 
along generation, transmission, and substations serve 
to compound the impacts of increasing energy demand 
on system resource requirements. 
Figure 3-12. Required increase in capacity in California due 
to higher temperatures, in order to provide 1961–1990 
levels of per-capita peak power by the end of this century. 
Assumes A2 scenario, and a 90
th
-percentile temperature. 
Source: Based on Sathaye et al. 2012 
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while reducing capacity by 7%–8% (for a 9°F increase in air 
temperature) (Sathaye et al. 2012). Higher temperatures 
may also reduce substation capacity 1%–3% compared to 
current capacity (Sathaye et al. 2012).  
Increased temperatures also shorten the lifetimes of power 
transformers. At higher temperatures, the insulation in 
transformers breaks down at an accelerated rate (Bérubé 
2007). At extreme temperatures, such as those 
encountered during grid emergencies when some 
transformers may be overloaded, significant overheating 
can rapidly shorten transformer lifetime. On very hot days, 
grid operators must reduce transformer loading or risk 
causing additional damage (Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000). 
Increasing nighttime temperatures will prevent equipment 
from cooling off, which may exacerbate the effects of high 
temperatures on power lines and transformers (DOE 2013). 
As climate change leads to higher relative sea levels, coastal 
flooding may pose a risk to some low-lying electric 
substations, especially when combined with storm surge. In 
a scenario with a 4.6-foot rise in sea level, one study 
determined that 3% of California’s electric substations 
would be vulnerable to a 100-year coastal flood (Sathaye 
et al. 2012).
10
 Increases in winter precipitation may also 
affect inland flooding via rain-on-snow events, which 
produce large amounts of runoff in mountain drainages. 
However, recent trends in the Western United States have 
shown these events occurring less frequently (McCabe et al. 
2007, USGCRP 2014).  
Electric Grid 
Resilience Solutions 
Measures to improve the resilience of new and existing 
electric transmission infrastructure include engineering 
structures to better withstand sea-level rise and hotter 
conditions, increased fire management practices to reduce 
short-term threats such as overloaded equipment, long-
term planning to increase network redundancy where 
wildfires are likely to occur, and transmission capacity 
expansion when necessary (DOE 2013). 
To reduce wildfire risk, utilities engage in vegetation 
management, including tree trimming, as well as thinning 
and prescribed burning to reduce fuel buildup (USGCRP 
2014). Adequate vegetation management can also reduce 
the risk of wildfires caused by tree strikes, and California 
regulators have cleared the way for utilities to take more 
proactive measures by requiring management on lower-
voltage power lines and by allowing utilities to cut off 
service to properties that will not allow tree trimming (EEI 
2014). Three California utilities—San Diego Gas & Electric 
(SDG&E), PG&E, and Southern California Edison—are also 
jointly funding the development of a statewide fire-threat 
                                                                
10
 Out of 2,690 substations, 86 are at risk (Sathaye et al. 2012). 
map that will indicate physical and environmental 
conditions that are associated with higher risk of power line 
fires (EEI 2014). PG&E has also partnered with local fire safe 
councils to help fund fuel reduction and emergency 
response access projects, such as installing remote fire 
detection cameras on lookout towers in critical fire risk 
areas (PG&E 2014b). To help ensure that power outages are 
identified and restored quickly, advanced communications 
and control technologies, such as state-of-the-art 
automated switch technologies, can “self-heal” the grid 
(PG&E 2015). 
Technologies to improve transformer resilience include 
installing or upgrading cooling fans or replacing transformers 
with more expensive, higher-temperature-rated units 
(Bérubé et al. 2007, USBR 2000). Management practices for 
protecting grid equipment, such as reducing loading on 
transformers during heat waves, can help prevent short-
term damage (Hashmi et al. 2013). In 2014, Colorado 
Springs Utilities partnered with Landis+Gyr to install an 
advanced load management program to protect distribution 
system assets during peak power consumption by 
dynamically reducing loads. The utility is planning to deploy 
1,900 smart thermostats and software applications to 
enable load shedding on specific feeder circuits to protect 
transformers and other distribution equipment, while 
maintaining reliable electric service (Landis+Gyr 2014). 
 
Illustrative electric grid resilience solutions 
Following the damaging wildfires of 2007, SDG&E 
implemented greater minimum clearances for 
vegetation and has explored using LiDAR to identify 
clearance issues (Fotland 2012). The utility has also 
hardened critical portions of its lines, including 
replacing wood poles with steel, replacing power 
conductors with stronger steel-core lines, increasing 
transmission line spacing, and installing advanced line 
closers to protect lines in case of emergency. In June 
2012, SDG&E activated the Sunrise Powerlink 
transmission line connecting San Diego to the Imperial 
Valley to improve reliability during summer heat waves 
(SDG&E 2012). SDG&E also partnered with the U.S. 
Forest Service and University of California, Los Angeles, 
to develop the Santa Ana Wildfire Threat Index, a web-
based tool available to the public that assesses the risk 
of wildfires during Santa Ana wind events (Rolinski 
et al. 2014). 
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Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Southwest’s oil and gas infrastructure includes oil and 
gas wells, oil refineries, and natural gas processing facilities. 
About 13% of domestic oil production is in the region, 
mostly in California, but also in New Mexico, Colorado, and 
Utah (EIA 2014a). The region's refinery capacity is also 
concentrated in California, mostly along the coast, and 
locally produced oil is primarily refined and consumed in 
the region (EIA 2014f, EIA 2014g). About 14% of the nation's 
natural gas is produced in the region, with Colorado and 
New Mexico as the largest producers (EIA 2013f).    
Climate change may have the following impacts on oil and 
gas exploration and production: 
• Rising sea levels, when combined with land subsidence 
and storm surge, could accelerate erosion and inundate 
low-lying and coastal oil and gas infrastructure (DOE 
2013, USGCRP 2014). 
• Declining water availability, including increased risk of 
drought, may affect production and refining operations 
that require freshwater resources (DOE 2013, 
Tiedeman et al. 2014, USGCRP 2014). 
 Flooding and inundation risks associated with rising sea 
levels may affect facilities along the entire California 
coastline, although land subsidence and concentrations of 
energy assets localize the impact to a few areas. Over the 
last century, sea levels in California have increased 6.7–7.9 
inches. South of Cape Mendocino, where tectonic shifts are 
causing land subsidence, sea levels are expected to increase 
another 1.4–5.5 feet by 2100, depending on emissions 
scenario and other uncertainties (NRC 2012).  
The vulnerability of specific energy assets is sensitive to 
their elevation and proximity to coastlines. An analysis of 
flooding impacts on utilities in Los Angeles (including 
electric power, water, and fuel systems) found that 
assuming 1.4 meter (4.6 feet) of sea level rise, combined 
with a once-in-100-year flood, caused moderate damage to 
three of the city's oil refineries but affected none of the 
city's power plants or natural gas facilities (Grifman et al. 
2013).  
Energy production can also be affected by prolonged 
drought. California's oil production is mostly composed of 
older wells undergoing water-intensive secondary and 
tertiary enhanced recovery processes. For the period 1999–
2012, the water intensity of the median California oil well 
increased more than 20%, and many wells are located in 
areas that may experience moderate to severe water stress 
by 2025 (Tiedeman et al. 2014). In the midst of a recent 
drought, California has passed new legislation mandating 
that oil drillers report the amount and source of water used 
in oil recovery (California Department of Conservation 
2015, Carroll 2014). Throughout the region, hydraulically 
fractured wells, which require about 3–6 million gallons of 
water per well for drilling and fracturing (Mantell 2011), are 
located in areas with water stress challenges that could be 
exacerbated by declining precipitation. One study found 
that over 95% of hydraulic fractured wells in Colorado and 
California are in locations considered “high” or “extremely 
high” water stress (Ceres 2014). 
Like thermoelectric power plants, oil refineries require a 
substantial amount of cooling water and may face 
escalating costs as droughts and critical water shortages 
become more frequent (DOE 2013).   
Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Resilience Solutions 
Resilience strategies to protect the Southwest’s coastal oil 
and gas infrastructure from inundation include both 
hardening and management solutions.  
Oil and gas companies facing periodic water constraints on 
drilling and refining operations can use degraded water or 
wastewater to reduce demand for municipal or freshwater. 
For example, a BP oil refinery in Los Angeles recently 
switched to recycled municipal wastewater to meet some 
of its process water needs (Troeh 2012). Oil production 
operations using water-intensive enhanced oil recovery 
could expand use of brackish groundwater or reuse 
produced water (DOE 2013). Alternative fracturing 
techniques that are typically used to promote enhanced 
product recovery in select shale formations may also reduce 
water use; these includeLiquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) 
fracturing, which uses propane and chemical additives in 
lieu of water; foam-based fracturing, which uses water, a 
foaming agent, and nitrogen or carbon dioxide; and channel 
fracturing, which uses proppant-laden fluid and gelled fluid 
to create channels (GAO 2015). In addition, enhanced oil 
recovery using carbon dioxide injection from carbon 
capture, storage, and use activities could contribute to 
reduced greenhouse gas emissions (climate mitigation) as 
well as enhanced resilience to climate change. Because 
water management is already a high-priority issue for most 
Southwestern states, solutions to problems of increased 
energy infrastructure vulnerability will continue to require 
comprehensive resilience strategies that address 
stakeholders in multiple sectors. 
Fuel Transport 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Much of the Southwest region is dependent on the 
extensive fuel transport infrastructure located along the 
California coast (Figure 3-13) (EIA 2014c). In particular, 
refineries in California rely on coastal infrastructure, such as 
ports in Los Angeles, Long Beach, and the Bay area, for 
imports of crude oil (EIA 2014c, CEC 2015). Once refined, 
gasoline and other petroleum products are transported 
primarily by pipelines to customers in California, Nevada, 
and Arizona (CDPC 2010). In addition, the region has 
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become increasingly dependent on domestic shipments of 
crude oil by rail.  
  
Figure 3-13. Natural gas and other fuel pipelines in the 
Southwest 
Source: Adapted from EIA 2014c 
New Mexico and Colorado are major producers of natural 
gas, which is consumed in-state and transported via 
pipeline to other western states. Markets in California are 
served by natural gas from Arizona, Nevada, and the 
Northwest (EIA 2014c). California exports and imports a 
limited amount of natural gas by pipeline to and from 
Mexico (EIA 2014m, EIA 2015a).      
Climate change may have the following impacts on fuel 
transport: 
 Rising sea levels could result in a higher rate of coastal 
erosion and a greater likelihood of flooding coastal 
infrastructure, including ports, terminals, pipelines, and 
railroads (CEC 2012, Sathaye et al. 2012, USGCRP 2014). 
Coastal ports and facilities are vulnerable to increased flood 
regimes along the coast due to higher sea levels, and may 
be at greater risk of being forced to stop or delay 
operations during floods. According to one study, 80% of 
the Port of San Francisco, 60% of the Port of Oakland, and 
approximately 50% of the Port of Richmond in the Bay Area 
could be inundated during a 100-year flood event with 1.4 
meters (4.6 feet) of sea level rise (CEC 2012). A 100-year 
flood event combined with sea level rise could also flood 
almost 1,700 miles of roadway in the Bay area, including 
almost 170 miles of major highways, stalling port 
operations by hindering the transport of personnel and 
goods (CEC 2012). Much of northern California’s 
Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta region has subsided 
below sea level and is already highly vulnerable to flooding. 
The delta contains significant natural gas infrastructure, 
including the McDonald Island natural gas storage facility 
and multiple pipelines, that supplies the Bay Area and 
Sacramento/Stockton (Sathaye et al. 2012).  
Pipelines along the coast and in low-lying areas may be 
vulnerable to corrosion as coastal flooding associated with 
rising sea levels may increase saltwater intrusion of 
groundwater. As sea levels rise, pipelines may also be 
increasingly at risk from flooding that can expose buried 
pipe, making it susceptible to impact from flood-borne 
debris (DOE 2013). Pumping stations, terminals, low-lying 
railroad equipment and other fuel transport infrastructure 
near the coast are also at increased risk of damage from 
flooding and erosion as sea level rise accelerates. 
Fuel Transport 
Resilience Solutions 
Fuel transport assets, including port facilities, can be 
hardened to mitigate the risks from sea level rise, reducing 
the likelihood of damaging coastal erosion and flooding 
events. For instance, sea walls and natural barriers such as 
wetlands can dampen the impacts of sea level rise and 
prevent coastal erosion in some instances. Pipelines may be 
upgraded to more robust materials such as coated steel or 
plastics to prevent corrosion and damage from flood-borne 
debris. Another resilience measure is elevating or relocating 
critical equipment such as pumping stations, port assets, 
and railroad structures out of coastal floodplains. For 
example, the McDonald Island natural gas storage facility is 
designed so that the compressor and wellhead controls can 
still operate under a 20 foot head of water (Sathaye et al. 
2012). Some equipment can also be sealed in waterproof 
enclosures to prevent damage during flood events (DOE 
2010). Planning for future sea level rise when siting and 
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Regional Climate Change Observations 
and Projections in Detail 
Higher Temperatures 
Historical observations 
 Since 1895, temperatures have increased an average 
of 0.17°F per decade, or almost 2°F (NOAA 2013). 
 Heat waves are occurring more often and cold waves 
less often: For 1895–2011, there is a statistically 
significant increase in the number of heat waves across 
the region (NOAA 2013). 
Future projections 
 Average temperatures are expected to increase at a 
faster rate, with summer and autumn increases most 
severe: Under a higher emissions scenario (A2), 
temperatures are projected to increase 5.5°F–8.5°F by 
the end of the century (2070–2099, compared to the 
climate of 1971–1999), with the lowest increases along 
the coast. Under a lower emissions scenario (B1), 
increases may be 3.5°F–5.5°F (NOAA 2013). 
 Extremely hot days are projected to become more 
common, and consecutive number of days of extreme 
heat are expected to grow longer: In the southern part 
of the region, especially in deserts, arid regions, and 
high plains, 25–40 more days with a daily maximum 
temperature >95°F are expected by mid-century 
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000), and the 
maximum number of consecutive hot days is projected 
to increase by 16–32; through most of the rest of the 
region, 10–25 more extremely hot days per year are 
projected, with annual maximum consecutive hot days 
growing by 4–16 (NOAA 2013). 
 Cooling degree days (CDDs) are expected to increase: 
In much of the region, an increase of 400–1,000 CDDs is 
expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000); increases of 200–400 CDDs are expected 
in northern parts, and fewer in the Rockies (NOAA 2013). 
 Heating degree days (HDDs) are expected to decrease, 
cold nights to occur less frequently, and freeze-free 
season to grow: The northern and mountainous parts 
of the region are expected to experience a decline in 
HDDs of 1,100–1,700 by mid-century (2041–2070, 
compared to 1980–2000); in the south and along the 
coast, declines of 500–1,100 HDDs are projected. The 
freeze-free season is expected to be 20–45 days longer 
by mid-century, and days with daily minimums less 
than 10°F are no longer expected to occur, except in 
high-elevation areas (NOAA 2013). 
Changing Water Patterns and Wildfires 
Historical observations 
 More winter precipitation has been falling as rain 
rather than as snow: Across western mountain regions, 
October-to-March snow water equivalent (SWE), 
normalized by total precipitation, has fallen over the 
period 1950–1999, with a strong indication that up to 
60% of the changes are due to climate change (Barnett 
et al. 2008).  
Future projections 
 Annual mean precipitation is expected to decrease: 
Under a higher emissions scenario (A2), end-of-century 
(2070–2099) precipitation is projected to be 3%–12% 
lower in the southern portion of the region than the 
period 1971–1999. Under a lower emissions scenario 
(B1), models are less certain (NOAA 2013). 
 Spring and summer are projected to be drier and 
winter wetter: Spring and summer average 
precipitation may decline by more than 15% in parts of 
the region by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1971–2000); summer coastal precipitation is projected 
to increase more than 15%; winter precipitation is 
generally expected to increase, with regions seeing 
greater than 15% increases (NOAA 2013). 
 Periods with little or no precipitation are likely to 
become longer: Across most of the region, the annual 
maximum number of consecutive days with less than 
three millimeters of precipitation is projected to 
increase 5–25 days per year by mid-century (2041–
2070, compared to 1980–2000). Projected increases 
are smallest in eastern Colorado (NOAA 2013). 
 Snowpack may decline across the region: By mid-
century (2041–2070), April 1 SWE is projected to fall by 
more than 40% compared to 1971–2000 (Cayan et al. 
2013). 
 Streamflow in many major basins is expected to 
decline: By the 2070s, annual streamflow in the 
Klamath, Sacramento–San Joaquin, Colorado, and Rio 
Grande rivers is projected to decline relative to the 
1990s (USGCRP 2014). For all but the Colorado River, 
declines are projected to be greatest between April and 
July (USGCRP 2014).  
 Droughts are expected to intensify across the region: 
Future droughts in the region, and especially in the 
Colorado River watershed, are projected to become 
more frequent, intense, and longer-lasting than in the 
historical record (USGCRP 2014). 
 Risk of wildfire is expected to increase: The area of 
land burned in wildfires is projected to increase, 
including a doubling of area in the southern Rockies by 
mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1970–2006) and 
an almost 75% increase in northern California by end-
of-century (compared to 1960–1990) (USGCRP 2014). 
Sea Level Rise 
Future projections 
 Sea level rise is expected to accelerate: Along most of 
the California coastline (south of Mendocino), relative 
sea levels are projected to increase by 17–66 inches by 
2100 compared to 2000, depending on emissions 
scenario and other uncertainties (NRC 2012). 
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4. Northern Great Plains 
Overview  
The Northern Great Plains is home to less than 2% of the U.S. 
population but is a major supplier of critical energy resources 
used throughout the nation. These resources include coal from 
the Powder River Basin, electricity exported via interstate 
transmission lines, and rapidly growing oil production from the 
Bakken formation. Extensive rail and pipeline networks 
transport energy resources across the region. Major climate 
change impacts projected to increasingly threaten the region’s 
energy infrastructure include the following: 
 Climate change is projected to increase both the frequency 
and severity of heavy precipitation events in northern 
states, increasing heavy runoff and the risk of flooding.
a
 
Floods threaten low-lying assets such as power plants, oil and 
gas facilities, and rail lines located in flood plains, and they 
can disrupt delivery of fuels and damage infrastructure.
b
  
 Average temperatures are projected to increase, and 
extremely hot days are projected to occur more 
frequently. Heat waves are likely to become more 
frequent, more severe, and longer-lasting.
c
 Extreme heat 
can delay or disrupt rail service, affecting fuel shipments. As 
air and water temperatures rise, thermoelectric power 
plants operate less efficiently, and electricity demand for 
cooling increases. Higher temperatures also cause sag and 
increase resistance in transmission lines. Together, these 
effects may reduce available power supply during the 
hottest months when demand is highest.
d
  
 Decreasing water availability is projected in the summer 
for parts of the region as a result of seasonal changes in 
precipitation patterns from climate change and competing 
uses for water.
e
 Limited water availability may reduce the 
availability of thermoelectric power generation and affect 
biofuel production and oil and gas operations. Power plants, 
biorefineries, and agriculture are all major water users and require more water as temperatures increase. Competing uses for 
water, such as crop irrigation, may also contribute to limited availability.
f
 
Table 4-1. Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Northern Great Plains 
Subsector Vulnerability Magnitude Illustrative Resilience Solutions 
Fuel Transport Increased disruption from roadbed 




Increased disruption of coal and 




From the Bakken fields, rail accounts for 
more than 70% of total oil shipments and 
100% of deliveries to the West Coast
i
 
Almost 50% of the coal produced in the 
United States travels along a small number 
of central rail lines in the region
j
 
Preventive maintenance, track 




Improved detection of track 







Reduced efficiency from 
increasing air and water 
temperatures and decreasing 
water availability 
The region exported over 70 TWh of 
electricity in 2012, so reductions in 




Alternative water sources, 
recirculating, dry, or wet-dry 
hybrid cooling systems 
Electricity  
Demand 
Increased electricity demand in 




An additional 200–800 CDDs per year is 




Capacity expansion, energy 
efficiency, and demand-side 
management programs 
QUICK FACTS       
Northern Great 
Plains States:   




5,036,423  (1.6% of U.S.) 
Area (square miles) 464,000 (13% of U.S.) 
Energy expenditures  $33 billion 









Electric power                     TWh 160 88 n/a 
Petroleum                     MMbbls 333 166 1% 
Coal                           million tons 466 85 88% 













Natural gas 2 1% 4 55 
Coal 114 71% 18 42 
Nuclear 6 4% 1 2 
Hydroelectric 22 14% 5 55 
Wind  15 9% 5 72 
Biomass <1 <1% <1 4 




Electric Power   
Wells (>1 boe/d): 15,900 Power plants (> 1 MW):  277 
Refineries:  11 Interstate transmission lines:  18 
Liquids pipelines: 29 Coal 
 
  
Ports (>200 tons/yr): 0 Mines:  28 
Natural Gas 
 
Waterways   
Wells:  29,000 Coal and petroleum routes:   1 
Interstate pipelines: 26 Railroads 
 
  
Market hubs:  1 Miles of freight track:   13,500 
Note: Table presents 2012 data except number of oil wells, which is 2009 data. 
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW. 
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2011, EIA 2013a, EIA 2013c, EIA 2014b, EIA 2014e, EIA 2014m, 
EIA 2014n, EIA 2014o, EIA 2014p, EIA 2014q, USACE 2014, US Census Bureau 2014 
 
Chapter 4: Northern Great Plains 
Climate Change and the Energy Sector 
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Powder River Basin coal 
The nine largest U.S. coal mines are located in the 
Powder River Basin (EIA 2014o). Coal from Wyoming 
supplies power plants in more than 30 states (EIA 2014b). 
In the western United States, a small number of routes 
handle very large amounts of coal. Much of this coal is 
transported in trains of 120 coal cars going from a single 
mine to a single power plant over distances that can 
exceed 1,000 miles (EIA 2012b, EIA 2014c). 
The Joint Line, a 100-mile rail line, links Powder River 
Basin coal to the nation's rail network. The Joint Line is 
the busiest freight railroad in the world as measured by 
gross ton-miles. Approximately 130 trains, weighing as 
much as 19,000 tons, move on the Joint Line on a normal 
day (DOE 2007).  
 
 
Figure 4-1. Coal deliveries by rail from the Powder River Basin 
Source: EIA 2012b 
Bakken oil 
Crude oil production in the Bakken shale formation of North 
Dakota has increased more than 750% since 2007 (EIA 
2014d). North Dakota currently produces over one million 
barrels per day, representing over 10% of domestic oil 
production (EIA 2014e). As the region's crude oil resources 
become more important to the national energy economy 
and pipeline capacity remains limited (EIA 2014f), railroads 
are playing a more important role in transporting crude oil 
(CRS 2014, EIA 2012c, EIA 2012d). 
Figure 4-2. Crude-by-rail loading (blue) and unloading (red) 
terminals 
Source: EIA 2014f 
Regional Energy Infrastructure 
Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions 
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of 
resilience solutions in the Northern Great Plains are 
discussed below. System components that are most 
vulnerable to climate change are described first. 
Fuel Transport 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Northern Great Plains is a major supplier of both coal 
and crude oil to U.S. energy markets (see sidebar). The 
Powder River Basin in Wyoming alone produces almost half 
of the nation’s coal (EIA 2012a), and the rapid development 
of the Bakken shale in North Dakota has made it one of the 
top-producing oil fields (EIA 2014a). Railways are an integral 
part of the transportation infrastructure for both of these 
resources. Rail is also the primary mode of transport for 
ethanol. 
The Northern Great Plains is also traversed by a substantial 
network of high-capacity natural gas and oil pipelines. The 
region is the proposed location of several major new crude 
oil pipeline routes, with 12 crude oil pipeline projects 
(ranging from 10,000 barrels per day to 800,000 barrels per 
day) proposed in the region as of 2012 (KLJ 2012). Gas 
pipelines are also undergoing expansion, largely as a result 
of the development of coal bed methane and tight sands 
natural gas in the Powder River Basin and shale gas 
production in the Bakken formation (EIA 2014g, EIA 2014i). 
Since 2005, over $17 billion has been invested in natural gas 
pipelines connecting to states in the Northern Great Plains 
(EIA 2014h).  
Climate change is expected to have the following impacts 
on fuel transport in the Northern Great Plains: 
 Projected increases in the frequency of heavy 
precipitation, as well as total annual precipitation, may 
increase the frequency of damage and disruption to 
railways and pipelines from flooding (CCSP 2008, 
USGCRP 2014). 
 Rising temperatures, including increases in the 
frequency, severity, and duration of heat waves, may 
increase the risk of delays and disruptions to rail 
shipments, as well as cause damage to—and higher 
maintenance costs for—rail infrastructure (USGCRP 
2014). 
Annual precipitation (Figure 4-3) and the frequency and 
severity of heavy precipitation events are projected to 
increase in the northern and eastern portions of the area 
(NOAA 2013a), increasing the risk of flooding impacts on 
fuel transport. 
Powder River Basin 
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Figure 4-3. Mean change in annual precipitation by mid-century
1 
 
Source: NOAA 2013c 
Both heavy precipitation events and extended periods of 
rainfall can lead to regional flooding events (NOAA 2013a). 
Heavy precipitation events can cause high runoff and 
flooding that can disrupt train traffic and damage 
submerged track and roadbed (Union Pacific 2011). High 
streamflows can cause erosion of track beds, especially 
where railroads run in low-lying areas adjacent to rivers and 
streambeds (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). In the Red River 
Valley of North Dakota, one of the most flood-prone rivers 
in the country, peak streamflows have been steadily 
increasing from rapid spring snowmelt combined with 
rainfall (Hirsch and Ryberg 2012, NOAA 2013a).  
Intense precipitation events and flooding can also affect 
buried pipelines by eroding soil cover and exposing the 
pipeline to damage from flowing water and collisions with 
flood debris or even vehicles or boats (DOE 2013a, DOT 
2014, NRC 2008). Pipelines that are near creeks, rivers, or 
where water is funneled away are more vulnerable to 
erosion (DOT 2014). Intense precipitation can also cause 
ground subsidence, where the soil underneath the pipeline 
sinks, causing stress on the pipeline structure (NRC 2008). A 
flooding event in Montana was a key contributing factor in 
the rupture of the ExxonMobil Silvertip Pipeline that 
resulted in damages of more than $100 million (DOE 
2013a). Historically, however, pipeline damage from natural 
events is responsible for only a small fraction of damages to 
pipelines; corrosion and equipment failure are the biggest 
causes of accidental crude oil pipeline releases (DOT 2012).  
Any damage or disruption to major interstate and 
international pipelines crossing the Northern Great Plains 
could have a significant impact on energy markets outside 
the region. Several of the largest interstate natural gas 
pipelines that operate in the region deliver to customers 
outside of the region (EIA 2014i).  
Temperature increases due to climate change and increased 
rail traffic may cause the rails to exceed temperature design 
                                                                
1
 Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the 
end of the last century (1971–2000) under an A2 emissions 
scenario 
limits, which can cause track buckling under heat stress 
(also known as “sun kinks,” pictured in Figure 4-4) (CCSP 
2008, NRC 2008). Tracks buckle when excessive 
compressive stress along the track leads to deformation or 
misalignment (Volpe 2003). Compressive stress can come 
from both increased track temperature (as the rail material 
expands) and loading from train traffic (FRA 2011). Since 
2003, there have been 49 derailments in the Northern 
Great Plains directly attributable to buckled or sun-kinked 
track, and the average temperature at the time of 
derailment was about 89°F (FRA 2014). 
 
 
Figure 4-4. Examples of track buckling  
Source: Volpe 2003 
Railroad operators respond to high ambient temperatures 
by slowing traffic along rail lines (called slow orders) and 
reducing loads to prevent buckling and related derailments 
(CCSP 2008, FRA 2011). Slow orders are costly, as they 
consume rail capacity, lead to higher operating costs and 
delays in deliveries, and increase equipment cycle time, 
requiring railroads to maintain larger fleets (CCSP 2008). 
Fuel Transport 
Resilience Solutions 
Risks to railroads from increased flooding can be mitigated 
through system and track upgrades, but they can be costly. 
Resilience solutions include upgrading drainage systems, 
ensuring culverts can handle increased runoff from heavy 
precipitation events, and increasing pumping capacity in 
tunnels (DOT 2009). Policy measures that restrict new rail 
line development in floodplains, revise standards for 
drainage capacity or elevating tracks, or require more 
frequent track inspection can also improve resilience. Track 
integrity inspections are shifting from visual methods to 
sophisticated sensing techniques operated from vehicles 
such as hi-railers (trucks that ride on rails). 
Resilience of natural gas and liquid fuels transmission 
pipelines could be improved by upgrading to pipes made 
from more robust materials such as coated steel or modern 
plastics. Pipeline operators may also install barriers (such as 
berms) or plant grass above pipelines to reduce the risk of 
erosion and subsequent exposure of buried pipelines, and 
horizontal directional drilling can be used to bury pipelines 
deeper to reduce the risk of pipeline exposure (Brown 2013, 
DOT 2014, Miller & Bryski 2012). After the Silvertip pipeline 
ruptured in Montana, ExxonMobil was ordered to replace 
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the existing Yellowstone River, Clarks Fork, and Rock Creek 
river crossings with horizontal directionally drilled pipelines 
(Katchmar 2012).  
 
Temperature impacts affecting railroads can be reduced by 
incorporating climate projections into design considerations 
when replacing tracks. Rails are designed to withstand 
temperature gradients based on expected ambient 
temperatures and heat generated from railcar traffic (FRA 
2011, Volpe 2003). Railroad companies that are 
incorporating higher baseline temperatures into their 
planning would most likely upgrade tracks when they are 
replaced for other reasons, including normal wear and tear, 
upgrades for traffic reasons, or damage from other extreme 
events, including flooding (CCSP 2008).  
Management practices, such as ensuring rails are regularly 
inspected for signs of damage, can also increase resilience 
to climate impacts. Manual inspection remains the 
preferred method to detect erosion damage, buckles, and 
sun kinks, although rail breakage can be inspected via the 
application of an electrical current to detect faults remotely 
(CCSP 2008, Volpe 2003).  
Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Electricity from coal-fired thermoelectric power plants 
dominates the generation mix in Northern Great Plains 
states (Table 4-2).  
Table 4-2. Electricity generation by type for states in the 
Northern Great Plains 
Generator 
Type 
MT ND NE SD WY Total  
Coal 50% 78% 73% 24% 88% 71% 
Hydroelectric  41% 7% 4% 50% 2% 14% 
Wind 5% 15% 4% 24% 9% 9% 
Nuclear 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 4% 
Natural Gas 2% 0% 2% 2% 1% 1% 
Other 3% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 
Source: EIA 2013c  
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on thermoelectric power generation in the Northern Great 
Plains: 
 Higher average and extreme temperatures are expected 
to reduce electricity generation and transmission 
capacity (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
 Reduced precipitation in the southern and western 
portions of the region, as well as higher evaporative loss 
from reservoirs, may affect water availability for 
thermoelectric power generation (DOE 2013a, NOAA 
2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
 Increased average and extreme precipitation may 
heighten the risk of damage or disruption caused by 
flooding (NOAA 2013a). 
Projected changes in precipitation and temperature—both 
independently and in combination—may restrict the 
available capacity of thermoelectric power generation in 
the region. The efficiency of thermoelectric power 
generation decreases with increasing air and water 
temperatures (DOE 2013a). Because of projected increases 
in average and extreme temperatures in the Northern Great 
Plains, climate change may reduce regional power 
generation capacity during times of high demand for 
cooling (USCGRP 2014). Furthermore, high air temperatures 
reduce transmission capacity (DOE 2013a), which can 
compound problems of reduced power supply. As shown in 
Table 4-3, all states in the region except South Dakota 
export electricity to other states, and capacity restrictions 
may affect neighboring regions. 
Table 4-3. Net interstate trade of electricity for states in the 
Northern Great Plains, Terawatt-hours (2012) 
MT ND NE SD WY 
12.8 21.5 0.8 -0.5 30.1 
Source: EIA 2014u 
Examples of rail damage and disruption 
2011: Exceptional spring rains, combined with rapid 
snowmelt, produced flooding in the Missouri River 
basin, threatening Union Pacific's Central Corridor 
line near North Platte, Nebraska. When the Platte 
River began to carve a new channel near the rail 
line, the Nebraska National Guard and Nebraska 
Highway Department contributed to an effort to 
build an emergency levee. During the same floods, 
levee breaks on additional Union Pacific lines near 
Omaha, Nebraska, led to closures for portions of 
June and July. To reopen the line, rail workers raised 
the track bed before the floodwaters had receded 
(Union Pacific 2011). 
2007: Severe flooding in March and April resulting 
from a blizzard significantly disrupted service on the 
Powder River Basin's Joint Line. Rail facilities were 
shut in, and 170 rail loadings were cancelled (DOE 
2007).  
2005: Greater-than-normal rainfall and accumulating 
coal dust caused a series of three major derailments 
and significant damage to Powder River Basin’s  Joint 
Line. The derailments caused significant delays in coal 
deliveries and led to a restriction on new customers 
that lasted almost two years. Many power plant 
customers were forced to draw down stockpiles 
because of delayed or cancelled deliveries, and some 
had limited coal supplies for the summer when high 
temperatures led to greater-than-normal energy 
demand. Following the derailments, production at 
Powder River Basin mines was curtailed for several 
months, and problems with deliveries to generators 
persisted through the spring of 2006 (DOE 2007). 
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As shown in Figure 4-5, precipitation is projected to 
increase throughout the region during the winter, but 
precipitation is projected to decrease in the southern and 
western portions of the region during warmer seasons, 
when demand for power is highest. Affected regions include 
Montana, Nebraska, and Wyoming (NOAA 2013a).  
  
Figure 4-5. Change in seasonal precipitation by mid-century
2
 
Source: NOAA 2013c 
Decreased availability of water could pose an operational 
risk to thermoelectric facilities using freshwater for cooling 
(DOE 2013a). For example, the Platte River, which flows 
through Wyoming and Nebraska, is a heavily managed and 
over-appropriated river system (NOAA 2013a). The coal-
fired power plants using the Platte River and its tributaries 
for cooling water are vulnerable to water stress (DOE 
2013a). When water shortages occur, power plants in the 
region are likely to draw from groundwater and compete 
with irrigated agriculture for scarce water resources (NETL 
2009, UCS 2011).  
Projected increases in extreme heat could accelerate the 
loss of surface water reservoirs through evaporation and 
may compound local water scarcity issues. Across most of 
the region, 5–20 more days with a daily maximum 
temperature >95°F are projected by mid-century (NOAA 
2013a). Nebraska is likely to be the most affected, including 
increases of as many as 25 more extremely hot days per 
year projected (NOAA 2013a). Moreover, because high 
temperatures decrease thermal efficiency of power 
generation (DOE 2013a), more extreme high-temperature 
days could compound the risks to these facilities, 
particularly during periods of low water availability. 
                                                                
2
 Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the 
end of the last century (1971–2000) under an A2 emissions 
scenario 
Thermoelectric power plants are also vulnerable to 
flooding. They are typically located near rivers or other 
sources of water and are susceptible to physical damage 
and disruption from flooding. The eastern portion of the 
Northern Great Plains has experienced an increasing 
frequency and magnitude of flooding events (Hirsch and 
Ryberg 2012) and is projected to see higher levels of total 
precipitation and heavy precipitation events as a result of 
climate change (NOAA 2013a).  
 
Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Resilience Solutions 
New generation capacity can help address falling capacity 
due to decreased plant efficiency during periods of higher 
air and water temperatures. New generation capacity with 
sources and supply chains less affected by increasing 
temperatures and decreased water availability (e.g., wind 
and solar photovoltaics [PV]) may help make the region’s 
power sector more resilient to climate change. Programs 
that reduce total and peak electricity demand can also 
reduce the water needs of thermoelectric generators. 
Water scarcity has already threatened major power plants 
in the region, and several generation facilities have 
undertaken major infrastructure projects to ensure access 
to alternative sources of water (NETL 2009). Many facilities 
have installed recirculating water cooling systems, which 
withdraw significantly less water than once-through plants 
(DOE 2013a). Power plant owners in the Northern Great 
Plains have turned to groundwater to supply cooling water 
needs when surface water reservoirs have reached critically 
low levels. Future competition for limited surface and 
groundwater resources may lead power plants to consider 
adoption of more water-efficient cooling technologies (e.g., 
Examples of impacts to power plants from  
flooding and limited water availability 
2011: Missouri River floodwaters surrounded Fort 
Calhoun Nuclear Power plant in Nebraska. The 
nuclear reactor remained closed during the 
summer because of persistent flood waters (DOE 
2013a). 
2008: Owners of the 1,710 MW Laramie River 
Station in Wyoming installed a 90,000-foot-long 
pipeline to deliver groundwater to supplement 
water from the Grayrocks Reservoir, but a drought 
lowered the reservoir to 10% of its capacity and 
forced the utility to purchase water from the 
Wheatland Irrigation District (NETL 2009, UCS 
2011). 
2004: The Nebraska Public Power District spent  
$12 million and installed 40 wells at its 1,300 MW coal-
fired Gerald Gentleman Station to ensure there would be 
enough water in the event that its reservoir goes dry 
(NETL 2009). 
 
Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Northern Great Plains 4-6 
 
dry cooling, wet–dry hybrid cooling, etc.), use of 
nontraditional water (e.g., saline and brackish groundwater, 
municipal waste water, etc.), and additional water 
conservation measures.  
Diversification of power generation sources to fuels 
requiring little or no water input, such as wind power and 
solar photovoltaic systems, may help to make the region’s 
power sector more resilient to water scarcity events. For 
example, in response to Minnesota's Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS) and North and South Dakota renewable 
energy objectives, the Otter Tail Power Company has 
expanded its wind generation resources, which require no 
cooling water. Through the TailWinds program, customers 
can choose to purchase 100% of their electricity from wind 
generation (Otter Tail Power Company 2014).  
Programs that reduce total and peak electricity demand can 
also reduce the water needs of thermoelectric generators, 
as discussed in the Electricity Demand section. 
Engineered barriers such as levees can be effective in 
protecting vulnerable thermoelectric power plants from 
flooding during heavy precipitation events. Utilities may 
also elevate critical equipment to protect against flooding 
or upgrade low-lying components with submersible 
equipment or watertight doors. Planners can protect new 
capacity by locating new equipment at higher elevations or 
outside of flood plains.  
Electricity Demand 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Northern Great Plains exports more than 50% of the 
electricity generated in the region and on the whole has 
sufficient generating capacity to meet increased demand 
within the region (EIA 2014b). However, neighboring states 
that receive electricity exports from the Northern Great 
Plains states, including states in the Midwest, Southwest, and 
Southern Great Plains, may be affected if local demand grows 
or generating capacity falls.  
The region is situated far from the moderating effects of the 
oceans and has a distinctly continental climate, with 
average low temperatures in January about 0–15°F and 
average high temperatures in July about 80–88°F (NOAA 
2015). Like other regions with cold winters, the Northern 
Great Plains uses primarily natural gas for space heating, 
with electricity a distant second (EIA 2014l, EIA 2014r). The 
region’s power consumption is typically summer-peaking, 
with utilities in the region experiencing peak demand about 
16% higher in summer than in winter (EIA 2013b). Much of 
the electricity demand is driven by non-residential uses, 
including irrigation, food processing, fertilizer and pesticide 
production, and manufacture of farm and construction 
equipment (EIA 2014b).  
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on electricity demand in the Northern Great Plains: 
 Higher maximum temperatures, longer and more severe 
heat waves, and higher overnight lows are expected to 
increase electricity demand for cooling in the summer 
(DOE 2013a, NOAA 2013a). 
Hotter summers will increase electricity demand for air 
conditioning and refrigeration, while warmer winters may 
lead to reduced heating demand, with the summer increase 
in electricity demand outweighing the winter decrease 
(USCGRP 2014). As shown in Figure 4-6, an increase of 200–
800 cooling degree days (CDDs) per year is projected by 
mid-century for most of the region, with the exception of 
the higher elevations of Montana and Wyoming (USGCRP 
2014). Although the annual CDDs in the region are lower 
than most other regions, an increase in CDDs may lead to 
an increased proportion of households and businesses 
installing air conditioning units (USGCRP 2014). For 
example, Williston, North Dakota, is projected to 
experience 200–400 additional CDDs, which is an increase 
of 43%–86% compared to its historical average (NOAA 
2013b). In addition, buildings already with air conditioning 
are expected to increase electricity demand for cooling 
(USGCRP 2014). 
 
Figure 4-6. Change in annual CDDs by mid-century
3
 
Source: NOAA 2013c 
Climate change is only one of several factors projected to 
drive changes in demand for electricity. Population shifts 
from rural to urban areas and electricity use associated with 
growing oil production in the Bakken region are also 
altering the demand profile, as well as other unrelated 
changes to demand resulting from new devices and 
technologies. One study projects electricity demand 
(electrical load) in the Bakken region will increase more 
than 200% in 20 years, from 1,209 MW in 2012 to 3,721 
MW in 2032, excluding demand shifts expected due to 
climate change (KLJ 2012). 
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 Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the 
reference period (1980–2000) under an A2 emissions scenario 
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With the region being a net exporter of electricity, there is 
likely adequate electricity supply to meet additional 
demand. However, shifting demand loads within the region 
may also require additional investments in transmission 
capacity to reach the expanding areas (Basin 2014), which is 
further discussed in the Electric Grid section.  
Electricity Demand 
Resilience Solutions 
Capacity expansion, energy efficiency, load management, 
and other programs administered by regional power 
producers can help reduce total electric power demand and 
peak loads. Power producers in the Northern Great Plains 
states have already implemented a number of demand-side 
management practices to reduce the load and improve 
energy efficiency. These efforts have so far reduced the 
region’s peak load by 2,100 MW, and over 4,000 industrial 
customers are enrolled in price-responsive programs to 
reduce consumption during peak demand (EIA 2013b). 
Because the Northern Great Plains exports electricity 
outside of the region, measures being implemented in 
other states can also help mitigate critical summer season 
peaks. 
 
Many agricultural-heavy electric utilities use demand 
response programs to manage a large number of small 
users connected to the grid. For example, Nebraska's 
Dawson Public Power partners with agricultural customers 
who allow the utility to control the electric usage of these 
systems when demand for electricity is high (EIA 2014j).  
Energy storage systems provide one potential solution to 
addressing the region's changing demand profile. The 
region has seen expanding wind power assets, with net 
generation from wind power increasing by over 300% from 
2002 to 2012, and storage systems could allow these 
intermittent sources to store generated energy and then 
deliver it when needed (EIA 2013c).  
Capacity expansions may also help alleviate growing 
demand for electricity, especially in remote areas where the 
cost of installing new transmission capacity is high. Owing 
to the region's extensive wind resources, new generation is 
likely to include expanded wind capacity (NREL 2014). For 
example, Montana–Dakota Utilities Co. announced in 2013 
that, to meet growing customer demand, the company was 
purchasing a 107 MW wind farm (Capital Journal 2014).   
Electric Grid 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
As Northern Great Plains states are net exporters of 
electricity, neighboring regions are dependent on a reliable 
flow of power from those states. The region straddles the 
divide between the western and eastern electricity grids, 
with Montana and Wyoming largely part of the Western 
Interconnection, and most of Nebraska, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota connected to the Eastern Interconnection. 
The Northern Great Plains is home to four of the six DC ties 
between the western and eastern grids (WAPA 2015). 
Climate change is expected to have following impacts on 
the electric grid in the Great Plains North region: 
 Higher average and extreme air temperatures are 
expected to reduce the efficiency and capacity of 
transmission lines and substations, and may damage 
power transformers (Bérubé 2007, DOE 2013a). 
 Increased wildfire activity in the western, forested part 
of the region is expected to increase the risk of physical 
damage to transmission lines and distribution systems 
(DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
Higher temperatures decrease the current-carrying capacity 
of transmission lines and reduce the efficiency of substation 
equipment (DOE 2013a). High temperatures also cause 
thermal expansion of transmission line materials, and 
sagging lines increase the risk of power outages when they 
make contact with other lines, trees, or the ground (DOE 
2013a). When energized transmission lines come into 
contact with vegetation, they can also spark wildfires, 
potentially leading to much greater damage. Additionally, 
elevated ambient air temperatures may also put 
transformers at a greater risk of damage and force 
operators to reduce the loading of transformers on the 
hottest days (Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000). Incremental 
changes in transformer operating temperature lead to 
exponentially larger rates of irreversible transformer 
insulation breakdown, so even small increases in ambient 
air temperatures can lead to extensive damage if protective 
measures are not taken (Bérubé 2007, Hashmi et al. 2013).  
Electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure is 
also vulnerable to physical damage from increasing 
wildfires, which can destroy wood poles and steel towers, 
damage extensive miles of conductor, and foul lines with 
soot and fire retardant (DOE 2013a). Wildfires can also 
cause operators to shut down or derate lines to protect 
them from wildfire-associated heat and smoke (CPUC and 
DOI 2008, DOE 2013a). Soot and smoke can reduce the 
electrical resistance of air, increasing the likelihood of tree 
strikes or arcing between lines. In addition, wildfires 
Demand response resources program 
Montana–Dakota Utilities Co. has contracted with 
Constellation Energy to offer a demand response 
resources program for commercial and industrial 
customers. Participants in Montana, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota agree to curtail non-critical load during 
demand response events initiated by the utility and 
will receive financial compensation (both capacity and 
energy payments) in return (Constellation Energy 
2011). 
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remove vegetation and can increase exposure of electricity 
poles to erosion resulting from subsequent heavy 
precipitation events. 
The risk of wildfires is projected to increase in the 
mountainous forest and shrubland areas of Montana and 
Wyoming, as warmer temperatures, increased 
evapotranspiration, and a longer growing season can dry 
soils and contribute to a buildup of combustible biomass 
(USDA 2013). Some ecosystems may experience a four-fold 
increase or more in the average area burned per year for 
each 1°C global temperature rise (NRC 2011). Increased 
wildfire risk areas coincide with the location of several large 
transmission lines (>345 kV) in the region (Figure 4-7). In 
2005, the Tarkio fire burned under two of the Bonneville 
Power Administration’s (BPA's) 500 kV transmission lines in 
western Montana, causing BPA to preemptively shut the 
lines down (Montana Standard 2005). In another recent 
example, the 2012 Ash Creek Complex Fire in southeast 
Montana caused significant damage to the area's grid as it 
burned through a major transmission line (KTVQ 2012).   
 
Figure 4-7. Electric transmissions lines (>345 kV), shown by 
dashed lines on the map, and projected percentage increase in 
burned areas for a 1°C increase in global average temperature
4
  
Sources: NRC 2011, EIA 2014k 
Electric Grid 
Resilience Solutions 
Both operational and hardening measures can be taken to 
improve the resilience of new and existing transmission 
infrastructure. The detrimental effects of increased 
temperatures on grid capacity may require expanding 
capacity or reducing demand, while assets can be protected 
from increased fire activity with both system upgrades and 
improved management practices.  
                                                                
4
 Wildfire projections are based on temperature and precipitation 
patterns associated with a 1°C increase in global average 
temperature and are relative to the median area burned during 
1950–2003. 
Adding grid capacity and redundancy can increase resilience 
to falling capacity on extremely hot days, especially as the 
hottest days will likely see the highest demand for 
electricity (DOE 2013a). Utility measures to reduce demand, 
including energy efficiency and load management 
programs, can also reduce the need for new transmission 
capacity (DOE 2013a). As the region is a significant 
electricity exporter, local demand management programs 
may have limited efficacy when addressing falling 
transmission capacity on long-distance interstate 
transmission lines. However, such measures may be 
effective for reducing burdens on transmission lines 
connecting small communities to the grid. Such programs 
are discussed in the Electricity Demand section.  
To prevent damage to transformers, operators can reduce 
transformer loads when air temperatures are high (Hashmi 
et al. 2013). Operators can also install or upgrade cooling 
systems for large transformers and invest in newer 
thermally upgraded transformers (USBR 2000, Bérubé 
2007).  
Proactive vegetation management is an important practice 
for increasing resilience to both increasing temperatures 
and wildfire. Managers can reduce the risk of tree strikes 
resulting from sagging lines by trimming trees along 
transmission rights-of-way. Vegetation management is a 
key practice for reducing transmission line vulnerabilities to 
wildfire. Active forest management includes measures to 
reduce build-up of hazardous fuels near key power lines—
such as forest thinning and prescribed burning—and reduce 
the likelihood of human-caused ignition (e.g., campfires, 
short circuits from faulty equipment on power lines) (CPUC 
and DOI 2008, DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). PacifiCorp, a 
power company that operates Rocky Mountain Power in 
the Northern Great Plains and Southwest region, has 
developed an app to monitor wildfires that could damage 
lines and disrupt service to customers. The app allows the 
utility to monitor and protect transmission lines and 
prevent power outages even when lines are damaged (ESRI 
2014). 
Strengthening of power lines and towers to resist physical 
damage, including the installation of steel towers for the 
most vulnerable lines, can improve the resilience of 
individual lines to wildfires, limiting damage and expediting 
restoration (DOE 2013a). Resilience could also be improved 




Hydroelectric generation produces 14% of the region's 
electric power (see Table 4-2 on page 4-4) (EIA 2013c). 
Hydroelectric facilities in Montana and South Dakota make 
up the majority of the region’s total output of hydropower, 
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generating about 11 million MWh per year and 6 million 
MWh per year, respectively (Figure 4-8) (EIA 2013c). 
 
  
Figure 4-8. Canyon Ferry Dam and Reservoir near Helena, 
Montana 
Source: USBR 2013 
Climate change in the Northern Great Plains may affect 
hydropower in the following ways: 
 In the Columbia River Basin, decreasing summer 
streamflows may reduce downstream hydropower 
production, and increasing winter and early spring 
streamflows may increase production (BPA 2011, DOE 
2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
 In the Missouri River basin, projected seasonal declines 
in precipitation in the southern and western portion of 
the region may reduce the water available to generate 
hydropower (USGCRP 2014). 
The Northern Great Plains largely lies to the east of the 
Continental Divide; however, four dams in Montana are 
located in the Columbia River Basin on the Flathead, 
Kootenai, and Clark Fork Rivers (EIA 2014t). Spring 
snowpack and summer precipitation in far western 
Montana are expected to decline in a warming climate, 
contributing to decreased summer streamflows for power 
plants in the Columbia River Basin (BPA 2011, DOE 2012).  
The Missouri River basin stretches across most of the 
region, and its drainage provides water to many of the 
hydroelectric generators in both Montana and South 
Dakota. For example, the Platte River basin in Wyoming and 
Nebraska, which is part of the Missouri River system, is the 
source of numerous hydropower facilities (EIA 2014b). The 
Missouri River basin draws from a large area where climate 
models project both increasing and decreasing 
precipitation, depending on the season, location, and 
emissions scenario. The gradient towards reduced 
precipitation in the southwestern portion of the region 
suggests that facilities drawing on water flows from those 
areas could face reductions in available generating capacity, 
although there is uncertainty about these projections.  
Hydroelectric Power 
Resilience Solutions 
Most of the Northern Great Plains is projected to see higher 
precipitation during the winter (Figure 4-5). If excess river 
flow remains within the reservoir capacities of dams, then 
hydropower facilities may be able to store the water for 
generation (DOE 2013a). Otherwise, potentially reduced 
summer flows may have an impact on generation.  
In the western, mountainous parts of the region, 
forecasting snowmelt timing based on snowpack and 
temperature trends will facilitate the prediction of seasonal 
availability of hydropower generation. Leveraging these 
data resources can improve the resilience of regional power 
production—not only by supporting the preparation and 
execution of contingency plans for hydropower production 
but also by improving the effectiveness of overall regional 
water management strategies that affect thermoelectric 
generation and other water users. 
Bioenergy 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
As a major producer of biofuels, the Northern Great Plains 
is vulnerable to climate impacts that affect the cultivation, 
transportation, and conversion of crops to fuel. Bioenergy 
production and consumption in the region is dominated by 
ethanol production from corn and also includes a small 
amount of biodiesel from canola oil and electricity 
generation from captured landfill and wastewater gases.  
The region is home to almost a quarter of the nation's 
ethanol refining capacity, with operational facilities 
capable of producing 3.2 billion gallons of ethanol per year 
(Figure 4-9) (NEO 2014). Of the 48 ethanol biorefineries in 
the region, all but one use corn as a feedstock (RFA 2014). 
The region harvested 22% of the nation's corn acres in 2013 
(USDA 2014).  
Figure 4-9. Industrial biorefinery in York County, Nebraska 
Source: ORNL 2006 
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Climate change in the Northern Great Plains may affect 
bioenergy production in the following ways: 
 Increasing temperatures may benefit certain crops, but 
extreme temperatures may harm them; warmer 
temperatures may also benefit weeds, disease, and 
pests (USGCRP 2014). 
 Lower numbers of freezing days and a lengthening of 
the frost-free growing season may extend the range 
where biofuel crops can be grown (Bjerga 2012, NOAA 
2013a, Roberts and Schlenker 2011). 
 Changes to precipitation and evapotranspiration, 
including an increasing risk of periodic drought or floods, 
may either benefit or harm agricultural production 
(NOAA 2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
Climate change impacts on corn growth are complex, with a 
mix of outcomes depending on the region, and are evolving 
over time. Changes in the length of the frost-free season in 
the plains are projected to be favorable, with increases of 
15–24 days per year by mid-century, depending on the 
location (NOAA 2013a). A longer growing season will 
improve northern farmers' ability to grow a more diverse 
set of crops, expanding from wheat in the northern parts of 
the region to include both corn and soy (Bjerga 2012, 
Roberts and Schlenker 2011). Plant growth is generally 
aided by increased average temperatures and CO2 levels; 
however, beneficial effects to crops may be outpaced by 
adverse impacts such as increased growth of weeds and 
survival of diseases and pests farther north as winters warm 
(USGCRP 2014). Projected increases in winter and spring 
precipitation may also benefit agricultural productivity as 
soil moisture reserves are recharged, although increased 
heavy precipitation events can erode soils, flood fields, and 
damage or destroy crops (USGCRP 2014).  
Higher temperatures increase evapotranspiration, and 
declining summer precipitation may increase instances of 
drought (USGCRP 2014). In 2012, drought coincided with a 
16% decline in Nebraska corn production compared to 2011 
levels, and surface water irrigation withdrawals were halted 
in some areas to maintain sufficient streamflow (Plume 
2012, USDA 2012a, USDA 2014). The corn shortage resulted 
in Nebraska’s ethanol plants operating at 70% of capacity, 
and eight ethanol plants in Nebraska and Minnesota 
stopped production (Nebraska Ethanol Board 2012, Salter 
2013).   
Biorefineries are also vulnerable to decreasing water 
availability during drier summers and periods of drought 
(DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). Biorefineries use about 
2.7 gallons of water per gallon of ethanol produced (Wu 
et al. 2011). A typical 100 million gallon-per-year ethanol 
plant requires approximately one million gallons of water 
per day (DOE 2013a).  
Bioenergy 
Resilience Solutions 
Resilience strategies for agriculture include diversification 
of crops, increased and efficient application of pesticides, 
and additional practices associated with sustainable 
agriculture, such as no-till farming to better retain soil 
moisture and reduce erosion (USGCRP 2014).  
Although water efficiency in biorefineries has significantly 
improved over the past decade, there are additional 
opportunities for process improvements (Wu et al. 2011). 
Freshwater demand could be substantially reduced by 
recycling water or using alternative water resources (DOE 
2013a). For example, Tharaldson Ethanol LLC in Casselton, 
North Dakota, uses wastewater from Fargo, North Dakota, 
as its main source of water (Schuh 2010).  
 
Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The region’s oil and gas industry is driven by increasing 
crude oil production from the Williston Basin's Bakken and 
Three Forks formations in North Dakota and eastern 
Montana. Advances in drilling methods and technology, 
high oil prices for the past decade, and a better 
understanding of the geology of the Bakken have 
contributed to the growth of the region’s oil industry (EIA 
2014s). 
Climate change is projected to affect oil and gas exploration 
and production in the Northern Great Plains as follows: 
• Declining water availability in the summer may increase 
costs for oil production operations, which require 
freshwater resources (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
• More frequent and intense heavy precipitation events 
increase the likelihood of associated flooding, which 
could damage facilities and disrupt operations (DOE 
2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
Under a high emissions scenario, some models project 
summer precipitation to decline in the Missouri River basin 
(USGCRP 2014). Decreasing precipitation in the summer 
and warmer temperatures accelerating evaporation of 
surface water could limit local water available in the Bakken 
region for oil and gas operations, which mainly uses surface 
water sources such as Lake Sakakawea in North Dakota 
Water use efficiency in cellulosic ethanol plants 
The Dakota Spirit AgEnergy cellulosic ethanol plant is 
expected to function as a prototype for a high level 
of water-use efficiency when it is constructed. The 
plant in Jamestown, North Dakota, will use steam 
from the Spiritwood Energy Station, an electricity 
generating station that uses wastewater from the 
City of Jamestown as its main water source (Schuch 
2010). 
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(Figure 4-10). Other surface water systems in the Bakken 
region do not provide a reliable source of water because of 
seasonal flow variations (NDIC 2010). Lake Sakakawea is a 
main water supply source for competing uses, such as the 
large agriculture sector, and decreasing water availability 
can increase costs and amplify current challenges for the oil 
industry in obtaining water. Water used in North Dakota’s 
Bakken for hydraulic fracturing can be as high as 60,000 
barrels (bbl) (3 million gallons) per shale well, depending on 
the number of stages in the fracture. Companies must truck 
water to many well site locations in 7,500–8,000 gallon 
tanker trucks, and resulting transport costs can lead to 
purchased water costs ranging from $0.88/bbl to $6.05/bbl 
(NDIC 2010). 
 
Figure 4-10. Proximity of Lake Sakakawea to Bakken oil and gas 
operations 
Source: EIA 2014k 
While seasonal water availability could decline, annual 
average precipitation and heavy rainfall events are 
expected to increase (NOAA 2013a). Extreme precipitation 
events cause large volumes of runoff to flow quickly over 
farmland and rangeland into streams and rivers, increasing 
the chance of overland and river flooding. Oil and gas 
equipment and operations in low-lying areas are 
susceptible to physical damage and disruption from floods. 
In June 2015, North Dakota oil regulators ordered an oil 
producer to shut-in 15 oil wells near the confluence of the 
Missouri River and Yellowstone River after more than 1.5 
inches of rainfall sparked flooding concerns (DOE 2015). 
In the winter, warmer temperatures could benefit oil 
production. Cold and icy weather can strand wells, cause 
producers to scale back on drilling and completions, and 
reduce output (DOE 2014b). Cold waves are projected to be 
less intense in the future (USGCRP 2014). 
Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Resilience Solutions 
As competition for limited water resources increases, oil 
and gas companies can take measures to reduce their 
vulnerability to freshwater scarcity. Resilience solutions 
include water reuse/recycling and switching to lower-
quality water, such as produced water, degraded water, 
wastewater, or brackish groundwater sources, which do not 
compete with irrigation and municipal water needs. 
Companies may also be able to utilize alternative fracturing 
techniques such as foam-based fracturing, Liquid Petroleum 
Gas (LPG) fracturing, or channel fracturing. These methods 
use alternate fluids for fracturing and may reduce water 
requirements while promoting enhanced recovery, but only 
work in formations with specific characteristics (GAO 2015). 
Planners can protect oil and gas operations from flooding 
by locating new equipment at higher elevations or outside 
of flood plains, where practical. Levees or other engineered 
barriers can also be an effective option to prevent damage 
to valuable equipment from floods.  
Wind Energy 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Northern Great Plains region has over 5,100 MW of 
operational wind generating capacity, or almost 15% of 
total electricity generation capacity in the region, and some 
of the best onshore wind resources in the country (EIA 
2013a, NREL 2014). In the region, there are 38 utilities 
operating 72 wind generation stations (EIA 2013a).  
There is not yet substantial agreement among sources as to 
how a changing climate will ultimately affect wind 
resources in the United States in general and in the 
Northern Great Plains in particular (DOE 2013a). It is 
uncertain whether wind power production will be disrupted 
by climate-driven changes to wind patterns or whether it 
will see an increase in available capacity.   
Wind Energy 
Resilience Solutions 
Sophisticated wind forecasting systems allow operators to 
better predict available wind generation and determine 
when wind power needs to be supplemented with other 
generation sources to meet customer demand. Xcel Energy, 
a utility operating throughout the midwestern and western 
United States, has deployed the WindWX system, which 
uses real-time, turbine-level operating data to forecast wind 
generation (Edison Foundation 2013). 
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Wyoming’s Foote Creek Rim project has 183 wind turbines 
with a generating capacity of 135 MW. These turbines are 
designed to withstand 125-mph gusts and are also 
adapted to operate reliably in extremely cold conditions ( 
Figure 4-11). The project also has electronic control systems 
that point each turbine into the wind and adjust the pitch of 
the blades to make the best use of wind in variable 
operating conditions (BLM 2011). 
  
 
Figure 4-11. Foote Creek Rim wind project in southeastern 
Wyoming, which is equipped with technology to maximize 
generating output under a range of conditions  
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Regional Climate Change Observations 
and Projections in Detail 
Higher Temperatures 
Historical observations 
 Since 1895, average temperatures have increased 0.2°F 
per decade, or almost 2.2°F (NOAA 2013a). 
 Winters have warmed faster than other seasons: Since 
1895, average temperatures have increased 0.33°F per 
decade in the winter, compared to 0.20°F per decade in 
the spring, 0.14°F per decade in the summer, and 0.13°F 
per decade in the fall (NOAA 2013a).  
 Freeze-free season has been growing: Across all of the 
Great Plains, the length of the freeze-free season has 
grown since 1895. The average freeze-free season was 
about six days longer during 1991–2010 than during 
1961–1990 (NOAA 2013a). 
Future projections 
 Average temperatures are projected to increase at a 
faster rate: Increases of 3.5°F–9.5°F are projected by 
2070–2099 compared to 1971–1999 levels, depending 
on the region and greenhouse gas emissions (NOAA 
2013c). 
 Extremely hot days are projected to become more 
common: Across most of the region, 5–20 more days 
with a daily maximum >95°F are projected by mid-
century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000); 
Nebraska is likely to be most affected, including 
increases of as many as 25 more extremely hot days per 
year projected (NOAA 2013c). 
 Consecutive number of days of extreme heat are 
expected to become longer: The annual maximum 
number of consecutive days with a daily high >95°F is 
projected to increase by 0–12 days by mid-century 
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000) across most of 
the region, with larger increases in the southern part 
(NOAA 2013c). 
 Extremely cold nights are projected to become much 
less common: Across the region, 10–30 fewer days with 
daily minimums <10°F are projected by mid-century 
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000), with 
mountainous regions seeing the largest decrease and 
Nebraska and South Dakota seeing the smallest change 
(NOAA 2013c). 
 Freeze-free season is projected to lengthen: Across 
most of the region, the freeze-free season is projected 
to be 18–24 days longer by mid-century (2041–2070, 
compared to 1980–2000), with larger increases in the 
mountains (NOAA 2013c).  
 Cooling degree days (CDDs) are projected to increase: 
In Nebraska and South Dakota, an increase of 400–800 
CDDs is projected by mid-century (2041–2070, 
compared to 1980–2000), while increases are projected 
to be lower elsewhere in the region, especially in the 
mountains (NOAA 2013c). 
 Heating degree days (HDDs) are projected to decrease: 
Across the region, declines of 850–1,650 HDDs are 
projected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000), with the lowest declines in Nebraska and 
the highest declines in the western and northern 
portions of the region (NOAA 2013c). 
Changing Precipitation Patterns and Wildfire 
Historical observations 
 Historical trends in precipitation are not statistically 
significant, neither annually nor seasonally (NOAA 
2013a). 
 Across the Great Plains, extreme precipitation events 
have occurred more frequently: An index of one-day 
precipitation events projected to occur once every five 
years shows a statistically significant upward trend since 
1895 (NOAA 2013c). 
 April snowpack in Montana and Wyoming has declined: 
From 1955 through 2013, annual total snowpack in April 
has declined at most observation sites in the region's 
mountains (EPA 2014).  
 Snowmelt in Wyoming has occurred earlier over the 
last half-century: From 1961–2002, snowmelt in 
Wyoming has occurred earlier (USGCRP 2014). 
Future projections  
 Across most of the region, annual precipitation is 
projected to increase: By the end of the century (2070–
2099, compared to 1971–1999), precipitation is 
projected to increase 0%–9% across the entire region 
excluding Nebraska and depending on both latitude and 
emissions scenario. Generally, the projected increase 
increases with latitude (NOAA 2013c).  
 Winter and spring precipitation is projected to 
increase: In general, northern state winters and springs 
are projected to see increased precipitation relative to 
the 1970–1999 period average under a higher emissions 
(A2) scenario, while changes to summer and fall 
precipitation are small (USGCRP 2014).  
 Drier summers are projected: In the central Great 
Plains, a trend toward drier summers is projected 
(USGCRP 2014). 
 Extreme precipitation is projected to occur more 
frequently in the northern states: Very heavy 
precipitation events are projected to increase in 
northern states, leading to increased runoff and flooding 
(USGCRP 2014). 
 Risk of wildfire is projected to increase: For every 1°C 
rise in global temperature, the area burned by wildfire in 
the western Northern Great Plains region is projected to 
increase by 73% to over 600% (compared to the median 
annual burned from 1950–2003), depending on the 
ecosystem (NRC 2011).  
 
Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Northern Great Plains 4-14 
 
Chapter 4 References 
AAR (Association of American Railroads). 2014. “US Freight Railroad Industry Snapshot.” Association of American Railroads. 
http://www.aar.org/data-center/railroads-states. 
Basin. 2014. “Antelope Valley Station to Neset Transmission Project.” Basin Electric Power Cooperative. 
http://www.basinelectric.com/Projects/North_Dakota_Transmission/index.html. 
Bérubé J., J. Aubin, and W. McDermid. 2007. “Transformer Winding Hot Spot Temperature Determination.” Electric Energy T&D Magazine 
11(2). March/April. http://www.electricenergyonline.com/show_article.php?article=311.  
Bjerga, A. 2012. “Corn Belt Shifts North with Climate as Kansas Crop Dies.” Bloomberg, October 15. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
10-15/corn-belt-shifts-north-with-climate-as-kansas-crop-dies.html. 
BLM (U.S. Bureau of Land Management). 2011. “Wyoming Wind Energy Project.” Accessed February 10, 2015. 
http://www.blm.gov/wy/st/en/field_offices/Rawlins/wind.html. 
BPA (Bonneville Power Administration). 2011. “Fact Sheet: Northwest Federal Agencies Prepare for a Changing Climate.” Portland, OR: 
Bonneville Power Administration. http://www.bpa.gov/power/pgf/ClimateChange/Climate_Change_Sept_2011_post.pdf.  
Brown, M. 2013. “Floods Blamed for 16 Pipeline Spills.” Associated Press. January 3. http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/apnewsbreak-floods-
blamed-16-pipeline-spills. 
Capital Journal. 2014. “Montana-Dakota Utilities to Buy ND Wind Farm.” The Capital Journal, November 24. Accessed December 15. 
http://www.capjournal.com/news/montana-dakota-utilities-to-buy-nd-wind-farm/article_eac25f3e-73f6-11e4-8b64-5b7a057326ff.html.  
CCSP (U.S. Climate Change Science Program). 2008. “Impacts of Climate Change and Variability on Transportation Systems and Infrastructure: 
Gulf Coast Study, Phase I.” In Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.7, M. J. Savonis, V. R. Burkett, and J. R. Potter, eds. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Transportation. 
Constellation Energy (Constellation Energy Group, Inc.). 2011. “Reduce Your Energy Cost with Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.” Constellation 
Energy Group, Inc. Accessed December 15, 2014. http://www.constellation.com/documents/product%20sheets/montana-dakota-
utilities.pdf.  
CPUC and DOI (California Public Utilities Commission and U.S. Department of Interior). 2008. Effect of Wildfires on Transmission Line Reliability. 
Environment Impact Statement, Sunrise Powerlink Project, Attachment 1A. California Public Utilities Commission. 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/environment/info/aspen/sunrise/deir/apps/a01/App%201%20ASR%20z_Attm%201A-Fire%20Report.pdf. 
CRS (Congressional Research Service). 2014. U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil: Background and Issues for Congress, 7-5700. CRS Report. 
Congressional Research Service. May 5. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43390.pdf. 
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy). 2007. Deliveries of Coal from the Powder River Basin: Events and Trends 2005-2007. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Energy. October. https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/Final-Coal-Study_101507.pdf. 
DOE. 2012. Climate Change and Energy Supply and Use: Technical Report to the U.S. Department of Energy in Support of the National Climate 
Assessment. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy. February 29. http://www.esd.ornl.gov/eess/EnergySupplyUse.pdf.  
DOE. 2013a. U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy. July 16. 
http://www.energy.gov/downloads/us-energy-sector-vulnerabilities-climate-change-and-extreme-weather.  
DOE. 2013b. Effects of Climate Change on Federal Hydropower. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy. August. 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/water/pdfs/hydro_climate_change_report.pdf. 
DOE. 2014a. Business-as-Usual Reference Case: U.S. Liquid Fuels Transportation, Storage, and Distribution Infrastructure. Unpublished 
contribution to the Quadrennial Energy Review. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy.  
DOE. 2014b. Energy Assurance Daily – January 7, 2014. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy. 
https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/eads/ead010714.pdf. 
DOE. 2014c. “Ethanol Production and Distribution.” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy. Accessed March 27, 2015. 
http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/ethanol_production.html. 
DOE. 2015. Energy Assurance Daily – June 4, 2015. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy. 
https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/eads/ead060415.pdf. 
DOT (U.S. Department of Transportation). 2009. Literature Review: Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment, Risk Assessment, and Adaptation 
Approaches. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation. 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/climate_change/adaptation/publications_and_tools/vulnerability_assessment/. 
DOT. 2012. Hazardous Liquids Accident Data with Emphasis on Crude Oil and Internal Corrosion. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration. Presented to Transportation Research Board, October 23. http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/dilbit/Keener102312.pdf.   
DOT. 2014. “Impacts of Climate Change and Variability on Transportation Systems and Infrastructure: The Gulf Coast Study, Phase 2. 
6. Evaluating Vulnerability of Pipelines.” U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. September 5. 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/climate_change/adaptation/ongoing_and_current_research/gulf_coast_study/phase2_task3/task
_3.1/page06.cfm 
Edison Foundation. 2013. Innovations across the Grid: Partnerships Transforming the Power Sector. Washington, DC: The Edison Foundation. 
December. http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iei/Documents/InnovationsAcrosstheGrid_LoRes_InstElcInnv.pdf.  
 
Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Northern Great Plains 4-15 
 
EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration). 2011. “Distribution and Production of Oil and Gas Wells by State.” Accessed December 5, 2014. 
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/petrosystem/petrosysog.html.   
EIA. 2012a. Coal Production Annual 2012. Washington, DC: U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
http://www.eia.gov/coal/data.cfm#production. 
EIA. 2012b. “Coal Transportation Rates to the Electric Power Sector.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. November 16. 
http://www.eia.gov/coal/transportationrates/archive/2010/trend-coal.cfm. 
EIA. 2012c. “Rail Deliveries of Oil and Petroleum Products up 38% in First Half of 2012.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. July 26. 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7270. 
EIA. 2012d. “North American Spot Crude Oil Benchmarks Likely Diverging Due to Bottlenecks.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. June 21. 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6790. 
EIA. 2013a. Existing Nameplate and Net Summer Capacity by Energy Source, Producer Type and State (EIA-860). U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/. 
EIA. 2013b. Electric Power Sales, Revenue and Energy Efficiency Data – Annual (Form EIA-861). Washington, DC: U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/. 
EIA. 2013c. “Electricity State Level Data: Net Generation by State by Type of Producer by Energy Source (EIA-906, EIA-920, and EIA-923).” Excel 
data sheet. Washington, DC: U.S. Energy Information Administration. http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/. 
EIA. 2014a. “North Dakota and Texas Now Provide Nearly Half of U.S. Crude Oil Production.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. July 1. 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16931.  
EIA. 2014b. “State Energy Profiles.” Washington, DC: U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed August 20. http://www.eia.gov/state/.  
EIA. 2014c. “Railroad Deliveries Continue to Provide the Majority of Coal Shipments to the Power Sector.” Washington, DC: U.S. Energy 
Information Administration. Accessed August 20. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16651.  
EIA. 2014d. Drilling Productivity Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Energy Information Administration. August 11. 
http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/.  
EIA. 2014e. “Petroleum & Other Liquids Data Series: Crude Oil Production.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. June. 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_m.htm. 
EIA. 2014f. “Crude-by-Rail Transportation Provides Bakken Shale Production Access to Major Markets.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
June 10, 2014. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16631. 
EIA. 2014g. “Nonmarketed Natural Gas in North Dakota Still Rising Due to Higher Total Production.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
Accessed August 22. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15511. 
EIA. 2014h. Natural Gas Pipelines Projects Excel data sheet. Washington, DC: U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/data.cfm#pipelines.   
EIA. 2014i. “Natural Gas Pipelines in the Central Region.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed August 22. 
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/central.html. 
EIA. 2014j. “Electricity Monthly Update: Highlights for May 2014.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed February 5, 2015. 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/archive/july2014/. 
EIA. 2014k. “U.S. Energy Mapping System.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed August 20. 
http://www.eia.gov/state/maps.cfm?src=home-f3. 
EIA. 2014l.” Less severe weather means lower expected household heating bills this winter.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed 
February 5, 2015. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18291#tabs_SpotPriceSlider-3. 
EIA. 2014m. “Natural Gas: Number of Producing Wells.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed October 20. 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_wells_s1_a.htm.  
EIA. 2014n. “Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed December 5. 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dcu_stx_a.htm.  
EIA. 2014o. “Coal Data Browser.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed December 5. 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/coal/data/browser/#/topic/20?agg=1,0&geo=vvvvvvvvvvvvo&sec=g&freq=A&start=2008&end=2013&ctype=lin
echart&ltype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0.  
EIA. 2014p. “Natural Gas Consumption by End Use.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed December 5. 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_SDC_a.htm. 
EIA. 2014q. “Number and Capacity of Petroleum Refineries.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed February 6, 2015. 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pnp_cap1_dcu_nus_a.htm. 
EIA. 2014r. “Natural gas is the dominant heating fuel in colder parts of the country.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed February 
5, 2015. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18811. 
EIA. 2014s. “Bakken fuels North Dakota’s oil production growth.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed February 9, 2015. 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17391. 
 
Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Northern Great Plains 4-16 
 
EIA. 2014t. “The Columbia River Basin provides more than 40% of total U.S. hydroelectric generation.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
Accessed March 24, 2015. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16891. 
EIA. 2014u. “State Electricity Profiles, Table 10.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed March 25, 2015. 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/. 
EIA. 2014v. “Coal stockpiles at coal-fired power plants smaller than in recent years.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed March 
26, 2015. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18711. 
EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). 2014. “Climate Change Indicators in the United States. Figure 1: Trends in April Snowpack in the 
Western United States, 1955-2013.” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/indicators/snow-
ice/snowpack.html. 
ESRI. 2014. “Need to Fight Fire? There’s a Map App for That!” ESRI, October 6. Accessed December 15. http://www.esri.com/esri-
news/releases/14-4qtr/need-to-fight-fire-theres-a-map-app-for-that. 
FRA (Federal Railroad Administration). 2011. Continuous Welded Rail Enforcement Guidance Manual. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration. https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L02700. 
FRA. 2014. Accident Data as Reported by Railroads. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration. 
Accessed August 22. http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/publicsite/on_the_fly_download.aspx.  
GAO (Government Accountability Office). 2015. Technology Assessment: Water in the Energy Sector – Reducing freshwater use in hydraulic 
fracturing and thermoelectric power plant cooling. Washington, DC: GAO. August. http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671913.pdf. 
Hashmi M, M. Lehtonen, and S. Hänninen. 2013. “Effect of Climate Change on Transformers Loading Conditions in the Future Smart Grid 
Environment.” Open Journal of Applied Sciences 3: 24-29. June. doi:10.4236/ojapps.2013.32B005. 
Hirsch, R. M., and K. R. Ryberg. 2012. “Has the Magnitude of Floods Across the USA Changed with Global CO2 Levels?” Hydrological Sciences 
Journal 57: 1–9.  
Katchmar, P. J. 2012. “ExxonMobil Silvertip Pipeline Crude Oil Release into the Yellowstone River in Laurel, MT on 7/1/2011.” Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Transportation.http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ExxonMobil01022013.pdf.  
KLJ. 2012. Power Forecast 2012. Williston Basin Oil and Gas Related Electrical Load Growth Forecast. KLJ Engineering. 
http://www.nd.gov/ndic/ic-press/Power2012.pdf. 
KTVQ. 2012. “Ash Creek Fire in SE Montana Still at 110K+ Acres, Knocks Out Power.” KTVQ. June 28. http://www.kxlh.com/news/ash-creek-fire-
in-se-montana-still-at-110k-acres-knocks-out-power/.  
Miller, T. and T. Bryski. 2012. “Going Deep with Horizontal Directional Drilling.” World Pipelines. October 2012. 
http://www.golder.com/ph/modules.php?name=Publication&sp_id=260&page_id=212. 
Montana Standard. 2005. “Fire Shuts Down BPA Line.” The Montana Standard. August 11. http://mtstandard.com/news/state-and-
regional/fire-shuts-down-bpa-line/article_8f585733-05b2-5d07-bec6-573b4ea0b934.html. 
NDIC (North Dakota Industrial Commission). 2010. Bakken Water Opportunities Assessment – Phase 1. Prepared by University of North Dakota 
Energy & Environmental Research Center, April 2010. http://www.nd.gov/ndic/ogrp/info/g-018-036-fi.pdf. 
Nebraska Ethanol Board. 2012. " Ethanol Producers Adapt to Drought, Corn Prices." American Agriculturalist. August 16. 
http://farmprogress.com/story-ethanol-producers-adapt-drought-corn-prices-9-62421. 
NEO (Nebraska Energy Office). 2014. “Nebraska Energy Statistics: Ethanol Facilities Capacity by State and Plant.” Nebraska Energy Office. 
Accessed August 27. http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/122.htm.  
NETL (National Energy Technology Laboratory). 2009. An Analysis of the Effects of Drought Conditions on Electric Power Generation in the 
Western United States, DOE/NETL-2009/1365. National Energy Technology Laboratory. http://www.dis.anl.gov/pubs/63599.pdf. 
NOAA (U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration). 2013a. Regional Climate Trends and Scenarios for the U.S. National Climate 
Assessment. Part 9. Climate of the Contiguous United States. Washington, DC: U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration. http://scenarios.globalchange.gov/sites/default/files/NOAA_NESDIS_Tech_Report_142-9-
Climate_of_the_Contiguous_United_States_3.pdf. 
NOAA. 2013b. Cooling Degree Day Data Summary for Dec 2013. Washington, DC: U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration.ftp://ftp.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/htdocs/products/analysis_monitoring/cdus/degree_days/archives/Cooling%20Degree%20Day
s/monthly%20cooling%20degree%20days%20city/2013/Dec%202013.txt.  
NOAA. 2013c. Regional Climate Trends and Scenarios for the U.S. National Climate Assessment. Part 4. Climate of the U.S. Great Plains. 
Washington, DC: U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. 
http://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/technical_reports/NOAA_NESDIS_Tech_Report_142-4-Climate_of_the_U.S.%20Great_Plains.pdf. 
NOAA. 2015. “Data Tools: 1981-2010 Normals.” Accessed April 9. https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cdo-web/datatools/normals. 
NREL (National Renewable Energy Laboratory). 2014. “Wind Maps: U.S. Annual Average Wind Speed at 30m.” U.S. Department of Energy. 
http://www.nrel.gov/gis/wind.html. 
NRC (National Research Council). 2008. Potential Impacts of Climate Change on U.S. Transportation. Special Report 290. Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press. http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12179/potential-impacts-of-climate-change-on-us-transportation-special-report. 
 
Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Northern Great Plains 4-17 
 
NRC. 2011. Climate Stabilization Targets: Emissions, Concentrations, and Impacts over Decades to Millennia. Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press. LOC: 2010 936129.  
ORNL (Oak Ridge National Laboratory). 2006. “The Goal of Biomass Conversion: (c) Industrial Biorefinery in York County, Nebraska (Abengoa 
Bioenergy Corporation).” Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
https://public.ornl.gov/site/gallery/detail.cfm?id=235&topic=&citation=8&general=&restsection=#credits. 
Otter Tail Power Company. 2014. “Renewable Energy.” Otter Tail Power Company. Accessed December 15. https://www.otpco.com/about-
us/environmental-commitment/climate-change/greenhouse-gas-reduction-efforts/#renewable-energy.   
Plume, R. 2012. “Nebraska Farms Ordered to Halt Irrigation Amid Drought.” Reuters, July 16. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/16/us-
usa-drought-nebraska-idUSBRE86F0XP20120716. 
RFA (Renewable Fuels Association). 2014. “Biorefinery Locations.” Renewable Fuels Association. Accessed August 1. 
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/bio-refinery-locations/. 
Roberts M. J. and W. Schlenker. 2011. “The Evolution of Heat Tolerance of Corn: Implications for Climate Change.” In The Economics of Climate 
Change: Adaptations Past and Present. G. D. Libecap, and R. H. Steckel, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. May. 
http://www.ncsu.edu/cenrep/research/documents/Roberts_NBER09_11_05-1.pdf. 
Salter, J. 2013. “Corn Shortage Idles 20 Ethanol Plants Nationwide.” USA Today, February 10. 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/10/corn-shortage-idles-plants-nationwide/1906831/. 
Schuch, W. M. 2010. Water Appropriation Requirements, Current Water Use, & Water Availability for Energy Industries in North Dakota: A 2010 
Summary. Bismarck, ND: North Dakota State Water Commission. August. http://www.swc.state.nd.us/4dlink9/4dcgi/GetContentPDF/PB-
1800/W&E%20RPT%20FinalR.pdf. 
UCS (Union of Concerned Scientists). 2011. Power and Water at Risk. Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists. 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/ew3/power-and-water-at-risk-with-endnotes.pdf. 
Union Pacific. 2011. “End of Year 2011 Railroad Service Outlook.” Letter from Union Pacific to the Honorable Daniel R. Elliot, Chairman, Surface 
Transportation Board. http://www.stb.dot.gov/peakletters1.nsf/245ad10a6c67d8ec8525790400697a70/ 
273d6406ee58b40a852579190061ac3d/$FILE/UP%20STB%20Peak%20Season%20Letter%202011.pdf. 
USACE (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) 2014. Waterborne Commerce of the United States: Calendar Year 2012 Part 2 – Waterways and Harbors 
Gulf Coast, Mississippi River System and Antilles. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 
http://www.navigationdatacenter.us/wcsc/pdf/wcusmvgc12.pdf. 
USBR (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation). 2000. Permissible Loading of Oil-Immersed Transformers and Regulators. Denver, CO: U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, Facilities Engineering Branch. September. http://www.usbr.gov/power/data/fist/fist1_5/vol1-5.pdf.  
USBR. 2013. “Canyon Ferry Dam and Reservoir near Helena, Montana.” Archived Photographs from the Great Plains Region. Washington, DC: 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. March 8. http://www.usbr.gov/gp/multimedia/archive/photos.html. 
USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture). 2012a. 2012 Crop Report. Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Agriculture. 
http://usda01.library.cornell.edu/usda/nass/CropProdSu/2010s/2012/CropProdSu-01-12-2012.pdf. 
USDA. 2012b. Water Conservation in Irrigated Agriculture: Trends and Challenges in the Face of Emerging Demands. Economic Information 
Bulletin Number 99. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture. http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/884158/eib99.pdf.  
USDA. 2013. Wildfire, Wildlands, and People: Understanding and Preparing for Wildfire in the Wildland-Urban Interface. General Technical 
Report RMRS-GTR-299. U.S. Forest Service. http://www.fs.fed.us/openspace/fote/reports/GTR-299.pdf.  
USDA. 2014. 2014 Crop Report. Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture. 
http://www.usda.gov/nass/PUBS/TODAYRPT/crop1113.pdf. 
USGCRP (U.S. Global Change Research Program). 2014. Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Global Change Research Program. http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report.  
U.S. Census Bureau. 2014. “State & County QuickFacts.” U.S. Department of Commerce. Accessed July 22. 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html. 
Volpe. 2003. “Track Buckling Research.” Cambridge, MA: U.S. Department of Transportation, The National Transportation Systems Center. 
2003. http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/50000/50700/50710/Track_Buckling_Research_2003.pdf. 
WAPA (Western Area Power Administration). 2015. "Transmission Frequently Asked Questions." Accessed February 6. 
http://ww2.wapa.gov/sites/western/about/faqs/pages/faqtrans.aspx. 
Wu, M., M. Mintz, M. Wang, S. Arora, and Y. Chiu. 2011. Consumptive Water Use in the Production of Ethanol and Petroleum Gasoline – 2011 
Update. ANL/ESD/09-1-Update. Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory. 
  
 





 Source: USGCRP 2014 
b
 Sources: CCSP 2008, USGCRP 2014, NOAA 2013a 
c
 Sources: NOAA 2013c, USGCRP 2014  
d
 Sources: CCSP 2008, DOE 2013a, NRC 2008 
e
 Source: USGCRP 2014 
f
 Sources: DOE 2013a, USDA 2012b, USGCRP 2014 
g
 Sources: USGCRP 2014, Union Pacific 2011 
h
 Sources: CCSP 2008, USGCRP 2014 
i
 Source: DOE 2014a 
j
 Sources: DOE 2007, EIA 2012a 
k
 Source: CRS 2014 
l
 Source: CCSP 2008 
m
 Sources: EIA 2013a, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013c 
n
 Source: DOE 2013a 
o
 Source: NOAA 2013c 
 
Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Southern Great Plains 5-1 
 
5. Southern Great Plains 
 
Overview 
The Southern Great Plains region, comprising Kansas, 
Oklahoma, and Texas, contains oil and gas infrastructure critical 
to the nation’s energy supply, including numerous offshore 
platforms, onshore oil and gas wells, oil refineries, natural gas 
processing plants, pipelines, and shipping terminals. Many of 
these assets are located near the Texas Gulf Coast. Key climate 
change impacts projected for the region include the following: 
 The intensity of Atlantic hurricanes is projected to 
increase, and the most intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 
5) are projected to occur more frequently. Associated 
storm surge impacts may be enhanced by higher sea levels. 
Sea level rise is expected to be greater in some areas 
because of local land subsidence.
a
 Critical oil and gas 
infrastructure, power plants, and transport infrastructure 
such as bridges and pipelines located along the Texas Gulf 
Coast may be at risk of damage from more powerful 
hurricanes and storm surges amplified by sea level rise. High 
winds from more intense hurricanes may increase risk of 
damage to power lines.
b
 
 Average temperatures are projected to increase, and 
extremely hot days are likely to occur more often. Heat 
waves are projected to become more severe and last 
longer. By mid-century, the average number of cooling 
degree days (CDDs) may increase by 600–1,000 per year.
c
 
Increasing air and water temperatures in the Southern 
Great Plains will reduce the efficiency and available capacity 
of power plants and transmission lines while also increasing 
average and peak electricity demand for electricity for 
cooling in the summer.
d
  
 Precipitation is projected to decrease across most of the 
region, with the largest declines occurring in the summer. 
Dry spells may become longer. These changes may lead to 
more frequent droughts.
e
 Combined with increasing demand and competition for water from other sectors, climate change 
may further limit the availability of water for energy. This includes withdrawals for critical operations such as power 
generation, oil refining, and the region’s growing unconventional oil and gas production.
f
 
Table 5-1. Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Southern Great Plains 
Subsector Vulnerability Magnitude Illustrative Resilience Solutions 
Oil and Gas 
Exploration and 
Production 
Heightened exposure to damage 
and disruption from an increasing 




Increasing numbers of Category 4 and 5 
hurricanes by the end of the century
h
 
Infrastructure hardening and 
elevation, improved operations 




Increased demand for cooling 
energy in the summer, coinciding 
with reduced available capacity of 
power generation and transmission
i
 
Increasing CDDs by as much as 1,000 




Energy efficiency, demand-side 
management programs and 






Reduced available generation 
capacity from higher temperatures 
and decreased water availability, 
and reduced capacity of electric 
lines from higher temperatures
k
 
Increasing air temperatures by 3.5°F–
8.5°F and decreasing summer rainfall by 
10%–30% by the end of the century
l
  
Alternative water sources and 
water-efficient power generation 




QUICK FACTS       
Southern Great Plains States:   Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas 
Population  (2013) 
 
33,000,000  (11% of U.S.) 
Area (square miles) 412,000 (12% of U.S.) 
Energy expenditures  $190 billion 









Electric power                     TWh 552 465 n/a 
Petroleum                     MMbbls 861 1,460 <1% 
Coal                           million tons 45 135 99% 













Natural gas 256 46% 95 257 
Coal 195 35% 36 35 
Nuclear 47 8% 6 3 
Hydroelectric 2 <1% 2 36 
Wind  46 8% 18 146 
Biomass 2 <1% <1 30 




Electric Power   
  Wells (>1 boe/d): 133,000   Power plants (> 1 MW):  555 
  Refineries:  36   Interstate transmission lines:  24 
  Liquids pipelines: 32 Coal 
 
  
  Ports (>200 tons/yr): 13   Mines:  20 
Natural Gas 
 
Waterways   
  Wells:  161,000   Coal and petroleum routes:   11 
  Interstate pipelines: 41 Railroads 
 
  
  Market hubs:  8   Miles of freight track:   18,600 
Note: Table presents 2012 data except number of oil wells, which is 2009 data. 
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW. 
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2011a, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013d, EIA 2013e, EIA 2014a, EIA 
2014d, EIA 2014f, EIA 2014g,  EIA 2014h, EIA 2014i, EIA 2014j, U.S. Census Bureau 
2014a 
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities 
and Resilience Solutions  
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of 
resilience solutions in the Southern Great Plains are 
discussed below. System components that are most 
vulnerable to climate change are described first. 
Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Southern Great Plains is a principal element of the U.S. 
oil and gas supply network. The region includes extensive 
upstream exploration and production infrastructure, as well 
as downstream refining and product delivery systems. The 
region accounts for 40% of total domestic crude oil 
production, with Texas the leading crude oil-producing 
state in the nation (EIA 2014a). Oil refineries in the region 
account for one third of the nation’s capacity (Table 5-2). 
Table 5-2. Southern Great Plains crude oil production and 
refinery capacity, 2013  
 
KS OK TX Total 
Crude Oil Production (million bbl) 47 114 924 1,084 
Share of U.S. Total 2% 4% 34% 40% 
Refinery Capacity (million bbl/d) 0.3 0.5 5.1 6.0 
Share of U.S. Total 2% 3% 29% 34% 
Sources: EIA 2014a, EIA 2014b 
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on the subsector: 
 Increasing frequency of intense hurricanes increases 
the risk of damage or disruption to coastal and offshore 
oil and gas facilities (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
 Rising sea levels, combined with projected increases in 
hurricane intensity and associated heavy rainfall, leads 
to intensified flood regimes along coasts (USGCRP 
2014). 
 Decreasing water availability and drought could affect 
unconventional oil and gas production and oil refining 
operations (DOE 2013). 
More intense hurricanes and rising sea levels will expose 
the region’s extensive oil and gas exploration, production, 
and refining infrastructure to increased risk of damage and 
disruption (DOE 2013). The intensity, frequency, and 
duration of North Atlantic hurricanes, as well as the 
frequency of the strongest storms (Category 4 and 5), have 
all increased since the early 1980s. As the climate continues 
to warm, hurricane-associated storm intensity and rainfall 
rates are projected to increase (USGCRP 2014).  
 
 
Offshore oil and gas platforms are vulnerable to high winds 
and damaging surf caused by hurricanes. One study found 
that approximately 3%–6% of offshore platforms exposed 
to hurricane force winds
1
 typically experience damage that 
can take less than a month to over six months to repair, and 
2%–4% are typically destroyed (Kaiser and Yu 2009). As the 
frequency of Category 4 and 5 hurricanes increases, 
damage from these intense storms will increase as well.  
Offshore platforms typically follow the design specifications 
of the American Petroleum Institute (API), which sets 
performance standards for withstanding stresses such as 
wind speeds and wave heights for a 100-year storm. 
However, some of these threshold limits have been 
significantly surpassed in recent years (Cruz and Krausmann 
2008). Furthermore, as oil exploration and production 
operations move farther offshore into deeper waters, the 
potential for damage increases (DOE 2013).  
                                                                
1
 Hurricane force winds typically extend 25–50 miles from the eye 
of the storm (Kaiser and Yu 2009). 
Examples of Gulf Coast infrastructure damage from 
hurricanes* 
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike (2008) 
 At peak of disruptions, more than 20% of U.S. 
refinery capacity was offline (API 2014a). 
 Significant destruction to electric power 
infrastructure delayed the restart of pipeline and 
refinery operations (API 2014a). 
 60 offshore platforms (approximately 1% of total 
offshore oil production) were destroyed (API 
2014a). 
 Three of the four Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
sites sustained extensive damage (DOE 2010a). 
Hurricanes Rita and Katrina (2005) 
 The storms destroyed 115 platforms and 
damaged 52 others, and 19 drilling rigs were set 
adrift (API 2014a). 
 Hundreds of platforms were shut down, and over 
400 offshore pipelines were damaged (DOE 
2009). 
 An estimated 29% of U.S. refinery capacity was 
taken offline (API 2014a). 
Hurricane Ivan (2004) 
 Seven platforms were destroyed and 24 damaged 
(API 2014a). 
 At the time, Hurricane Ivan was considered the 
costliest hurricane season ever to the oil and gas 
industry (Cruz and Krausmann 2008). 









Hurricane force winds can also cause severe damage to 
refineries, including refining cooling towers. For example, 
during Hurricane Rita, 50% of the cooling towers at facilities 
in Port Arthur, Texas, were damaged (NIST 2006). 
Hurricanes also destroy wetlands and other features that 
help protect coastal infrastructure, increasing the 
vulnerability of coastal and inland infrastructure to future 
storms. Moreover, the exposure of coastal energy facilities 
to damage and disruption from hurricanes is magnified by 
sea level rise, which amplifies the height of storm surges 
(Figure 5-1) (DOE 2013). In Texas, 17 major energy facilities 




Figure 5-1. Flooded Texas refinery in 2008 following Hurricane 
Ike  
Source: PBS 2008 
Depending on location, relative mean sea level in Texas has 
already increased by approximately one to three inches per 
decade because of a combination of global sea level rise 
and land subsidence in the region (NOAA 2009). Future sea 
level rise is projected to climb between one and five inches 
per decade in the first half of the 21
st
 century and to 
accelerate over time (USGCRP 2014). 
Decreasing water availability may negatively affect the oil 
and gas sector. Under a high emissions scenario, spring and 
summer precipitation is projected to decrease by 10%–30% 
                                                                
2
 Climate Central data uses the FEMA HAZUS dataset to define 
major energy facilities. These include electricity generating 
stations and substations, natural gas control stations and 
compressor stations, oil refineries, control stations, and tank 
farms, among others (Climate Central 2014, FEMA 2014). 
by the end of the century for most of the region (USGCRP 
2014). A recent study found that under a high emissions 
scenario, droughts are likely to be longer, with 80% 
likelihood that the region will experience a decadal or multi-
decadal drought between 2050 and 2099 (Cook et al. 2015). 
Effects from climate change, including decreasing rainfall, 
higher temperatures, and increasing evaporation rates, in 
combination with increasing competing demands for water 
from increasing population and other factors, are expected 
to increase water stress on both surface water and 
groundwater resources. 
One of the sectors that may face increasing water stress is 
the region’s rapidly growing unconventional oil and gas 
industry (Figure 5-2). Ninety percent of hydraulic fracturing 
operations in Texas currently use groundwater reservoirs 
(Arnett et al. 2014). In the Eagle Ford shale formation, 
where hydraulic fracturing is the third-largest consumer of 
groundwater (after irrigation and municipal districts), 
aquifers are being depleted 2.5 times faster than the rate of 
recharge (Arnett et al. 2014).  
 
Figure 5-2. Growth of crude oil production (in millions of barrels 
per day) at two major shale formations in the Southern Great 
Plains  
Source: EIA 2014c 
Oil refineries may also be affected by decreasing water 
availability. Conventional oil refining typically consumes 
between 0.5 and 2.5 gallons of water per gallon of gasoline 
equivalent, and securing access to diminishing water 
supplies may increase costs (DOE 2013).  
 
Dependence of refineries on electricity 
Many refineries rely on offsite power generation and 
transmission systems to operate at full capacity. This 
interdependence with the electric grid means that 
interrupted electricity supply, transmission, and 
distribution may result in broad disruptions to petroleum 
production and distribution systems. 
Example impact from water shortages  
2011: During the worst drought ever recorded in Texas, 
the river that provided water for the ConocoPhillips 
refinery near the town of Sweeny, Texas, ran dry, 
forcing the company to construct an emergency 
pipeline to tap into groundwater (Galbraith 2012). 
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Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Resilience Solutions 
The oil and gas industry is experienced with managing 
hurricane risk and actively pursues measures to mitigate 
these risks. For example, the API has developed guidance 
and recommendations for improving the resilience of 
offshore platforms to hurricane-related damage and 
operations disruption. In response to heavy damage 
inflicted by recent storms, new engineering and operations 
guidance has been developed that provides: 
 Modified design specifications for new platforms 
 Operations protocols for hurricane season, such as 
positioning platform decks higher above the sea 
surface, methods for securing platform equipment to 
rigs, and locating “jack-up” rigs on more stable areas of 
the sea floor  
 Improved data for wind, wave, current, and surge 
conditions at higher spatial resolution 
 Protocols for post-hurricane structural assessment 
(API 2014a) 
Better coordination between government and industry will 
also improve the preparation for and response to future 
hurricanes. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), formerly the 
Minerals Management Service, has adopted measures to 
improve pre-season planning and communications among 
federal agencies and help industry develop new standards 
and guidelines (Cruz and Krausmann 2008). 
Refineries can reduce wind damage to cooling towers 
through multiple actions, including special braces to stop 
fan blades from dislodging, and installation of wind girders 
to deflect wind and reinforce the structural integrity of the 
tanks to prevent collapse (DOE 2010b). 
Engineered barriers such as levees can be effective in 
protecting vulnerable coastal areas. In addition, wetland 
restoration and development of other natural barriers 
(“green infrastructure”) may be a cost-effective resilience 
technique (TNC-DOW 2012). These types of structures—
natural and manmade—help protect coastal infrastructure 
from storm surges and wave impacts (DOE 2013). 
Historically, the economic value of natural landscape 
features has not been incorporated into the risk 
management decisions involved in the planning and 
construction of coastal infrastructure. Recently, however, 
projects undertaken between private industry and natural 
resource conservation stakeholders have shown that 
collaboration and data sharing can be a successful strategy 
for integrating the value of environmental features into 
coastal facilities planning (TNC-DOW 2012). 
As competition for declining water resources increases, oil 
and gas producers using hydraulic fracturing can take 
measures to reduce vulnerability to water scarcity. In the 
short term, many producers are resorting to hauling water 
over long distances by truck (Dittrick 2012). Another option 
is to switch to brackish groundwater sources, which do not 
compete with irrigation and municipal water needs but 
which require additional treatment steps and costs (Nicot 
and Scanlon 2012). Additional options for some operations 
include recycling and reuse of produced fracking water or 
dry fracking. Dry fracking uses highly pressurized gas 
instead of water to crack rock formations, and at least two 
companies in Texas are using dry fracking technology 
(Processing Magazine 2013). Along with technological 
solutions, market-based approaches to water conservation 
may be an effective strategy to improve the sector’s 
resilience to climate change (Arnett et al. 2014).   
Fuel Transport and Storage 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Southern Great Plains is a critical node in the 
nationwide natural gas and liquid fuels transport and 
distribution network (Figure 5-3). The Cushing oil hub in 
Oklahoma is the world’s largest crude oil storage hub, 
which transfers approximately 1.7 million barrels per day 
(Zawadski 2013). The port of Houston is the second largest 
petrochemical complex in the world and is the location of 
ExxonMobil’s Baytown Refinery, the nation’s second largest 
petrochemical refinery behind Valero’s Port Arthur facility 
(EIA 2014d, Port of Houston 2014).  
 
Figure 5-3. Extensive petroleum transport infrastructure in Texas 
and Oklahoma  
Source: DOE 2015b 
 
Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Southern Great Plains 5-5 
 
The Gulf Intracoastal Waterway is a key asset in the 
distribution of petroleum products (Figure 5-4) (CCSP 2008). 
In 2010, the Texas portion of the Gulf Intracoastal 
Waterway transported 67 million short tons of petroleum 
and chemical products—comprising 91% of the waterway’s 
traffic by weight—and the total value of all shipments was 
over $25 billion (TxDOT 2013). 
 
 
Figure 5-4. Gulf Intracoastal Waterway 
Source: TxDOT 2013 
Offshore, a network of more than 25,000 miles of seafloor 
pipeline carries the daily production of oil and gas platforms 
in the Gulf to facilities along the Texas coast and other Gulf 
states (NOAA 2014). The Texas coast is also the location of 
two of the nation’s four storage sites of the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve (SPR) (EIA 2014d). The SPR provides a 
government-owned emergency stockpile of crude oil, 
should disruption in commercial oil supplies threaten the 
U.S. economy. 
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on fuel transport and storage: 
 Increasing hurricane intensity, and increasing 
frequency of the most intense hurricanes (Category 4 
and 5) along with associated storm surges and rising 
sea levels,  increases the risk of damage or disruption 
to coastal and offshore oil and gas transportation and 
storage facilities from wind, coastal flooding, and storm 
surge (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
Coastal ports and facilities are vulnerable to high wind 
speeds and storm surge associated with intense hurricanes. 
Storm surge has the capacity to knock down terminal 
buildings, dislodge cargo containers, damage terminal 
equipment, and damage wharf and pier structures (CCSP 
2008). Hurricane- and sea level rise-related impacts may 
also increase the risk of damage to waterway assets and 
disruption of operations (CCSP 2008). Storm debris can 
block navigation channels, and markers and barrier islands 
can be affected (CCSP 2008). Rail terminals, docks, and 
ships located along the coast are also vulnerable. 
Aboveground storage facilities can be damaged by high 
winds associated with intense hurricanes, and storage tanks 
can be lifted by floodwaters, which may cause spills of 
hazardous materials (API 2014a, DOE 2010b, DOE 2015a, 
Santella et al. 2010). SPR facilities may also be exposed to 
hurricane damage, including inundation caused by storm 
surge (DOE 2015a). 
Large surface waves and strong near-bottom currents from 
hurricanes can scour the seafloor and create underwater 
mudslides that damage subsea pipes and other equipment 
that rests on the bottom (Burkett 2011). In fact, during the 
2005 hurricane season, pipelines were identified by 
industry experts as the weakest link and were a major cause 
of delays in bringing production back online (Cruz and 
Kraussman 2008). The majority of damage to offshore 
pipelines during previous hurricanes has occurred at or near 
platform interfaces (DOE 2015a). 
Onshore pipelines are vulnerable to damage from coastal 
and inland flooding events, which can alter the water table 
or soil stability and damage buried pipes (DOT 2014, GAO 
2014). Buried onshore pipes may be further damaged by 
storm surge and flooding by corrosion due to saltwater 
intrusion of groundwater (DOT 2014). During hurricanes, 
debris from high winds and flooding can damage 
aboveground pipeline infrastructure such as compressor 
and pumping stations and metering stations, and 
aboveground infrastructure is vulnerable to flood damage 
and subsequent scour (DOT 2014). 
The projected increase in intense hurricanes may lead to 
increased natural gas and oil supply disruptions due to 
damage and disruption of pipeline and refinery 
infrastructure, which could in turn affect short-term fuel 
prices. Supply disruptions during hurricanes may cause 
natural gas and petroleum product prices to spike while 
crude oil prices fall (API 2014b).  
Fuel Transport and Storage 
Resilience Solutions 
Options for improving resilience of onshore pipelines 
include installing manmade or natural barriers to reduce 
risk of erosion, which could expose buried pipes. Another 
risk reduction measure is upgrading pipes with more robust 
materials that are less likely to leak or rupture from 
seawater-induced corrosion—such as coated steel pipes 
instead of cast iron or bare steel. 
Dependence of pipelines on electricity 
The vulnerability of oil and gas pipelines is closely 
connected to the operability of the electric grid. 
Pipeline operations rely on electricity to deliver 
products to consumers. Electricity is needed for 
operations of pumps and valves that control the flow 
of fuel through pipelines. Power disruptions can shut 
down oil and gas operations, even when there is no 
direct structural damage (DOE 2013).  
 
Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Southern Great Plains 5-6 
 
Similar to other low-lying and coastal infrastructure, some 
fuel storage and transport assets can be hardened to better 
withstand more intense hurricanes and storm surges. 
Example measures include installing water-tight doors, 
elevating critical equipment (substations, control rooms, 
pump stations), relocating vulnerable facilities, and building 
or strengthening berms, levees, and floodwalls. Shorelines 
of critical waterways can be hardened to prevent and offset 
erosion, and dredging can be employed to maintain 
shipping access (CCSP 2008, DOE 2010b).  
Resilience efforts for wind protection may include installing 
wind girders on storage tanks (DOE 2010b). 
Thermoelectric Power Production 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Fossil fuel-fired power plants dominate the electricity 
source mix in the region, with natural gas and coal 
representing over 80% of the total generation (Table 5-3). 
Thermoelectric power from nuclear plants provides another 
8% of generation. Projected changes in temperature and 
water availability—both independently and in 
combination—may restrict the available capacity of 
thermoelectric power generation in the region. 
Table 5-3. Net electric power generation by fuel type, 2012  
 
 Kansas Oklahoma Texas 
Total 
Region 
Natural Gas  6% 50% 50% 46% 
Coal  63% 38% 32% 35% 
Nuclear  19% 0% 9% 8% 
Wind  12% 10% 7% 8% 
Other  0% 2% 2% 2% 
Source: EIA 2013b 
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on thermoelectric power generation in the region: 
 Reduced surface water availability for cooling in most 
locations and seasons and higher evaporative loss from 
surface water sources could reduce generation 
capacity. 
 Higher air and water temperatures reduce plant 
efficiencies and increase the risk of exceeding thermal 
water discharge limits (DOE 2013). 
 Increased intensity of hurricanes and sea level rise-
enhanced storm surge increase risk of damage and 
disruption to coastal power plants (DOE 2013, USGCRP 
2014). 
The vast majority of thermoelectric power water 
withdrawals in the region are from fresh surface water 
sources
3
 (UCS 2012, USGS 2005), making the region’s 
                                                                
3
 Two different sources provide different estimates: the U.S. 
Geological Survey provides an estimate that 84% of thermoelectric 
withdrawals are from fresh surface water, while the Union of 
Concerned Scientists' EW3 model calculated 94% in 2008.  
thermoelectric power production infrastructure vulnerable 
to increasing droughts, including a possible multi-decadal 
drought by the end of the century projected as a result of 
climate change (Cook et al. 2015, USGCRP 2014). 
A number of power plants have been stressed by limited 
water availability in recent years. For example, water 
shortages forced one power plant to curtail operations and 
threatened more than 3,000 MW of generating capacity in 
Texas during a historic drought in 2011, and the grid 
operator put an emergency action alert system in effect to 
deal with coincident increases in electricity demand (CRS 
2013, ERCOT 2011, USGCRP 2014). The impact of drought 
on electricity supply was exacerbated in Texas by the fact 
that the state is nearly isolated from the rest of national 
electricity grid; marginal electricity prices reached the 
market ceiling of $3,000 per MWh, and daily day-ahead 
prices reached over $600 per MWh (CRS 2013, EIA 2011b, 
USGCRP 2014).  
Thermoelectric power infrastructure may also face 
increased stress from higher temperatures. Average annual 
temperatures in the region are projected to increase by 
3.5°F–8.5°F by the end of the century, depending on the 
emissions scenario, with extremely hot days (>95°F) 
occurring more frequently and for longer stretches of time 
(NOAA 2013). Increasing air and water temperatures reduce 
the efficiency and available generation capacity of 
thermoelectric power plants (DOE 2013). Higher surface 
water temperatures will also heighten the likelihood that 
power plants will exceed thermal water discharge limits 
mandated to protect aquatic ecosystems, which could 
further reduce available power capacity. One study found 
that under a high emissions scenario, curtailments of power 
plants in Texas could remove up to 5,500 MW of peak load 
capacity from the ERCOT grid in 2030 (Cook 2013). 
Similar to the risk posed to coastal oil and gas 
infrastructure, increased frequency of intense (Category 4 
and 5) hurricanes and sea level rise-enhanced storm surge 
threatens power plants located near the Texas Gulf coast. 
Plants farther inland, which are often located along rivers 
and in low-lying areas, may also be at increased risk from 
flooding caused by heavy precipitation associated with 
intense hurricanes. Specific vulnerabilities to hurricanes and 
sea level rise vary significantly from site to site and are 
largely dependent on facility elevation, distance from coast, 
and mitigating measures the facility may have taken to 
improve its resilience. 
Thermoelectric Power Production 
Resilience Solutions 
Installing water-saving technologies at power plants could 
significantly reduce water withdrawals. Cooling towers with 
condensing technology, recirculating cooling, or dry cooling 
systems are examples. Other solutions include retrofitting 
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or replacing plant equipment to accommodate use of 
nontraditional water (e.g., brackish groundwater or 
municipal wastewater). For example, the 1,080 MW coal-
fired Harrington Station in Amarillo, Texas, uses treated 
wastewater rather than freshwater to meet cooling needs 
(UCS 2011). One analysis suggests that most plants 
vulnerable to drought could be retrofitted for less than 
$4/MWh, or for less than a 10% increase in the levelized 
cost of electricity (Tidwell et al. 2013). 
Water availability issues could be partly addressed through 
policy measures employed at the state and local levels and 
informed by technical assistance at the federal level. Some 
areas have established market-driven solutions to address 
the vulnerability of critical shortages in supply. For example, 
nineteen water districts using the Edwards Aquifer in San 
Antonio, Texas, have formed an alliance that creates a 
streamlined market for trading water rights for sustainable 
water development through 2060 (USGCRP 2014).  
 
New generation capacity with sources and supply chains 
less affected by increasing temperatures and decreased 
water availability, such as wind power and solar PV, will also 
help make the region’s power sector more resilient to 
climate change. Fuel sources that are less dependent on 
water availability can help supply peak power generation 
during critical summer days. Indeed, new wind turbines 
represent about 38% of the new capacity additions in the 
region since 2000 (Figure 5-5), and in most cases, ERCOT 
anticipates that new generation resources will primarily be 
renewables that do not require cooling water (ERCOT 
2012).  
 
Figure 5-5. Recent additions in Southern Great Plains electric 
generation nameplate capacity (MW) by fuel type, 2000–2012 
Source: EIA 2013d 
Shifting from coal-fired power plants to natural gas 
combined cycle plants (NGCCs) can also reduce annual 
freshwater consumption. Estimates of the potential effects 
of coal-to-natural-gas fuel switching in Texas’ power sector 
projected savings of 53 billion gallons of freshwater per 
year, or 60% of Texas coal power’s water footprint, largely 
due to the higher efficiency of NGCCs (Grubert et al. 2012) 
Retrofitting facilities to harden them against more intense 
hurricanes and storm surges can also reduce vulnerabilities. 
Improved engineered barriers such as levees can be 
effective in protecting vulnerable thermoelectric power 
plants from flooding. Utilities may also elevate critical 
equipment to protect against flooding or upgrade plants 
with submersible equipment or watertight doors. Planners 
can protect new capacity by locating new generators at 
higher elevations that are not at risk of flooding due to 
hurricanes or storm surges.  
Electricity Demand 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Compared to other areas of the United States, the warmer 
weather in Texas and its neighboring states means that air 
conditioning accounts for a greater portion of home energy 
use (18% compared to 6% nationally), while space heating 
accounts for a much smaller portion (22% compared to 41% 
nationally) (EIA 2014d). Almost all residents in the region 
use air conditioning equipment, with over 80% using central 
air conditioners. Along with the Southeast region, the 
Southern Great Plains has among the highest per capita 
electricity use in the nation (EIA 2014d).  
Hotter temperatures and more frequent extreme high 
temperatures are projected for the Southern Great Plains; 
these increases are expected to contribute to higher energy 
demand from increased use of air conditioning (USGCRP 
2014). 
Climate change is expected to affect electricity demand in 
the Southern Great Plains as follows: 
 Higher maximum temperatures, longer and more severe 
heat waves, and higher overnight lows are expected to 
increase electricity demand for cooling in the summer 
(NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
 
Examples of state policy measures addressing storm 
damage 
In Texas, utilities are required to submit annual reports 
that describe their efforts to identify areas within their 
service territories that are particularly susceptible to 
severe weather damage and harden facilities in those 
areas (EEI 2014).  
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NOAA climate models project that, by mid-century, there will 
be more than 15 additional days with temperatures reaching 
100°F and upwards of 30 more warm nights (>80°F) per year. 
These warmer temperatures will increase cooling energy 
demand. Over the same period, the region is expected to 
have 600 to 1,000 more CDDs per year compared to the end 




Figure 5-7. Increase in annual CDDs by mid-century
4
  
Source: NOAA 2013 
Other factors, such as population growth and changing 
technologies such as electric vehicles, are also important to 
consider in long-range electricity demand projections, 
especially in Texas, which contains three of the five fastest-
growing cities in the nation and which has faced declining 
reserve margins in recent years (EIA 2012, U.S. Census 
                                                                
4
 Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the 
end of the last century (1980–2000) under an A2 emissions 
scenario 
Bureau 2014b). These trends will have significant implications 
for the power sector in the region, as predicted increases in 
air conditioning demand will require a system that can 
handle more extreme peak loads. Current forecasts from the 
Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) anticipate that 
summer peak reserve margins could fall to 7.3% by 2024 
without capacity expansion (ERCOT 2014). ERCOT’s forecast 
did not take future warming into account and instead relied 
on recent weather averages.  
In the winter, warmer temperatures and fewer days below 
freezing are expected to reduce demand for heating energy 
(DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). Almost all homes in the region 
are heated, and about half of residents use electricity for 
heating, a greater proportion than the U.S. average (EIA 
2013g). However, peak electricity demand in the winter is 
about 25% less than in the summer,
5
 and this difference 
may increase with warmer temperatures (EIA 2013a, 
USGCRP 2014).  
Electricity Demand 
Resilience Solutions 
Alongside measures to reduce demand, such as energy 
efficiency measures and demand-side management 
programs, capacity expansion can help mitigate falling 
summer reserve margins. 
Capacity expansion in the region is likely to be a necessary 
component of any adaptive response. In Texas, ERCOT has 
identified a need to replace 13 GW of retiring natural gas 
generation, in addition to addressing growing summer peak 
demand (ERCOT 2012). In its latest Integrated Resource 
Plan, ERCOT found that demand for new capacity will be 
met over a 20-year planning horizon by new natural gas 
combined-cycle units, by wind and solar generation, or by a 
combination of the three. For example, in one scenario 
(BAU [business as usual] with Updated Wind Shapes), 
capacity requirements are met by 17 GW of new wind, 3.6 
GW of natural gas combined-cycle units, and 10 GW of solar 
PV (ERCOT 2012). Wind power currently generates 8% of 
                                                                
5
 On average across all utilities located in the region, peak winter 
electricity generation is about 25% less than peak summer 
generation. 
Example impact from heat waves  
2011: During a summer of intense heat, the electricity 
demand in Texas surpassed a previous record for three 
consecutive days (Tweed 2012). 
Figure 5-6. Days above 100°F in summer 2011 
Source: NOAA 2013 Compounding power sector vulnerabilities from higher 
temperatures and reduced water availability  
High temperatures stress multiple components of the 
electric power system. At the same time that higher 
temperatures increase demand for air conditioning, they 
also decrease the efficiency of thermoelectric power 
plants and transmission lines. Meanwhile, power plants 
require more water for cooling in hot temperatures, 
when water availability and thermal discharge restrictions 
are already more likely to be risk factors (DOE 2013). 
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the region’s electricity, with 18 GW of wind turbines 
installed (EIA 2013d). The market penetration of solar PV is 
also increasing in the region. Since wind and solar PV do not 
require cooling water, they are inherently more resilient to 
water stress than many other power generation 
technologies. Wind and natural gas plants represent most 
of the new capacity planned to come online in the region 
(Figure 5-8). 
  
Figure 5-8. Utility-scale generating plants planned to come online 
from December 2014 to November 2015 
Source: EIA 2015 
Approximately 3,000 MW of peak load have been avoided 
through demand-side management programs in the Southern 
Great Plains (EIA 2013a). Approximately 180,000 residential, 
commercial, and industrial customers are enrolled in price-
responsive programs. The city of San Antonio by itself 
accounts for almost half of these customers. Time-sensitive 
programs such as demand response are also established in 
the region, with almost 120,000 customers enrolled (EIA 
2013a). However, on the whole, demand response is mostly 
an untapped mechanism in the region. As of 2012, demand 
response potential within ERCOT represented only 2.6% of 
the total system peak load (FERC 2013). 
Grid-scale energy storage systems and other developing 
technologies can also contribute to meeting the region's 
changing demand profile. Storage systems could allow 
intermittent renewable generation sources, such as the 
region’s burgeoning wind power capacity, to store 
generated energy and then deliver it when needed. 
Electric Grid 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Southern Great Plains encompasses two regional 
electricity grids: ERCOT, which covers most of Texas, and 
the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) market in Kansas, 
Oklahoma, and the Texas panhandle, which is part of the 
Eastern Interconnection power grid. Small portions of 
Texas’ grid are also part of the grid operated by the 
Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO). ERCOT 
is unique in that, unlike SPP and MISO, it operates as an 
independent interconnection—i.e., it is not synchronously 
connected to the Eastern and Western Interconnections 
that cover the other lower 48 states (FERC 2014). ERCOT is 
also connected to the Mexican states of Tamaulipas and 
Chihuahua, although trade between ERCOT and Mexico 
represents a small portion of electricity supply and typically 
occurs during periods of constrained supply (EIA 2013h). Six 
of the seven connections between Mexico and ERCOT are 
for emergency use only (Center for Energy Economics 
2006). 
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on the region’s electric grid: 
 Increases in average and extreme temperatures reduce 
the efficiency and available capacity of transmission 
lines and substations and could damage power 
transformers (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
 Hurricane intensity and the frequency of the most 
intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5) are projected to 
increase, and sea level is expected to rise at an 
accelerating rate, increasing the risk of physical damage 
to grid infrastructure from wind and coastal flooding 
(DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
Higher temperatures can force transmission operators to 
decrease the current-carrying capacity of transmission lines, 
which can exacerbate supply constraint issues during 
extreme heat events when demand for power is the 
highest. For example, one California study estimated that a 
9°F increase in air temperature could decrease transmission 
line capacity by 7%–8% (Sathaye et al. 2013). Higher 
temperatures cause thermal expansion of transmission line 
materials, and sagging lines increase the risk of power 
outages when the lines make contact with other lines, 
trees, or the ground (DOE 2013). More than 825,000 
customers in Texas have been affected by electric 
transmission outages caused by heat waves between 1992 
and 2009 (DOE 2015b). 
The risk of damage to transformers from higher ambient 
temperatures can also impel operators to constrain 
transmission capacity (USBR 2000). As transformers are 
forced to operate above their rated ambient temperature, 
their insulation begins to break down at an exponentially 
increasing rate, eventually destroying the transformer 
(Bérubé et al. 2007, Hashmi et al. 2013). Transformers are 
critical to system operations and may be overloaded during 
system emergencies (such as when transmission capacity is 
insufficient), pushing temperatures to critical limits.  
The infrastructure associated with electric power 
transmission is also likely to be increasingly threatened by 
more frequent intense hurricanes. The damage to the 
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electric grid during the 2008 hurricane season, for example, 
left 2.5 million Texas customers without power (API 2014a). 
The combined effects of rising sea levels, increasing storm 
surges, and increases in hurricane rainfall may expose low-
lying substations near the Gulf Coast to flooding and 
inundation, threatening lengthy shutdowns during and after 
hurricanes (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). Furthermore, higher 
wind speeds associated with higher-intensity hurricanes will 
increase the threat of damage and disruption to power lines 
(Figure 5-9). Finally, because of the relative isolation of 
ERCOT, it is more difficult to import power from other 
regions when the grid is stressed by capacity limitations, 
and the risk of cost increases or supply disruptions to power 
customers in Texas may be higher than in surrounding 
states and regions.  
  
Figure 5-9. Linemen repairing downed distribution poles 
following Hurricane Ike near Galveston, Texas 
Source: FEMA 2008 
Electric Grid 
Resilience Solutions 
Resilience could be improved through increased 
transmission redundancy and capacity (DOE 2013). For 
infrastructure located near the Gulf Coast, hardening 
measures include activities such as replacing wood power 
poles with steel, concrete, or composite structures, along 
with installing guys and other structure supports; burying 
power lines in areas of high wind exposure; elevating critical 
equipment and relocating substations to areas less 
susceptible to flooding; and investing in spare/backup 
equipment (CCSP 2008, DOE 2010b, EOP 2013).   
Utilities also use mobile transformers and substations to 
temporarily replace damaged energy infrastructure. These 
temporary units can include a trailer, switchgear, breakers, 
emergency power supply, and transformers with enhanced 
cooling capability that allows restoration of grid service 
while circumventing damaged substation equipment, 
allowing time to repair grid components (DOE 2010b).  
In some instances, energy storage systems can be a viable 
option for improving resilience to vulnerable areas. For 
example, AEP, the serving utility in Presidio, Texas, has 
procured a large-scale energy storage system to provide 
islanding for the entire town. Presidio is particularly 
vulnerable to extended outages because the town is 
supplied by a single transmission line that is difficult to 
access (NEMA 2013). 
Wind Energy 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Southern Great Plains contains some of the best 
onshore wind resources in the country (Figure 5-10) and 
represents almost a third of total installed wind power in 
the United States. Texas, with over 12,000 MW installed, is 
the national leader, while Kansas and Oklahoma together 
contribute about 6,000 MW (EIA 2013d). 
 
Figure 5-10. Annual average wind speed at 80 meters 
Source: NREL 2014 
Wind turbines in close proximity to the Gulf Coast may be 
vulnerable to wind damage from more intense hurricanes. 
Most wind turbines are designed to withstand sustained 
wind speeds of 112 mph (Rose et al. 2012), and many 
hurricanes have winds that significantly exceed this speed.  
Some climate models have suggested that climate change 
may lead to changes in average wind speeds, although 
there is not yet substantial agreement among sources as to 
how a changing climate will ultimately affect wind 
resources (DOE 2013).  
Wind Energy 
Resilience Solutions 
There is limited research examining hurricane force wind 
speeds as pertains to resilience of wind turbine design and 
construction (Pryor and Barthelmie 2010). While the 
industry standard design criteria call for turbines to 
withstand sustained 112 mph wind speeds, more research 
may be necessary regarding updates to these standard 
practices and other potential strategies for improving wind 
turbine resilience.  
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Regional Climate Change Observations 
and Projections in Detail 
Higher Temperatures 
Historical observations 
 Since 1895, average temperatures have increased 
0.09°F per decade, or almost 0.99°F (NOAA 2013). 
 Frost-free season has been lengthening: The average 
duration of the frost-free season across the entire 
Great Plains region increased by about ten days (1991–
2012, compared to 1901–1960) (USGCRP 2014). 
Future projections 
 Average temperatures are expected to increase at a 
faster rate: Depending on the region and greenhouse 
gas emissions, increases of 3.5°F–8.5°F are expected by 
2070–2099 compared to 1971–1999 levels (NOAA 2013). 
 Extremely hot days are projected to become more 
common: Across most of the region, 15–30 more days 
with a daily maximum temperature >95°F are expected 
by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000); 
Texas is likely to be the most affected and may see over 
30 more extremely hot days per year (NOAA 2013). 
 Consecutive number of days of extreme heat are 
expected to become longer: The annual maximum 
number of consecutive days with a daily high >95°F is 
projected to increase by 8–20 days by mid-century 
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000) across most of 
the region; West Texas is likely to be the most affected 
and may see the number of consecutive days with a 
daily high >95°F increase by up to 24 days (NOAA 
2013). 
 Extremely cold nights are expected to become less 
common: Across the region, 0–10 fewer days with daily 
minimums <10°F are expected by mid-century (2041–
2070, compared to 1980–2000) (NOAA 2013). 
 Freeze-free season is expected to lengthen: Across the 
region, the freeze-free season is expected to be 21–30 
days longer by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000) (NOAA 2013). 
 Cooling degree days (CDDs) are expected to increase: 
Across the region, an increase of 600–1,000 CDDs is 
expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000), with Texas and Oklahoma seeing the 
largest change (NOAA 2013). 
 Heating degree days (HDDs) are expected to decrease: 
Across most of the region, declines of 450–850 HDDs 
are expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000); Kansas is likely to be the most affected, 
with declines of up to 1,050 HDDs possible by mid-
century (NOAA 2013). 
Changing Precipitation Patterns 
Historical observations 
 Historical trends in precipitation are not statistically 
significant, neither annually nor seasonally (NOAA 
2013). 
 Across the Great Plains, extreme precipitation events 
have occurred more frequently: An index of one-day 
precipitation events expected to occur once every five 
years shows a statistically significant upward trend 
since 1895. In 2011, a linear trend of the series showed 
a 30% increase over the period (NOAA 2013). 
Future projections 
 Across most of the region, annual precipitation is 
expected to decrease: By the end of the century 
(2070–2099), precipitation across the region is 
expected to decrease 0%–12% compared to the period 
1971–1999, depending on both latitude and emissions 
scenario. The decrease in precipitation is expected to 
be greatest in Texas and southwestern Oklahoma 
(NOAA 2013). 
 Spring precipitation is projected to decrease in Texas: 
Texas is expected to see a 10%–30% decrease in 
precipitation by the end of the century (2071–2099, 
compared to 1971–1999) under a higher-emissions 
scenario (USGCRP 2014). 
 Drier summers are expected across most of the 
region: Summer precipitation is expected to decrease 
by 10%–30% by the end of the century (2071–2099, 
compared to 1971–1999) under a higher emissions 
scenario across the entire region, excluding 
southwestern Texas (USGCRP 2014). 
 Consecutive number of days with little or no 
precipitation are likely to become longer: The annual 
maximum number of consecutive days with less than  
3 mm of precipitation is projected to increase 3–15 
days by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–
2000) across most of the region, excluding Kansas 
(NOAA 2013). 
Hurricanes and Sea Level Rise 
Historical observations 
 Relative mean sea level in Texas has risen because of 
a combination of global sea level rise and land 
subsidence in the region: Relative mean sea level on 
the Texas coast rose 0.08–0.27 inches/year, depending 
on the location, between the middle of the 20
th
 century 
and 2006 (NOAA 2009). 
Future projections 
 Sea level rise is expected to accelerate: Between 1992 
and 2050, sea level on the Texas coast is projected to 
rise at an average rate of 0.14–0.35 inches/year (no ice 
sheet melt) or 0.27–0.48 inches /year (ice sheet melt), 
depending on the location (USGCRP 2014). 
 Frequency of intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5) is 
projected to increase (USGCRP 2014). 
 Hurricane-associated storm intensity and rainfall are 
projected to increase: Rainfall rates within 100 km of 
tropical storm centers are projected to increase by 20% 
by 2100 (USGCRP 2014).
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The Midwest is home to expansive agricultural lands, forests in 
the north, the Great Lakes, substantial industrial activity, and 
major urban centers. The region has an energy-intensive 
economy, and its electricity mix is heavily dependent on 
thermoelectric plants, with coal- and natural gas-fired power 
plants accounting for about 70% of annual generation and 
nuclear power representing more than 20%. More than one 
quarter of national installed wind energy capacity, one third of 
biodiesel capacity, and more than two thirds of ethanol 
production are located in the Midwest. Major climate change 
impacts projected to increasingly threaten the region’s energy 
infrastructure include the following: 
 Average temperatures are projected to increase, extremely 
hot days are projected to occur more frequently, and heat 
waves are projected to become longer and more severe. 
The average number of cooling degree days (CDDs) is 
projected to increase by 150–900 by mid-century.
a
 Higher 
air and water temperatures cause power plants to operate 
less efficiently and in some cases may force plants to curtail 
production or temporarily shut down. Transmission line 
capacity also declines with higher temperatures, reducing 
the available power supply in the Midwest and in other 
regions that depend on its electricity exports. At the same 
time, higher temperatures increase demand for cooling 
energy, increasing the potential for shortfalls.
b
 
 Heavy precipitation events are projected to occur more 
frequently, and average winter and spring precipitation 
levels are projected to increase, increasing the risk of high 
streamflows and flooding.
c
 Floods can disrupt energy 
service and damage assets located in flood plains, such as 
power plants and rail lines. Varying water levels on important shipping routes, including the upper Mississippi River, Illinois 
River, Missouri River, and Ohio River, as well as the Great Lakes, could disrupt fuel transport along these waterways.
d
 
Table 6-1. Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Midwest 





Reduced power plant generation 
capacity and reduced electric grid 
capacity due to higher temperatures
e
 
More than 90% of power generation 
is from thermoelectric plants. The 
region exports significant quantities 
of electricity, so reductions in 




Improved operations protocols, 
expanded capacity, alternative 
water sources, recirculating, dry, 
or wet-dry hybrid cooling systems 
Fuel Transport Increased risk of disruption to rail and 
barge transport of coal and petroleum 




The Midwest produces 11% of U.S. 
coal, and 58% of the region’s power 
plant capacity is coal-fired. 
Disruptions in rail and barge 
transport also affect other regions
h
 
Elevating infrastructure, upgrading 
drainage systems, ensuring 
culverts can handle increased 






Increased demand for electricity for 
cooling in the summer due to higher 




The region is projected to experience 
150–900 CDDs per year by mid-




Energy efficiency, load 
management, capacity additions 
QUICK FACTS       
Midwest States:   




61,000,000 (19% of U.S.) 
Area (square miles) 447,000 (13% of U.S.) 
Energy expenditures  $260 billion 









Electric power                     TWh 815 771 n/a 
Petroleum                     MMbbls 24 1,150 <1% 
Coal                           million tons 112 285 90% 













Natural gas 97 12% 69 347 
Coal 476 58% 105 208 
Nuclear 183 22% 25 17 
Hydroelectric 6 1% 2 174 
Wind  38 5% 15 261 
Biomass 8 1% 2 140 




Electric Power   
Wells (>1 boe/d): 5,230   Power plants (>1 MW):  1,421 
Refineries:  14   Interstate transmission lines:  48 
Liquids pipelines: 27 Coal  
Ports (>200 tons/yr): 6   Mines:  94 
Natural Gas 
 
Waterways   
  Wells:  47,000   Coal and petroleum routes:   17 
  Interstate pipelines: 33 Railroads  
  Market hubs:  2   Miles of freight track:   35,600 
Note: Table presents 2012 data except for the number of oil wells, which is 2009 data. 
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW. 
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2013a, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013c, EIA 2013d, EIA 2014a, EIA 
2014b, EIA 2014c, EIA 2014d, EIA 2014e, EIA 2014g, EIA 2014m, NEO 2014, US Census 
Bureau 2014, USACE 2014 
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities 
and Resilience Solutions 
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of 
resilience solutions in the Midwest are discussed below. 
System components that are most vulnerable to climate 
change are described first. 
Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Electricity generation in Midwestern states is dominated by 
thermoelectric power plants, accounting for about 92% of 
total electricity production, with over half generated from 
coal-fired plants (EIA 2013d). Projected changes in 
precipitation and temperature—both independently and in 
combination—may restrict the available capacity of 
thermoelectric power generation in the region.  
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on thermoelectric power generation in the Midwest: 
 Increasing air and water temperatures are expected to 
reduce the generation capacity and efficiency of 
thermoelectric units (DOE 2013). 
 Expected increases in heavy precipitation events will 
increase the likelihood of associated flooding, which 
could damage facilities and disrupt operations (USGCRP 
2014). 
 Decreasing summer precipitation and longer periods 
between rainfall events may limit water availability, 
affecting power plant operations (DOE 2013, USGCRP 
2014). 
Projected climate change-induced increases in average and 
extreme temperatures in the Midwest may reduce regional 
power generation capacity. Increases in ambient air and 
water temperatures reduce the thermal efficiencies of 
thermoelectric power plants, which can result in reduced 
power output and additional fuel consumption. 
Approximately 95% of electrical generating infrastructure in 
the region is susceptible to decreased efficiency due to 
higher temperatures (USGCRP 2014). In addition, the 
Midwest is a net exporter of electricity; decreases in power 
output or increases in fuel consumption could hinder 
system flexibility or increase costs across the eastern United 
States (USGCRP 2014). 
Increasing water temperatures put power plants at risk of 
exceeding thermal discharge limits established to protect 
aquatic ecosystems, and nuclear power plants face safety 
limits on the intake temperature of water used for cooling 
(DOE 2013). Plants facing elevated water temperatures may 
be forced to temporarily shut down or curtail generation. 
The sidebar presents examples of nuclear and coal plants 
that, over the last few years, have had to take action 
because of incoming or outgoing water being inadequate or 
too warm. These plants have reduced generation, shut 
down, or sought special exemptions from state regulators 
to continue to operate.  
 
Thermoelectric power plants are also vulnerable to 
flooding. Winter and spring precipitation for much of the 
Midwest could increase by 20% or more by the end of the 
century, although summer rainfall is projected to decline 
(NOAA 2013b, USGCRP 2014). In addition, more intense 
rainfall events are expected, increasing the chance of 
flooding from rapid runoff channeled from farm fields and 
urban areas. Power plants are typically located near rivers 
or other sources of water and may be susceptible to 
physical damage and disruption from flooding. Many areas 
in the Midwest have experienced increasing frequency and 
magnitude of flooding events (Hirsch and Ryberg 2012), and 
this trend is projected to continue (Figure 6-1) (USGCRP 
2014). 
Examples of high temperatures affecting 
thermoelectric power generation in the Midwest 
2012: Four coal-fired power plants and four nuclear 
power plants in Illinois requested permission to 
exceed the permitted water temperature discharge 
levels, established to prevent adverse ecological 
impacts. The Illinois Environmental Protection 
Agency granted special exceptions to the eight power 
plants, allowing them to discharge water that was 
hotter than allowed by federal Clean Water Act 
permits (Eilperin 2012).  
2012: The Braidwood nuclear plant in Illinois had to get 
special permission from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission to continue operating after the 
temperature of the water in its cooling pond rose to 
102°F (Eilperin 2012). 
2012: The Powerton coal plant in central Illinois had to 
temporarily shut down a generator during peak 
summer heat when water in the cooling pond 
became too warm for effective cooling (Bruch 2012). 
2006: One unit at American Electric Power’s D.C. Cook 
Nuclear Plant was shut down because the high 
summer temperatures raised the air temperature 
inside the containment building above 120°F, and the 
temperature of the cooling water from Lake 
Michigan was too high for cooling intake. The plant 
could not be returned to full power until the heat 
wave passed five days later (Krier 2012).  
2006: Two units at Exelon’s Quad Cities Generating 
Station had to reduce electricity production to less 
than 60% electricity capacity because the 
temperature of the Mississippi River was too high to 
discharge heated cooling water from the reactors 
(USNRC 2006). 
 





Figure 6-1. Rainfall increase during the wettest five-day period 
over a year by mid-century
1
 
Source: USGCRP 2014 
While annual average precipitation and heavy rainfall 
events are expected to increase, summer rainfall is 
projected to decline, and the number of consecutive days 
with no precipitation is projected to rise (Figure 6-2) 
(USGCRP 2014).Models indicate more precipitation when it 
rains but increased duration between rainfall events, which 
increases the chance of seasonal drought. Over 90% of 
electricity generation in the Midwest requires freshwater 
for cooling (UCS 2012), and low flow conditions in rivers and 
lakes pose an operational risk to thermoelectric facilities 
that require cooling water. Summer droughts can also 
contribute to warmer surface water temperatures, 
exacerbating power plant vulnerabilities associated with 
higher temperatures. 
 
Figure 6-2. Increase in the number of consecutive dry days over a 
year by mid-century
1 
Source: USGCRP 2014 
                                                                
1
 Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the end 
of the last century (1971–2000) under an A2 emissions scenario 
Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Resilience Solutions 
New generation capacity can help address falling capacity 
due to decreased plant efficiency. Capacity expansion with 
low water requirements (e.g., thermoelectric power plants 
with dry cooling or wet–dry hybrid cooling technology) or 
no water requirements (e.g., wind and solar photovoltaics) 
would help make the region’s power sector more resilient 
to climate change. Programs that reduce total and peak 
electricity demand can also reduce the water needs of 
thermoelectric generators. 
Technologies such as wind energy that are more resilient to 
climate change impacts can play an important role in future 
capacity additions. The region has abundant wind 
resources, and new generation is likely to include expanded 
wind capacity (NREL 2014a). For example, Illinois, Iowa, and 
Minnesota are among the top five states in the nation in 
existing and planned wind capacity additions in 2014 and 
2015 (Figure 6-3). Policy measures play an important role in 
encouraging wind energy development. Michigan’s wind 
capacity is among the fastest growing in the nation and is 
boosted by Michigan's Clean, Renewable, and Efficient 
Energy Act, which requires that all electricity providers 
obtain at least 10% of their power from renewable 
resources (EIA 2013e). Illinois' renewable portfolio standard 
requires that investor-owned electric utilities with more 
than 100,000 Illinois customers obtain 25% of retail sales 
from renewable resources by May 2026, with at least 75% 
of the requirement from wind (EIA 2015). 
 
Figure 6-3. Existing wind capacity (green) and planned wind plant 
installations in 2014 (dark blue) and 2015 (light blue) 
Source: Adapted from EIA 2014j 
Engineered barriers such as levees can be effective in 
protecting vulnerable thermoelectric power plants from 
flooding during heavy precipitation events. Utilities may 
also elevate critical equipment to protect against flooding 
or upgrade plants with submersible equipment or 
watertight doors. Planners can protect new capacity by 
locating new generators at higher elevations or outside of 
flood plains.  
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To better understand the implications of changing water 
availability for cooling thermoelectric generation, advances 
are being made in modeling and projecting future impacts. 
For example, Exelon is developing tools to predict near- and 
long-term (decades) changes in water availability, including 
impacts linked to climatic changes, increased population 
density, and upstream use (Exelon 2013). In 2013, Exelon 
completed a pilot hydrological/climate modeling study of 
the Kankakee River in northern Illinois, which supplies 
water to the Braidwood nuclear plant. The facility had to 
suspend its withdrawals for several days during the summer 
of 2012 because flows in the river dipped below the 
threshold specified in the facility’s public water withdrawal 
permit from the Illinois Department of Natural Resources. 
The Braidwood study was conducted as an analytical pilot 
to determine the extent to which watershed flows could be 
predicted and the extent to which climate change could 
potentially alter future water availability. In addition, Exelon 
and the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) are examining approaches to 
“downscale” NOAA climate models, which would be 
required before such models could be applied to 
operational decision making on a facility level. 
Fuel Transport 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Midwest is reliant on rail, barge, pipeline, and truck 
transport of energy products, notably coal. The region 
produces about 11% of the coal produced in the United 
States and imports significant quantities from the Northern 
Great Plains and Northeast regions (EIA 2013a). The 
Midwest depends heavily on coal for electricity, with coal-
fired generation making up 58% of all electricity generated 
in the region (EIA 2013d). Rail is the primary means of 
transporting coal, but another key fuel transportation 
method is shipping of coal (and other energy products) by 
barge, utilizing the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, as well as 
the Great Lakes. Energy commodities make up the largest 
proportion of total inland U.S. waterborne cargo traffic, and 
waterborne commerce is essential to the energy sector 
(USACE 2012). New domestic energy production is spurring 
rapid growth in the waterborne transport of energy 
commodities and related products, increasing the demands 
on waterborne traffic.  
Midwest refineries and consumers rely on supplies of crude 
oil and refined petroleum products imported from other 
regions by barge and pipeline. In 2013, almost 580 million 
barrels of crude oil and refined petroleum products were 
moved via pipeline from PADD 3 (a region including the Gulf 
Coast states) to PADD 2 (which includes the Midwest, as 
well as some Great Plains and Southeast states) (EIA 2014k). 
As supplies of crude oil from the Northern Great Plains and 
Canada continue to grow, the Midwest is becoming less 
dependent upon pipeline shipments of crude oil from the 
Gulf Coast. Movements by barge or tanker are smaller but 
still important. In 2013, 80 million barrels of crude oil and 
petroleum products were shipped from PADD 2 to PADD 3 
by barge and tanker, and 18 million barrels of petroleum 
products were moved in the opposite direction (EIA 2014f). 
In 2012, crude oil, refined petroleum products, and coal 
accounted for 55% of all U.S. waterborne cargo traffic by 
weight (DOE 2015c).  
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on energy transport in the Midwest: 
 Expected increases in extreme precipitation events will 
increase the frequency of associated floods, which 
could damage and disrupt transport infrastructure 
(DOE 2013, NOAA 2013b, USGCRP 2014). 
 More frequent and intense heat waves could damage 
rail infrastructure, increasing the likelihood of rail 
congestion and disruption to energy commodities 
transport (DOE 2013, NOAA 2013b, USGCRP 2014). 
 Barge transport of energy products on rivers and lakes 
faces increased risk of disruption from changes in water 
levels due to flooding, droughts, and evaporation (DOE 
2013, USGCRP 2014). 
Both heavy precipitation events and extended periods of 
rainfall that saturate the soil can lead to regional flooding 
events (NOAA 2013b, USGCRP 2014). High water levels 
increase flow velocities and make river navigation by barge 
difficult or dangerous (Posey 2014, USGCRP 2009). Heavy 
precipitation events can also cause high runoff and flooding 
that can disrupt train traffic and submerge track and 
roadbed, causing extensive damage (Figure 6-4) (Union 
Pacific 2011). High streamflows during heavy precipitation 
events erode track beds, especially where railroads run in 
low-lying areas adjacent to rivers and streambeds (DOE 
2013, USGCRP 2014). Higher current velocities can also 
affect river crossings, including rail and pipeline bridges, by 
scouring bridge piers (Posey 2014). Buried pipelines are less 
vulnerable to flooding impacts but may be subject to 
damage from flood-borne debris, as high streamflow could 
erode the soil and expose pipelines buried in riverbanks or 
 
Figure 6-4. A railroad bridge is partially swept away by Cedar 
River floodwaters in Waterloo, Iowa, in 2008 
Source: NOAA 2015 
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under the riverbed (GAO 2014). For example, in 2011, 
flooding along the Missouri River in Iowa submerged and 
damaged a pipeline, causing the pipeline to spill over 800 
barrels of natural gas liquids into the river (EPA 2012, 
Gebrekidan 2011).  
As the frequency, length, and intensity of heat waves 
increase, railroads and roadbeds are more susceptible to 
material stress and damage (Posey 2012). Heat waves also 
increase the likelihood of rail buckling, and railroads may 
reduce the loading of rail cars and issue “slow orders" to 
prevent derailments due to rail buckling (CCSP 2008, FRA 
2011, USGCRP 2014). These measures can be costly, as they 
lead to delays, consume rail capacity, increase operating 
costs, and require railroads to maintain larger fleets of 
rolling stock (CCSP 2008). Heat waves can also cause 
bridges to expand, stressing thermal expansion joints and 
causing a need for more frequent maintenance (Posey 
2012).  
 
Increasing episodes of flooding (see text box) and drought 
affect waterway levels and may have an impact on barge 
transport of energy commodities in the region, particularly 
along the Mississippi River. For example, during the 2012 
drought, Mississippi River levels were near historic lows, 
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers allowed barges to 
move in only one direction for eight hours a day and closed 
the river to barge traffic for the remaining 16 hours for 
dredging operations (Fears 2013). In December 2012, total 
barge cargo in the portion of the Mississippi River running 
from St. Louis to Cairo, Illinois, was down more than 1,100 
kilotons compared to December 2011. By February 2013, 
barges that typically run 12 feet deep were only allowed to 
run 8–9 feet deep (Rizzo 2013). A tow (chain of barges 
pulled or pushed as a group) on the upper Mississippi, 
Illinois, and Ohio Rivers typically has 15 barges, each 
capable of carrying more than 1000 tons. A one-inch drop in 
river level reduces tow capacity by 255 tons, resulting in 
transport delays and higher costs (NOAA 2012).  
 
There is still considerable uncertainty in projections for 
Great Lakes water levels (USGCRP 2014). Increasing 
temperatures may lead to drops in lake levels due to 
increased evaporation, but increases in precipitation may 
offset this effect (Posey 2012).  While lower water levels 
could reduce the amount of cargo  ships could transport, if 
lake ice levels decline, the St. Lawrence Seaway may remain 
open longer and increase the shipping season (USGCRP 
2014, Posey 2012).  
Fuel Transport 
Resilience Solutions 
Measures to harden fuel transportation infrastructure to 
better withstand flooding include building or improving the 
design of dams and levees, some of which failed to hold 
during the 2008 floods in the Midwest. The dams and 
levees along the upper Mississippi River were not 
constructed according to a comprehensive plan, and the 
level of protection provided by these structures varies, 
ranging from protection from flood events occurring once in 
5 years or less up to once in 500 years (CRS 2009). To 
improve resilience to drought conditions, increased 
maintenance dredging can increase river depths, reducing 
the likelihood of barge transport restrictions. 
Risks to railroads from flooding can be mitigated through 
system and track upgrades, but these can be costly. 
Resilience solutions include upgrading drainage systems, 
ensuring culverts can handle increased runoff from heavy 
precipitation events, and increasing pumping capacity in 
tunnels (DOT 2009). Policy measures that restrict new rail 
line development in floodplains, revise standards for 
drainage capacity or elevating tracks, or require more 
frequent track inspection can also improve resilience. Track 
integrity inspection is shifting from visual methods to 
sophisticated sensing techniques operated from vehicles 
such as hi-railers (trucks that ride on rails).  
Riverbank transport assets, including railroads and buried 
pipelines, can be protected through the use of manmade or 
natural barriers to reduce the risk of erosion. Pipelines 
under river crossings can be protected by using horizontal 
drilling techniques to bury the pipe significantly deeper 
than traditional trenching methods (Brown 2013, Miller and 
Bryski 2012). Pipelines at risk from erosion can also be 
replaced with materials that are less likely to leak or 
rupture from impacts (e.g., coated steel rather than cast 
iron or bare steel). 
Fuel transport during the 2008 Midwest floods 
Parts of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Wisconsin received 
more than a foot of rain over 15 days in 2008, causing 
widespread flooding along the Mississippi River and 
regional rivers. The floods caused extensive damage to 
the region and disrupted barge, truck, and rail transport 
of energy products (NOAA 2008). The U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers was forced to close locks on a 250-mile 
stretch of the upper Mississippi River, disrupting 
transport of petroleum products, coal, and ethanol 
(Iowa DOT 2008). Major rail infrastructure in the region 
was destroyed by floodwaters as railroad bridges were 
swept away, disrupting rail service in Iowa and other 
portions of the Midwest (DOE 2008). Damage to the 
railroad system in Iowa was estimated to be between 
$68 and $83 million and repairs lasted up to 12 months. 
In addition, 125 miles of primary highway were washed 
out, and 1,500 miles of road needed replacement 
(NOAA 2009). 
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Rails are designed to withstand temperature gradients 
based on expected ambient temperatures and heat 
generated from railcar traffic (FRA 2011, Volpe 2003). New 
or replacement tracks can be installed to function at higher 
temperatures, reducing the likelihood of derailment. 
Railroad companies that are incorporating considerations of 
higher temperatures from climate change into their 
planning would most likely upgrade tracks when they are 
replaced for other reasons, including normal wear and tear, 
upgrades for traffic reasons, or damage from other extreme 
events, including flooding (CCSP 2008). 
To increase resilience to disruptions in fuel supply, utilities 
may also consider increasing fuel stockpiles. For example, 
Ameren is implementing new fuel inventory policies and 
developing alternative delivery options at facilities to 
mitigate the risk of fuel supply disruption (Ameren 2013).  
Electricity Demand 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Midwest on the whole is an electricity exporter, 
providing power to adjacent states in the Northeast 
(USGCRP 2014). However, several states in the region, 
including Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin, are net importers of power from neighboring 
states and Canada (EIA 2014a, EIA 2012b). Some localities in 
the Midwest, as well as adjacent states in the Northeast, 
may be affected if electricity demand in the region grows.  
Winters in the region are cold, and in most cities, total 
energy demand for winter heating is five to seven times 
greater than energy demand for cooling (USGCRP 2014). 
But since heating is traditionally provided by fossil fuels, 
including natural gas and heating oil, utilities in the region 
are typically summer peaking, with summer peak demand 
an average of 14% higher than winter peak demand (EIA 
2013c). The region is highly energy-intensive and more 
industrial than the rest of the country, with 34% of total 
electricity consumption in the industrial sector (EIA 2013c, 
USGCRP 2014).  
Climate change is projected to have the following impact on 
electricity demand in the Midwest: 
 Higher maximum temperatures, longer and more severe 
heat waves, higher humidity, and higher overnight lows 
are likely to increase electricity demand for cooling in 
the summer (NOAA 2013b, USGCRP 2014). 
As shown in Figure 6-5, an increase of 300–900 CDDs is 
projected by mid-century for most of the region, with the 
exception of the northern portions of Minnesota and 
Wisconsin and the upper peninsula of Michigan (NOAA 
2013b). Relative to historical climate, and depending on the 
region, these increases represent up to a doubling of CDDs 
by mid-century (NOAA 2013b).   
 
Figure 6-5. Increase in annual total CDDs by mid-century
2
  
Source: NOAA 2013b 
Additional CDDs will likely impel consumers to use more air 
conditioning as daytime and nighttime temperatures rise. In 
addition, it is likely that warmer temperatures will increase 
the number of homes and businesses with air conditioners 
in the region, which would amplify the electricity demand 
effects of increasing CDDs. One study projects that 
temperatures in much of the Midwest will be similar to 
current temperatures in the South by the end of the 
century, including more days over 95°F each year in Chicago 
than the average Texas resident experiences today (RBP 
2015). Market penetration of air conditioners in the South 
is currently 98%, compared to 91% in the Midwest (EIA 
2011b). As temperatures increase, the market penetration 
of air conditioners in the Midwest may approach that of the 
South. These changes could contribute to rapid increases in 
total and peak energy demand.  
Demand for cooling energy depends on not only 
temperature but also humidity (Beecher and Kalmbach 
2012). Projected changes for the region include increasing 
heat waves coinciding with increased humidity, 
compounding factors driving growth in peak energy 
demand (USGCRP 2014).  
Increasing use of air conditioning is likely to heighten power 
sector vulnerability to service disruptions unless it is offset 
by demand management programs, improvements in air 
conditioner energy efficiency, or new generation and 
transmission capacity (refer to Thermoelectric Power 
Generation and Electric Grid sections). 
In the winter, increasing temperatures are expected to 
reduce demand for heating. One study found that heating 
degree days may decrease by 15% across the Midwest by 
mid-century (CMAP 2013). Having fewer heating degree 
                                                                
2
 Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the 
end of the last century (1980–2000) under an A2 emissions 
scenario 
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days is likely to reduce demand for heating fuel, primarily 
natural gas (EIA 2013f). 
Electricity Demand 
Resilience Solutions 
Energy efficiency, load management, and capacity 
expansion (including more climate-resilient technologies) all 
play roles in reducing the exposure of the Midwest’s power 
sector to increasing electricity demand. One study found 
that increased demand in the Midwest associated with 
climate change could exceed 10 GW, which would require 
more than $6 billion in infrastructure investments (Gotham 
et al. 2012). 
As changes to electricity demand depend on not only 
climate but also population change, economic growth, and 
the deployment of new technologies, investments in 
capacity expansion will likely be made as part of an 
integrated planning process. Growth in power consumption 
in the region has been slower than the national average 
over the last two decades and has fallen in several states 
(Beecher and Kalmbach 2012). This decrease is partly due to 
slow population growth, which has been slower than any 
other region over the same period (U.S. Census Bureau 
2014).  
Energy efficiency, load management, and other programs 
administered by regional power producers can help reduce 
total electric power demand and peak loads (Beecher and 
Kalmbach 2012). Midwest utilities have already 
implemented a number of demand-side management 
(DSM) practices to reduce loads and improve energy 
efficiency. For example, Hoosier Energy is expanding DSM 
efforts targeting water heaters, air conditioners, and heat 
pumps, contributing to lower costs and better reliability in 
times of high energy demand. The utility also offers 
incentives to encourage installation of higher efficiency 
heating and cooling systems, helps customers meet 
enhanced energy efficient design and construction 
standards to lower energy costs, and supports appliance 
recycling programs to remove inefficient refrigerators and 
freezers (Hoosier Energy 2014). 
 
 
DSM programs have so far achieved peak load reductions of 
over 3,700 MW and enrolled over 5,000 industrial 
customers, 32,000 commercial customers, and 1.2 million 
households in price responsive programs (EIA 2013c). A 
survey of 37 Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) 
utilities indicated a peak load reduction potential of over 
4,700 MW from retail demand response programs (LBNL 
2008). 
Capacity expansion can also help alleviate the stresses that 
increasing peak electricity demand will place on the region’s 
electricity supply. In addition, new capacity investments 
Increasing resilience through flexible demand 
Columbia Water & Light (CWL) in Missouri offers a load 
shedding program to commercial and industrial 
customers. Customers who reduce their electric 
demand during peak demand periods can receive a 
credit of $36 per year per kilowatt based on the 
average reduction in demand during requested 
periods. Customers can receive credits for up to 50% 
of the customer’s normal base load demand prior to 
load shedding (CWL 2014b). 
2003 Blackout: A lesson in regional interdependencies 
On August 14, 2003, a major blackout struck the 
northeastern United States and parts of Canada, 
including areas in Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, 
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Vermont, and the 
Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec. Some 50 
million people were affected. The blackout occurred on 
a hot summer day, with temperatures exceeding 87°F 
and elevated power demand throughout the region 
(DOE 2004).   
Figure 6-6: New York City skyline during the 2003 blackout 
that was initiated in the Midwest 
Source: DHS 2013 
The blackout was initiated by outages on transmission 
lines operated by First Energy (FE) in Ohio. High 
ambient temperatures and high demand caused a 
345 kV transmission line to sag low enough to arc to a 
tree, causing the line to trip (DOE 2004). This outage 
caused increased loads on other lines, causing those 
lines to trip, and soon a surge of power propagated 
throughout the northeastern grid. While management 
practices allowed the outage to spread across the 
region, the sensitivity of FE’s transmission lines to 
elevated temperatures were also to blame (DOE 2004). 
Subsequent investigations found that FE made 
optimistic assumptions about transmission line cooling 
when setting summer emergency ratings, and that FE 
had failed to trim trees in its rights-of-way, precipitating 
the line strike (DOE 2004). 
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may be needed to replace a substantial number of baseload 
coal plants that may be retiring (see Thermoelectric Power 
Generation section) (EIA 2014l).  
Electric Grid 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Midwest region includes portions of MISO and PJM 
Interconnection, as well as a small part of the Southwestern 
Power Pool (SPP). The region’s grid is dense, with total 
regional power production and consumption second only to 
the Southeast and significant mileage of 345 kV lines (EIA 
2013b, EIA 2013c, EIA 2014a). 
Climate change is expected to have the following impacts 
on the electric grid in the Midwest: 
 Higher average and extreme air temperatures and 
higher nighttime temperatures reduce the capacity of 
transmission lines and substations, increasing the 
likelihood of disruption (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
 Higher extreme temperatures may reduce the lifetime 
transformers and reduce transformer overloading 
capacity (Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000). 
Higher temperatures can cause transmission operators to 
decrease the current-carrying capacity of transmission lines 
in order to protect the equipment (Sathaye et al. 2013). 
High temperatures cause thermal expansion of transmission 
line materials, and sagging can permanently damage lines 
and increase the likelihood of power outages when the lines 
make contact with other lines, trees, or the ground (see 
sidebar) (DOE 2013). In Ohio, heat events have resulted in 
transmission outages for about 25,000 customers from 
1992–2009 (DOE 2015b). The combined impacts of 
increasing demand and reduced capacity increase the 
likelihood that transmission operators will be forced to 
impose brownouts (Sathaye et al. 2013). Additionally, in the 
summer, overheated power lines rely on cooler overnight 
temperatures to reduce thermal load. Projected climate 
changes include heat waves with higher nighttime 
temperatures that hinder overnight cooling and may lead to 
more overheated power lines (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014).  
Reduced transmission capacity, when combined with 
projected increases in demand for cooling energy and 
reductions in available generating capacity associated with 
higher air and water temperatures, can also affect regions 
that depend on power imports from the Midwest.  
Higher ambient temperatures can increase the likelihood 
that power transformers will be damaged, especially on 
extremely hot days when electricity demand is highest 
(Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000). Power transformers are 
typically rated for 24-hour average ambient temperatures 
of 86°F (when temperatures do not exceed 104°F) (PJM 
2011). Above a transformer’s rated temperature, its paper 
insulation breaks down at exponentially higher rates, so 
even incremental increases in ambient temperature can 
harm transformers, especially if high temperatures occur 
during grid emergencies when transformers must be 
overloaded for safety or reliability purposes (Bérubé 2007, 
Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000). To protect transformers, 




New and existing transmission infrastructure can be made 
more resilient through the use of smart technologies that 
better respond to grid emergencies by isolating outages 
before they can cause cascading failures (Ameren 2013, 
DOE 2004, DOE 2013). These advanced technologies 
provide increased redundancy in transmission networks and 
substations. New transmission lines can also be designed to 
accept emergency loading conditions at higher 
temperatures, and operators can use realistic assumptions 
about weather conditions when defining emergency 
conditions (DOE 2004, DOE 2013). 
 
Improved operations can also increase grid resilience. 
Vegetation management is an important means of 
preventing line outages caused by tree strikes, as well as 
fires that can be started by such events (DOE 2013). For 
example, American Electric Power (AEP) has invested more 
than $1 billion in vegetation management around 
transmission lines and is designing new and replacement 
poles to withstand damage greater than its National Electric 
Safety Code (NESC) requirement in the service territory 
(AEP 2014). In some cases, grid resilience can be improved 
through undergrounding of lines, although it is costly. For 
example, Ameren is burying power lines in the region to 
increase physical resilience and is working to incorporate 
smart technology such as intelligent switches that can 
Building a resilient electric grid in Chicago 
Commonwealth Edison, a unit of Exelon Corporation, 
has partnered with American Superconductor 
Corporation (AMSC) on the  Electric Grid (REG) Resilient
effort, a plan to deploy AMSC’s high-temperature 
superconductor technology (AMSC 2014). This 
technology will be used to build a superconducting 
cable system to connect substations in Chicago’s grid 
and build redundancy that allows multiple substations 
to share the extra load in the event of a substation 
going offline (AMSC 2014, DHS 2015). By splitting the 
load among operational substations, REG can help 
prevent outages (DHS 2015). REG is a part of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Science and 
Technology Directorate’s efforts to improve the 
security and resilience of electric grids in the United 
States, and was validated at Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory (AMSC 2014, DHS 2015). 
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isolate outages and respond to failures when damage 
occurs (Ameren 2013). 
The resilience of transformers to higher air temperatures 
and higher nighttime temperatures can be increased by 
installing or upgrading forced-air or forced-oil cooling in 
transformers (Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000). Operators 
can derate transformers during periods of elevated ambient 
temperatures to lower the thermal loading and protect the 
transformers from damage (USBR 2000). In the long term, 
operators can replace existing transformers with thermally 
upgraded transformers to increase resilience (Bérubé et al. 
2007). 
Local power generation can improve resilience by reducing 
reliance on long-distance delivery of electricity via the grid. 
Local or distributed generation, such as onsite solar panels 
or small-scale wind power (Figure 6-7), reduces exposure to 
grid outages. In addition, critical facilities such as 
emergency response services and water utilities can install 
backup power generators with sufficient capacity to 
operate continuously for extended outages. 
 
Figure 6-7: Small scale wind turbines at Dull Homestead Farm in 
Brookville, Ohio 
Source: DOE 2015a 
Bioenergy 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
As a major producer of agricultural products, the Midwest is 
critical to the nation’s supply of biofuels. Ethanol 
production from corn dominates regional bioenergy 
production and consumption. It also includes a small 
amount of biodiesel production from canola oil, and 
captured landfill and wastewater gases are used to 
generate electricity and produce renewable natural gas 
(biomethane).  
The Midwest region is home to over half of the nation's 
ethanol refining capacity, with operational facilities capable 
of producing 7.3 billion gallons of ethanol per year (NEO 
2014). Of the 121 ethanol biorefineries in the region, all but 
one rely on corn as a feedstock (RFA 2014). While corn is a 
commodity and is grown in almost every state, corn 
production for biofuel is an especially important product in 
the Midwest. Led by Iowa and Illinois (ranked first and 
second among states in corn production, respectively), the 
region harvested 58% of the nation's corn acres in 2013 
(USDA 2014).  
Climate change is expected to have the following impacts 
on bioenergy in the Midwest: 
 Moderately higher temperatures may benefit crops, but 
extreme temperatures may harm them; warmer 
temperatures may also benefit weeds, disease, and 
pests (USGCRP 2014). 
 Lower numbers of freezing days and a lengthening of 
the frost-free growing season may extend the range 
where biofuel crops can be grown (Bjerga 2012, NOAA 
2013b, Roberts and Schlenker 2011). 
 Moderate increases in seasonal precipitation may 
benefit crops, but an increasing probability of seasonal 
drought and floods may harm them (NOAA 2013b, 
USGCRP 2014). 
The projected impacts of climate change on corn growth 
are complex, with a mix of outcomes depending on region 
and climate uncertainty, and are expected to evolve over 
time. Changes in the length of the frost-free season are 
projected to be large and positive, aiding corn cultivation, 
with increases of 15–30 days per year by the middle of the 
century, depending on the location (NOAA 2013b). Plant 
growth can also be aided by increased CO2 levels. In the 
long run, however, temperature increases are projected to 
shorten the duration of reproductive development of corn 
and lead to declines in yield (USGCRP 2014). Additionally, 
any beneficial effects to crops may be outpaced by 
increased weeds, diseases, and pests, making cultivation 
more difficult and less productive (USGCRP 2014).  
Projected increases in winter and spring precipitation may 
also benefit agricultural productivity, as soil moisture is 
recharged. However, springs that are too wet may also 
reduce crop yields, forcing growers to switch to shorter-
season varieties. The region is expected to experience 
increased intensity of extreme precipitation events, which 
can erode soils and flood fields. Finally, higher 
temperatures (which increase evapotranspiration), 
declining summer precipitation, and an increase in the 
average number of days without precipitation may increase 
the region's vulnerability to periodic seasonal drought 
(USGCRP 2014).  
Crop yields in the Midwest will be more strongly influenced 
by anomalous weather events than by changes in average 
temperature and annual precipitation. Increasing intensity, 
frequency, and length of heat waves may also reduce yields 
by preventing the effective pollination of crops (Figure 6-8) 
(USGCRP 2014).  
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Figure 6-8. Drought-stressed corn 
Source: Station 2012 
Figure 6-9 shows the effects of changes in maximum 
summer temperature on yields for two major crops in the 
region.  
    
Figure 6-9. Differences in corn (top) and soybean (bottom) yields 
based on maximum summer temperatures in Illinois and Indiana 
Source: USGCRP 2014 
Biorefineries may also be vulnerable to climate change 
impacts. Biorefineries—which convert biomass 
(predominately corn) to ethanol or other fuel—can use a 
substantial amount of water. Water needs in biorefineries 
have fallen significantly over a ten-year timeframe from an 
average of 6 gallons of water per gallon of ethanol 
produced down to 2.7 (Wu and Peng 2011). Declines are 
largely due to new efficient designs; however, similar to 
petroleum refineries, biorefineries could face water 
shortfalls if seasonal droughts occur more frequently (DOE 
2013, USGCRP 2014). 
Bioenergy 
Resilience Solutions 
A number of resilience-building options are available to 
growers of biofuel crops. In the Midwest, a longer freeze-
free season could allow more northern farmers to grow 
corn. Nationally, adaptation strategies for agriculture 
include diversification of crops and crop rotation (including 
heat- and drought-tolerant varieties), increased use of 
pesticides, and additional practices associated with 
sustainable agriculture, such as improving soil quality and 
minimizing off-farm flows of nutrients and pesticides 
(USGCRP 2014). Bio-refining technologies that use less 
water to produce fuels can also help increase resilience in 
cases of seasonal water shortages. 
Wind Energy 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Midwest region has over 15,000 MW of operational 
wind generating capacity, or 5% of total capacity in the 
region (EIA 2013b). In the Midwest, 146 utilities and 
producers operate 261 wind farms (EIA 2013b). Some of the 
best onshore wind resources in the country are located in 
Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota, and all of the states in the 
region except Indiana incentivize wind power with 
renewable portfolio standards (EIA 2012a, NREL 2014a). 
Although some models have suggested that climate change 
may lead to declines in average wind speeds, there is not 
yet substantial agreement among researchers as to how a 
changing climate will ultimately affect wind resources in the 
United States (DOE 2013). It is uncertain whether wind 
power production will be disrupted by climate-driven 




Various measures can be taken to increase the resilience of 
wind energy. In general, if wind speeds decline, operators 
can increase the resilience of wind energy by increasing the 
efficiency of operating turbines, although these 
improvements would be beneficial regardless of reductions 
in wind resources. Generation by a single turbine can be 
increased by increasing turbine height and blade length 
(AWEA 2014). A wind farm can also operate more efficiently 
if turbines are sited to reduce the impact of a single 
turbine’s wake on other turbines (NREL 2014b). 
Advances in wind turbine technology can also enhance 
resilience to more extreme wind conditions. For example, 
because utilities cannot control when wind is available, it 
has been difficult to fully incorporate wind power into the 
electricity grid, but innovative battery designs and other 
grid-scale storage technologies designed to store energy 
produced by wind could enhance the use of wind turbine 
technology.  
 
Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Midwest 6-11 
 
Regional Climate Change Observations 
and Projections in Detail 
Higher Temperatures 
Historical observations 
 Since 1895, average temperatures have increased 
0.14°F per decade, or almost 1.5°F (NOAA 2013a). 
 Spring temperatures have increased 0.17°F per 
decade, or almost 1.9°F (NOAA 2013b). 
 Frost-free season has been lengthening: The average 
length of the frost-free season across the Midwest 
region increased by about nine days (comparing 1991–
2012 to 1901–1960) (USGCRP 2014). 
 Water temperatures on the Great Lakes have 
increased by more than 5°F from 1968 to 2002 (NOAA 
2013a). 
 Ice coverage on the Great Lakes has decreased: The 
average annual maximum ice coverage during 2003–
2013 was less than 43%, whereas the average ice 
coverage during 1962–2013 was 52% (USGCRP 2014). 
Future projections 
 Average temperatures are projected to increase at a 
faster rate: Depending on the region and greenhouse 
gas emissions, increases of 4.5°F–9.5°F are projected by 
2070–2099 compared to 1971–1999 levels, with the 
largest increases in Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin (NOAA 2013b). 
 Extremely hot days are projected to become more 
common: Across most of the region, up to 25 more 
days with daily maximum temperatures >95°F are 
projected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000); portions of southern Missouri and Illinois 
are likely to be the most affected and may see as many 
as 30 more extremely hot days per year (NOAA 2013b). 
 Consecutive number of days of extreme heat are 
expected to become longer: The annual maximum 
number of consecutive days with a daily high >95°F is 
projected to increase by up to 16 days by mid-century 
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000) across the 
region; the southern portion of the region is likely see 
the greatest increases (NOAA 2013b). 
 Extremely cold nights are projected to become less 
common: Across the region, 5–25 fewer days with daily 
minimums <10°F are projected by mid-century (2041–
2070, compared to 1980–2000) (NOAA 2013b). 
 Frost-free season is projected to lengthen: The frost-
free season is projected to be 15 to more than 30 days 
longer by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–
2000) across the region, with the largest increases in 
Michigan (USGCRP 2014). 
 Cooling degree days (CDDs) are expected to increase: 
Across the region, an increase of 150–900 CDDs is 
projected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000) (NOAA 2013b). 
 Heating degree days (HDDs) are expected to decrease: 
Across most of the region, declines of 700–1,300 HDDs 
are projected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000); Michigan is projected to be the most 
affected, with declines of up to 1,500 HDDs by mid-
century (NOAA 2013b). 
Changing Water Availability 
Historical observations 
 Since 1895, annual precipitation has increased by 0.31 
inches per decade, or almost 3.4 inches (NOAA 2013b). 
 Across the Midwest, extreme precipitation events 
have occurred more frequently: An index of two-day 
extreme precipitation events expected to occur once 
every five years shows a statistically significant upward 
trend since 1895 (NOAA 2013a). 
Future projections 
 Annual precipitation is projected to increase: By the 
end of the century (2070–2099), precipitation in the 
northern portion of the region is projected to increase 
by 3%–9% under a high emissions scenario (compared 
to the period 1971–1999); Minnesota is projected to be 
the most affected and may see an increase as high as 
12% (NOAA 2013b). 
 Winter and spring precipitation is projected to 
increase; summer precipitation may decline: Midwest 
winters, springs, and falls are projected to see 
increased precipitation by mid-century (2071–2099, 
relative to 1971–2000) under a higher emissions 
scenario, while summer precipitation may decline by 
10% or more in southwestern parts of the region 
(USGCRP 2014). 
 Extreme precipitation events are projected to 
increase, particularly in the northern portion of the 
region: The number of days per year with precipitation 
greater than one inch is projected to increase by 10%–
50% by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–
2000) under a high emissions scenario; Minnesota is 
projected to be the most affected, and portions of the 
state may see an increase of over 50% (NOAA 2013b). 
 Consecutive number of days with little or no 
precipitation are likely to become longer: The annual 
maximum number of consecutive days with less than 
0.01 inches of precipitation is expected to increase by 
mid-century (2041–2070, relative to 1971–2000), with 
Missouri and Illinois projected to experience the largest 
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The Northeast consists of a number of large and densely 
populated urban and industrial areas, as well as wide-ranging 
rural areas and deciduous forestland. The climate is 
characterized by cold winters and warm, humid summers. The 
region relies primarily on thermoelectric power, including 
natural gas-fired, nuclear, and coal-fired plants. The Northeast 
produces large amounts of coal, mainly in West Virginia and 
Pennsylvania, and has a significant number of natural gas wells. 
Major climate change impacts projected to increasingly 
threaten the region’s energy infrastructure include the 
following: 
 Temperatures are projected to increase, and heat waves 
are projected to occur more frequently and last longer.
a
 
Warmer temperatures and longer, more frequent, and 
more severe heat waves are expected to increase both 
average and peak demand for cooling energy, while 




 Atlantic hurricane intensity is projected to increase, and 
the most intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5) are 
projected to occur more frequently. Combined with 
projected sea-level rise, hurricane-associated storm surge 
is likely to cause greater coastal damage.
c
 Coastal power 
plants, electrical grid components, and fuel transport 
infrastructure are at risk of damage from more intense 
hurricanes and sea level rise-enhanced storm surges.
d
 
 Heavy precipitation events are projected to occur more 
frequently, with the number of days with more than one 
inch of rain increasing 12%–30% by mid-century.
e
 Inland 
flooding from increasingly frequent and intense heavy 
precipitation events heightens the risk of damage and 
disruption to roads, railroads, power lines, pipelines, and other low-lying infrastructure.
f
  
Table 7-1: Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Northeast 
Subsector Vulnerability Magnitude Illustrative Resilience Solutions 
Energy Demand and 
Thermoelectric 
Power Generation 
Higher temperatures reduce system 




Air temperature increases of 3.5°F–
6.5°F and CDD increases of 100–700 
projected by mid-century
h
   
Capacity additions, demand-side load 
management, energy efficiency 
Electric Grid Increased intensity of storms and 
heavy rainfall, causing wind damage 




Recent hurricanes resulting in wide-
spread regional power outages to 
more than 8 million customers
j
 
Physical hardening, submersible 
equipment, redundant transmission, 
smart grid and distributed generation, 
and vegetation management 
Fuel Transport and 
Storage 
Increased exposure to damage and 
disruption from flooding during 
heavy precipitation events and sea 
level rise-enhanced storm surge 
during more intense hurricanes
k
 
Sea level rise expected to exceed 
global average of 1–4 feet by 2100 
and coastal flooding impacts from 




Reinforcing shorelines of critical 
waterways; dredging to maintain 
shipping access; elevating or 
rerouting critical rail, road, or pipeline 
arteries 
QUICK FACTS       
Northeast States:   
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, West Virginia 
Population (2013) 
 
65,000,000 (21% of U.S.) 
Area (square miles) 198,000  (6% of U.S.) 
Energy expenditures  $257 billion 









Electric power                     TWh 665 599 n/a 
Petroleum                     MMbbls 7 1,050 <1% 
Coal                           million tons 178 95 89% 













Natural gas 215 32% 69 280 
Coal 186 28% 48 86 
Nuclear 199 30% 26 17 
Hydroelectric 37 6% 8 369 
Wind  8 1% 4 84 
Biomass 13 2% 3 163 




Electric Power   
  Wells (>1 boe/d): 2,360   Power plants (> 1 MW):  1,270 
  Refineries:  10   Interstate transmission lines:  37 
  Liquids pipelines: 12 Coal 
 
  
  Ports (>200 tons/yr): 20   Mines:  520 
Natural Gas 
 
Waterways   
  Wells:  113,000   Coal and petroleum routes:   25 
  Interstate pipelines: 25 Railroads 
 
  
  Market hubs:  2   Miles of freight track:   16,200 
Note: Table presents 2012 data except for the number of oil wells, which is 2009 data. 
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW. 
Sources: AAR 2014,  EIA 2011, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013c, EIA 2013d, EIA 2014a, EIA 2014b, 
EIA 2014c, EIA 2014e, EIA 2014f, EIA 2014g, USACE 2014, US Census Bureau 2014 
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities 
and Resilience Solutions  
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of 
resilience solutions in the Northeast are discussed below. 
System components that are most vulnerable to climate 
change are described first.  
Electricity Demand 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
With cold winters and warm, humid summers, the 
Northeast relies on energy for both heating and cooling. 
The region’s electricity consumption is distinctly seasonal. 
Summer peak demand served by the average utility in the 
region is about 30% higher than winter peak demand (EIA 
2013a). More than four out of five households in the region 
report using air conditioning, although they use it 
significantly less frequently than the national average (EIA 
2013e).  
Winter space heating in the region is provided primarily by 
natural gas and fuel oil (EIA 2014h). The region hosts the 
oldest building stock in the nation, and therefore recent 
improvements in energy codes for new buildings may not 
benefit a large share of consumers (DOE 2008, NAHB 2012, 
USGCRP 2014).  
Climate change is expected to have the following impacts 
on electricity demand: 
 Higher average temperatures (including warmer 
overnight lows) and extreme high temperatures, 
including more frequent, more severe, and longer-
lasting heat waves, are expected to increase average 
and peak electricity demand for cooling (NOAA 2013, 
USGCRP 2014). 
By the end of this century, average temperatures in the 
Northeast are projected to increase by 3.5°F–8.5°F 
(compared to 1971–1999). By mid-century, increases of 
2.5°F–5.5°F could produce 400–700 additional CDDs per 
year in the southern portion of the region and along the 
coasts from Massachusetts to Maryland (i.e., the location of 
the region’s largest metropolitan areas). Changes in CDDs in 
the interior of New York and New England are projected to 
be smaller, adding 100–400 CDDs by mid-century (NOAA 
2013). 
Changes to temperature extremes, including heat waves, 
are expected to increase peak electricity demand in the 
region. This may limit the electricity sector’s ability to 
deliver energy when it is most needed (DOE 2013a). Across 
most of the region, extremely hot days are expected to 
occur more often, and heat waves are expected to occur 
more frequently and last longer (USGCRP 2014, NOAA 
2013). Conversely, warmer winter temperatures and fewer 
numbers of days below freezing are expected to reduce 
demand for heating energy (NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
The projected increase in CDDs in the Northeast is 
comparable to CDD increases in most of the northern 
United States. However, the region hosts many densely 
populated metropolitan areas that magnify the intensity of 
summer heat through the urban heat island effect. 
Temperatures in densely populated towns and cities can be 
significantly higher than surrounding areas (EPA 2014). An 
example of this effect can be seen in a heat map of New 
York City (Figure 7-1). This effect, combined with the 
region’s relatively humid summertime climate, is expected 
to amplify the region’s electricity demand for cooling 
(USGCRP 2014).  
 
Figure 7-1. Urban heat islands magnify ambient temperatures. In 
this example, temperatures in urban areas of New York City are 
approximately 10°F warmer than the forested parts of Central 
Park 
Source: USGCRP 2014 
Increases in CDDs will likely cause homeowners and 
businesses to use air conditioning more often, as warmer 
daytime and nighttime temperatures will occur more 
frequently (DOE 2013a). More households and businesses 
may install air conditioning or upgrade from window units 
to whole-building systems. Large increases in summer air 
conditioning—along with associated technology and 
structural investments—could be a transformational change 
for much of the region. These changes could contribute to 
nonlinear increases in total and peak electricity demand 
(Auffhammer 2011). The New York Independent System 
Operator (NYISO) expects peak demand to grow an average 
of five times faster than total demand over the next decade 
(NYISO 2014).
1
  The most significant changes in the 
projected number of extremely hot days occur in and near 
coastal areas where the region’s populations are 
concentrated (Figure 7-2). 
                                                                
1
 Peak demand is forecast to grow 0.83% per year on average, 
while overall electricity demand is forecast to grow 0.16% per year 
on average from 2014 to 2024 in New York State. 
 










Source: USGCRP 2014 
Growth in electricity demand will reduce power system 
resilience unless mitigated by successful demand side 
management or increased generation capacity. These 
increases in peak and annual demand heighten the risk of 
service outages, particularly when combined with the 
impacts of climate change on electricity generation and 
transmission infrastructure (see Thermoelectric Power 
Generation and Electric Grid sections). 
Electricity Demand 
Resilience Solutions 
Energy efficiency, capacity expansion, and market 
mechanisms such as demand response could improve the 
electric power sector’s resilience to future increases in 
electricity demand.  
Energy efficiency can help reduce total electricity demand, 
even as the need for cooling energy increases. Federal 
energy efficiency programs such as the U.S. Department of 
Energy’s (DOE’s) Weatherization Assistance Program reduce 
energy demand by partnering with utilities (including the 
Northeast Utility System) to provide weatherization services 
to low-income families. Through DOE’s Better Buildings 
Challenge, organizations in the region and across the 
country are taking on important commitments to improve 
the energy intensity of their buildings by at least 20% over 
10 years and sharing strategies that work. Nationwide, 
more than 190 organizations are participating in the 
Challenge, representing more than 3 billion square feet of 
building space, over 600 manufacturing facilities, and close 
to $2 billion in energy efficiency financing (DOE 2014f). 
                                                                
2
 Projected changes for mid-century (2041–2070) relative to the 
end of the last century (1971–2000) under an A2 emissions 
scenario.  
In addition to future energy savings from federal energy 
efficiency programs, many Northeast states have adopted 
aggressive energy efficiency resource standards for 
investor-owned utilities and other power producers. 
Massachusetts, in particular, has one of the most ambitious 
targets for energy savings, requiring utilities to achieve 
annual savings of 2.4% per year through 2015, resulting in 
energy efficiency investments that are projected to reduce 
energy demand by over 3,700 GWh in 2015 (ACEEE 2014). 
New York requires a 20% energy efficiency improvement in 
buildings owned or managed by the state by the year 2020 
(BuildSmartNY 2015). 
Capacity expansion can alleviate the pressure that 
increasing peak electricity demand from warmer 
temperatures will place on the region’s electricity 
generators. Population shifts, economic growth, and new 
technologies, such as electric vehicles, could also contribute 
to increasing electricity use. In addition to meeting 
increased electricity demand, the electric power sector in 
the Northeast may need to replace a substantial number of 
baseload coal plants that are nearing retirement and 
nuclear plants that are approaching the end of their 
operating license and may not apply for renewal (ISO-NE 
2014). The bulk of new capacity is likely to come from 
natural gas. This transition from coal to gas can potentially 
reduce both greenhouse gas emissions and water 
withdrawals for cooling thermoelectric power plants. 
Between 2000 and 2012, the Northeast added more than 
30 GW of natural gas capacity, while retirements of coal 
and petroleum power plants resulted in a net decrease 
from those fuels (Figure 7-3) (EIA 2013c).  
Figure 7-3. Recent changes in Northeast electricity generation 
nameplate capacity by fuel type, 2000–2012 
Source: EIA 2013c 
Renewable energy represents a significant potential 
resource for new capacity. For example, wind power 
provided 11% of new capacity additions between 2000 and 
2012 (EIA 2013c). DOE has used loan guarantees to support 
deployment of innovative technologies that enable greater 
use of regional wind generation (see text box). Efforts also 
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include enhanced hydropower deployment, including 
efficiency upgrades of existing hydropower infrastructure. 
For example, more than 70% of the electricity New York 
Power Authority (NYPA) produces is from hydropower 
facilities (NYPA 2013). NYPA has conducted significant 
efficiency improvements over the last several years, 
including replacing and refurbishing major components and 
equipment, such as pump-turbines, that will enable the 
plants to operate at maximum efficiency well into the 21st 
century (NYPA 2013). 
Electric trading with other regions, including across the 
border with Canada, allows pooling of resources and can 
improve electric reliability. Although power imports can 
introduce vulnerabilities, as seen in the 2003 blackout that 
was triggered by an event in the Midwest, on balance 
interconnection improves reliability, both in sharing 
reserves and in guarding against cascading outages. Peak 
power use in Canada is during the winter, which enables 





Demand response in the power market is a strategy that 
reduces the risk from increasing peak electricity demand. 
Many operators in the Northeast are already leveraging 
demand response to address increasing peak demand. 
Compared to all other independent system operators (ISOs) 
and regional transmission organizations (RTOs) surveyed by 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee in 2012, the New 
England ISO had the highest rate of demand response 
capacity as a percentage of total peak load (10.7%), and 
                                                                
3
 Although it is outside the scope of this study, it is plausible that 
warmer temperatures in Canada will affect summer electricity 
demand and reduce the amount of power available for export to 
the United States. 
PJM Interconnection had the largest absolute response 
capacity, with 10,825 MW in reserve (FERC 2013).  
Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Northeast region generates almost all of its power from 
thermoelectric power plants. The region’s fuel mix is 
relatively evenly split between natural gas, nuclear, and 
coal, but important differences exist between New England 
and the Mid-Atlantic states (Table 7-2). Coal is the largest 
source of power for the Mid-Atlantic (33%) but is a small 
(3%) fraction of New England’s fuel mix, which relies on 
natural gas for more than half of its total electricity. Nuclear 
energy supplies 30% of the region’s power, a greater 
fraction than in any other region in the United States (EIA 
2013c).  
Table 7-2. Electric power generation in the Northeast by 
technology 






Coal 3% 33% 28% 
Natural Gas 52% 28% 32% 
Nuclear 30% 30% 30% 
Hydroelectric 6% 6% 6% 
Biomass 6% 1% 2% 
Wind 1% 1% 1% 
Solar <1% <1% <1% 
Other 2% 1% 1% 
Source: EIA 2013c 
Over the next several decades, the region’s fuel mix is 
expected to change. Many of the nuclear power plants in 
the region are scheduled to retire. The contribution of coal 
to the region’s generation mix is also expected to decline as 
more plants are closed (ISO-NE 2014, NYISO 2014). 
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on thermoelectric power generation in the Northeast: 
 Increasing air and water temperatures could reduce the 
available generation capacity of thermoelectric power 
plants (DOE 2013a). 
 Increased hurricane intensity, and more frequent 
intense (Category 4 and 5) hurricanes, combined with 
the effects of sea level rise, increase the vulnerability of 
coastal power plants to wind and coastal flooding 
damage (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
 More frequent and intense heavy precipitation events 
increase the vulnerability of low-lying inland and 
coastal power plants to damage and disruption from 
flooding (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
 Higher temperatures, decreasing summer precipitation, 
and increasing periods of time between precipitation 
events may increase the likelihood of thermoelectric 
Examples of U.S. Department of Energy support for 
deployment of wind generation technologies 
 In August 2011, DOE issued a loan guarantee 
enabling Record Hill Wind to build a 50 MW wind 
farm in Maine. This plant uses new technology that 
reduces the need for curtailments and allows 
consistent power output during extreme wind 
conditions, reducing wear and tear on the turbines 
and preserving the lifetime of the turbine 
components (DOE 2014a). 
 In September 2011, DOE issued a partial loan 
guarantee to Brookfield Renewable Power to 
construct the Granite Reliable wind power 
generation facility in New Hampshire. The facility is 
one of only a few land-based wind farms in the 
United States that use a 3.0 MW wind turbine 
(rather than a 1.7 MW turbine), reducing project 
costs on a per-megawatt basis (DOE 2014b). 
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power plants experiencing water shortages (DOE 
2013a, NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
The majority of thermoelectric power plants in the 
Northeast use fresh surface water for cooling (UCS 2012, 
Figure 7-4). Although many of the coal and nuclear power 
plants in the Northeast use advanced cooling technologies 
that recirculate cooling water, approximately 30% of 
generating capacity in the region (including one third of 
coal-fired plants and a quarter of nuclear plants) use once-
through cooling systems that draw from and discharge into 




Figure 7-4. Distribution of thermoelectric power plants greater 
than 70 MW by type of cooling system; larger circles on the map 
indicate higher net summer capacity 
Source: EIA 2012a 
Climate change is expected to increase the temperature of 
bodies of water used for cooling (NOAA 2013). Higher 
surface water temperatures decrease generation efficiency 
and, therefore, available capacity. This effective decrease in 
generation capacity may increase the likelihood of power 
disruptions; power plants may be forced to shut down to 
avoid exceeding the thermal water discharge limits imposed 
by law to protect ecosystems (DOE 2013a).  
Warmer surface water temperatures may also increase the 
likelihood of forced shutdowns of nuclear power plants. 
Nuclear plants are licensed to operate under a range of 
conditions. If water temperatures exceed this range, they 
may be required to shut down. For example, in 2010, and 
again in 2012, nuclear plants in the region faced mandatory 
curtailments or shutdowns in response to elevated cooling 
water temperatures (DOE 2013a). 
In addition to warmer water temperatures, higher air 
temperatures also reduce efficiency in power plants. For 
example, natural gas power plants may lose 0.3%–0.7% of 
power output for every 1.8°F increase in air temperature 
(DOE 2013a).  
Climate change is projected to increase the frequency of 
intense hurricanes, hurricane-associated storm and rainfall 
intensity, and heavy precipitation events (USGCRP 2014). 
Intense hurricanes can cause significant wind and flood 
damage to coastal power plants. In addition, hurricane-
                                                                
4
 Excluding oil-fired capacity. 
associated storm surge will likely be intensified by rising sea 
levels (USGCRP 2014). Estimates suggest that 19 power 
plants in the Northeast are located less than four feet 
above sea level (Climate Central 2014). 
Inland power plants are threatened by more frequent heavy 
precipitation and increased rainfall during the heaviest 
downpours (NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). Flooding in 
mountain valleys and floodplains can inundate vulnerable 
power plants and disrupt surface cooling water sources 
(DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014).  
While more frequent heavy downpours are expected to 
increase the likelihood of flooding, total summer 
precipitation is projected to decline (NOAA 2013, USGCRP 
2014). The largest changes are projected for western 
Pennsylvania and West Virginia, where rainfall may decline 
by 4%–8% in the summer (NOAA 2013). Combined with 
higher temperatures that lead to greater evaporation rates, 
the likelihood of seasonal water shortages may increase. 
Decreasing surface water availability resulting from lower 
summer rainfall, increased evaporation rates from higher 
temperatures, and competing uses (e.g., irrigation for 
agriculture and municipal water for metropolitan areas) 
may reduce the available generation capacity of 
thermoelectric power plants in the summer (DOE 2013a, 
USGCRP 2014).  
The once-through freshwater cooling systems used by many 
Northeast power plants (Figure 7-4) require a significant 
and consistent supply of water from lakes, rivers, and 
streams. Plants using these types of cooling systems are 
more vulnerable to deratings or outages due to low water 
levels. During periods of drought, plants using these cooling 
systems can become nonoperational if the water level 
drops below water intake structures (NERC 2013). 
Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Resilience Solutions 
Reduced efficiency and capacity from higher air and water 
temperatures can be addressed by capacity additions or 
through demand reduction measures such as load 
management and energy efficiency. New generation 
capacity with sources and supply chains less affected by 
increasing temperatures and decreased water availability 
(e.g., wind and solar photovoltaics) can help make the 
region’s power sector more resilient to climate change. 
 




Engineered barriers such as levees can be effective in 
protecting thermoelectric power plants that are vulnerable 
to flooding from hurricanes and heavy precipitation events. 
For example, ConEdison has installed new floodgates and 
doors in new walls and moats to access isolation zones at 
three generating stations in New York City and has installed 
new flood pumps on mobile skids that can remove excess 
water from isolation zones and moats (ConEd 2014b). 
Utilities may also elevate critical components to protect 
against flooding or upgrade plants with submersible 
equipment. Long-run changes to planning processes 
account for sea level rise, and increased storm surges are 
necessary to protect future power plants from coastal 
flooding.  
Introducing more advanced cooling technologies into the 
region’s power production infrastructure may be an 
effective strategy to reduce its vulnerability to periodic 
drought. For example, American National Power installed a 
dry cooling system in a natural gas-fired plant in 
Connecticut, cutting projected water consumption by 70% 
(UCS 2011).  
Generators can also pursue alternative water supplies for 
once-through power plants. For example, to mitigate the 
risk of low river levels in the region, Exelon Generation is a  
co-owner of the Merrill Creek Reservoir in New Jersey, 
which acts as water storage for Exelon’s generating stations 
when river flow on the Delaware River is low (Exelon 2014). 
Electric Grid 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Energy transmission and distribution infrastructure in the 
Northeast is both extensive and aging (ISO-NE 2014, Pepco 
2014). The region’s population and electric power 
infrastructure are concentrated in coastal cities and low-
lying river valleys (USGCRP 2014), making the Northeast 
electric grid vulnerable to flooding from both heavy 
precipitation events and coastal storm surge during 
hurricanes, both of which are projected to increase as a 
result of climate change.  
The Northeast region’s electric grid is operated by three 
independent system operators: the New England ISO, New 
York ISO, and PJM Interconnection. In many areas, the 
electric grid is characterized by an extensive network of 
older, lower-capacity transmission lines serving as feeder 
lines to transformers and other critical system components 
(ISO-NE 2014).  
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on the electric grid: 
 Increasing hurricane intensity (and frequency of 
Category 4 and 5 storms) and frequency of heavy 
precipitation events will increase the likelihood of wind 
damage, flooding, and inundation of coastal and inland 
electric grid infrastructure (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
 Sea level rise is expected to magnify the height and 
reach of storm surges, exacerbating the impact of 
hurricanes on coastal transmission and distribution 
infrastructure (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
 Increasing air temperatures and higher nighttime 
temperatures are projected to reduce the electric grid’s 
transmission capacity and increase the risk of damage 
to transformers (Bérubé 2007, DOE 2013a). 
 Increasing frequency of extreme temperatures will 
increase the risk of physical deformation of power lines 
and disruptions to service (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
Components of the electric grid may be damaged by 
flooding and storm surge during extreme precipitation 
events and hurricanes (see Figure 7-6 and sidebar on next 
page: Northeast hurricanes and electric grid infrastructure), 
and overhead power lines are vulnerable to wind damage 
from intense storms (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). For 
example, transmission lines damaged by hurricanes 
resulted in outages for almost 1.5 million Maryland 
customers from 1992–2009 (DOE 2015a). In coastal areas, 
substations may be flooded, critically undermining electric 
 
 
Hardening power generation in New York City 
By 2050, 97% of New York City’s power plants are 
projected to be in the 100-year flood plain. New York 
City has developed a plan to work with plant owners, 
utilities, and regulators to harden assets against 100-
year floods. The City has called on the New York Public 
Service Commission to require that new and upgraded 
generation facilities be hardened if they cannot 
demonstrate they would be able to remain operational 
during a 500-year flood event (NYC 2013). 
Figure 7-5. Projected increase in FEMA 100-year flood zone 
for New York City 
Source: NOAA 2014 
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grid operations. When components of electric transmission 
and distribution infrastructure are flooded with seawater 
during storm surge events, the salt water may permanently 
damage electrical components (ConEd 2013). In general, 
more frequent and intense coastal flooding is expected to 
result in an increased frequency of longer-term localized 
outages due to flooded and corroded equipment, as well as 
increased damage from saltwater encroachment and 
structural damage due to wave action (USGCRP 2014). 
More severe storms and flooding also impair the ability of 
repair crews to respond and restore service (DOE 2013d). 
 
Figure 7-6. Significant damage to New Jersey distribution 
infrastructure caused by Hurricane Sandy 
Source: DOE 2014e 
Average sea levels are projected to rise between one and 
four feet by the year 2100, compounding the coastal 
flooding impacts of storm surge from intense hurricanes 
(USGCRP 2014). Moreover, local land subsidence is 
expected to increase the local rate of sea level rise across 
much of the northeastern coastline, especially in the 
southern portion of the region (USGCRP 2014). States in the 
southern portion of the region have relatively flat (low-
sloping) coastlines and are particularly vulnerable to the 
amplifying effect of sea level rise on the height and reach of 
hurricane storm surge (USGCRP 2014). Although states 
farther north, such as Massachusetts and New York, have 
higher sloping coastlines, the presence of major cities and 
the high concentration of infrastructure bordering the coast 
increase the potential for storm surge-related damage and 
disruption to essential electric grid infrastructure (USGCRP 
2014). 
Extremely high temperatures can force transmission 
operators to reduce the current-carrying capacity of 
transmission lines (DOE 2013a, Sathaye et al. 2013). Hot 
weather conditions also reduce the capacity of power 
substations and increase the risk of damaging transformers 
(Bérubé 2007, DOE 2013a). These effects can be 
exacerbated by higher nighttime temperatures, which 
prevent power lines and other grid infrastructure from 
cooling off. Higher temperatures cause thermal expansion 
of transmission line materials, and sagging lines increase 
the risk of damage to the lines and cause outages if they 
 
Northeast hurricanes and electric grid infrastructure 
Hurricanes Sandy and Irene had severe impacts on the 
electric grid in the Northeast. During Sandy, more than 
100 electric substations in four states were inundated, 
and almost 9 million customers were left without 
power (Table 7-3). Substation flooding during 
Hurricanes Sandy and Irene led to outages and severe 
disruptions to electric power service in the region 
(Figure 7-6 and Figure 7-7) (ConEd 2013, USGCRP 
2014).  
Figure 7-7. Areas of New York metro region inundated by 
Hurricane Sandy 
Source: DOE 2013b 
The damage to the electric grid from Hurricane Sandy 
rippled through other sectors, including transportation, 
communications, wastewater treatment, and health 
care. For example, loss of power to pipelines in the 
region temporarily disabled pipeline transport of 
critical fuels to the region (Table 7-3, DOE 2013b). 
Subsequently, power outages also prevented gas 
stations from being able to pump gasoline, resulting in 
widespread fuel shortages in New York and New Jersey 
(see Fuel Transportation and Storage section). In 
addition, power outages at treatment plants sent 
billions of gallons of raw and partially treated sewage 
into the region’s waterways, affecting public health and 
aquatic habitats (Climate Central 2013). 
Table 7-3. Energy impacts of Hurricane Irene and Hurricane 
Sandy 
Impact Irene Sandy 
Electric Customer Outages 
(millions)  
6.69  8.66  
Petroleum Refining Capacity 
Shut Down (barrels per day)  
238,000  308,000  
Petroleum Product 
Terminals Shut Down 
(number)  
57  25  
Source: DOE 2013b 
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make contact with other lines, trees, or the ground (DOE 
2013a). 
The risk of damage to transformers from higher ambient 
temperatures and higher nighttime temperatures can also 
force operators to reduce the capacity of transformers 
(USBR 2000). Typical power transformers in the region are 
rated to 24-hour average ambient temperatures of 86°F, 
with a maximum of 104°F (PJM 2011). Above the rated 
ambient temperature, the paper insulation used in 
transformers begins to break down at an exponentially 
increasing rate (Bérubé 2007, Hashmi et al. 2013). 
Transformers are critical to system operations and may be 
overloaded during system emergencies, pushing 
temperatures to critical limits. Elevated ambient 
temperatures on the hottest days of the year may limit the 
emergency overloading capacity available to operators 
(Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000). 
Electric Grid 
Resilience Solutions 
A number of measures are available for grid operators to 
improve the resilience of transmission and distribution 
infrastructure to extreme weather and temperatures. 
Measures include physical and engineering modifications to 
hardware to better withstand the impacts of climate change 
(hardening) and improvements in the tools available to grid 
operators to improve flexibility and response options during 
extreme weather events.  
In flood-prone areas, infrastructure owners may choose to 
replace existing equipment with submersible equipment or 
elevate components above expected flood stages (NY Storm 
Recovery 2014). For example, ConEdison has installed 
submersible switches on the distribution grid (NEMA 2013).  
Additionally, ConEdison considers a number of modeled 
and observed flooding scenarios to set the minimum 
elevation of new and existing grid infrastructure (ConEd 
2013).  Public Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G) is 
elevating or physically hardening 21 transmission switching 
stations that would benefit from flood and/or storm surge 
mitigation, such as those located below the newly defined 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) advisory 
base flood elevations. 
System-wide resilience to reduced capacity and increased 
risk of disruption from elevated temperatures can be 
improved by adding additional capacity and redundancy to 
the transmission grid (DOE 2013a). Transformers can be 
protected from higher ambient temperatures by installing 
or upgrading cooling systems, or by replacing existing units 
with thermally upgraded transformers (Bérubé 2007, USBR 
2000). Operators can increase transformers’ resilience to 
increasing air temperatures by derating transformers when 
air temperatures are high to prevent damage (Hashmi et al. 
2013). 
 
The deployment of improved system controls can enable 
more flexible and targeted grid operator response to critical 
events, regardless of their cause. Grid sectionalizing is one 
solution that infrastructure managers can use to increase 
the resilience to climate change. ConEdison is implementing 
an overhead system upgrade in the region that will reduce 
the number of customers served by a single circuit to fewer 
than 500. It is anticipated that 15%–20% fewer homes and 
businesses will lose power during major storms as a result 
of the measure (ConEd 2014b). The use of isolation 
switches at local levels, for example, enables operators to 
section off vulnerable locations during emergencies without 
disrupting the larger network. Iberdrola USA has adopted 
the goal of increasing the number of distribution circuits in 
order to decrease the number of customers served per 
circuit. Grid sectionalizing will also improve resilience to 
impacts of extreme heat on overhead transmission and 
distribution lines (ConEd 2013).  
In May 2014, the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities 
approved an investment program of resilience solutions to 
be implemented by PSE&G. The program includes efforts to 
harden infrastructure and restore service to customers 
quicker following major storm events. In the approved 
program, 29 switching and substations that were damaged 
by water in recent storms will be raised, relocated, or 
otherwise protected, and smart grid technologies will be 
deployed to better monitor system operations and facilitate 
swifter mobilization of repair teams.  
In Maine, Central Maine Power’s (CMP’s) smart metering 
network allows for remote verification and diagnosis of 
outages reported by customers, speeding the assessment 
and restoration and reducing the recovery times. 
New York’s vision for a future “Energy Highway” is one 
example of an integrated approach to system resilience. 
The state’s long-term plan for its transmission grid includes 
a number of strategies to prepare for climate change and 
higher peak energy demand. New York plans to increase its 
investment in smart grid systems to improve resilience 
through enhanced power systems operation, security, and 
energy storage. The plan also includes increasing the 
capacity of power transmission lines to allow access to new 
generation sources, particularly wind power (NYEHTF 2012). 
National Grid focuses on microgrids  
National Grid has partnered with Clarkson University on 
an underground microgrid pilot project in Potsdam, 
New York, that would increase the resilience and 
efficiency of New York’s electricity grid. The microgrid 
could be islanded in an emergency and would serve 
critical loads with local generation from existing natural 
gas, fuel oil, hydroelectric, and photovoltaic sources 
(National Grid 2014). 
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DOE and Sandia National Laboratories are collaborating 
with the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, City of 
Hoboken, and PSE&G to develop and implement a plan for 
the first-ever transit system microgrid as part of Hurricane 
Sandy recovery efforts (City of Hoboken 2013, DOE 2013c, 
NJ Transit 2014). NJ TransitGrid (NJT) is being designed as a 
dynamic microgrid spanning rail lines and critical stations 
and maintenance facilities across New Jersey Transit’s busy 
northeastern corridor between Newark and New York City. 
NJT will help to ensure trains keep running even if the 
centralized grid goes down (City of Hoboken 2013, DOE 
2013c, NJ Transit 2014). Beyond being America’s third-
largest transportation system and serving nearly 900,000 
passengers daily, the stretch of rail covered by NJT is both 
an important access point to Manhattan and one of the 
most at risk from flooding. 
Fuel Transport and Storage 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Transportation and storage infrastructure are integral to 
the Northeast’s energy systems. The region imports very 
nearly all of the petroleum it consumes, and while 
production of natural gas is growing in the Marcellus shale, 
significant quantities are still imported. Coal transportation 
is also critical to meeting the region’s energy demand.  
Petroleum transportation infrastructure varies within the 
region. Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
West Virginia receive most refined petroleum products by 
pipeline from the Gulf Coast and Midwest or from local 
refineries. Refineries in northwest Pennsylvania rely on 
imports of crude oil by pipeline from Canada, while 
refineries in Delaware, New Jersey, and around Philadelphia 
rely on shipments by tanker from other countries and 
increasingly on crude-by-rail shipments from shale 
formations in the United States and Canada (EIA 2014b). 
New England has no product pipelines from outside the 
region and is entirely reliant on marine terminals to receive 
petroleum products, which are then transported further 
inland by rail, truck, pipeline, and barge. Road infrastructure 
in the Northeast is also critical for delivery of retail 
petroleum products. 
The Northeast, particularly New England, relies on 
aboveground liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage more than 
any other region in the United States (DOE 2014d). New 
England does not contain any underground natural gas 
storage sites but is home to almost 75% of the nation’s 
aboveground LNG storage capacity (DOE 2014d, EIA 2014d). 
Natural gas storage is critical for meeting peak winter gas 
demand for heating and is increasingly important for 
electricity generation (NERC 2011).   
Coal is transported from domestic producing regions by rail 
and is imported from South America by ship (EIA 2014b). 
Coal is also transported through the region for export: the 
Port of Baltimore is the third largest coal export port in the 
United States (EIA 2014b). Coal is brought to the port by rail 
from mines in the Appalachian region (EIA 2014b).  
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on transport of energy products: 
 Projected increases in the storm intensity of hurricanes 
and frequency of intense the most intense hurricanes 
(Categories 4 and 5) are expected to heighten the risk 
of damage and disruption of coastal transportation and 
storage infrastructure, including ports, refineries, and 
pumping stations (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
 More frequent extreme precipitation events can cause 
flooding and damage to transportation infrastructure 
running along rivers and in low-lying areas, leading to 
service disruptions (DOE 2013a, USGCRP 2014). 
Coastal energy transportation infrastructure across the 
Northeast seaboard is vulnerable to storm surge and heavy 
winds associated with hurricanes (DOE 2013a, EIA 2014b). 
Included are petroleum, LNG, and coal terminals, port 
facilities, aboveground storage facilities, pipeline pumping 
stations, and petroleum refineries. Over this century, 
models project a slight decrease in the average annual 
number of tropical storms but an increase in hurricane-
associated storm intensity and rainfall rates, as well as in 
the number of Category 4 and 5 hurricanes (USGCRP 2014). 
Storm surges associated with hurricanes will likely be 
enhanced by rising global sea levels, which are projected to 
rise between one and four feet by the end of the century, 
with even higher local rates of relative sea level rise 
(USGCRP 2014). Storm surge can cause structural damage 
(due to wave impact and erosion) and saltwater corrosion 
and lead to extended service disruptions to critical facilities 
(CCSP 2008, USGCRP 2014). 
Inland flooding caused by extreme precipitation events is a 
major threat to Northeast transportation infrastructure and 
systems (USGCRP 2014). Roads and bridges, railroads, 
pipelines, and other energy transportation and storage 
infrastructure located alongside rivers or in river floodplains 
are vulnerable to disruption of service and damage from 
flooding and debris. For example, two pipeline ruptures in 
April 2015 in Marshall County, West Virginia, were caused 
by shifting soil after heavy rains (AP 2015). Natural forces 
are the leading cause of damage to petroleum product 
pipelines in West Virginia (DOE 2015b). The Northeast has 
already experienced significant increases in the amount of 
rain that falls during the heaviest downpours. Compared to 
the middle of the last century, extreme precipitation events 
in the Northeast are already 70% heavier (USGCRP 2014).
5
 
By the middle of this century, the average number of days 
per year with precipitation of more than one inch is 
                                                                
5
 Comparison is between 1958 and 2010. Extreme precipitation 
events are defined as the heaviest 1% of all daily events. 
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projected to grow 12%–30% under continued emissions 
growth (compared to the 1980–2000 average) (NOAA 
2013). Intense hurricanes can also contribute to inland 
flooding as hurricane-associated rainfall increases (USGCRP 
2014). 
Through wave action and erosion, storm surges affecting 
port and terminal facilities can knock down terminal 
buildings and dislodge cargo containers, damage specialized 
terminal equipment, and damage wharf and pier structures 
and undermine the foundation of terminals (CCSP 2008). 
Facilities can also be inundated, rendering them inoperable 
and damaging equipment with saltwater contamination. 
High winds can damage refinery structures, aboveground 
tanks at storage terminals, and retail outlets (API 2014, DOE 
2010). For example, during Hurricane Rita in 2005, 
approximately half of the cooling towers at refineries in 
Port Arthur, Texas, and Port Neches, Texas, were damaged, 
some with fan blades that were dislodged and launched by 
intense winds (DOE 2010).  
Terminals and aboveground facilities are forced to stop or 
delay operations prior to and during hurricanes, affecting 
the transport of oil and gas throughout the region (CCSP 
2008). Storm-associated currents and flood debris can block 
or render inoperable navigation channels, extending delays 
(CCSP 2008). One analysis of U.S. Department of 
Transportation data found that 28 intermodal freight 
terminals across the region were located less than four feet 
above sea level, with 13 of these terminals located in New 
Jersey (Climate Central 2014). 
Many of the key highways and railroads in the Northeast 
are located in areas prone to coastal flooding and are 
vulnerable to damage and disruption from more frequent 
intense hurricanes (USGCRP 2014). By one estimate, more 
than 4,500 miles of roads in the region lie below four feet 
above sea level (Climate Central 2014). Short-term impacts 
of coastal flooding may temporarily take roads out of 
service and damage culverts and bridge decks, but 
prolonged flooding may weaken roadways over the long 
term (CCSP 2008). Similarly, railroads are susceptible to 
long-term damage from flooding, including erosion of the 
track subgrade that will weaken the track’s foundation. 
Saltwater inundation of coastal rail infrastructure can also 
damage infrastructure, causing corrosion of rail lines, 
electrical distribution systems, and signaling equipment 
(Figure 7-8) (USGCRP 2014).  
Further inland, increasing frequency of heavy precipitation 
events may lead to washout of roads and railroads and 
damage to rail yards and bridges important for the 
transportation of energy products (see sidebar: Coastal and 
inland flooding: A Tale of Two Storms) (DOE 2013a).  
 
Coastal and inland flooding: A Tale of Two Storms 
Successive tropical storms struck the Northeast in 2011 
and 2012, unleashing both inland and coastal flooding 
on the region’s transportation infrastructure. Hurricane 
Irene dumped more than 10 inches of rain on large 
areas of New Jersey, upstate New York, and southern 
Vermont in a short period of time, causing record-
breaking flood stages in mountain valleys across the 
region (NOAA 2011). While coastal impacts were less 
severe than expected, the inland floods destroyed or 
damaged nearly 2,400 roads and over 300 bridges, 
including major interstates, as well as over 200 miles of 
railroad in Vermont alone (NOAA 2011, VANR 2014). 
Subsequent efforts to restore power were hampered 
by widespread road closures, leading to lengthy delays 
in full power restoration (NJBPU 2011). 
Hurricane Sandy made landfall in New Jersey and 
brought tropical storm conditions and record storm 
surges to a large portion of the East Coast. As tides well 
above 13 feet were measured across New York Harbor, 
coastal flooding associated with Hurricane Sandy 
damaged buildings, equipment, and cargo at ports in 
New York and New Jersey. Flooding and power outages 
closed fuel terminals in New York City for four days to 
more than a week following the storm, resulting in 
long-term delays (ICF 2014, NYC 2013). Ocean water 
flooded and heavily damaged three of the four major 
tunnels into Manhattan, and two Class I railroads with 
service into the Northeast, CSX and Norfolk Southern, 
embargoed traffic into the region (Progressive 
Railroading 2012, USGCRP 2014). The Colonial Pipeline 
(a major source of gasoline and petroleum products for 
the New York City metropolitan area) was shut down 
for four days, and National Grid’s natural gas 
distribution mains in portions of New York were 
severely damaged and had to be rebuilt (DOE 2013a, 
NYC 2013). Extensive power outages from Sandy also 
caused crippling fuel shortages in New Jersey, New 
York City, and Long Island, leading to fuel rationing. 
Even after many stations were resupplied, electricity 
was not available to power pumps (Nahmias 2013). Figure 7-8. Corroded electrical substation equipment 
damaged by saltwater following Hurricane Sandy 
Source: Port Authority of NY & NJ 2015 
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Flooding of river valleys can wash out road and railroad 
culverts and embankments, bridge piers, and pipelines that 
follow river courses or cross underneath riverbeds. For 
example, flooding has already been a problem for 
important coal railroads in the Appalachian Mountains that 
follow riverbanks (DOE 2013a). Hurricane Irene was a major 
precipitation event that produced destructive flash flooding 
across upstate New York and southern Vermont in 2011 
(Figure 7-9) (NOAA 2011). Resulting floods damaged 
hundreds of miles of roads and rail and significantly 
disrupted transportation in the region (USGCRP 2014, VANR 
2014). 
 
Figure 7-9. Vermont Route 131, washed out from flooding 
following extreme precipitation during Tropical Storm Irene 
Source: USGCRP 2014 
Some climate change impacts may benefit energy sector 
transportation in the future. Winter temperatures are 
expected to increase, reducing cold weather risks to 
transportation infrastructure and winter pipeline 
congestion (NERC 2013, USGCRP 2014). For example, 
increasing average temperatures and decreasing heating 
degree days may alleviate constraints on natural gas 
pipeline capacity during the winter months as heating 
energy demand falls (NERC 2013). Furthermore, freezing 
temperatures can interrupt gas wells and pipelines; 
naturally occurring hydrates can freeze wellheads, 
pipelines, and pipeline equipment, causing temporary 
shutdowns in extremely cold weather (NERC 2011). 
Fuel Transport and Storage 
Resilience Solutions 
Similar to other low-lying and coastal infrastructure, some 
fuel storage and transport assets can be hardened to better 
withstand more intense hurricanes and associated storm 
surge, and management measures can reduce the risk of 
damage and shorten resulting disruptions. Examples of 
hardening measures include elevating critical equipment, 
using submersible equipment, building or improving the 
design of levees and floodwalls, and installing watertight 
doors on vulnerable structures. For example, the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey is installing 
waterproof doors at flood elevation levels and increasing 
the height of retaining walls by four to six feet in the 
Holland Tunnel to prevent future flooding (NY Storm 
Recovery 2014). At fuel terminals and pipeline pumping 
stations, critical equipment, including substations, control 
rooms, and pumps, can be elevated or sealed in waterproof 
structures (DOE 2010). In preparation for expected flooding, 
small pump motors can be wrapped for protection or 
mounted on skids to allow operators to lift the motors prior 
to flooding events (DOE 2010). To prevent tank movement 
during flood events, operators can anchor tanks or add 
product to increase the tanks’ weight and prevent floating, 
and ensure that containment dike drainage valves are 
opened to allow flood waters to exit the diked area (DOE 
2010). ConEdison has undertaken several measures to 
harden its LNG peak-shaving facility in New York, such as 
installing dockside auxiliary diesel pumps for use after 
storm events and constructing elevated corrosion-resistant 
platforms to install transformers, the diesel-driven backup 
pump, and a diesel black start generator (ConEd 2014a). 
Fuel shipping operations can be protected by hardening the 
shorelines of critical waterways to prevent and offset 
erosion, and dredging can be employed to maintain 
shipping access and accelerate a return to normal 
operations.  
To protect infrastructure from wind impacts, refineries can 
ensure that fan blades are secured prior to storms. 
Installing girders on storage tanks to reinforce their 
structural integrity can harden the tanks against hurricane-
force winds (DOE 2010).  
Natural gas and steam distribution systems can be 
hardened to better withstand flooding events and intense 
hurricanes. Example measures include replacing cast iron 
and bare steel distribution pipes with coated steel pipes, 
upgrading low-pressure facilities to high-pressure facilities 
to minimize water infiltration, and developing devices that 
customers can use to mitigate water infiltration in flooded 
homes. Utilities may also harden infrastructure surrounding 
distribution systems. For example, the First Avenue Tunnel 
in New York City, which contains both steam and gas mains 
and high-voltage electric feeders, was flooded with 500,000 
gallons of water during Hurricane Sandy (ConEd 2013). 
ConEdison is designing vent cover plates for the First 
Avenue Tunnel and replacing head houses on other tunnels 
with hardened and reinforced concrete structures to 
prevent damage from future flooding (ConEd 2013). PSE&G 
is replacing and modernizing 250 miles of low-pressure cast 
iron gas mains in or near flood areas, and protecting an LNG 
station and five natural gas metering stations located in 
flood zones. 
To prevent power outages from leading to temporary fuel 
shortages, pipeline and storage facility operators and fuel 
retailers can ensure adequate backup is available at critical 
locations. For example, Colonial Pipeline operators pre-
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positioned the company’s mobile generators to New Jersey 
in anticipation of Hurricane Sandy (GAO 2014). States can 
also ensure that gas stations and fuel retailers have 
sufficient access to backup generation.  
 
The Northeast is home to federal reserves of both heating 
oil and gasoline, established to minimize the region’s 
vulnerability to shortages and disruptions in fuel product 
supply. The reserves store almost two million barrels of 
petroleum products at sites in Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, and New Jersey. In the aftermath of 
Hurricane Sandy, the U.S. Department of Defense 
distributed diesel fuels from the heating oil reserve to state, 
local, and federal responders in New York and New Jersey 
to fuel emergency equipment such as generators and 
vehicles (DOE 2013a). New York State, NYPA, and other 
entities are planning to set up a strategic fuel reserve with 
2.5 million gallons of gasoline and diesel fuel to provide 
emergency short-term supply. In the event of a shortage, 
the fuel reserves will be dispersed at strategic locations in 
New York to ensure sufficient fuel is available for 
emergency responders, including transmission and repair 
crews (NY Storm Recovery 2014, NYPA 2014).  
Resilience solutions for inland infrastructure include design 
changes and upgrades to prevent erosion, improve 
drainage, and harden assets. Road and rail bridges and 
culverts can be protected from erosion and scour by 
improving flow around bridge foundations, increasing the 
size of hydraulic openings, and increasing culvert capacity, 
or by installing riprap to protect piers and abutments (DOT 
2009, State of New York 2013). Improved drainage can 
reduce flooding of road surfaces and railbeds, and 
increased pumping capacity can protect tunnels (DOT 
2009). River embankments can be protected with manmade 
or natural barriers to erosion to prevent undercutting of 
road and track beds or exposure of buried pipes. Pipelines 
under river crossings can be protected by using horizontal 
drilling techniques to bury the pipe significantly deeper 
than traditional trenching methods, and by upgrading pipes 
with more robust materials that are less likely to leak or 
rupture from impacts (Miller and Bryski 2012). 
FEMA recently awarded New York State $74 million to 
improve the resilience of 29 bridges across the state to 
scour of bridge foundations due to increasing flooding 
impacts (State of New York 2013). The State is planning to 
upgrade a total of 105 scour- and flood-prone bridges by 
elevating and improving flow around bridge piers at a 
projected total cost of $518 million (State of New York 
2013).  
Management measures can also improve the resilience of 
infrastructure to inland flooding. By performing adequate 
maintenance and reducing repair backlogs, managers can 
reduce the risk of damage to assets (DOT 2009). Managers 
can also prepare contingency plans, undertake risk 
assessments of existing assets, and use flood monitoring 
sensors to improve their understanding of risks (DOT 2009).  
  
Fuel station resilience in New York 
In 2013, New York State passed a law that requires 
retail fuel stations located adjacent to evacuation 
routes and controlled access routes to maintain fueling 
operations. Stations must have equipment allowing 
them to connect to generators during power outages 
and must enter into supply contracts for emergency 
generators (NYS 2013).  
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Regional Climate Change Observations 
and Projections in Detail 
Higher Temperatures 
Historical observations 
 Since 1895, average temperatures have increased 
0.16°F per decade, or almost 1.8°F (NOAA 2013). 
 Since 1895, summer temperatures have increased 
0.11°F per decade, or almost 1.2°F (NOAA 2013). 
 Frost-free season has been growing: The average 
length of the frost-free season across the Northeast has 
increased by about ten days (1991–2012, compared to 
1901–1960) (USGCRP 2014). 
Future projections 
 Average temperatures are expected to increase at a 
faster rate: Depending on the location and emissions 
scenario, increases of 3.5°–8.5°F are projected by 
2070–2099 compared to 1971–1999 levels (NOAA 
2013). 
 Extremely hot days are projected to become more 
common: Across most of the region, up to 15 more 
days with a daily maximum temperature >95°F are 
expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000); West Virginia and Maryland are likely to 
be the most affected and may see as many as 20 more 
extremely hot days per year (NOAA 2013). 
 Consecutive number of days of extreme heat are 
expected to become longer in West Virginia and 
Maryland: The annual maximum number of 
consecutive days with a daily high >95°F is projected to 
increase by 4–8 days by mid-century (2041–2070, 
compared to 1980–2000) in southern portions of the 
region (NOAA 2013). 
 Extremely cold nights are expected to become less 
common: Across the region, 5–25 fewer days with daily 
minimums <10°F are expected by mid-century (2041–
2070, compared to 1980–2000) (NOAA 2013). 
 Freeze-free season is expected to lengthen: The 
freeze-free season is expected to be 20–30 days longer 
by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000) 
across the region (NOAA 2013). 
 Cooling degree days are expected to increase: Across 
most of the region, an increase of 200–600 CDDs is 
expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000) (NOAA 2013). 
 Heating degree days are expected to decrease: Across 
most of the region, declines of 900–1,500 HDDs are 
expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000) (NOAA 2013). 
Changing Precipitation Patterns 
Historical observations 
 Since 1895, annual precipitation has increased by 0.39 
inches per decade, or almost 4.3 inches (NOAA 2013). 
 Between 1958 and 2010, the region saw over a 70% 
increase in the amount of precipitation falling in very 
heavy events (USGCRP2014). 
Future projections 
 Annual precipitation is projected to increase: By the 
end of the century (2070–2099), precipitation across 
the region is expected to increase by 3%–12% across 
most of the region compared to the period 1971–1999 
(NOAA 2013). 
 Drier summers are expected in Pennsylvania and West 
Virginia: Summer precipitation is expected to decrease 
by 5%–10% by the end of the century (2071–2099, 
compared to 1971–1999) under a high emissions 
scenario (USGCRP 2014). 
 Extreme precipitation events are projected to 
increase: The number of days per year with 
precipitation greater than one inch is projected to 
increase by 12%–30% by mid-century (2041–2070, 
compared to 1980–2000) under a high emissions 
scenario across most of the region (NOAA 2013). 
 Seasonal drought risk is projected to increase in 
summer and fall: High temperatures are expected to 
lead to greater evaporation and earlier snowmelt, 
resulting in seasonal drought (USGCRP 2014). 
Hurricanes and Sea Level Rise 
Historical observations 
 Relative mean sea level has risen because of a 
combination of global sea level rise and land 
subsidence in the region: Relative mean sea level on 
the Northeast coast rose 0.07–0.22 inches per year, 
depending on the location, between the beginning and 
middle of the 20
th
 century and 2013 (NOAA 2015). 
Future projections 
 Sea level rise is expected to accelerate: Between 1992 
and 2050, sea level on the coast in the Northeast is 
projected to rise at an average rate of 0.06–0.27 inches 
per year (no ice sheet melt) or 0.21–0.41 inches per 
year (ice sheet melt), depending on the location 
(USGCRP 2014). 
 Frequency of intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5) is 
projected to increase (USGCRP 2014). 
 Hurricane-associated storm intensity and rainfall are 
projected to increase: Rainfall rates within 100 km of 
tropical storm centers are projected to increase by 20% 
by 2100 (USGCRP 2014). 
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The Southeast region, characterized by hot and humid 
summers and mild winters, is predominantly powered by coal, 
natural gas, and nuclear power plants. The region contains 
extensive oil and gas infrastructure that is essential to the 
nation’s energy supply. Primarily located near the Gulf Coast, 
this infrastructure includes oil refineries, natural gas processing 
plants, offshore platforms, and energy transport infrastructure. 
Major climate change impacts projected to increasingly 
threaten the region’s energy infrastructure include the 
following:  
 Hurricane storm intensity and rainfall are projected to 
increase, and the most intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 
5) are projected to occur more frequently. Coastal 
flooding is likely to worsen as sea level rise and local land 
subsidence enhance hurricane-associated storm surge.
a
 
Critical oil and gas wells, refineries, and ports located along 
the Gulf Coast, as well as coastal power plants, 
transmission lines, and transportation infrastructure, are at 
risk of damage from intense hurricanes and sea level rise-
enhanced storm surges. Heavy rainfall and high winds may 
damage power lines, power plants, and other energy 
assets. Transportation infrastructure such as ports, major 
roads, and rail lines along the Gulf and Atlantic coastlines 




 Average and extreme temperatures are projected to 
increase, and heat waves are likely to become more 
severe, occur more often, and last longer.
c
 Electricity 
demand for cooling rises with increasing air and water 
temperatures, yet higher temperatures reduce the capacity 
of thermoelectric power plants and transmission lines.
d
  
Table 8-1. Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in the Southeast 
Subsector Vulnerability Magnitude Illustrative Resilience Solutions 
Oil and Gas 
Exploration and 
Production 
Increased exposure to damage and 
disruption from an increasing 
frequency of powerful hurricanes 
combined with sea level rise
e
 
Increasing number of Category 4 




Elevating and hardening 
infrastructure, improving 
emergency preparedness 
protocols, restoring coastal 
habitats
g
   
Fuel Transport  Increased exposure to damage and 
disruption from sea level rise-




Increasing sea level rise by 0.06–0.48 
inches per year from 1992–2050, 
depending on the location and 
magnitude of ice sheet melt
i
  
Reinforcing shorelines of critical 
waterways; dredging to maintain 
shipping access; elevating or 







Electricity Demand  
 
Higher temperatures resulting in 
increased average and peak 
electricity demand and reduced 




Increasing air temperatures by 2.5°F 
–8.5°F and increasing numbers of 
cooling degree days (CDDs) by 450–




Increasing energy efficiency, 
demand-response programs, 
installing new generation and 
transmission capacity 
QUICK FACTS        
Southeast States:   
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 




79,000,000  (25% of U.S.) 
Area (square miles) 503,000  (14% of U.S.) 
Energy Expenditures  $343 billion 









Electric power                     TWh 1,170 1,120 n/a 
Petroleum            million barrels 116 1,680 2% 
Coal                           million tons 140 208 94% 













Natural gas 432 37% 155 325 
Coal 399 34% 103 134 
Nuclear 275 24% 39 22 
Hydroelectric 30 3% 23 214 
Wind  <1 <1% <1 2 
Biomass 24 2% 6 166 




Electric Power   
Wells (>1 boe/d): 12,400 Power plants (> 1 MW):  1,024 
Refineries:  31 Interstate transmission lines:  32 
Liquids pipelines: 18 Coal 
 
  
Ports (>200 tons/yr): 27 Mines:  516 
Natural Gas 
 
Waterways   
Wells:  62,300 Coal and petroleum routes:   56 
Interstate pipelines: 60 Railroads 
 
  
Market hubs:  5 Miles of freight track:   32,800 
Note: Table presents 2012 data except number of oil wells, which is 2009 data. 
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW. 
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2011, EIA 2013a, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013c, EIA 2014a, EIA 2014c, 
EIA 2014d, EIA 2014e, EIA 2014f, EIA 2014g, EIA 2014h, US Census Bureau 2014, 
USACE 2014 
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities 
and Resilience Solutions 
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of 
resilience solutions in the Southeast are discussed below. 
System components that are most vulnerable to climate 
change are described first.  
Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Southeast region contains extensive oil and gas 
exploration and production infrastructure, with almost a 
quarter of the nation’s oil refining and natural gas 
processing capacity. Some of the United States’ largest oil 
fields are located off the coast of Louisiana. Most of this 
offshore production, which constituted 17% of all oil 
production in the United States in 2013, comes onshore in 
Louisiana (EIA 2014a).  
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on the Southeast’s oil and gas industry:  
 Increasing frequency of the most intense hurricanes 
increases the risk of damage and disruption to coastal 
and offshore oil and gas facilities (DOE 2013, USGCRP 
2014). 
 Rising sea level combined with projected increases in 
hurricane and associated storm intensity, storm surge, 
and heavy rainfall may lead to intensified flooding 
along coasts (USGCRP 2014). 
 Decreasing water availability may increase the cost of 
onshore unconventional oil and gas production (DOE 
2013). 
Offshore oil and gas platforms are vulnerable to high winds 
and damaging surf caused by hurricanes. One study found 
that approximately 3%–6% of offshore platforms exposed 
to hurricane-force winds typically experience damage that 
could take anywhere from less than a month to at least 6 
months to repair, and an additional 2%–4% are typically 
destroyed (Kaiser and Yu 2009). As the frequency of 
Category 4 and 5 hurricanes increases, the risk of damage 
from these intense storms is likely to increase as well. 
Offshore platforms typically follow the design specifications 
of the American Petroleum Institute (API), which sets 
performance standards for withstanding stresses such as 
wind speeds and wave heights for a 100-year storm. 
However, some of these threshold limits have been 
significantly surpassed in recent years (Cruz and Krausmann 
2008). Furthermore, as oil exploration and production 
operations move farther offshore into deeper waters, the 
potential for damage increases (DOE 2013).  
 
Oil and gas infrastructure affected by 2005 hurricanes 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita disrupted production 
operations and caused widespread damage along the 
Gulf Coast in 2005. The storms temporarily took offline 
100% of Gulf of Mexico oil production and more than 
88% of Gulf of Mexico natural gas production, and power 
outages knocked out three major petroleum pipeline 
systems (Colonial, Plantation, and Capline) (DOE 2009, 
Grenzeback and Lukmann 2008). The hurricanes caused 
significant damage to parts of the Port of New Orleans 
and silted in nearby waterways, preventing deep-draft 
ships from passing through. Parts of the Lower 
Mississippi River were closed to traffic for over a week, 
and more than 300 barges along the river were 
significantly damaged, set adrift, or sunk. Damaged 
vessels and power outages disrupted freight transport 
along the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. Commercial barge 
traffic could not use locks, as they were being operated 
for floodwater drainage. Together, Hurricane Katrina and 
Rita led to a $15 billion loss to energy markets, two-
thirds of which was associated with physical damage to 
infrastructure (Grenzeback and Lukmann 2008). 
Figure 8-1. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed 113 offshore 
platforms, damaged another 52 platforms, and damaged more 
than 450 pipelines.  
Source: USGCRP 2014 
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Coastal energy infrastructure—including processing plants 
and refineries—are vulnerable to physical damage from 
inundation and waterborne and airborne debris during 
hurricanes. Storm surges associated with intense hurricanes 
destroy equipment, damage building foundations, and 
knock buildings down. Even if exploration and production 
facilities are not physically damaged, they can be forced 
offline for extended periods following hurricanes when 
damage to refining and processing infrastructure and the 
electric grid prohibits access to crude oil, natural gas, 
and/or power (EIA 2009). 
Hurricanes can destroy wetlands and other natural features 
that help protect coastal infrastructure (Figure 8-2). Natural 
barriers absorb hurricane-generated storm surges and 
waves, and their destruction increases the vulnerability of 
coastal and inland infrastructure to future storms. Coastal 
development can also destroy natural barriers, and 
Louisiana has lost 1,880 square miles of land along the coast 
in the past 80 years owing to management of river flow, 
dredging, and other natural and manmade problems 
(USGCRP 2014).  
 
 
Figure 8-2. Aerial photos of Isle de Jean Charles in Louisiana 
taken in 1963 (top) and 2008 (bottom) show the effects of sea 
level rise, land subsidence, and human development on the Gulf 
Coast 
Source: USGCRP 2014 
The exposure of coastal energy facilities to hurricanes is 
magnified by sea-level rise, which amplifies the height of 
storm surges. Depending on location, relative mean sea 
level in some locations along the Gulf Coast has already 
increased by almost three inches per decade because of a 
combination of global sea-level rise and land subsidence 
(NOAA 2009). Future sea-level rise is projected to climb 
between one and five inches per decade in the first half of 
the 21
st
 century and to accelerate over time (USGCRP 
2014). In the Southeast, 187 major energy facilities are 
located below four feet above sea level; 148 of these 
facilities are located in Louisiana (Climate Central 2014).  
Shale oil and gas exploration and production may face 
decreasing water availability. Shale oil production in the 
United States requires between 4.2 and 8.5 million gallons 
of water per day to produce 2.1 million gallons of oil per 
day. Production in the Haynesville Shale in Louisiana and 
Texas requires about 3.75 million gallons of water per well 
(Burke 2013, Stark et al. 2012), most of which is used for 
hydraulic fracturing. More than 2,600 wells have been 
drilled in this shale as of September 2014 (LDNR 2014). 
About 20% of the water that is used in shale production in 
the Haynesville Shale is groundwater. Louisiana requires 
permits for groundwater withdrawals. Production in the 
Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas requires closer to 3 million 
gallons of water per well (Stark et al. 2012).  
Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Resilience Solutions 
Oil and gas operators along the Gulf Coast, experienced 
with risk management from natural hazards, can adopt a 
number of solutions to enhance resilience to more frequent 
Category 4 and 5 hurricanes and associated storm surge. 
These solutions include expanding the use of mobile 
equipment (Entergy 2010) and practices for improving 
resilience of offshore platforms to hurricanes. Floating 
production systems are already in use in deepwater drilling 
operations in the Gulf of Mexico (BSEE 2014); these systems 
can be disconnected and removed from a site in advance of 
a hurricane, reducing the risk of damage and destruction to 
the platform. New engineering and operations guidance 
developed by the American Petroleum Institute provides 
modified design specifications for new platforms; 
operations protocols for hurricane season, such as 
positioning platform decks higher above the sea surface, 
methods for securing platform equipment to rigs, and 
locating mobile “jack-up” rigs on more stable areas of the 
sea floor; improved data for wind, wave, current, and surge 
conditions at higher spatial resolution; and protocols for 
post-hurricane structural assessment (API 2014a).  
Engineered barriers such as levees can be effective in 
protecting vulnerable coastal areas. In addition, wetland 
restoration and development of other natural barriers may 
be a cost-effective resilience technique (TNC-DOW 2012). 
These types of structures—natural and manmade—help 
protect coastal infrastructure from storm surges and wave 
impacts (DOE 2013). Historically, the economic value of 
coastal protection and other ecological services provided by 
natural landscape features has not been consistently 
incorporated into the risk management decisions involved 
in the planning and construction of coastal infrastructure. 
Recently, however, projects undertaken between private 
industry and natural resource conservation stakeholders 
have shown that collaboration and data sharing can be 
successful strategies for integrating the value of 
environmental features into coastal facilities planning (TNC-
DOW 2012). 
 




As competition for limited water resources increases in 
some areas, oil and gas companies can take measures to 
reduce vulnerability to water scarcity. Resilience solutions 
include water recycling and reuse as well as utilizing sources 
of lower-quality water, such as degraded water, 
wastewater, or brackish groundwater. These sources do not 
compete with irrigation and municipal needs, but they do 
require additional treatment steps and add to costs.  
Fuel Transport and Storage  
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Southeast region is home to critical oil and gas 
transport and storage infrastructure, including ports, 
terminals, storage facilities, highways, railroads, and 
pipelines. In the central Gulf Coast region, 72% of ports, 
27% of major roads, and 9% of rail lines are at or below 4-
foot elevation (CCSP 2008).
1
  
The region contains 27 petroleum ports and energy 
fabrication ports—which build the structures used in 
offshore oil and gas exploration and production—including 
the Port of South Louisiana, the largest port in the United 
States. The region also includes Port Fourchon, Louisiana, 
an energy supply port that serves as the launching point to 
supply rigs producing about 90% of the deepwater oil in the 
Gulf of Mexico and the land base for the Louisiana Offshore 
Oil Port (LOOP) (Figure 8-3) (DHS 2011). LOOP is the only 
deepwater port in the United States and the single largest 
point of entry for crude oil coming into the United States via 
tanker (EIA 2014a).  
Five of the ten currently-operating LNG import terminals in 
the United States are located in the Southeast, and many 
are in the process of applying to export LNG (EIA 2014a, 
FERC 2012). Louisiana is also the location of Henry Hub, a 
major natural gas market hub where more than a dozen 
pipelines converge and that serves as the national 
benchmark for natural gas pricing (EIA 2014a). 
                                                                
1
 In the referenced study, the Central Gulf Coast includes the coast 
between Galveston, TX and Mobile, AL (CCSP 2008).   
 
Figure 8-3. LOOP’s two onshore facilities, the Clovelly Dome 
Storage Terminal (above) and Fourchon Booster Station, which 
are located in coastal Louisiana 
Source: DOTD 2015 
Louisiana hosts two of the nation’s four Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve (SPR) storage sites. The SPR provides the United 
States with energy and economic security through the 
emergency stockpile of crude oil.  
Climate change is projected to affect fuel transport and 
storage in the Southeast in the following ways: 
 Projected increases in the frequency of the most 
intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5) and associated 
storm surge and intense winds increase the risk of 
damage and disruption to coastal and offshore oil and 
gas transport and storage infrastructure (DOE 2013, 
USGCRP 2014). 
 Rising sea levels and land subsidence combined with 
projected increases in hurricane intensity and 
associated storm surge and heavy rainfall, are expected 
to increase flood regimes along coasts, affecting coastal 
transportation and storage infrastructure (USGCRP 
2014). 
 Barge transport of energy products on inland 
waterways may be at increased risk of disruption from 
lower water levels associated with decreasing 
precipitation, increasing evapotranspiration, and 
competing demand for water (DOE 2013, Ingram et al. 
2013). 
Coastal ports and facilities are vulnerable to high wind 
speeds and storm surge associated with intense hurricanes. 
Storm surge has the capacity to knock down terminal 
buildings, dislodge cargo containers, damage terminal 
equipment, and damage wharf and pier structures (CCSP 
2008). When terminals and aboveground facilities are 
forced to stop or delay operations, oil and gas markets 
nationwide can be affected.  
The impact of intense hurricanes on coastal ports and 
facilities in Florida may be particularly acute, as Florida is 
entirely dependent on petroleum products delivered by 
tanker and barge and has no interstate crude oil or 
petroleum product pipelines (EIA 2014a). During previous 
hurricanes, petroleum supplies have been delivered by 
Shell efforts to harden offshore oil platforms 
Shell researched damage done to the Mars platform in 
the Gulf of Mexico during Hurricane Katrina to develop 
measures to increase resilience of offshore platforms to 
hurricane damage. Most of the above-water damage to 
the platform occurred when clamps holding the rig’s 
structure failed under 270-kilometer-per-hour winds. 
Shell installed re-designed clamp systems on all 
offshore platforms in 2006; the new systems are four 
times stronger than the older ones (Shell 2013).  
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truck and rail to compensate for closures of ports and 
terminals (DOE 2005).  
Accelerating sea-level rise (Figure 8-4) and more intense 
hurricanes are likely to further affect coastal facilities 
through damage to low-lying roads that provide access to 
coastal energy infrastructure. Sea-level rise contributes to 
more damaging storm surges by amplifying their height and 
reach. In the short term, roads may be closed, but 
prolonged flooding can weaken roadways over the long 
term. Over half of the interstate and arterial-road miles 
along the Gulf Coast are vulnerable to a storm surge of 18 
feet (CCSP 2008). An 18-foot storm surge would inundate 
98% of the Gulf Coast’s ports (CCSP 2008). A storm surge of 
23 feet has the ability to inundate 66% of interstate 
highways, 57% of arterial roads, and almost half of the 
railroad miles along the Gulf Coast (CCSP 2008).
 
These levels 
are below the storm surge levels of 25–28 ft produced by 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 along the Mississippi coast (NOAA 
2014a). 
  
Figure 8-4. Relative risk from sea level rise according to a Coastal 
Vulnerability Index, which is based on coastal system 
susceptibility to change and the area’s natural ability to adapt 
Source: USGCRP 2014 
Due to sea level rise and land subsidence, Louisiana State 
Highway 1, the only road that provides land access to Port 
Fourchon, Louisiana, could be inundated and inaccessible 
more than 155 days by 2040, and more than 300 days per 
year by 2050 (Figure 8-5) (DHS 2011, Needham et al. 2012). 
An analysis by the Department of Homeland Security found 
that a 90-day washout of Highway 1 in Louisiana, due to 
either washout of the road following a storm or gradual 
submersion due to sea-level rise and land subsidence, 
would reduce production by 120 million barrels of oil and 
250 billion cubic feet of gas over a 10-year period (DHS 
2011). Other ports would be able to replace only 
approximately 25% of the service provided by Port 
Fourchon (DHS 2011). 
 
Figure 8-5. Highway 1 in Louisiana, which provides the link to a 
critical U.S. oil facility, Port Fourchon, and is vulnerable to 
climate impacts 
Source: USGCRP 2014 
Sea level rise may pose the greatest danger to the dense 
network of marine and coastal facilities in the central Gulf 
Coast region between Mobile Bay, AL, and Galveston, TX.  
An increase in relative sea level of 2 feet has the potential 
to affect 64% of the region's port facilities, while a 4-foot 
rise in relative sea level would affect nearly three-quarters 
of port facilities (CCSP 2008). By 2100, global average sea 
levels are expected to rise 1–4 feet above current levels, 
and rates of increase are expected to be even higher in the 
Southeast (USGCRP 2014).  
Offshore pipelines that provide crude oil and natural gas to 
Gulf Coast refineries from offshore production are 
vulnerable to large surface waves and strong near-bottom 
currents associated with hurricanes. The currents scour the 
seafloor, creating underwater mudslides that damage 
subsea pipes and other equipment that rests on the 
seafloor. During the 2005 hurricane season, most of the 
damage to offshore pipelines occurred at the interface 
between pipelines and offshore platforms and subsea 
pipelines were identified by industry experts as the major 
cause of delays in bringing production back online (Cruz and 
Krausmann 2008, DOE 2015). Onshore pipelines are 
vulnerable to damage from coastal and inland flooding 
events, which can expose buried pipe that can then be 
impacted by flood-borne debris (GAO 2014, CCSP 2008). 
Onshore pipes are also vulnerable to corrosion as rising sea 
levels and coastal flooding increase saltwater intrusion of 
groundwater, and aboveground structures associated with 
pipelines may be damaged by high winds and flooding 
during hurricanes (DOT 2014).  
The Gulf Intracoastal Waterway is a key asset in the 
distribution of petroleum products (CCSP 2008). Increasing 
intensity of hurricanes and sea level rise-enhanced storm 
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surge may increase the risk of damage and disruption to 
waterway assets and operations. Storm debris can block 
navigation channels, and markers and barrier islands can be 
affected (CCSP 2008). Rail terminals, docks, and ships 
located along the coast in the Southeast are also vulnerable 
to high winds and storm surge from intense hurricanes.  
Aboveground storage facilities are also vulnerable to 
storm surge and high winds associated with intense 
hurricanes. Storm surge and flooding can inundate 
facilities, and high winds can damage aboveground tanks 
at storage terminals and lead to spills in hazardous 
materials (API 2014a, Santella et al. 2010). Additionally, 
aboveground storage tanks can float off of their 
foundations during hurricanes, leading to spills (DOE 
2015a). For example, flooding associated with Hurricane 
Katrina dislodged and damaged an above-ground storage 
tank at the Meraux Refinery in St. Bernard Parish, 
Louisiana, resulting in a release of more than 25,000 
barrels of crude oil that impacted an adjacent residential 
neighborhood (EPA 2014).  
During Hurricane Ike in 2008, the SPR site in West 
Hackberry, Louisiana, was flooded with debris, and the 
electrical systems sustained significant damage. Two 
additional SPR sites in Texas were damaged by storm surge 
from the hurricane, and costs for the repairs to all three SPR 
sites amounted to about $22 million (DOE 2010a). Supply 
disruptions during hurricanes can cause natural gas and 
petroleum product spot prices to spike (API 2014b, DOE 
2009). Damage and disruption to the region’s oil and gas 
infrastructure associated with a projected increase in 
intense hurricanes and accelerating sea level rise may 
contribute to short-term price volatility throughout the 
country (API 2014b, DOE 2009). 
 
Lower waterway levels may disrupt barge transport of 
energy commodities, particularly in the western portion of 
the region where some models project an increasing 
likelihood of drought (DOE 2013, Ingram et al. 2013). Less 
rainfall and increasing evapotranspiration due to higher 
temperatures contribute to reduced runoff into navigable 
waterways. In addition, withdrawals for competing uses, 
such as agricultural, industrial, and municipal use, can 
contribute to lower water levels. In August 2012, the 
Mississippi River approached historically low water levels in 
several places and barges ran aground in the main river 
channel near Greenville, Mississippi (NASA 2012). Water 
availability may decline by 2.5%–6.4% by 2060 for most of 
Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Tennessee (USGCRP 2014). One study found that the largest 
decrease in river flow magnitude is projected to occur in the 
Appalachian-Cumberland subregion, which includes, 
Kentucky and Tennessee, and the Mississippi Alluvial Valley, 
which spans the Mississippi River from Kentucky to the Gulf 
Coast (Ingram et al. 2013). Low flow conditions along rivers 
may cause barge operators to reduce their loads, with 
estimates suggesting that in some cases a one-inch drop in 
river level could reduce tow capacity by 255 tons (DOE 
2013). 
 
Coastal Virginia vulnerable to sea level rise and storm 
surge 
In the Norfolk, Virginia, metropolitan area, a Category 4 
storm in conjunction with a one-foot sea level rise could 
inundate critical energy assets. Under such a scenario, a 
DOE analysis identified exposure of the following fuel 
transport infrastructure: 11 petroleum terminals 
(>100,000 bbl), two natural gas pipelines, an LNG 
storage facility, and a petroleum pipeline. In addition, 
39 substations (>230kV) and four power plants (>100 
MW) are threatened in such a scenario (DOE 2014). 
  
Fourchon beach repair and renourishment project 
In 2013, the Greater Lafourche Port Commission 
initiated a $5.4 million project to restore 6 miles of 
beach and dunes on Fourchon Beach to provide storm 
surge protection to Port Fourchon and the surrounding 
area (Houma Times 2012, Buskey 2013). The Federal 
Emergency Management Office (FEMA), Shell, and the 
Port Commission provided funding for the Fourchon 
Beach Repair/Renourishment Project, also known as 
the GeoTube Project (Shell 2012). Under this initiative, 
contractors installed geotubes, large tubes that are 
made of fabric and filled with sand, along the beach and 
covered the geotubes with sand to create an over-10-
foot dune (Houma Times 2012). 
Figure 8-6. The landscape of coastal Louisiana, including the 
Port Fourchon area (red circle), which has been significantly 
altered since 1932 
Brown indicates land that was lost or converted to water from 
1932–2010 and green indicates land that was gained from 
1932–2010 through coastal improvements such as shoreline 
revetments and beach enrichment. Blue indicates open water. 
Source: NOAA 2012 
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Fuel Transport and Storage  
Resilience Solutions 
In many cases, fuel storage and transport assets can be 
hardened to better withstand more intense hurricanes and 
storm surges. Examples of infrastructure hardening include 
installing water-tight doors, elevating critical equipment, 
using submersible equipment, and building or improving 
the design of levees. Railroad and road bridges can be 
raised above storm surge levels or engineered to withstand 
lateral and uplift forces resulting from flooding and wave 
action (Cauffman 2006, DOT 2014). Shorelines of critical 
waterways can be hardened to prevent and offset erosion. 
Dredging, flood control, and water management practices 
can be employed to maintain shipping access, including 
appropriate upstream reservoir management to maintain 
water levels for shipping without impacting the other 
purposes of the reservoirs.  
Portions of Louisiana State Highway 1 were elevated in 
2009 to protect the road from 100-year flood events, and 
bridge designers used restraining devices and anchor bolts 
to protect the road from storm surge forces. The raised 
segment of the road was unaffected by Hurricane Isaac, 
however the bridge approaches—the portions of the road 
to the north and south of the raised section—and adjacent 
land were inundated by storm surge and suffered damage 
from erosion (GAO 2013).  
Strategies for improving resilience of onshore pipelines 
include installing manmade or natural barriers to reduce 
risk of erosion, which could expose buried pipes. Another 
risk reduction measure is upgrading pipes with more robust 
materials that are less likely to leak or rupture from 
seawater-induced corrosion—such as coated steel pipes 
instead of cast iron or steel. 
Barge transport of energy commodities can be more 
resilient to disruptions from low flow conditions by 
implementing dredging and water management practices, 
such as upstream reservoir management to maintain river 
flow levels (Ingram et al. 2013). 
Electric Grid  
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Most of the Southeast electricity markets operate under a 
traditional vertically integrated utility model, with the 
exception of Virginia, which is part of the PJM 
Interconnection, and parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Arkansas, which are part of the Midcontinent Independent 
System Operator (MISO) market. For states dominated by 
the traditional utility model, utilities own the transmission 
network. Many transmission investments in the Southeast 
are driven by future load growth and reliability needs rather 
than by power plant retirements or connecting to 
distributed renewables, which are important drivers in 
other regions (EEI 2013). 
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on the electric grid in the Southeast: 
 Increasing hurricane intensity and frequency of the 
most intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5), along with 
hurricane-associated storm surge enhanced by sea 
level rise, may increase the risk of physical damage or 
disruption to transmission and distribution 
infrastructure, including substations and transformers, 
near the coast (DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
 Increasing average and extreme temperatures reduce 
transmission efficiency, increase the risk of damage to 
transformers, and may reduce available transmission 
capacity (Bérubé et al. 2007, DOE 2013, USBR 2000, 
USGCRP 2014). 
Intense hurricanes produce high winds and increase 
incidents of damage and disruption to power lines (Figure 
8-7 and Table 8-2). Severe weather is the leading cause of 
electric power disturbance events in the United States, and 
as intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5) become more 
common as a result of climate change, the Southeast 
region’s electric transmission and distribution infrastructure 
will be increasingly threatened (DOE 2013, EOP 2013, 
USGCRP 2014). Transmission outages from hurricanes and 
tropical storms affected more than 10 million customers in 
Florida from 1992–2009 (DOE 2015b). 
Substations and underground distribution systems are 
vulnerable to damage from storm surge and coastal 
flooding during hurricanes. The most prevalent cause of 
damage to substations in coastal regions is flooding from 
storm surge (DOE 2009). According to one study, projected 
sea level rise by 2030 could increase the number of 
substations exposed to storm surge from a Category 1 
hurricane by 82 (from 255 substations in a scenario without 
sea level rise to 337 substations in a scenario with a 10 inch 
sea level rise) (DOE 2015a).  Any significant increase in 
hurricane intensities would greatly exacerbate exposure to 
storm surge and wind damage. During Hurricanes Katrina 












Affected   
(in millions)  
2.7 1.5 3.5 1.1 3.9 
Utility Poles 
Destroyed  
72,447 14,817 ~14,000 11,478 10,300 
Transformers 
Damaged 




1,515 3,550 NA 241 238 
Substations 
Offline 
300 508 241 368 383 
Source: DOE 2009 
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and Rita, low-lying power substations in Mississippi and 
Louisiana suffered significant damage to controllers, 
switches, and other components as a result of storm surge 
and waves (DOE 2009). Even equipment that was pressure-
washed with fresh water immediately after the storm was 
destroyed from salt water exposure (NIST 2006). More than 
one million distribution poles were damaged during 
Hurricane Katrina, and during Hurricane Gustav, damage to 
high-voltage transmission lines caused the transmission 
system south of Lake Pontchartrain, including the city of 
New Orleans, to be islanded from the supply network for 
two days (DOE 2009, DOT 2014).  
 
 
Figure 8-7. High winds and flooding during Hurricane Katrina 
downed power lines and poles in New Orleans  
Source: FEMA 2005  
During periods of high air temperatures, operators reduce 
the carrying capacity of transmission lines and power 
substations, and higher air temperatures may compound 
capacity constraints during extreme heat events when 
demand for power for air conditioning is the highest (DOE 
2013). This effect can be exacerbated by higher nighttime 
temperatures, which prevent power systems from cooling 
off. Higher temperatures also cause thermal expansion of 
transmission line materials, and sagging lines increase the 
risk of power outages when the lines make contact with 
other lines, trees, or the ground (DOE 2013). 
Higher temperatures can damage power transformers and 
force operators to reduce transformer loading on extremely 
hot days (Bérubé et al. 2007, USBR 2000). Power 
transformers in the United States are typically designed to 
operate at an average ambient temperature of 86°F over a 
24-hour period where maximum temperatures do not 
exceed 104°F (PJM 2011, Hashmi et al. 2013). As 
temperatures increase above the rated temperature, the 
paper insulation in traditional power transformers begins to 
break down. Transformers are critical to system operation, 
and during emergency conditions, they may be overloaded 
forcing temperatures as high as 284°F and causing 
breakdown to occur as much as 100 times faster than 
normal (USBR 2000, Bérubé et al. 2007). Higher ambient 
temperatures increase the likelihood of transformers 
reaching critical temperatures during emergency 
overloading (Hashmi et al. 2013).  
Electric Grid  
Resilience Solutions 
Resilience could be improved through hardening measures 
that help the grid withstand higher winds and flooding, as 
well as additional capacity in the transmission networks 
(DOE 2013). In some circumstances, new conductor 
technologies could be installed that withstand higher 
temperatures with fewer losses and less sag (NARUC 2011).  
Although it is expensive, undergrounding power lines is one 
measure that can protect power lines from wind impacts. In 
order to protect its distribution system from storm impacts, 
Dominion Virginia Power initiated a decade-long program in 
2014 to place underground approximately 4,000 miles of 
the utility’s most outage-prone distribution lines: about 7 
percent of the 57,100-mile system. This $175 million-per-
year undergrounding program is expected to substantially 
increase system reliability and resilience to climate change 
and extreme weather (Dominion 2014). 
For infrastructure located near the Gulf Coast, hardening 
measures include activities such as replacing wood power 
poles with steel, concrete, or composite structures, burying 
critical power line segments, and relocating equipment 
away from flood zones or building levees around equipment 
(EOP 2013). For example, Entergy has invested in elevating 
substation control equipment, such as the Leeville 
substation in southern Louisiana, above the 100-year flood 
level (Entergy 2013, Kusnetz 2012). Elevating critical 
equipment such as substations is a common hardening 
practice to protect against storm surge (Figure 8-8). To 
determine how high to elevate substations, control rooms, 
and other vital assets, utilities often use the Seas and Lakes 
Overland Surges (SLOSH) model (DOE 2010). SLOSH is a 
computerized model developed by the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) that estimates 
storm surge heights and winds from hurricane scenarios 
(NOAA 2014b).  
Figure 8-8. Elevated substation in Vermilion Parish, Louisiana 
Source: DOE 2010b 
 





Entergy and America’s Wetland Foundation collaborated on 
the development of a framework to inform economically 
sensible approaches to address risks and to build a resilient 
Gulf Coast (Entergy 2010). The study covered a wide region, 
including Texas, Louisiana, and coastal counties in 
Mississippi and Alabama, and was comprehensive across 
key economic sectors, including fuel supply, electricity 
generation, and residential and commercial demand 
sectors. The study projected that by 2030 there may be 
nearly $1 trillion in energy assets at potential risk from 
rising sea levels and more intense hurricanes. Based on an 
analysis of hazards, assets, and vulnerabilities, the Gulf 
Coast energy sector faces an average annual loss from 
climate change and extreme weather of $8 billion in 2030 
(Entergy 2010). The study identified key “no regrets” 
options for adaptation that have low investment needs, 
high potential to reduce expected losses, and additional 
strong co-benefits such as wetlands restoration. The study 
also concluded that supporting and enforcing a range of 
actions to reduce the risks that individuals bear (e.g., 
through building codes and development decisions) and to 
unlock barriers to increasing industry resilience would be 
important elements of a coordinated response (Entergy 
2010).  
To increase the resilience of transformers to high ambient 
temperatures, operators may derate existing transformers 
or install or upgrade forced-air or forced-oil cooling in 
transformers (Hashmi et al. 2013, USBR 2000). When 
replacing existing transformers, operators can increase 
system resilience to increasing temperatures by installing 
thermally upgraded transformers (Bérubé et al. 2007). 
Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Fossil fuel-fired power plants dominate the electricity 
source mix in the Southeast, with coal and natural gas 
accounting for about 70% of total generation and 
nuclear representing about a quarter of total generation 
(Table 8-3). The source fuel varies within the region, with 
natural gas supplying the majority of electric power to 
states along the Gulf Coast. For example, about 68% of 
Florida’s power is generated from gas-fired power plants. 
Other states in the Southeast have a higher contribution 
from coal and nuclear power. Coal-fired generation makes 
up 92% of generation in Kentucky and provides the majority 
of generation in Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina. 
About half of South Carolina’s power comes from nuclear 
plants.  
Climate change may have the following impacts on 
thermoelectric power generation in the Southeast: 
 Increasing air and water temperatures decrease the 
efficiency and the available capacity of thermoelectric 
power plants (DOE 2013). 
 Increasing water temperatures could cause 
thermoelectric power plants to exceed thermal 
discharge limits and force temporary curtailments at 
plants (PNNL 2012). 
 Decreasing summer precipitation in some locations and 
higher evaporative losses from surface water resources 
could reduce water available for cooling (USGCRP 2014, 
NOAA 2013, NETL 2010). 
 Increasing hurricane intensity and frequency of intense 
hurricanes, sea-level rise-enhanced storm surge, and 
Florida Power & Light Electric Infrastructure Storm 
Hardening Plan 
Following the damaging 2004–2005 hurricane season, 
Florida Power and Light (FPL) announced their Storm 
Secure Plan to strengthen the electric grid against 
hurricanes. FPL announced that they would be adopting 
extreme wind velocity zone criteria (up to 150 mph) as 
a new standard for distribution construction and system 
upgrades. This plan also includes encouraging 
undergrounding of distribution lines by investing in 
local government-sponsored overhead-to-underground 
conversion projects, and calls for increasing pole 
inspections and line clearing and vegetation 
management activities (FPL 2006). 
In 2013, FPL announced the 2013–2015 Electric 
Infrastructure Storm Hardening Plan. The company 
expects to invest $428 million to $646 million to 
improve the resilience of its electric infrastructure (FPL 
2013a). This plan includes an initiative to protect 15 
above-grade vaults in the Miami downtown electric 
network distribution system (FPL 2013b). The vaults will 
be retrofitted with submersible equipment, and existing 
equipment will be replaced with new sealed, stainless 
steel equipment (FPL 2013b). FPL is also accelerating its 
program to replace wood transmission structures with 
concrete structures and upgrade ceramic post 
insulators with polymer material, and replaced over 
4,000 wood transmission structures and upgrade more 
than 3,600 ceramic post insulators from 2007–2012 
(FPL 2013a). 
Table 8-3. Electricity generation fuel mix in the Southeast  






Coal 22% 44% 34% 
Natural Gas 57% 20% 37% 
Nuclear 15% 30% 24% 
Hydroelectric 2% 3% 3% 
Other 4% 2% 3% 
* Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi  
Source: EIA 2013a 
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heavy rainfall threaten low-lying and coastal power 
generation facilities (GAO 2014, DOE 2013). 
As the temperatures of ambient air and water used for 
cooling increase, the thermal efficiency of power 
generation decreases (DOE 2013). Reduced thermal 
efficiencies can result in reduced power output and/or 
additional fuel consumption. With more than 90% of the 
electricity in the Southeast generated from thermoelectric 
power plants (Table 8-3), such decreases in power output or 
increases in fuel consumption will hinder system flexibility 
or increase costs across the region (EIA 2013a, DOE 2013).  
Higher surface water temperatures heightens the risk that 
power plants will exceed thermal discharge limits mandated 
to protect aquatic ecosystems, which could cause plants to 
temporarily reduce their power generation. For example, 
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant was forced to curtail operations 
after heat waves in 2007, 2010, and 2011 caused the 
temperature of the Tennessee River to exceed 90°F, as 
cooling water discharge from the plant would exceed the 
thermal limit (PNNL 2012).  
 
Figure 8-9. a) Projected trend in water availability in the 
Southeast; green area indicates range of emission scenarios and 
b) decadal trend for 2010–2060 relative to 2010; hatching 
indicates projected negative trend is statistically significant 
Source: USGCRP 2014 
Water availability for most of the Southeast is trending 
downward, particularly for the areas in the region west of 
the Appalachian Mountains and west of the Chattahoochee 
River (Figure 8-9). Decreasing surface water availability 
resulting from lower rainfall, increased evaporation rates, 
and competing uses (e.g., irrigation for agriculture and 
municipal water for a growing population) may threaten the 
available generation capacity of thermoelectric power 
plants. Drier summers are expected across most of the 
region (NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014).  
Many power plants in the Southeast region use once-
through freshwater cooling systems (Figure 8-10), and 
because of their need to withdraw large amounts of water 
from lakes, rivers, and streams, these plants are more 
vulnerable to deratings or outages due to low water. During 
periods of drought, plants using these cooling systems can 
become nonoperational if the water level drops below 
water intake structures (NERC 2013). 
 
Figure 8-10. Distribution of thermoelectric power plants greater 
than 70 MW by type of cooling system in the Southeastern 
United States; larger circles on the map indicate higher net 
summer capacity 
Source: EIA 2012a 
Changes in the number of intense hurricanes could increase 
the vulnerability of low-lying and coastal power plants to 
flooding and inundation. Flooding can interfere with power 
plant operations and floodwaters and flood-borne debris 
can damage structures that draw cooling water from rivers 
(DOT 2014, GAO 2014). Rising sea levels will magnify the 
destructive power of hurricanes. One study estimates that 
even with no sea-level rise, there are 69 electricity 
generation facilities in the Southeast potentially exposed to 
a Category 1 hurricane storm surge and 291 facilities 
exposed to a Category 5 storm (Maloney and Preston 
2014).
2,3
 However, with just 1.6 feet of relative sea-level 
rise, the number of facilities vulnerable to a Category 1 
storm surge increases by 41%. Depending on the sea-level 
rise scenario (ranging from 1.6 feet to 2.7 feet) and the 
                                                                
2
 Southeast region as defined in the study differs from the region 
definition in this profile. The study includes Texas but excludes 
Virginia. 
3
 The capacity of the 69 power plants exposed to a Category 1 
storm is about 15,000 MW, and the capacity of the power plants 
exposed to a Category 5 storm is about 86,000 MW. 
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intensity of the hurricane, the number of exposed power 
plants increases by 6%–60% (Maloney and Preston 2014). 
More intense hurricanes can also increase the risk of 
flooding to power plants in low-lying inland locations. 
Hurricanes can bring massive amounts of rainfall hundreds 
of miles from the coast. The rainfall produced by Atlantic 
hurricanes may increase by as much as 20% as a result of 
climate change (USGCRP 2014). 
Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Resilience Solutions 
New generation capacity with sources and supply chains 
less affected by increasing temperatures and decreased 
water availability, such as wind power and solar 
photovoltaic (PV), may help make the region’s power sector 
more resilient to climate change.  
Introducing more advanced cooling technologies into the 
region’s power production infrastructure may also be an 
effective strategy to reduce its vulnerability to decreasing 
water availability or generation reductions due to discharge 
water temperature restrictions. A large number of the 
power plants in the region rely on older once-through 
cooling systems. Nuclear and coal-fired power plants using 
these systems require the largest amounts of water 
compared to other fuels (DOE 2013). A transition to natural 
gas-fired power plants, which require relatively less cooling 
water, will enhance resiience. Equipping power plants with 
cooling ponds, recirculating systems, or advanced cooling 
technologies such as hybrid wet–dry and dry cooling 
systems will also reduce power plant exposure to water 
scarcity-related vulnerabilities. For example, Plant Yates, a 
coal-fired generator in Georgia that operated using a once-
through system, added cooling towers and cut water 
withdrawals by 93%, dropping withdrawals to 32 million 
gallons per day (UCS 2011). Additionally, Duke Energy is 
modifying equipment and procedures at nuclear and coal-
fired generating plants to reduce drought-related risks to 
generation (Duke Energy 2014). 
Policy measures could also help address water availability 
issues. Some areas have established market-driven 
solutions to address the vulnerability of critical shortages in 
supply.  
Coastal thermoelectric power plants can be hardened 
against hurricanes and heavy precipitation events and 
associated flooding through relocating or elevating critical 
equipment, upgrading plants with submersible equipment 
or watertight doors, and building improved levees around 
existing infrastructure. Planners can protect new capacity 
by locating new generators at higher elevations which are 





Among regions, the Southeast is the greatest energy 
consumer and has the highest per capita electricity use in 
the United States (EIA 2014a). On average, more than 10% 
of the energy consumed in homes is used for air 
conditioning in the Southeast, compared to a national 
average of 6% (EIA 2014a). Hotter temperatures and a 
higher frequency of extreme temperatures are projected 
for the region, which is expected to increase use of air 
conditioning and contribute to an overall increase in net 
energy use (USGCRP 2014). 
Climate change is expected to affect electricity demand in 
the following way: 
 Increasing average temperatures and occurrences of 
extreme temperatures are expected to increase 
average and peak demand for cooling energy (DOE 
2013). 
Although projected temperature increases are generally 
smaller for most parts of the Southeast than for other 
regions of the United States, higher temperatures are 
expected to be an important contributor to increased 
electricity use (USGCRP 2014). The Southeast may require 
the steepest increases in electricity transmission and 
distribution to meet cooling demand (USGCRP 2014). 
Climate change is expected to increase CDDs throughout 
the region, ranging from 450 to 750 additional CDDs in the 
northeastern part of the Southeast region to between 750 
and 1,150 additional CDDs per year projected for Florida, 
the Gulf Coast, and the Mississippi River Valley by the 
middle of this century (compared to 1980–2000) (NOAA 
2013). Florida is expected to see a sharp increase in the 
number of extreme temperatures (>95°F), quadrupling to 
over 60 days per year by mid-century (  
Figure 8-11).  
 
Evaluating the risk of sea level rise to nuclear reactors 
in Florida 
Florida Power & Light (FPL) has begun incorporating sea 
level rise into siting and hazard assessments for nuclear 
reactors. In June 2009, FPL submitted an application to 
evaluate the construction of two new nuclear reactor 
units at Turkey Point that incorporated potential sea 
level rise over the next 100 years. In a 2013 
reevaluation of flooding hazards for two existing 
nuclear reactor units at Turkey Point, FPL incorporated 








Figure 8-11. Number of days per year with daytime high 
temperatures exceeding 95°F historically (left) and by mid-
century (right) under a higher emissions scenario 
Source: USGCRP 2014 
Market penetration of air conditioners in the South is 
currently 98% (EIA 2013d), so an increase in CDDs will likely 
drive an increase in the energy use of existing air 
conditioners, an increase in the hours of operation, or both. 
Higher temperatures could have significant repercussions 
for the power sector, as the predicted increases cooling 
energy demand may require major system upgrades to 
handle increases in peak load.  
Higher temperatures can have a compounding effect on the 
water use in the region, as higher temperatures increase 
overall demand for water, increasing energy required for 
pumping, treatment, drainage, and desalination. For coastal 
communities that rely upon groundwater for their water 
supply, rising sea levels can contribute to saltwater 
intrusion of underground freshwater aquifers. Preventing 
saltwater intrusion requires additional energy for pumping. 
Energy demand for additional pumping in heavily managed 
water systems is projected to grow rapidly (Berry 2012).  
Alongside technological change and economic growth, 
population growth is an important factor driving future 
electricity demand in the region. The population in the 
Southeast is projected to increase by 57% between 2000 
and 2030, compared to a national average projected growth 
of 29% over the period (US Census Bureau 2005). The 
region has four of the ten fastest-growing metropolitan 
areas (Mackun 2010). 
Increases in electricity demand could exacerbate 
vulnerabilities to the broader energy system in the region, 
particularly during peak demand for cooling. Periods of high 
temperatures coincide with reduced power plant and 
transmission line efficiency and capacity and potentially 
coincide with decreased water availability for cooling at 
power plants.  
As temperatures increase, the demand for heating energy is 
expected to decline. Electricity is the primary fuel used for 
space heating in the Southeast (EIA 2013d), although with 
mild winters, the region’s peak electricity demand is about 
10% less in the winter than in the summer (EIA 2013e). 
Electricity Demand 
Resilience Solutions 
Energy efficiency, demand-response programs, and capacity 
expansion play an important role in reducing the exposure 
of the Southeast’s power sector to increasing energy 
demand.  
Anticipating the need to increase system resilience, several 
states in the region have enacted legislation to reduce 
future demand for electricity by requiring energy efficiency 
measures. For example, Florida and Georgia—states which 
are expected to see the largest increases in extremely hot 
days in the region—require that new homes meet 
International Energy Conservation Code building standards 
(ACEEE 2014a). Only two of the region’s thirteen states 
(Arkansas and North Carolina) have adopted an energy 
efficiency resource standard as a legislated target for 
energy savings. Arkansas requires a 0.75% annual reduction 
in investor-owned utility electricity sales, and North 
Carolina has a combined energy efficiency and renewable 
portfolio standard, requiring a 12.5% offset by 2021 from 
either efficiency savings or renewable energy (ACEEE 
2014b). 
 
Load management programs include dynamic pricing, 
remote-controlled thermostats, and dispatchable demand 
programs. Several utilities in the Southeast—including Duke 
Power, Georgia Power, and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority—have offered demand management programs to 
their large customers for a decade or more. For example, 
participants in Georgia Power’s real-time pricing program 
during the early 2000s reduced peak demand by 17%, or 
about 800 MW (MIT 2011). The Florida Public Service 
Commission establishes annual goals for seasonal peak 
demand and annual energy consumption reductions, and 
Improving resilience to greater electricity demand 
Entergy has worked to mitigate the effects of increasing 
electricity demand by investing in energy efficiency 
programs, including programs to weatherize low-
income homes and distribute 1,500 weatherization kits. 
Entergy, which has service territory in Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, reduced demand by 
40 MW in 2012 and has also added 2,080 MW of new 
capacity to meet future demand (Entergy 2013). 
In Tennessee, the city of Knoxville was recognized by 
the White House as a Climate Action Champion—in part 
for its energy efficiency and demand reduction efforts 
(White House 2015). The city has adopted the latest 
available building energy codes and is developing a 
revolving loan pilot program for residential energy 
efficiency retrofits. The city is also reducing energy 
consumption by upgrading streetlights and deploying 
energy management programs (City of Knoxville 2014). 
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conservation and load management programs are projected 
to reduce Florida utilities’ total summer peak demand by 
over 9,200 MW and annual energy consumption by over 
14,500 GWh (FPSC 2013). Almost 2.6 million residential 
customers and 65,000 commercial and industrial customers 
in the Southeast were enrolled in demand response 
programs in 2013, resulting in energy savings of more than 
99,000 MWh (EIA 2014i).  
In addition to energy efficiency and load management 
programs, new electric generation capacity may help the 
Southeast region reduce its vulnerability to increasing 
energy demand. Virtually all of the new capacity additions 
to the electric power sector between 2000 and 2012 are 
natural gas-fired units (EIA 2013c). Natural gas-fired 
generating units are projected to constitute a majority of 
the generation additions through 2040. 
Hydroelectric Generation 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The Southeast generates 3% of its electricity from 214 
federally and privately-owned hydroelectric facilities in the 
region (Figure 8-12) (EIA 2013a). These facilities make up a 
combined 23 MW of installed capacity and are typically 
located in low-elevation areas with heavily vegetated land 
cover (DOE 2012a, EIA 2013c). Compared to other regions 
with federally-operated hydropower resources, the 
Southeast climate typically has the highest amounts of 
precipitation and runoff, but is also the hottest region with 
large evaporative losses (DOE 2012a). As in other regions, 
hydroelectric power generation in the Southeast is only one 
of many competing users of water resources. Other major 
uses of water in the region include agricultural use, 
ecological flows, navigation, and growing demand for 
municipal and industrial users—particularly in Atlanta and 
northern Georgia (DOE 2012a, 2012b).  
 
Figure 8-12. The Raccoon Mountain project outside of 
Chattanooga, Tennessee, which is the Tennessee Valley 
Authority’s (TVA’s) largest hydroelectric facility where water is 
pumped to the reservoir on top of the mountain and then used 
to generate electricity when additional power is needed by the 
TVA system 
Source: TVA 2015 
Climate change may affect hydropower production in the 
following ways: 
 Throughout the Southeast, dry years4 are projected to 
occur more frequently, and the severity of low flow 
conditions
5
 is projected to increase (DOE 2012a, 
2012b). 
 Decreasing precipitation, increasing 
evapotranspiration, as well as competing demand for 
water, may decrease water availability for hydropower 
generation (DOE 2012a, Ingram et al. 2013). 
According to one study, the Southeast is projected to 
experience an increase in extremes in hydrology, primarily 
as a substantial increase in the number of dry years and 
decrease in the number of normal years, although some 
basins are projected to experience only a small change in 
the number of wet years (DOE 2012a).
6
 According to the 
same study, future low-flow periods may be 10%–30% more 
severe than current low-flow periods. Despite these 
changes to runoff, annual hydropower generation in the 
Southeast is projected to decrease only slightly, with 
median annual federal hydropower in the region decreasing 
by 0.5% in the mid-term (2025–2039, relative to 1960-1999) 
(DOE 2012a, DOE 2012b). However, seasonal trends may be 
more relevant than annual trends in impacting hydropower 
generation. Projected hotter-drier summers amy result in 
more significant decreases in hydropower generation, 
coinciding with increases in electricity demand for cooling. 
Across the region, changes to inter-annual variability will 
likely have a greater effect on the region’s hydropower 
resource than total reductions, as competition for water 
resources increases in dry years.  
When considered in the context of other water users, the 
increasing occurrence of low-water years may have a larger 
impact than indicated by models that only consider 
hydropower resources. One water resource assessment of 
the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River basin 
considered both climate change impacts and current water 
management procedures. The study indicated that under 
various emissions scenarios, the basin may be vulnerable to 
severe stress resulting in deeper reservoir drawdowns and 
reduced firm hydropower generation (Ingram et al. 2013). 
Federal hydroelectric facilities in the basin—including the 
Buford Dam and W.F. George Dam—typically provide 
power during peak demand periods but would be unable to 
operate if water levels drop below water intake conduits 
due to decreased water availability (CRS 2007).   
                                                                
4
 Dry years are defined as those with annual runoff values in the 
lowest 20% of years in the baseline period (1960–1999) 
5
 Low flow conditions are estimated by 10 year return-level 
quantiles of seasonal low runoff 
6
 Comparing projected runoff in the period 2025–2039 to a 
baseline period of 1960–1999, based on a 2.7°F temperature 
increase. 
 





To increase resilience to decreasing water availability, 
operators may consider hydropower generation as part of 
an integrated water management and planning approach. 
With competing demand from other users, hydropower 
may not be the highest-priority water user during periods of 
low flow. Operators may be able to maximize generation 
during low-flow periods by increasing efficiency of current 
facilities. For example, federal operators are working to 
replace older turbines with models that are more efficient 
at lower head levels (DOE 2012a). In addition, pumped 
storage can reduce vulnerabilities by pumping water to an 
elevated reservoir during low demand periods and then 
releasing the water to generate electricity when additional 
power is needed. 
Operators may also benefit from improved monitoring and 
forecasting tools (DOE 2012a). Following the 2007 drought 
in North Carolina, which forced Duke Energy to cut 
hydroelectric generation 67%, Duke Energy established a 
drought mitigation team to monitor and forecast drought 
effects throughout Duke Energy Carolinas’ service area 
(Duke Energy 2008). Duke Energy also partnered with public 
water system owners in the region to form the Catawba-
Wateree Water Management Group to establish a 
groundwater monitoring network, modify water intakes at 
hydroelectric facilities, optimize water intake and return 
locations, and establish demand-side management goals for 
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Regional Climate Change Observations 
and Projections in Detail 
Higher Temperatures 
Historical observations 
 Since 1970, average temperatures have increased 2°F 
(USGCRP 2014). 
 Frost-free season has been growing: The average 
length of the frost-free season across the Southeast 
region increased by about six days (1991–2012, 
compared to 1901–1960) (USGCRP 2014). 
Future projections 
 Average temperatures are expected to increase at a 
faster rate: Depending on the location and GHG 
emissions, increases of 2.5°F–8.5°F are expected by 
2070–2099 compared to 1971–1999 levels (NOAA 2013). 
 Extremely hot days are projected to become more 
common: Across most of the region, 20–30 more days 
with a daily maximum temperature > 95°F are 
projected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000); Florida is likely to be the most affected 
and may see as many as 40 more extremely hot days 
per year (NOAA 2013). 
 Consecutive number of days of extreme heat are 
expected to become longer: The annual maximum 
number of consecutive days with a daily high > 95°F is 
projected to increase by up to 20 days by mid-century 
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000) across the 
region; the western portion of the region is likely to be 
the most affected (NOAA 2013). 
 Extremely cold nights are expected to become less 
common: In the northern portion of the region, 2–10 
fewer days with daily minimums <10°F are expected by 
mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000) 
(NOAA 2013). 
 Freeze-free season is expected to lengthen: The 
freeze-free season is expected to be 20–30 days longer 
by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000) 
across most of the region (NOAA 2013). 
 CDDs are expected to increase: Across most of the 
region, an increase of 450–950 CDDs is expected by 
mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000); 
Florida is likely to be the most affected with increases 
of up to 1,150 CDDs by mid-century (NOAA 2013). 
 Heating degree days (HDDs) are expected to decrease: 
Across most of the region, declines of 100–900 HDDs 
are expected by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000); the northern portion of the region is likely 
to be the most affected, with declines of up to 1,100 
HDDs by mid-century (NOAA 2013). 
Changing Water Patterns 
Historical observations 
 Since 1895, summer precipitation has decreased by 
0.10 inches per decade, or 1.1 inches (NOAA 2013). 
 Since 1895, fall precipitation has increased by 0.27 
inches per decade, or almost 3 inches (NOAA 2013). 
 Across the Southeast, extreme precipitation events 
have occurred more frequently: An index of 2-day 
extreme precipitation events expected to occur once 
every five years shows a statistically significant upward 
trend since 1895 (NOAA 2013a). 
Future projections 
 Depending on the emissions scenario and region, 
annual precipitation is projected to increase or 
decrease: By the end of the century (2070–2099), 
annual average precipitation is expected to increase by 
3%–6% in the northern portion of the region under a 
low emissions scenario compared to the period 1971–
1999. Under a high emissions scenario, precipitation is 
projected to decrease by 3%–9% in the western and 
southern portions of the region compared to the 
period 1971–1999 (NOAA 2013). 
 Drier summers are expected across most of the 
region: Summer precipitation is expected to decrease 
by up to 15% by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1971–2000) under a higher emissions scenario in the 
northern and far southern portions of the region 
(NOAA 2013). 
 Extreme precipitation events are expected to increase 
in the northern portion of the region: The number of 
days per year with precipitation greater than one inch 
is expected to increase by up to 25% by mid-century 
(2041–2070, compared to 1980–2000) under a higher 
emissions scenario (NOAA 2013). 
 Consecutive number of days with little or no 
precipitation are likely to become longer in Louisiana: 
The annual maximum number of consecutive days with 
less than 3 mm of precipitation is expected to increase 
up to 10 days by mid-century (2041–2070, compared to 
1980–2000) (NOAA 2013). 
Sea Level Rise and Hurricanes 
Historical observations 
 Relative mean sea level has risen because of a 
combination of global sea level rise and land 
subsidence in the region: Relative mean sea level on 
the coast of the Southeast region rose 0.03–0.38 
inches/year between the middle of the 20
th
 century 
and 2006, depending on the location (NOAA 2009). 
Future projections 
 Sea level rise is expected to accelerate: Sea level on 
the coast in the Southeast is projected to rise at an 
average rate of 0.06–0.27 inches/year (no ice sheet 
melt) or 0.21–0.48 inches /year (ice sheet melt) 
between 1992 and 2050 depending on the location 
(USGCRP 2014). 
 Frequency of intense hurricanes (Category 4 and 5), 
hurricane-associated storm intensity, and rainfall 
rates are projected to increase (USGCRP 2014): Rainfall 
rates within 100 km of tropical storm centers are 
projected to increase by 20% by 2100 (USGCRP 2014). 
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Alaska consists of a vast, sparsely populated land area with over 
30,000 miles of ocean coastline. Diverse ecosystems span the 
state, ranging from Arctic tundra in the far north to temperate 
continental in the interior to maritime coastal in the south. The 
state is a major oil and gas exporter, with critical oil production 
assets, pipelines and roads, and export facilities. Key climate 
change trends that may affect the energy sector in the region 
include the following: 
 Air temperatures in Alaska have increased rapidly over 
the last half-century and are projected to continue rising 
at a rate faster than anywhere else in the United States. 
Permafrost across much of the state is thawing, and 
permafrost loss is expected to continue in the future.
a
 
Thawing permafrost alters the foundations of much of 
Alaska's infrastructure, such as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
System (TAPS), roads and airstrips, transmission lines, fuel 
storage tanks, and generators, and it can increase the 
vulnerability of riverbanks and coastlines to erosion.
b
  
 Arctic sea ice is retreating and is projected to decline 
substantially in the future.
c
 Sea ice protects coastlines 
from erosion and reduces the height of storm surge, 
reducing coastal flooding. Erosion of coastlines undercuts 
the structural footing of energy infrastructure, including 
barge landings, power lines, and fuel storage tanks. 
Reduced sea ice can increase the offshore oil drilling and 
shipping season but also increases the vulnerability of 
coastal communities to flooding during autumn storms.
d
 
 Wildfires may burn more extensively and frequently as 
projected higher temperatures, longer growing seasons, 
and drier conditions enable fires.
e
 Fire threatens 
infrastructure across Alaska's interior, including roads, 
transmission and distribution lines, and the TAPS. Wildfires 
and associated changes in vegetation cover can also lead to rapid, lasting permafrost thaw in some areas.
f
 
 Precipitation is projected to increase, and glaciers are expected to continue receding at increasing rates, likely increasing 
streamflow in the near term but causing long-term reductions.
g
 The continuing increase in river discharge from glaciers in 
southeastern and south central Alaska may increase hydropower potential but may also increase challenges associated with 
sedimentation and affect seasonal variability, complicating hydropower planning. In the long term, increases in rain (rather 
than snow) and associated changes in mountain snowpack, as well as the decline of glaciers, may reduce hydropower resources.
h
  
Table 9-1: Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in Alaska 
Subsector Vulnerability Magnitude Illustrative Resilience Solutions 
Fuel Transport 
and Storage 
Increased risk of damage to foundations 
of  transportation infrastructure from 
thawing permafrost, erosion of coastal 
and riparian fuel systems
i
 
Average annual shoreline erosion rates 
of 68 feet per year for the period 1954–
2003 in Newtok, Alaska, due to reduced 
sea ice and thawing permafrost
j
 
Maintenance of support structures 
and embankments, rerouting around 
permafrost, protection of shorelines, 
or relocation of assets
k
 
Oil and Gas 
Exploration 
and Production 
Reduced load-bearing of drilling pads 
due to permafrost thaw, shorter work 
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QUICK FACTS       
Population  (2013) 
 
740,000  (<1% of U.S.) 
Area (square miles) 571,000 (16% of U.S.) 
Energy expenditures  $8 billion 









Electric power                     TWh 7 6 n/a 
Petroleum            million barrels 188 45 2% 
Coal                           million tons 2 1 43% 













Natural gas 4 52% 1 13 
Coal 1 10% <1 5 
Nuclear 0 0% 0 0 
Hydroelectric 2 23% <1 28 
Petroleum 1 15% <1 89 
Wind  <1 1% <1 4 
Biomass <1 <1% <1 1 




Electric Power   
Wells (>1 boe/d): 1,284 Power plants (> 1 MW):  130**   
Refineries:  6 Interstate transmission lines:  0 
Liquids pipelines: 5 Coal 
 
  
Ports (>200 tons/yr): 7 Mines:  1 
Natural Gas 
 
Waterways   
Wells:  185 Coal and petroleum routes:   13 
Interstate pipelines: 0 Railroads 
 
  
Market hubs:  0 Miles of freight track:   506 
Note: Table presents 2012 data except number of oil wells, which is 2009 data. 
*Some plants use multiple fuels, and individual generating units may be <1 MW. 
**Total is less than sum of plants by fuel as some plants use more than one fuel. 
Sources: AAR 2014, EIA 2011, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013c, EIA 2013d, EIA  2014a, EIA 2014b, 
EIA 2014c, EIA 2014d, EIA 2014e, EIA 2014f, EIA 2014g, U.S. Census Bureau 2014b, 
USACE 2014 
 
Chapter 9: Alaska 
Climate Change and the Energy Sector 
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities 
and Resilience Solutions  
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of 
resilience solutions in Alaska are discussed below. System 
components that are most vulnerable to climate change are 
described first.  
Fuel Transport and Storage 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Alaska's expansive territory separates its ample energy 
resources from rural communities and from easy access to 
wider energy networks. Alaska's remote communities rely 
on regular shipments of fuel–primarily by barge, but also by 
airplane–across long distances, often in difficult conditions 
(see sidebar). Highways and rail are used for fuel transport 
in Alaska's relatively populous Railbelt region, which spans 
from Fairbanks in the north to Anchorage, Valdez, and the 
Kenai Peninsula in the south. Oil products shipped by rail 
are increasingly important since the closing of the Flint Hills 
refinery in 2014, and petroleum products for Alaska's 
interior are now refined in Kenai and are shipped north to 
the Fairbanks area on the Alaska Railroad (Cole 2014).  
Transport of fuel for export is critical for Alaska’s economy, 
as Alaska is one of the top oil-producing states in the 
country (EIA 2014b). Most of Alaska's energy production 
operations are located on the North Slope of the Brooks 
Range along Alaska's northern coastline, although 
production has been falling steadily since 1988 as existing 
North Slope oil wells mature (EIA 2014a). The North Slope is 
one of the most remote places in the world, and oil 
produced from this region relies on the TAPS to access 
markets in Alaska and beyond. The TAPS consists of a 
network of gathering pipelines in the Prudhoe Bay area of 
Arctic Alaska, a single 48-inch-diameter pipeline stretching 
800 miles south to the port of Valdez, and a series of 12 
pumping stations and other support equipment and 
facilities located along its length. The pipeline carries nearly 
all of the oil produced in the North Slope each year 
(approximately 175 million barrels in 2014) (Alyeska 2014, 
EIA 2014a). Oil from the TAPS is transferred to tanker ships 
at the Valdez Marine Terminal.  
Several Alaskan communities rely on natural gas pipelines 
for deliveries of locally produced natural gas, and some of 
the natural gas produced on the Kenai Peninsula is exported 
to Asian markets through a liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
export terminal in Nikiski (EIA 2012, EIA 2014b, EIA 2014d). 
Nikiski is also the likely location for a future export terminus 
of a proposed gas pipeline from the North Slope gas fields 





Figure 9-1. Map of Alaska 
Alaska’s multi-modal transport network delivering fuel 
and supplies to rural populations 
Fuel transport for Alaska's remote rural communities 
outside of the Railbelt region requires significant effort 
and frequently comes at a high cost (Bradner 2012, 
USGCRP 2014). Over 80% of Alaska's communities have 
populations smaller than 1,000, many with no 
connection to wider energy or electrical networks (AFN 
2012, US Census Bureau 2014a, USGCRP 2014). Heating 
fuel, transportation fuel and diesel for electricity 
generation are all critical supplies for these remote 
communities. Diesel generators supply the large 
majority of Alaska's electricity outside of the Railbelt 
(AEA 2013a).  
Fuel shipments to Alaska's rural communities often 
require specialized equipment and multiple stages 
involving different vehicles (Bradner 2012). Over short 
distances, roads within and around towns serve as 
crucial links for Alaska's transportation networks. 
However, most remote communities are not connected 
via long-distance roads, and shipping by barge is the 
primary means of transporting fuel to Alaska's isolated 
coastal and interior riparian communities. For some 
communities beyond the reach of barge transport, fuel 
is shipped by air, often at extremely high cost (Bradner 
2012, USARC 2003). For these communities, the local 
airstrip is an essential part of their energy 
transportation infrastructure. Furthermore, because of 
seasonal constraints and the high cost of shipments, 
communities rely on large storage containers to reduce 
the number of necessary shipments. Many communities 
receive only one fuel shipment per year.  
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Some long-distance roads serve as crucial 
transportation links for providing energy 
infrastructure support. For example, the 
Dalton Highway stretches 414 miles 
between Fairbanks and Deadhorse, 
located on Prudhoe Bay, and is used to 
carry supplies and heavy machinery for 
North Slope oil production as well as for 
servicing the TAPS (Alaska Geographic 
2014).  
Climate change is projected to have the 
following impacts on fuel transport in 
Alaska: 
 Warming temperatures are expected 
to contribute to the continued thaw 
of permafrost, compromising the 
structural stability of transportation 
and storage infrastructure, including 
oil and gas pipelines, storage tanks, runways, railroads, 
and roads in northern and interior Alaska (USARC 2003, 
USGCRP 2014).  
 Reduced sea ice and thawing permafrost are expected 
to lead to accelerated rates of coastal and riparian 
erosion, affecting northern and western Alaska's 
shoreline energy assets, such as the extensive shipping 
infrastructure including ports and terminals; reductions 
in sea ice may also benefit shipping by extending the 
ice-free season (Alaska AAG 2010, DOE 2013, USGCRP 
2014).  
 Increased temperatures, drier conditions,1 and 
increased vegetation are expected to increase the 
extent and severity of forest fires, which can disrupt 
road and rail transport and contribute to rapid local 
permafrost thaw (LTER 2006, USGCRP 2014). 
Permafrost across the state is expected to experience 
continued warming, reduced thickness, and thawing, 
depending on the permafrost zone and soil factors. In zones 
of continuous permafrost
2
 (primarily occurring north of the 
Brooks Range, including the North Slope; Figure 9-2), 
permafrost thickness is expected to decline (ACIA 2005). In 
discontinuous permafrost zones—where permafrost 
temperatures are much closer to 0°C, including most of the 
Alaskan interior and western coastline—permafrost may 
thaw much more rapidly, especially in the southernmost 
                                                                
1
 In Alaska's interior, landscapes have become drier even as 
precipitation has increased. While the relative importance of 
different mechanisms contributing to drier conditions is not clear 
(including permafrost thaw and increased evapotranspiration), the 
National Climate Assessment has expressed high confidence that 
landscapes are getting drier (USGCRP 2014). 
2
 Continuous permafrost zones are defined as those with >90% of 
the land area underlain by permafrost. Discontinuous zones are 
those underlain by 50%–90% permafrost. Sporadic permafrost 
regions are those underlain by 10%–50% permafrost (ACIA 2005). 
reaches of the zone (ACIA 2005). In one study of permafrost 
north of Fairbanks, researchers found that 38% of their sites 
indicated thawing or unstable permafrost layers (LTER 
2006). 
Almost the entire length of the TAPS is constructed in 
continuous or discontinuous permafrost zones. Thawing 
permafrost layers can reduce the load-bearing capacity of 
the ground under the TAPS supports, and frost heave and 
uneven settlement may damage TAPS segments (DOE 2013, 
USARC 2003). Segments of the TAPS that are elevated 
above permafrost layers (over half of the pipeline length) 
utilize heat pipes called thermosyphons that passively 
transfer heat from the permafrost layer into the air, thus 
stabilizing the permafrost foundation (Alyeska 2014, DOE 
2013, USARC 2003). As ambient temperatures warm, 
existing thermosyphons may become insufficient to provide 
the necessary cooling to protect permafrost layers from 
thawing (ACIA 2005). The design of existing thermosyphons 
was based on the average permafrost and climate 
conditions of the period 1950–1970, a period featuring a 
much colder climate than today, and did not take a 
warming climate into account (NOAA 2013, USARC 2003, 
USGCRP 2014). A 2001 study indicated that upwards of one 
third of all vertical support members along the pipeline 
route had possible problems caused by climate change 
(USARC 2003). 
Permafrost thaw is already affecting segments of the 
pipeline. In one case, a reduction in permafrost thickness 
caused a vertical support member to tilt by seven degrees 
over a period of approximately three years. The vertical 
support member was replaced in 2000 (USARC 2003).  
In addition to structural vulnerabilities related to 
permafrost, climate change may also alter the stability of 
soil in the permafrost-free areas where the TAPS is buried. 
Changes in precipitation, temperature, and groundwater 
 
Figure 9-2. Extent of permafrost affecting Alaska's communities and highways 
Source: USARC 2003 
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availability may affect the annual frost depth of the soil's 
active layer in these areas, affecting soil stability and load-
bearing capacity (NOAA 2013, USARC 2003, USGCRP 2014). 
One study projected that permafrost warming of 5°C at a 
10-meter depth in Barrow, Alaska (in the continuous 
permafrost zone), would correspond to a decline in load-
bearing strength of 23% (ACIA 2005). The study also 
projected that permafrost warming of only 2°C in Bethel, 
Alaska (in the discontinuous permafrost zone), could be 
sufficient to reach thawing temperatures, resulting in the 
potential complete loss of permafrost and a projected 40% 
drop in load-bearing strength (ACIA 2005).  
Thawing permafrost also undercuts the stability of roads 
and airstrips. Most of Alaska's road miles are in 
Southcentral Alaska, which includes the Railbelt region and 
other areas where permafrost is less common (USARC 
2003). However, many of Alaska's long-distance highways 
are located in interior regions with discontinuous 
permafrost, which is more vulnerable to thaw and resulting 
instability (see Figure 9-2 on previous page) (ACIA 2005, 
USARC 2003). Furthermore, a large number of Alaska's 
remote communities are in areas with continuous or 
discontinuous permafrost coverage, and local roads are 
vulnerable to permafrost thaw and land settling. Roads 
underlain with ice-rich permafrost (such as sections of the 
Dalton Highway) may require substantial rehabilitation or 
relocation if thawing occurs (USARC 2003). In zones of 
warm, discontinuous permafrost, thawing beneath road 
embankments may occur in the next 20–30 years, within 
the lifetime of most embankments (ACIA 2005). While roads 
built on lower-ice permafrost may not necessarily require 
relocation, expensive, continuous repairs are likely to be 
necessary (ACIA 2005, USARC 2003). 
The state's only freight railroad company, the Alaska 
Railroad, operates a line that extends from Seward on the 
southern coast to the Fairbanks area in the state's interior. 
The railway line defines the relatively densely populated 
Railbelt region. The Alaska Railroad crosses sporadic and 
discontinuous permafrost zones and has historically been 
affected by differential frost heave and thaw settlement 
(USARC 2003). Continuing thaw of permafrost may increase 
these challenges, including increasing the risk of damage to 
track and railbed, as well as higher maintenance costs 
(USARC 2003).  
For many of Alaska's rural communities, thawing 
permafrost also threatens inland fuel transport and storage 
infrastructure, including airstrips, roads, and fuel storage 
tanks. Alaska has over 160 communities in continuous or 
discontinuous permafrost zones (USARC 2003). In these 
communities, thawing permafrost can cause the 
foundations of structures to settle inconsistently, leading to 
loss of support or damage to the structures (ACIA 2005, 
DeMarban 2012). For example, in Newtok, Alaska, thawing 
permafrost is contributing to the subsidence of land under 




Figure 9-3. Shifting fuel tanks in Newtok 
Source: Newtok Planning Group 2014 
Runways face the same vulnerabilities to permafrost thaw 
as other terrestrial infrastructure, including the risk of 
uneven land settling and loss of foundation strength. 
Runways in communities built on discontinuous or 
continuous permafrost may require major repairs or may 
have to be entirely relocated (USARC 2003). The village of 
Noatak in Alaska's northwestern interior relies exclusively 
on air transport for fuel shipments since falling water levels 
in the Noatak River have made barge shipments impossible 
(ANTHC 2011, USA Today 2012). Because of the high cost of 
shipping fuel by air, Noatak also sees the highest electricity 
costs in Alaska's northwest region (NANA Regional 
Corporation 2010).  
Air strips in coastal communities may also be vulnerable to 
coastal erosion and flooding. The community of Point Hope 
on the Bering Strait relocated to higher ground in the 
1970s, but climate change-related erosion and flooding 
remains a threat to the community's air strip (ANTHC 2010, 
GAO 2003). 
Thawing permafrost combined with declining sea ice can 
increase the rate of coastal erosion along Alaska's northern 
and western coastlines. Rapid coastal erosion can occur 
during severe storms when sea ice is not present to protect 
the shoreline from wave action and storm surge. 
Additionally, inland permafrost thaw can contribute to 
accelerated erosion of infrastructure along riverbanks 
(Alaska AAG 2010, USGCRP 2014). For Alaska's rural 
communities that rely on periodic shipments of fuel for 
heating, transportation, and electricity generation, 
permafrost thaw and erosion that damages transportation 
infrastructure can cause temporary or long-term 
disruptions to fuel deliveries and increase the costs of these 
essential products.  
Coastal erosion exacerbated by receding sea ice in Alaska is 
threatening fuel transport infrastructure for numerous 
small native communities. Since consistent satellite imagery 
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of Arctic sea ice became available in 1979, the extent and 
thickness of summer sea ice along Alaska’s coastlines has 
decreased substantially, and currently there is only about 
half as much as at the beginning of the record (USGCRP 
2014). Decline of sea ice cover is expected to continue: 
summer sea ice may disappear completely before mid-
century, and winter sea ice may no longer reach Alaska's 
southwest coast on the Bering Sea by the end of the 
century (ACIA 2005, USGCRP 2014). Coastal sea ice in the 
Arctic Ocean and Bering Strait protects shorelines from 
storm-driven wave action and flooding associated with 
storm surge (Alaska AAG 2010). As sea ice recedes earlier in 
the summer and returns later in the winter, communities 
are more vulnerable to storm-driven erosion. Permafrost 
thaw further allows greater coastal erosion, as coastal bluffs 
that have been historically "cemented" by ice-rich 
permafrost are beginning to thaw (USGCRP 2014). Some 
inland riparian communities may also experience greater 
erosion of riverbanks due to climate change as thawing 
permafrost allows more rapid erosion, especially if 
riverflows are increased by accelerating glacier melt or 
increased precipitation (ACIA 2005, Alaska AAG 2010, NOAA 
2013, USACE 2006b, USARC 2003).   
Coastal and riparian erosion can destroy barge landings, 
fuel connections, and other infrastructure used for 
offloading fuel shipments from barges. In cases in which 
fuel barges cannot offload, communities must transfer fuel 
to smaller, shallow draft ships capable of landing, adding to 
the cost (Bradner 2012, USGCRP 2014). In some cases, 
communities must rely on air shipments of fuel, which is 
extremely expensive (Bradner 2012, USARC 2003).   
Declining sea ice may also aid fuel deliveries for some 
communities, as the ice-free season grows longer. For 
coastal villages that are ice-bound for some portion of the 
year, declining sea ice may allow more flexible or more 
frequent fuel deliveries.  
Increasing incidence of forest fires may also affect the TAPS. 
The pipeline is designed to resist forest fires and is 
protected by a galvanized steel jacket and insulation, as 
well as its placement within a 64-foot wide right-of-way 
clear-cut of vegetation. Past fires have not affected the 
pipeline's operations; however, the costs associated with 
protecting the pipeline may increase, as climate change is 
projected to increase the risk of forest fires in Alaska (BLM 
2007, D'Oro 2003, News-Miner 2014). For example, in 
response to a fire that approached the TAPS in 2014 near 
the Yukon River Crossing, pipeline operators mobilized 
sprinkler systems, water trucks, and bulldozers in case the 
fire threatened the pipeline or support structures (News-
Miner 2014). Fires can also affect the health and depth of 
permafrost. By reducing insulating vegetation from the 
active layer of soil (the topmost layer that freezes and 
thaws annually) and by increasing soil drainage, fires can 
lead to rapid local permafrost thaw, or even long-term 
transition to permafrost-free soil (LTER 2006). When 
combined with warming, fire-related changes to local 




Fuel Transport and Storage 
Resilience Solutions 
As temperatures increase, the TAPS may require additional 
operational, maintenance, design, and construction 
techniques to prepare for rapid thawing permafrost. 
Currently, the TAPS and its supporting infrastructure are 
actively monitored for structural problems resulting from 
thawing permafrost, and vertical support members are 
inspected once every three years (Alyeska 2008, USARC 
Newtok erosion leading to energy crisis 
The Yup'ik Eskimo village of Newtok is facing erosion 
threats that have already destroyed its barge landing 
and disrupted fuel shipments (USACE 2008a, USGCRP 
2014). Located on the tidal Ninglick River just inland of 
the western coast of Alaska on the Bering Sea, the 
village is experiencing thawing permafrost and loss of 
sea ice that increases its vulnerability to rapid erosion 
during storms (USACE 2008b, USGCRP 2014). In 2005, 
the village's barge landing on the Ninglick was 
destroyed, and in April 2006, a fuel barge was grounded 
for three days, after which deliveries were suspended 
and the fall 2006 fuel delivery was not made (USACE 
2008a). The village experienced a fuel crisis in the 
winter of 2006–2007, and emergency shipments of fuel 
were flown in to supplement dwindling supplies until a 
solution could be found (D'Oro 2007, USACE 2008a). 
Fuel storage tanks—including tanks for the village's 
generator station and school, for home heating, and for 
marine and aviation fuel—are also threatened by 
erosion of both the Ninglick and the Newtok rivers 
(ADEC 2013a, DeMarban 2012). 
Figure 9-4. Shoreline erosion in Netwok 
Source: USACE 2008b 
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2003). The frequency or robustness of monitoring and 
inspecting may need to be increased in the face of climate 
change. In cases in which underlying permafrost has 
become insufficient to support the TAPS, new, deeper 
supports or rigid support structures can be used (USARC 
2003). Additionally, proactive maintenance and upgrading 
of thermosyphons avoids damage to underlying permafrost 
(Figure 9-5) (Alyeska 2008). Currently, the majority of 
repairs to thermosyphons are done in the Copper River 
Basin, an area in the southern reaches of the pipeline's 
range that is undergoing a transition from a discontinuous 
permafrost zone to a sporadic permafrost zone (Alyeska 
2008). 
 
Figure 9-5. An elevated section of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
System uses thermosyphons, which draws heat out of the ground 
and vents it into the air to prevent permafrost thaw 
Source: FBI 2012 
For communities facing rapid erosion, options for 
protecting coastal fuel transport and storage infrastructure 
may be limited. Many communities have invested millions 
of dollars in walls to reduce or stop erosion. For example, 
Bethel, which has about 6,000 residents, has deployed an 
extensive seawall along 8,000 feet of its riverbank at a total 
estimated cost of $24 million (GAO 2003). Bethel serves as a 
major regional fuel hub for several rural communities on 
the Kuskokwim River, and the seawall protects storage 
tanks capable of holding over 20 million gallons from 
eroding riverbanks (ADEC 2013b, Bradner 2012).  
In other communities, coastal energy assets may require 
relocation inland. For example, in Port Heiden and Levelock, 
fuel headers (connections used for refilling fuel storage 
tanks from barges) may need to be relocated inland, as 
shorelines are eroding (ADEC 2012, ANTHC 2014, LPB 2013). 
However, in other cases, the only solution to the challenges 
presented by erosion may be complete relocation of an 
entire community. Several communities, including Newtok, 
Kivalina, and Shishmaref, have voted to relocate, often at 
extremely high costs (GAO 2003). After efforts to build an 
erosion barrier from sandbags failed, the village of Newtok 
began the process of migration to a new village site in 2003 
(GAO 2003). In the village of Shishmaref, various attempts 
to address erosion of coastal bluffs—including seawalls 
constructed from sandbags, gabions, and concrete mats—
have failed to stop the threat to the community. The 
residents had to relocate 19 homes following storms in 
1997 and 2002. After the latter storm, the village voted to 
relocate in its entirety (GAO 2003). Relocation is expected 
to take 15–20 years and cost at least $180 million (USACE 
2006a). In the interim, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
built additional seawall protection in Shimsharef in 2007 at 
an estimated cost of $6.5 million (Weyiouanna 2007).  
Roads, railroads, and airstrips subject to shifting permafrost 
foundations may require increased maintenance, 
rehabilitation, rerouting, or relocation, depending on 
location-specific factors (USARC 2003). Future projects 
should take projected temperature increases into account 
when designing on or around permafrost. For example, new 
projects built on continuous permafrost can anticipate 
reduced load-bearing capacity and utilize thicker 
embankments when necessary (ACIA 2005). Because of the 
short summer building season, constructing a new rural 
airport in Alaska is an expensive and lengthy project, 
costing $15–$20 million and ordinarily taking 3–5 years—
and sometimes as much as 10 years (TRB 2012). Alaska has 
an airport system planning process in place that seeks to 
continually monitor Alaska’s airports and prioritize funding 
based on need and economic benefits (TRB 2012). For 
example, the Federal Aviation Administration provided 
$10.3 million to raise and lengthen the airstrip in Koyukuk, a 
village in Alaska's interior plagued by regular spring flooding 
(GAO 2003). 
The Alaska Village Electric Cooperative (AVEC) serves many 
of Alaska's most remote rural communities. AVEC is 
expanding the use of village interties (low-voltage 
transmission lines between villages) to reduce the 
likelihood of power outages if fuel storage tanks and 
generating equipment are affected by flooding and erosion 
impacts (AVEC 2013). By connecting nearby villages, AVEC 
can centralize energy generation and reduce the need for 
bulk fuel deliveries and storage for difficult-to-reach 
communities (AVEC 2013). Development of local renewable 
energy resources such as wind and ocean power may also 
increase the resilience of rural communities by reducing the 
need for remote fuel deliveries (AVEC 2013). 
Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
For the last four decades, Alaska has been one of the top 
oil-producing states in the country, and oil production is a 
key driver of the state's economy. Alaska produced 8% of 
the nation's oil in 2012. Although that percentage is down 
from a peak of 25% in 1988 (EIA 2014a), Alaskan oil still 
serves a large share of the western United States' demand 
 




Figure 9-6. Alaska tundra travel season 1970–2004 
Source: NOAA 2014 
for oil, and Alaska's remaining oil reserves constitute 8.7% 
of the nation's proven reserves (EIA 2015a, EIA 2014b). As 
Alaska's North Slope oil fields mature, exploration and 
drilling is reaching farther inland, and new wells are located 
farther apart (DeMarban 2014).  
Alaska's natural gas is produced primarily in the Cook Inlet, 
with additional production in the North Slope and outside 
Barrow. Unlike Alaska's oil sector, the state's natural gas 
resources are primarily used locally for electricity 
production, refining, and heating. Historically, 8%–15% of 
the state's total marketable gas production has been 
exported via the Kenai LNG export terminal, primarily to 
Japan (EIA 2012, EIA 2014b, EIA 2014d, EIA 2015b). Gas on 
the North Slope cannot be transported outside the region 
and is therefore consumed locally, or is reinjected.  
Because of the dominant role Alaska's oil industry plays in 
the state's economy, climate change impacts that affect the 
sector's productivity are likely to have negative effects on 
Alaska's economy. Oil production and other extractive 
industries constitute the largest single share of Alaska's GDP 
(21% in 2012), and taxes and royalties affiliated with the 
industry contribute over 90% of the state's unrestricted 
revenue (ADCCED 2014).  
Climate change is projected to have the 
following impacts on oil and gas exploration 
and production in Alaska: 
 Warming temperatures are expected to 
contribute to the continued thaw of 
permafrost, weakening the soil and 
causing differential settling underneath 
drilling pads and supporting 
infrastructure (ACIA 2005, USARC 2003, 
USGCRP 2014). 
 Increasing temperatures are likely to 
reduce the number of days of allowable 
road travel on frozen tundra, while 
dependence on ice roads for oil and gas 
production in the North Slope is 
increasing (ADNR 2004, DOE 2013). 
 Declining sea ice may benefit offshore 
oil exploration off the North Slope by 
providing a longer ice-free season and 
expand the spatial extent of offshore 
exploration in the Arctic (DOE 2013). 
Warming temperatures in the North Slope are expected to 
reduce the thickness of the permafrost layer and increase 
the depth of the active soil layer (the layer that freezes and 
thaws annually). North Slope drilling occurs on the colder, 
thicker tundra north of the Brooks Range that may not be 
as susceptible to thawing as the warm permafrost in 
Alaska's interior (USARC 2003). But even if permafrost is not 
completely lost, partial thawing of the permafrost layer can 
reduce the load-bearing capacity of soils and lead to 
differential settling, undermining the foundations of 
structures, including drilling pads, production installations, 
and supporting structures (DOE 2013, USARC 2003).  
Off-road transportation in Alaska's far north is essential for 
oil exploration and production on the North Slope, but is 
limited to the winter season to protect the sensitive tundra 
ecosystems. The Alaska Department of Natural Resources 
(ADNR) determines the annual opening and closing dates 
for off-road travel on tundra, basing its decisions on the 
thickness and hardness of the ground frost (ADNR 2004). 
Higher temperatures and thawing permafrost can shorten 
the winter operating season, decreasing productivity and 
increasing costs (DOE 2013, NOAA 2014). Since the 1970s, 
both warmer conditions and changes in regulatory criteria 
have shortened the tundra travel season by an average of 
100 days (Figure 9-6) (ADNR 2004, DOE 2013, NOAA 2014). 
The challenges of shorter winter working seasons are 
compounded by record demand for tundra travel as the 
extent of active North Slope oil and gas wells grows and 
becomes less geographically concentrated. In the winter of 
2013–2014, a record-high number of miles of ice roads 
were approved for construction (DeMarban 2014).  
In addition to a shorter season, the area of tundra that is 
expected to be sufficiently frozen to support ice roads is 
projected to fall. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) projects that, by mid-century, the average 
land area accessible by winter season ice roads in Alaska 
will fall by 29% compared to today (2045–2059 compared 
to 2000–2014) (IPCC 2014a).   
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Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Resilience Solutions 
Reductions in permafrost load-bearing capacity can be 
addressed by engineering structures with appropriate 
design criteria for the life of the foundation. Additionally, 
measures to insulate or ventilate underlying permafrost, 
such as construction of a gravel pad of appropriate depth or 
the use of thermal piles, can help maintain the permafrost 
temperature and protect foundations from thawing (Seifert 
2011).  
As understanding of tundra damage and regulations 
regarding tundra travel evolve, new technologies and 
approaches to protecting the tundra are emerging. For 
example, pre-packing of tundra snow prior to road opening 
may allow more rapid freezing of active layer soils and 
earlier opening of tundra travel (Byrne and Shultz 2015). 
Hydropower 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Hydropower systems in Alaska constitute an important 
share of electricity generation, providing about one quarter 
of all electricity in the state (EIA 2013a). Reliance on 
hydropower for electricity is distinctly regional, with the 
great majority of hydropower capacity located in the 
Railbelt region and southeast parts of the state. In the 
southeast, hydropower constitutes about one-half of 
installed capacity (AEA 2013a). However, apart from small 
hydropower facilities near Bristol Bay and in the Aleutian 
Islands, there is no installed hydroelectric capacity in the 
northern or western portions of the state (Table 9-2) (AEA 
2013a).  
Hydropower projects in Alaska's remote regions are 
typically run-of-the-river plants, which divert a portion of 
the flow of the river through turbines to generate power. 
These projects tend to be smaller operations such as the 
105 kW Town Creek Project in the City of Akutan (McMillen 
2011). Alaska also uses several lake-tap hydropower 
projects, such as the 31 MW Crater Lake Project (part of the 
Snettisham Project that powers Juneau), as well as 
traditional dams such as the 120 MW Bradley Lake 
Hydroelectric Project (AEA 2011, AEA 2014b). Alaska's 
larger dams are found in the southeastern and Railbelt 
regions of the state.  




% of Total 
Capacity in 
Region 
Southeast 210.1 51% 
Copper River/Chugach 19.2 33% 
Railbelt 184.4 13% 
Kodiak  22.9 37% 
Bristol Bay 0.8 3% 
Aleutians 0.8 2% 
Rest of Alaska  0 – 
Source: Adapted from AEA 2013a 
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on hydropower in Alaska: 
 More precipitation as rain rather than snow and 
increasing temperatures, particularly in winter, may 
result in earlier spring thaw, which could increase 
water availability for hydropower generation in the 
spring and reduce water availability in the summer 
(ACIA 2005, DOE 2013). 
 Accelerating glacial melt may increase water availability 
for hydropower generation on glacier-fed waterways in 
the short term but is expected to threaten these 
resources in the longer term by reducing river 
discharge and hydropower generation (DOE 2013, 
USGCRP 2014). Near-term increases in streamflow may 
also affect sediment loading, potentially reducing 
reservoir capacity and hydropower capacity (Cherry et 
al. 2010a).    
 Thawing permafrost may affect the design of potential 
new dams making use of Alaska's untapped 
hydropower resources (ACIA 2005, Sayles 1987). 
Declining snowpack and earlier snowmelt may shift peak 
streamflow timing and reduce water availability and 
hydropower generation in the summer at facilities that rely 
on snowmelt-fed rivers. This effect may be particularly 
acute at run-of-the-river facilities, which are directly 
dependent on river discharge (ACIA 2005, Blackshear et al. 
2011, IRENA 2012, DOE 2013). The average winter 
temperature minimum in southeastern Alaska has been 
increasing at an accelerating rate since 1940, and by the 
end of the century, average winter temperatures are 
projected to stay above freezing (Cherry et al. 2010b, NOAA 
2013). Increases in winter temperatures will increase the 
amount of precipitation that falls as rain rather than snow 
(Cherry et al. 2010b). For watersheds that typically store 
water in mountain snowpack from fall through spring, these 
effects could reduce the total water available from 
snowpack.  
In the southern portion of Alaska, precipitation is projected 
to increase, but the impact of these changes on 
hydropower generation is uncertain. Higher air 
temperatures are expected to increase evaporation, and 
longer growing seasons for vegetation in Alaska may 
ultimately reduce water availability for hydropower despite 
increased precipitation (USGCRP 2014). Vegetation changes 
associated with a warming climate may withdraw water 
from watersheds and reduce streamflow available for 
hydropower (ADNR 2014). Furthermore, the seasonality of 
storage reservoirs means that not all precipitation can be 
used for hydropower production. For example, projected 
increases in autumn precipitation may not contribute to 
hydropower production if warming temperatures mean 
additional precipitation falls as rain rather than snow. Since 
reservoirs are already at capacity by the fall, additional rain 
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will likely be spilled over at traditional and lake-tap facilities 
(Cherry et al. 2010b). 
Accelerating glacial melt is expected to generally increase 
streamflow and hydropower potential in Alaska on glacier-
fed streams in the near term. But as glaciers are expected 
to continue to shrink, hydropower production will likely 
eventually decline as less water is available (ADNR 2014, 
DOE 2013, USGCRP 2014). Currently, approximately half of 
Alaska's total runoff begins as glacier meltwater (ADNR 
2014). From the mid-1990s to 2000, the rate of glacial melt 
in North America tripled relative to the melt rate from the 
mid-1950s to the mid-1990s, and Alaska's glaciers currently 
exhibit the highest rates of decline anywhere on earth 
(ADNR 2014, Zemp and Haberli 2007). While the timing of 
each glacier's decline and potential disappearance depends 
on a number of factors, determining when a glacier's runoff 
is likely to peak and begin to fall is critical for water and 
hydropower resource planning (ADNR 2014).  
Depending on the hydrology and geology of each basin, 
increases in streamflow may increase the amount of 
sediment carried in a river (Cherry 2009). Sediment can 
affect hydropower facilities by collecting behind a dam, 
slowly reducing the storage capacity of a reservoir (Cherry 
et al. 2010a). Additionally, sediments present in water that 
passes through a turbine can wear down the turbine blades, 
reducing the efficiency and total capacity of a hydropower 
plant (Cherry et al. 2010a). Additional research is still 
needed to understand the role that climate change plays in 
affecting sediment loading in Alaska's rivers and basins, 
including those currently and potentially useful for 
hydropower production (ADNR 2014, Cherry 2009).   
Although dams built on permafrost foundations are rare, 
some do exist in Alaska (ACIA 2005, Sayles 1987). The 
largest of these, a containment structure for a mining 
operation outside of Levelock, failed in 1962 after falling 
into disuse. Thermal degradation of underlying permafrost 
led to seepage and erosion through the dam and 
embankments, and the dam was breeched during spring 
flooding (Sayles 1987). Although none of Alaska's 
permafrost-founded dams houses hydropower facilities, 
thawing permafrost would likely affect the design of 
potential new dams making use of Alaska's untapped 
hydropower resources, as these dams would need to be 
much higher than existing permafrost dams and ensure that 
the underlying permafrost would not thaw, settle, or shift 
(ACIA 2005, EIA 2014b). For example, construction of new 
frozen core dams would need to take future warming into 
account when planning cooling systems (Miller et al. 2013). 
Hydropower 
Resilience Solutions 
Hydropower operators can increase the resilience of their 
facilities by increasing monitoring of snow water resources, 
allowing operators to better anticipate changes to riverflow 
(Cherry et al. 2010b). In general, increased transmission 
capacity can allow water planners and hydropower 
operators to take advantage of spatial variability in water 
availability as well as better utilize all generation resources. 
For example, energy managers in Sitka are planning to 
reduce their dependence on local hydropower by building 
additional interties to nearby communities (Cherry et al. 
2010b). 
Another resilience measure suitable for some hydropower 
operators is to maintain higher winter carryover reservoir 
storage levels and reduce reservoir water releases to adapt 
to shifting snowpack levels, snowmelt timing, and glacial 
runoff. For example, the dam at Blue Lake is currently 145 
feet high, but managers are raising the height of the dam by 
83 feet. This would reduce water releases during high 
winter flow times and would increase the facility’s 
generation capacity by 27% (City of Sitka 2015). Run-of-the-
river hydropower operators may increase resilience to 
changing seasonal riverflow patterns by increasing pondage 
(or small-scale storage) at facilities. 
Electric Grid 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Alaska's electricity sector can be divided into two types of 
transmission regions: (1) the interconnected transmission 
grid in the Railbelt, with diverse generating resources, and 
(2) local distribution grids serving rural communities 
operating small generation facilities. Utilities in the Railbelt 
are interconnected by long-distance power lines that 
operate at higher transmission voltages (Figure 9-7). 
Outside of the Railbelt, communities rely on locally 
produced energy, such as diesel generators, or on nearby 
resources such as wind turbines and hydropower facilities. 
Some rural communities operate interties that connect the 
distribution grids of two or three communities but operate 
at lower distribution voltages.  
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The Railbelt-area transmission grid 
connects the Kenai Peninsula and 
Anchorage to communities in the 
interior around Fairbanks. This 
region includes over 80% of 
Alaska's electricity generation and 
consumption and six utilities: 
Anchorage Municipal Light & 
Power, Chugach Electric 
Association, Golden Valley Electric 
Association, Homer Electric 
Association, Matanuska Electric 
Association, and Seward Electric 
System (ARCTEC 2013, EIA 2013a, 
EIA 2013b). Although the grid is 
Alaska's largest, the Railbelt relies 
on relatively low-voltage 
transmission lines compared to the 
lower 48 states—mostly 115 kV 
lines but also 230 kV, 138 kV, and 
69 kV lines (AEA 2014a, ARCTEC 
2013). The transmission grid helps 
connected utilities share reserve 
capacity, but the grid suffers from 
significant capacity constraints that 
can limit the operation of 
generators such as the Bradley 
Hydroelectric Project (AEA 2013b, 
Brehmer 2014). Several plans have 
been developed by utilities in the 
region and the Alaska Energy 
Authority (AEA) to expand transmission capacity and range. 
The 2013 Railbelt Transmission Plan proposes upgrading 
several lines to 230 kV, adding new redundancy, and 
incorporating other grid improvements including grid-scale 
storage systems (AEA 2013b). 
For many of Alaska's small rural villages, electrical loads are 
met by a single central diesel generator and served by local 
distribution grids. Historically, these communities have 
been considered too far apart and serving loads too small to 
justify the cost of long-distance transmission lines (AEA 
2009, NANA Pacific 2008). However, for some rural 
communities, short-distance low-voltage distribution 
interties can prove economic by helping achieve greater 
efficiency, including by reducing costs associated with fuel 
delivery (AVEC 2013). Additionally, communities with access 
to renewable resources rely on short-distance transmission 
lines to deliver power. For example, much of Juneau's 
electricity is generated at the Snettisham Hydroelectric 
Project, which relies on a 44-mile high-voltage transmission 
line to reach the city (AIDEA 2014).   
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on the electric grid in Alaska: 
 More frequent and extensive forest fires may increase 
the risk of damage to transmission lines in the Railbelt, 
as well as in rural communities (LTER 2006, USGCRP 
2014). 
 Thawing permafrost can compromise the foundation of 
power line towers and may affect towers in large parts 
of northern and interior Alaska (ACIA 2005, USARC 
2003, USGCRP 2014).  
 Coastal flooding and erosion resulting from permafrost 
thaw and declining sea ice cover may increase the risk 
of damage to distribution systems in rural villages (GAO 
2003, USGCRP 2014). 
 Higher temperatures and changes to precipitation may 
increase the frequency of avalanches, which, in some 
locations, can threaten transmission lines and other 
infrastructure (ACIA 2005). 
 Increased precipitation, higher rates of glacier melting, 
and greater risk of glacier outbursts may increase the 
likelihood of conditions favorable to flooding, which 
could damage electrical transmission and distribution 
lines (IPCC 2014b, NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
Figure 9-7. Alaska electricity infrastructure 
Source: DOE 2015 
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Alaska's warming climate is driving an increase in the 
likelihood, length of wildfire season, and range of wildfires 
across much of the state's southern coast and interior 
regions (USGCRP 2014). Increased fire activity may threaten 
transmission and distribution power lines, as well as 
substations and other support equipment and structures. 
Warming temperatures have led to a longer growing season 
and expanded northward the range of spruce forests and 
other vegetation, as well as leading to drier conditions in 
interior Alaska (USGCRP 2014). Additionally, higher 
precipitation and temperatures have increased growing 
rates, accelerating the pace at which rights-of-way can 
become overgrown (USGCRP 2014). In the last decade, 
more large fires burned across Alaska than in any decade 
since recordkeeping began in the 1940s (USGCRP 2014).  
 
Fires can burn wooden power poles and destroy substations 
and transformers, and heat and smoke can degrade the 
capacity of a line, as well as increase the risk of arcing 
between lines or to ground (DOE 2013). Fire retardants 
used to combat fires can also foul transmission lines and 
reduce capacity. All of these impacts can lead to extended 
outages, especially if fires affect lines without redundant 
capacity or if backup generation is not available. Vegetation 
overgrowth can also increase the risk of fires caused by 
power line tree strikes. For example, in 2014, a Golden 
Valley Electric Association transmission line was struck by a 
falling tree, causing a fire that burned an acre around the 
power line (AFS 2014a). The following day, an additional 15 
fires started in the Fairbanks area, many caused by trees 
being blown over onto power lines (AFS 2014b). 
Much of the interior Railbelt, including Fairbanks and the 
surrounding area, is underlain by discontinuous "warm" 
permafrost, which is the most likely to thaw in the coming 
decades. For example, the Alaska Intertie, a 138 kV 
transmission line connecting Fairbanks to the rest of the 
Railbelt region south of Healy, Alaska, is built across 170 
miles of warm permafrost (AEA 2014a, Wyman 2009). The 
line has suffered significant loss of permafrost along its 
right-of-way, resulting in frost heave (vertical lifting of piles 
due to freezing of water in the active layer soils) lifting pole 
foundations 3–6 feet and necessitating expensive repairs 
(Wyman 2009).  
Permafrost thaw, uneven settlement, and the risk of frost 
heave also affect rural distribution lines and interties. For 
example, AVEC is planning an intertie line for the 
communities of St. Mary, Pilot Station, and Mountain 
Village, located in areas of warm, discontinuous permafrost 
along approximately 30 miles of the Yukon River in western 
Alaska. To reduce the risk of frost heave, minimum pile 
depths of 40 feet are recommended (Duane Miller 
Associates 2009).  In Atmautluak, poles supporting the 
Village's distribution lines began to show signs of frost 
jacking and tipping due to permafrost thaw (Figure 9-9) 
(Atmautluak Traditional Council 2010).   
 
Figure 9-9. Overhead distribution lines in Atmautluak, Alaska 
Source: ADEC 2015 
In some rural communities threatened by erosion and 
coastal flooding, electrical distribution systems may also be 
vulnerable to these impacts. The combined effects of 
permafrost thaw and declining sea ice can increase wave 
height and storm surge during storms, and permafrost thaw 
can soften the soil, increasing erosion rates (Alaska AAG 
2010, USGCRP 2014). For example, beach erosion and 
 
Wildfires causing damage to power lines resulting in 
lengthy outages 
In May 2014, the Funny River fire burned through parts 
of the Kenai Peninsula (in the Railbelt region), leading 
the Homer Electric Association (HEA) to shut down a 
nearby transmission line, causing a widespread outage, 
and interrupting power to the incident command 
center responding to the fire (Kelly 2014). In 2007, 
another fire in the area caused HEA to shut down the 
transmission line connecting to the Bradley Lake 
Hydroelectric Plant (HEA 2007). 
Figure 9-8. Funny River fire threatening the Soldotna-Homer 
transmission line (in purple) on the Kenai Peninsula in 2014  
Source: Adapted from AFS 2014c 
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flooding enabled by a decrease in sea ice  threatens over 
one mile of Barrow's subterranean utility corridor, which 
carries power distribution lines (as well as water, 
wastewater, and television, telephone, and internet utility 
lines) throughout the community (BUECI 2015, GAO 2003). 
The frequency of avalanches is projected to increase 
throughout mountainous regions of Alaska as temperatures 
and precipitation increase (ACIA 2005, USFS 2010). 
Although power lines and other infrastructure are typically 
sited to avoid such hazards, a series of avalanches in April 
2008 near Juneau destroyed a mile-and-a-half section of the 
transmission line connecting the Snettisham Hydroelectric 
Project to the city (ACIA 2005, DOE 2008). Although diesel 
generators located in the city were able to provide 
sufficient back-up power, repairs to the line took over a 
month and a half. During that time, the emergency 
electricity rates were almost 500% higher than normal (DOE 
2008). 
While the influence of climate on flooding is complex and 
the specific effects of climate change on Alaska's rivers will 
vary across different regions and basins, a combination of 
projected changes to Alaska's hydrological systems may 
increase conditions favorable to flooding (ACIA 2005, 
USGCRP 2014). Projected increases in precipitation and 
glacial melt are likely to increase streamflows in Alaska's 
rivers (ADNR 2014, NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
Furthermore, accelerating glacial melt is associated with 
increased incidence of glacial outbursts, which may increase 
the risk of flooding, erosion and landslides, and associated 
damage downstream (IPCC 2014b). As glaciers retreat, 
frontal moraines can cause unstable glacial lakes to form in 
front of the glaciers, leading to increased risk of glacial lake 
outburst floods. Combined with increasing rainfall, the 





Measures to improve the resilience of new and existing 
electric transmission infrastructure include engineering 
structures to better withstand hazards—increased forest 
fire activity, thawing permafrost, and coastal erosion where 
relevant—as well as management practices to protect 
infrastructure from these hazards, and planning to improve 
resilience to grid outages. In many places, Alaska's electric 
grid is currently vulnerable to disruption, as many of 
Alaska's long-distance transmission lines and distribution 
interties operate without redundancy (AEA 2013b, AVEC 
2013). The AEA and many of Alaska's utilities are currently 
considering several plans to increase transmission 
redundancy (AEA 2013b, AVEC 2013, Lincoln 2014). 
Transmission expansion plans in the Railbelt region would 
increase the region's resilience to climate change impacts 
and other potential disruptions; however, reliability 
concerns must be balanced against the high cost of 
transmission infrastructure. For example, one study 
estimates that 230 kV lines cost $0.5–$1.5 million per mile, 
depending on conditions (NANA Pacific 2008). In rural 
regions, AVEC estimates a cost of $0.25–$0.45 million per 
mile for distribution interties (AVEC 2013).  
Practices to reduce transmission line vulnerability to 
wildfire include proactive vegetation management, 
especially in areas where ecosystems are transitioning to 
greater vegetation and wildfire risk (USGCRP 2014). By 
maintaining rights-of-way and trimming back encroaching 
trees and underbrush, utilities can minimize not only 
wildfire impacts on lines but also the likelihood of fires 
started by line strikes (DOE 2013). Since access to rights-of-
way can pose a problem to regular maintenance, expanded 
use of aerial trimming may also improve performance 
(Sheppard 2012, Wyman 2009).  
Uneven permafrost thaw, loss of soil support, and exposure 
to frost heave can be accounted for when designing new 
transmission line towers. The use of tower designs—such as 
the X-tower (Figure 9-10)—that can tolerate greater lateral 
movement of foundations can reduce the impact of 
differential settlement (Wyman 2009). Frost heave of 
power line poles and towers can be mitigated by designing 
future transmission lines with pile foundations that are 
sufficiently deep to counter frost heave forces (Wyman 
2009). While this increases the initial cost and may require 
a change in typical construction practices, this would avoid 
costly maintenance and repair of lines that would otherwise 
be necessary with shifting tower foundations (Wyman 
2009). Existing towers experiencing frost heave should be 
monitored, and when necessary, wood piles can be 
replaced with steel pipe or H-piles, which reduces heave 
forces (Atmautluak Traditional Council 2010, Polarconsult 
Alaska 2009). Additionally, for guyed towers, installation of 
breakable links can reduce the risk of compressive tower 
Flooding can knock out power in Alaska's population 
centers  
In 2006, following several days of intense precipitation, 
flooding on the Susitna River north of Anchorage 
washed out several 230 kV transmission towers 
connecting to the Beluga generating station. A week 
earlier, a tower on a parallel line also fell into the river, 
causing extended power outages (Chugach 2006). 
A sudden outburst of a glacial lake forming behind the 
front of the Mendenhall glacier in 2011 caused power 
outages and property damage in Juneau. By the 
summer of 2014, water had once again built up behind 
the front, leaving residents at risk (Forgey 2014). 
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failure when towers undergo heave (Polarconsult Alaska 
2009).  
For utility corridors, distribution lines, and other grid 
equipment threatened by erosion, resilience solutions can 
include installing protective barriers to slow the rate of 
erosion or relocate infrastructure. In Barrow, efforts to 
protect shoreline infrastructure and buildings have included 
beach nourishment, construction of berms, and the use of 
gabions and geotextile mats to harden the shoreline (USACE 
2007). Such measures can be costly; in Barrow, beach 
nourishment alone cost $28 million over a 10-year period 
(USACE 2007). In recent years, some of Barrow's vulnerable 
structures have been relocated due to the high cost of 
shoreline maintenance (USACE 2007).  
For localities in the Railbelt that are connected to the 
region's transmission grid and that rely on large, centralized 
power plants, the development of decentralized generation 
resources may also improve those communities’ ability to 
weather electric grid disruptions. Such resources can 
include traditional fossil-fired generators, as well as 
renewable resources that do not rely on fuel imports, 
including wind power, ocean energy, and locally sourced 




Construction plans for the Northern Intertie include 
resistance to permafrost thaw 
The Northern Intertie is a new long-distance 
transmission project that will increase capacity and 
resilience between the Fairbanks and Anchorage/Kenai 
regions by providing a second transmission corridor 
(AEA 2013b). The line runs 170 miles across extensive 
warm, discontinuous permafrost roughly parallel to the 
Alaska Intertie (AEA 2013b). By studying the existing 
Alaska Intertie's foundations, designers determined 
that permafrost thaw was likely and that the resulting 
exposure to annual freeze-thaw cycles would threaten 
the new project's foundations. The resulting design 
addressed these vulnerabilities by deploying flexible  
X-tower supports and driving the pile foundations much 
deeper than traditional design requirements; piles were 
driven a minimum of 36 feet and, in some cases, up to 
90 feet deep (Wyman 2009). 
Figure 9-10. The X-tower transmission line support, which 
allows greater lateral movement of tower foundations  
Source: AEA 2013c 
 
Distribution intertie lines can diversify power supplies 
and improve resilience in rural communities 
The communities of Tununak, Nightmute, and Toksook 
Bay on Nelson Island on the Bering Sea are connected 
by 23 miles of low-voltage intertie lines serving a 
population of about 1,200 people (AVEC 2013, REAP 
2010). These intertie projects allow the Alaska Village 
Electric Cooperative to interconnect generation 
resources and reduce costs (AVEC 2013, REAP 2010). 
Opportunities for additional interties may exist; of 
Alaska's 183 villages participating in the AEA's Power 
Cost Equalization program (which subsidizes rural 
electricity), only 27 operate electrical connections to 
another village (AVEC 2013).  
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Regional Climate Change Observations 
and Projections in Detail 
Higher Temperatures 
Historical observations 
 Average temperatures have increased 3°F since 1949: 
Although warming has occurred across Alaska and in all 
seasons, historical increases in temperature have been 
dominated by warming in the winter and spring seasons 
and have primarily occurred in Alaska's interior (NOAA 
2013, USGCRP 2014). 
 The growing season has lengthened by 45% in interior 
Alaska: Over the course of the last century, the growing 
season (average annual number of days between first 
and last freezing temperatures) in the interior of Alaska 
has grown longer, with most of the growth in the last 25 
years; in Fairbanks, the frost-free season has grown 2–3 
weeks since 1950 (NOAA 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
 Extremely cold temperatures have occurred less often, 
and extremely warm temperatures have occurred more 
often: Over the period 1950–2008, all observed weather 
stations in all regions of Alaska except the Southeast 
have showed increasing occurrence of the hottest 1% of 
days and a decreasing occurrence of the coldest 1% of 
days (NOAA 2013). 
Future projections 
 Average temperatures are projected to increase at a 
faster rate than elsewhere in the United States: By the 
end of this century (2070–2099) under a higher 
emissions scenario (A2), temperatures across Alaska are 
expected to increase 7.5°–13.5°F compared to 1971–
1999 levels, with the largest projected increases in the 
north and the smallest in the south (USGCRP 2014). 
 The growing season is projected to continue to expand: 
Across large parts of southwestern and interior Alaska, 
increases of 15–25 days are projected by 2060–2069 
(compared to 2010–2019), and in a large part of 
southwestern Alaska, the growing season lengthens to 
more than 200 days (NOAA 2013). 
 Spring thaw is projected to arrive earlier, and fall 
freezes are projected to occur later: Spring thaw over 
much of Alaska is projected to advance by 2–3 weeks by 
2090–2099, relative to 1961–1990. Along the western 
and northern shorelines, autumn freeze is delayed 40–
60 days as a consequence of sea ice loss (NOAA 2013).  
Increasing Precipitation and Changing Water 
Patterns 
Historical observations 
 Average annual precipitation has increased: Across the 
state, average annual precipitation has increased about 
10% over the period 1949–2005 (NOAA 2013). 
 Glaciers have retreated substantially across Alaska: 
Current rates of glacial mass loss from Alaska and British 
Columbia total 40–70 gigatons per year (USGCRP 2014). 
Future projections 
 Total annual precipitation is projected to increase 
across the state: In a higher emissions scenario, 
increases of 15%–35% are projected by 2070–2099 
(compared to 1971–1999), with larger increases in the 
north and interior, and smaller increases in the (already 
wet) south; under a lower emissions scenario, increases 
may range from 5% to 20% (NOAA 2013).  
 Seasonal changes are projected to be fairly consistent:  
Across the state, increases are projected in all seasons, 
with the largest increases in winter, and smaller but 
positive changes in all other seasons. Winter average 
annual precipitation is projected to increase an average 
of 30% under a higher emissions scenario, with spring, 
summer, and fall increases of 22%, 21%, and 24%, 
respectively (NOAA 2013). 
 Glaciers are expected to continue shrinking: Increasing 
temperatures are expected to drive continued glacial 
retreat, with glaciers that empty into the ocean at the 
highest risk (ACIA 2005, USGCRP 2014). 
Extreme Precipitation, Wildfires, and Sea Level Rise 
Historical observations 
 Wildfires have burned more acres: During the 2000s, an 
average of 1.9 million acres were burned by wildfires 
each year, an amount 50% higher than any previous 
decade since the 1940s (NOAA 2013).  
Future projections 
 Increasing fire activity is expected to continue in the 
future: Drying landscapes, as well as increases in 
vegetation, are expected to increase the risk of fire in 
the future (USGCRP 2014). 
 Permafrost temperatures are projected to increase, 
and permafrost thickness is expected to decline across 
the state: In zones of discontinuous and sporadic 
permafrost where temperatures are near freezing, 
increasing temperatures are expected to lead to loss of 
permafrost; in areas of continuous permafrost, warming 
temperatures are expected to lead to declines in 
permafrost layer thickness and increases in active soil 
layer thickness (ACIA 2005, USGCRP 2014).  
 The extent of sea ice is expected to decline 
substantially: By the end of the century, the extent of 
winter sea ice is expected to decline substantially, 
leaving much of Alaska's southwestern coastline on the 
Bering Sea ice-free. Summer sea ice may disappear 
completely before mid-century (ACIA 2005, USGCRP 
2014). 
 Relative sea level rise is not as severe in the region as 
elsewhere in the United States: Uplift across most of 
the Alaskan coastline and rebound from melting glaciers 
are countering the effects of sea level rise, meaning local 
sea levels are falling relative to land, although more 
research is needed for much of Alaska's coastline 
(Freymuller 2010). 
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10. Hawaii and Puerto Rico 
 
Overview  
Hawaii and Puerto Rico are the largest U.S. islands in population, 
size, and energy consumption.
1
 These islands are isolated from 
larger mainland energy supply networks, including pipelines, 
railroads, and transmission grids. Both are located in tropical 
climates—Hawaii in the Pacific Ocean and Puerto Rico in the 
Caribbean—and since they are critically reliant on coastal 
infrastructure, they are vulnerable to similar climate change impacts 
such as large storms and sea level rise. Key climate trends affecting 
the energy sector in the region include the following: 
 Atlantic hurricanes are projected to increase in intensity, and 
the most intense hurricanes are projected to occur more 
frequently. Pacific hurricane storm tracks are projected to shift 
toward Hawaii.
a
 Increasing hurricane intensity and frequency 
increases the risk of damage to energy infrastructure, 
disruptions to fuel shipments caused by coastal and inland 
flooding and erosion, wind and wave damage, and landslides.
b
  
 Average sea levels are projected to rise.c Rising sea levels 
increase storm surge flood stages and storm-driven waves, 
pushing coastal impacts further inland. Increasing sea levels also 
decrease the depth of freshwater lenses underlying islands, 




 Average temperatures are projected to increase over the 
course of the next century.
e
 Higher temperatures can reduce 
the efficiency of thermoelectric power plants and the capacity 
of transmission lines—especially on the hottest days—and 
cause damage to roads and power transformers, shortening the 
lifetime of critical energy infrastructure. Higher temperatures 
are also likely to increase demand for cooling energy.
f
 
Table 10-1: Examples of important energy sector vulnerabilities and climate resilience solutions in Hawaii and Puerto Rico 
Subsector Vulnerability Magnitude Illustrative Resilience Solutions 
Fuel Transport and 
Storage 
Coastal flooding and erosion; wave 
and wind damage to ports, ships, 
terminals, refineries and storage, 
bridges and roads; landslide and 
heat damage to roads
g
 
Hurricane Georges in 1998 destroyed 
three bridges and damaged roads 
costing $20 million; Hawaii’s Barbers 
Point Harbor, the primary interisland 
distribution fuel hub,  vulnerable to 
amplified tides and waves 
h
 
Building seawalls or natural buffer 
zones, hardening infrastructure to 
resist inundation, replacing 
equipment with submersible or 




Coastal plants vulnerable to flooding 
and structural damage from storms, 
sea level rise, and erosion
i
 
Majority of power plants vulnerable to 
sea level rise-enabled coastal flooding
j
 
Coastal hardening; increased, 
diversified, and distributed capacity 
Electric Grid Flooding, erosion, wave, and wind 
damage to towers and substations
k
 
Outages caused by Hurricane Georges 




Strengthened tower and substation 
designs, selective undergrounding of 
transmission and distribution lines 




Projected rise in average temperatures 
by 2.0°F–5.0°F in Hawaii
n
 and by 3.6°F–
9°F in Puerto Rico by 2100
o
 
Increased capacity, energy efficiency 
and load management measures 
                                                                
1
 Other U.S. islands located in the Pacific, including Guam, American Samoa, and Northern Marianas, are not examined in this report but are 
likely to have climate trends, energy sector vulnerabilities, and resilience solutions similar to those in Hawaii. Likewise, the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
located in the Caribbean, is not separately examined but is likely to have impacts and solutions similar to those in Puerto Rico. 
QUICK FACTS     
 
Hawaii Puerto Rico 
Population (2013) 
 
1,400,000  3,500,000 
Area (square miles) 
 
        10,932 5,325 
Annual energy expenditures $7.8 billion N/A* 
ENERGY SUPPLY AND  
DEMAND* Hawaii Puerto Rico 




Petroleum          million bbl 42 65 
Coal                       million tons 0.8 1.7 
Natural gas      bcf 2.7 48 












Petroleum 7,483 71% 2,181 
Coal 1,537 15% 203 
Renewables 1,039 10% 517 




Petroleum 13,000 65% 4,778 
Natural gas 3,600 18% 540 
Coal 3,200 16% 454 
Renewables 200 1% 224 




Petroleum ports (>200 tons/yr): 6 3 
Major power plants (> 1 MW): 43 15** 
*Annual energy expenditure for Puerto Rico is not available. 
** Includes only commercial plants. 
Notes: Energy data for Hawaii is from 2012. Energy data for Puerto Rico is from 
2013, except total generation data, which is from 2011. Electricity production by 
fuel is calculated based on both 2011 and 2013 data.  
Sources: EIA 2015a, EIA 2013b, EIA 2013c, PREPA 2013, US Census Bureau 2014a, 
US Census Bureau 2014b 
 
Chapter 10: Hawaii and Puerto Rico 
Climate Change and the Energy Sector  
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Regional Energy Sector Vulnerabilities 
and Resilience Solutions  
Key energy subsectors and illustrative examples of 
resilience solutions in Hawaii and Puerto Rico are discussed 
below. System components that are most vulnerable to 
climate change are described first.  
Fuel Transport and Storage 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
In both Hawaii and Puerto Rico, separation from the 
mainland’s ground transportation networks—including 
roads and railroads, electric grids, and pipelines—
necessitates that imported energy resources come via 
marine vessel. Imports of petroleum products include 
chiefly diesel, gasoline, and distillates, as they are the 
primary fuel types for electricity generation and 
transportation on the islands; but imports also include coal 
from barges and liquefied natural gas (LNG) both from 
tankers and in containerized form (EIA 2015a). 
Petroleum is the primary energy source for Hawaii and 
Puerto Rico (EIA 2015a). Both Hawaii and Puerto Rico 
receive large quantities of petroleum products at different 
types of ports, barge landings, and docks. At some sites, 
such as offloading docks for electricity generating stations, 
fuels are stored and consumed on location and require no 
secondary transportation once on the island. For example, 
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority’s (PREPA’s) largest 
power plant (Aguierre, located on Puerto Rico's 
southwestern coastline) receives both No. 2 and No. 6 fuel 
oils from barges via dedicated discharging docks and stores 
fuel on site for use in its boilers and turbines (PREQB 2008). 
Since the closing of the Cataño Refinery in 2009, Puerto 
Rico has no refining capacity and must import finished 
petroleum products. 
In Hawaii, unrefined crude oil is the primary petroleum 
import and is delivered to two refineries on Oahu. The 
refineries use offshore moorings to receive crude oil. 
Refined products that are used for transportation, heating, 
and electricity generation are transported from these 
refineries to downtown Honolulu via a 10-mile 
underground pipeline (OMPO 2011). Petroleum products 
are also loaded onto barges for transport to other fuel ports 
across the state (OMPO 2011). Hawaii's refineries supply 
feedstocks for the state's synthetic natural gas processing 
plant that converts naphtha to methane, and the facilities 
distribute this natural gas to commercial and residential 
customers via a pipeline distribution system (EIA 2015a). 
This system is also being supplemented by small imports of 
containerized LNG (EIA 2015a). 
Relatively little natural gas is used in Puerto Rico and 
Hawaii. Puerto Rico imports natural gas for electricity 
production via LNG tankers at EcoEléctrica's Peñuelas LNG 
terminal and regasification facility located on Guayanilla 
Bay on the island's southern coast. Because of the 
historically high cost of petroleum relative to other fuels, 
PREPA is planning to convert several of its oil-fired turbines 
to use natural gas, requiring an expansion of the island's 
LNG import capacity (EIA 2015a). PREPA is planning a new 
LNG import terminal to serve its 1,500 MW Aguierre power 
plant on the island's southeastern coast, and the power 
company is considering using either pipelines or a second 
LNG import terminal to access its power plants on the 
northern coast (EIA 2015a). Containerized LNG is also 
imported for small industrial purposes (Crowley 2014, EIA 
2015a).   
After fuel is shipped to the islands, it is primarily 
transported via roads, as railroads are not commonly used 
in Hawaii or Puerto Rico. Other less common forms of non-
road energy transport include conveyors and pipelines. For 
example, on Oahu, coal offloaded for the AES-Barbers Point 
power plant is carried via a 1.6-mile elevated, enclosed 
conveyor belt (OMPO 2011). 
Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on fuel transport and storage in Hawaii and Puerto Rico: 
 Rising sea levels, combined with increasing frequency 
of the most intense hurricanes in the Atlantic (and a 
possible increase in the number of Pacific hurricanes 
affecting Hawaii), increase the risk of flooding-, 
erosion-, wave-, and wind-related damage to coastal 
fuel transport and storage infrastructure such as roads, 
ports, landings and docks, and storage tanks (API 2014, 
DOE 2013, Murakami et al. 2013, PRCCC 2013b, 
USGCRP 2014).  
 Increasing frequency of intense North Atlantic 
hurricanes and a shift in the track of Pacific hurricanes 
toward the Hawaiian Islands increases the risk of 
disruption to shipping from storms impacting 
navigation (Murakami et al. 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
 Increasing occurrence of extreme precipitation, Pacific 
hurricanes, and increasing rainfall from Atlantic 
hurricanes may contribute to more frequent inland 
flooding and landslides (especially in the spring), 
potentially damaging roads, bridges, and energy 
infrastructure (Murakami et al. 2013, PRCCC 2013a, 
PRCCC 2013b). 
 Increasing temperatures, including more intense and 
longer-lasting heat waves, soften asphalt and may 
contribute to additional damage to island roads 
important for fuel transport (PRCCC 2013a, PRCCC 
2013b). 
Coastal flooding poses a major challenge to the energy 
infrastructure of island communities. In Puerto Rico, major 
coastal flooding is typically associated with storm surge and 
high wave action brought by hurricanes, but can also be 
caused by other storms. In Hawaii, tropical cyclones are also 
dangerous causes of coastal flooding, and evidence 
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suggests that a northward shift in Pacific cyclone tracks 
could expose Hawaii to more frequent hurricane impacts 
(Murakami et al. 2013). In the Atlantic, research suggests a 
roughly two-fold increase in the occurrence of Category 4 
and 5 hurricanes by the end of the century (Bender et al. 
2010). Additionally, rising sea levels can magnify the effects 
of storm surge flooding by creating a higher baseline for 
flood stages (USGCRP 2014). For both Hawaii and Puerto 
Rico, coastal flooding threatens to disrupt and damage 
important coastal infrastructure, including roads, bridges, 
ports, docks, and storage tanks (OMPO 2011, PRCCC 
2013b). Flooding can shut down port operations and cause 
structural damage to docks, buildings, and heavy machinery 
necessary for loading and unloading fuels (OMPO 2011, 
PRCCC 2013b). For example, the seaport in Arecibo, Puerto 
Rico, currently experiences regular problems with flooding 
because of its exposure to high-energy waves (PRCCC 
2013b). Rising sea levels will likely intensify flooding, 
pushing storm surge and storm waves farther inland 
(USGCRP 2014). Similarly, Barbers Point Harbor in Kalaeloa, 
Hawaii, is vulnerable to amplified tides and waves due to 
seiches (OMPO 2011). This harbor is used for offloading 
coal for AES-Barbers Point, as well as loading petroleum 
products from the Barbers Point refineries (OMPO 2011). 
Because of its importance to the island's energy supply, 
disruptions to the harbor's ability to load and offload fuels 
could disrupt energy systems and have severe implications 
for the state's economy (OMPO 2011).  
As with fuel transfer facilities at ports, the loading and 
unloading docks used by island power plants and refineries 
are vulnerable to damage and disruption from coastal 
flooding. All of Puerto Rico's major power plants use on-
site docks to bring fuel to their facilities. Studies have 
identified six of the territory's power plants as vulnerable to 
flooding, with the 602 MW oil-fired Palo Seco and the 220 
MW dual-fuel Mayagüez power plants being most 
vulnerable (Figure 10-1) (PRCCC 2013b, PREPA 2013). 
 
 
Figure 10-1. PREPA's Palo Seco Power Plant on Puerto Rico's 
northern coast 
Source: EPA 2012 
Coastal flooding can also disrupt and damage roads and 
bridges, which are key transportation links in island energy 
systems. Flooding can inundate roads, blocking access to 
fuel ports and preventing fuel deliveries to power plants. 
Erosion caused by heightened wave activity can damage 
bridges and may require that existing bridges be raised. Of 
the 240 bridges in Puerto Rico's coastal zones, 30 are 
potentially vulnerable to coastal flooding (PRCCC 2013b). In 
1998, flooding from Hurricane Georges did a total of $21 
million in damages to roadways in Puerto Rico and led to 
the destruction of three bridges (PRCCC 2013b). In Honolulu 
Harbor, Hawaii, sea level rise and increased storm surge 
projected for 2100 could have combined impacts that 
expose harbor access roads and bridges to inundation and 
erosion, potentially disrupting fuel supplies (OMPO 2011). 
Coastal flooding can damage and disrupt the operation of 
refineries and fuel storage tanks (PRCCC 2013b). Refinery 
buildings, structures, and storage tanks can be damaged by 
waves and salt water inundation; and storage tanks can be 
lifted if their containment berms are breached (DOE 2010). 
Analysis of flood impacts at the Chevron refinery on Barbers 
Point in Oahu found that three feet of sea level rise would 
expose the refinery to significant flooding vulnerabilities; 
this is within the 1–4 foot range projected by the end of the 
century (OMPO 2011, USGCRP 2014). While Puerto Rico has 
no refining facilities, fuel tanks at several airports, including 
the Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport and the Isla 
Grande Airport, are at risk from sea level rise (PRCCC 
2013b). Additionally, coastal flooding can damage 
underground fuel storage tanks in low-lying areas such as 
those used by gas stations (PRCCC 2013b). 
 
Hurricanes can disrupt shipping by preventing navigation 
for several days at a time. The increased intensity and 
frequency of the most intense hurricanes in the Atlantic, 
Roads as critical energy corridors 
The Farrington Highway on Hawaii's most populous 
island, Oahu, is the only road connecting the 45,000 
residents of the Waianae Coast to the rest of the 
island's communities and infrastructure (OMPO 2011). 
The 18-mile two-lane highway runs along the coast and 
has historically seen closures due to both coastal and 
inland flooding, downed utility poles, and other 
emergencies. Furthermore, some segments of the 
highway are being undercut by erosion. Projected 
increases to sea level and storm surges will exacerbate 
these problems, and the highway is classified as “high 
vulnerability” by the Oahu Metropolitan Planning 
Organization (OMPO 2011). Collapse or other damage 
to the Farrington Highway could cut off entire 
communities from fuels and other critical supplies 
(OMPO 2011). 
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and the possibly of more hurricanes affecting Hawaii, may 
threaten the ability of fuel barges to make critical deliveries. 
While large power plants typically have stockpiles of fuel, 
shipping disruptions combined with damage to port 
facilities may compound the risks to fuel transport posed by 
severe weather events. For example, Puerto Rico's largest 
generating station, the oil-fired Aguierre Power Plant, 
typically receives fuel deliveries once every three days, but 
it does have on-site capacity to store approximately 36 days 
of fuel for typical operations
2
 (PREPA 2013). 
Wind impacts resulting from hurricanes can affect a variety 
of transportation and storage infrastructure, including large 
storage tanks and elevated facilities (API 2014, OMPO 2011, 
PRCCC 2013b). The elevated, enclosed conveyor belt used 
to transport coal inland to the AES-Barbers Point coal plant 
may be susceptible to wind damage, as may container port 
cranes necessary for the loading and offloading of fuel 
products (OMPO 2011).   
Inland flooding and landslides may pose a risk to Puerto 
Rico's roads, bridges, and ports, as some climate models 
project significant increases in the intensity of hurricane-
related extreme precipitation events in the springtime 
(PRCCC 2013a). Several ports in Puerto Rico already 
experience regular river flooding, including the Pan 
American dock in San Juan and the Port of Ponce (PRCCC 
2013b). Landslides occur when bursts of heavy rainfall 
destabilize the soil on sloped terrain, and in Puerto Rico, 
they are a significant source of damage to property, 
including roads (Figure 10-2) (PRCCC 2013b). For example, 
heavy storms in May and June of 2011 led to landslides and 
extensive road and bridge damage in parts of Puerto Rico. A 
state of emergency was declared, and almost $6 million was 
requested to repair damage to roads and bridges (FEMA 
2011). 
 
Figure 10-2. Severe storms and flooding swept away roads and 
bridges in Barranquitas, Puerto Rico 
Source: FEMA 2010 
                                                                
2
 These shipments deliver 780,000 barrels of residual fuel oil, and 
consumption is around 21,700 barrels per day (PREPA 2013). 
Over a long period of time, warmer temperatures may also 
affect roads. Higher temperatures weaken asphalt, and 
continuous use at elevated temperatures can reduce 
roadway lifetimes. On the islands, where roads are crucial 
fuel transport links, the reliability of road infrastructure is 
essential. Use of roadways during periods of elevated 
temperatures—especially during prolonged heat waves—
may lead to cracking and rutting, requiring more frequent 
and costly maintenance and eventually earlier replacement 
of road surfaces (PRCCC 2013b).  
Fuel Transport and Storage 
Resilience Solutions 
Enhancing resilience to coastal flooding and erosion 
requires either relocation or hardening of existing assets, as 
well as planning to ensure that future investments are 
designed in anticipation of the range of possible future 
impacts (DOE 2013). Hardening of assets can involve 
constructing seawalls to reduce erosion, enclosing 
equipment in submersible cases, replacement with 
submersible equipment, or raising infrastructure above 
projected flood stages (DOE 2013). Relocation of assets 
inland or to higher elevation coastlines can increase 
resilience to flooding and erosion, but the practice is 
contingent on local geography and may not be a feasible or 
cost-effective option for large facilities with significant 
dedicated infrastructure.  
Harbor facilities such as docks, access roads, storage areas, 
and tanks may be raised in anticipation of higher flood 
stages, and vegetative buffer zones may be used to reduce 
flooding and erosion. For example, an open vegetative area 
on the southern (ocean-facing) shore of Sand Island in 
Honolulu Harbor may act as a buffer zone for both erosion 
and flooding of infrastructure in Hawaii's largest port 
(OMPO 2011). In cases in which infrastructure is destroyed 
and must be rebuilt, replacement facilities can incorporate 
hardening measures into new designs. Following Hurricane 
Georges in 1998, the damaged Río Tallaboa Bridge was 
heightened to avoid future damage from coastal flooding 
(PRCCC 2013b). Sea walls are a likely hardening option for 
large facilities that may not be economically raised or 
relocated. Sea walls can stabilize or stop erosion and can 
provide protection from storm surge flooding (O'Connell 
2009). However, sea walls may also carry negative side 
effects: hardening of Hawaii's shorelines have contributed 
to the loss or narrowing of 24% of Oahu's natural sandy 
beaches—a crucial economic asset for the state (O'Connell 
2009).  
For many climate impacts, including damage to roads from 
increased heat, landslides, and wind, improved planning 
and designs may be the most effective means of reducing 
vulnerabilities. As roads damaged by flooding are replaced, 
new routes, designs, and innovative materials may be 
considered.  
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Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Hawaii and Puerto Rico share several commonalities 
between their respective fleets of power plants. As the 
islands have no domestic fossil fuel production, they must 
rely on imports of fuels to operate their baseload 
thermoelectric power generation. Most of the power plants 
use ocean water for cooling, while the remainder typically 
use recirculating cooling systems to reduce their reliance on 




Figure 10-3. Share of energy consumption by fuel (2012) 
Source: EIA 2014 
Historically, U.S. islands have relied on petroleum as their 
primary energy source, including as a fuel for electricity 
generation (Figure 10-3) (EIA 2014). Petroleum-fired power 
plants include both traditional steam boilers burning 
residual fuel oil and combustion turbines/combined-cycle 
plants burning distillates (EIA 2013c). Hawaii and Puerto 
Rico each have one coal-fired power plant: AES-Barbers 
point, on the Hawaiian island of Oahu, and AES-Puerto Rico 
in Guayama (Hawaiian Electric 2013, PREPA 2013). Puerto 
Rico also hosts a 540 MW natural gas-fired combined-cycle 
power plant, EcoEléctrica, which is fueled by an on-site LNG 
receiving terminal (PREPA 2013). PREPA purchases power 
from EcoEléctrica, and in 2013, PREPA converted two units 
of its nearby Costa Sur generating station to dual-fuel firing, 
capable of burning oil or natural gas purchased from 
EcoEléctrica's terminal (PREPA 2013). PREPA is planning to 
convert additional petroleum-fired power plants to dual-
fuel capability, starting with the 1,500 MW Aguierre power 
plant, following construction of additional LNG import 
capacity (EIA 2015a, PREPA 2013). In Hawaii, Hawaiian 
Electric Company and its subsidiaries (“Hawaiian Electric,” 
the state's primary utility, which serves approximately 95% 
of Hawaii's residents) are also considering a future energy 
plan that would convert many petroleum-fired power 
plants to also use natural gas (Hawaiian Electric 2013, 
Hawaiian Electric 2014, Hawaiian Electric 2015a). Hawaiian 
Electric's preferred energy plan would see petroleum use 
fall dramatically by 2017, and the AES-Barbers Point coal 
plant would switch to 50% biomass co-firing (Hawaiian 
Electric 2014). 
Use of renewables is increasing in Hawaii. In 2012, wind, 
geothermal, biomass, and some hydroelectric and solar 
produced approximately 10% of Hawaii's electricity (EIA 
2013a). Puerto Rico uses relatively few renewable 
generators, with 224 MW of installed renewable capacity 
producing approximately one percent of the island's total 
power (PREPA 2013, EIA 2015a).  
Figure 10-4. Locations of large electricity generation facilities in 
Hawaii (2005) 
Data source: UCS 2012 
The bulk of Hawaii’s and Puerto Rico’s electric power 
generation infrastructure is concentrated in low-lying, 
coastal areas (Figure 10-4 and Figure 10-5) (EIA 2015a, 
PRCCC 2013b). On the island of Oahu (with Hawaii's largest 
population), the Kalaeloa/Barbers Point area hosts nine 
power plants, including the island's largest, alongside two 
refineries. The Kalaeloa coastal plain is 9–12 feet above 
mean sea level (OMPO 2011). In Puerto Rico, several 
generating stations are located near the coast, including the 
AES-PR and PREPA Aguierre power plants in the southeast 
and the PREPA Costa Sur and Ecoeléctrica plants outside 
Ponce (PREPA 2013).  
Figure 10-5. Locations of large electricity generation facilities and 
major transmission lines in Puerto Rico (2012) 
Data source: PREPA 2013 
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Climate change is projected to have the following impacts 
on electric power generation in Hawaii and Puerto Rico: 
 Increasing hurricane intensity and frequency of the 
most intense hurricanes in the Atlantic, as well as a 
possible increase in the frequency of hurricanes 
affecting Hawaii, may increase the vulnerability of 
coastal power plants to damage and disruption from 
sea level rise-enhanced storm surge flooding, 
heightened wave action, and wind damage (DOE 2013, 
Murakami et al. 2013, OMPO 2011, PRCCC 2013b, 
USGCRP 2014). 
 Salt water intrusion caused by sea level rise, increases 
in evaporation rates, and changes in precipitation (in 
Puerto Rico) may decrease the availability of fresh 
water for cooling of thermoelectric power plants in 
Hawaii and Puerto Rico (DOE 2013, IPCC 2014, PRCCC 
2013b, USGCRP 2014). 
 Higher temperatures may reduce the efficiency of 
thermoelectric power plants and diminish the peak 
capacity of island electricity systems (DOE 2013). 
Hurricanes pose a considerable threat to island energy 
infrastructure, including power plants. Associated heavy 
rainfall and storm surge can cause coastal flooding that 
forces shutdowns, disrupts generation, and damages and 
destroys electrical equipment by inundating it with 
saltwater. Wind, wave action, and erosion can also cause 
structural damage (DOE 2013). Because many power plants 
in Hawaii and Puerto Rico are located close to the ocean, 
coastal flooding can threaten a significant share of an 
island’s electric generating capacity in a single event. For 
example, on Hawaii's populous island of Oahu, hurricanes 
are historically the most damaging natural events (City and 
County of Honolulu 2012). The large concentration of 
energy infrastructure along the coast increases Oahu's 
vulnerability to winds, flooding, erosion, and wave damage 
from tropical cyclones (Figure 10-6). For example, nine 
power plants clustered in the low-lying area around 
Kalaeloa/Barbers Point represent almost 70% of the island's 
generating capacity (OMPO 2011). Similarly, models 
simulating 643 historical storm tracks in the vicinity of Oahu 
and Kauai (including Category 2, 3, and 4 storms) have 
shown that in the worst-case scenario (direct impact of a 
Category 4 hurricane), much of Honolulu would be 
inundated by a combination of storm surge and wave force 
(Kennedy et al. 2012). A total of 61% of the electric power 
generation facilities in Oahu are located within the 
inundation zone of a Category 4 hurricane (FEMA 2009). 
The electric power sector and the fuel transport 
infrastructure are often interdependent systems (DOE 
2013). In Hawaii and Puerto Rico, several important fuel 
supply facilities and power plants are co-located in coastal 
industrial areas (OMPO 2011, DISUR 2012). Because these 
assets often have low levels of redundancy (OMPO 2011), 
the direct impact of a hurricane has high potential for 
affecting these assets simultaneously, further elevating the 
risk that damage or disruption to one of the energy 
subsectors will cascade into the other. 
 
Figure 10-6. Hawaiian Electric Company power plant at Kahe 
Point in West Oahu 
Source: Zamuda 2015 
Climate change is projected to contribute to the increasing 
scarcity of freshwater on islands. Local freshwater scarcity 
for power plants can be caused by intrusion of salt water 
into fresh water reservoirs, increased evaporation of 
surface water due to higher temperatures and, in Puerto 
Rico, projected declines in future precipitation (PRCCC 
2013a, USGCRP 2014).
3
 Disruptive changes in water 
availability can impact power plants; if reduced surface 
water availability affects power plant intakes, or if saltwater 
intrusion fouls power plant wells, finding a new source of 
water could prove expensive.  
Almost 30% of Hawaii's electricity generating capacity relies 
on freshwater for cooling (UCS 2012). These power plants 
employ recirculating cooling systems, and the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS) estimates freshwater withdrawals 
for thermoelectric power production to be approximately 
3% of total withdrawals (USGS 2005). The rest of the state's 
power plants use either ocean water or dry cooling systems 
(UCS 2012). In Puerto Rico, all six of PREPA's baseload 
power plants use some freshwater for cooling; however, 
the USGS estimates that freshwater withdrawals in Puerto 
Rico for thermoelectric power production represent less 
than 1% of total water withdrawals (USGS 2005). 
Projected increases in temperature for the island regions 
are relatively mild compared to other places in the United 
States; however, even incremental increases in 
temperature reduce the efficiency of combustion turbine 
                                                                
3
 Precipitation models for the Caribbean are uncertain compared 
to other regions, but indicate decreasing precipitation over the 
course of this century (PRCCC 2013c, USGCRP 2014). 
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power plants (DOE 2013, NOAA 2013, PRCCC 2013a). While 
the changes in power output are small (less than a 1% 
reduction for every 2°F increase in temperature), they could 
have significant impacts on the electricity supply system, 
particularly during heat waves, if losses in capacity are not 
offset by greater supplies elsewhere or by reduced demand 
(DOE 2013). Because capacity reductions due to efficiency 
reductions are largest when temperatures are highest, 
increasing peak temperatures reduce a power plant’s 
effective peaking capacity at the same time that demand 
for cooling energy peaks (see Energy Demand section).  
Thermoelectric Power Generation 
Resilience Solutions 
Because of the dependence of both Hawaii and Puerto Rico 
on coastal power plants, resilience to damage and 
destruction from hurricanes may be improved through an 
array of strategies that involve protecting against high 
winds, storm surge, coastal erosion, and flooding. These 
include engineering improvements to structures, installing 
or enhancing sea walls and other barriers, and relocating or 
elevating facilities such as fuel storage tanks and unloading 
docks. Additionally, site selection and design of new power 
plants and support facilities (including future LNG import 
terminals and gasification facilities) can incorporate 
projected rather than historic coastal flooding heights, wind 
speeds, and wave energy projections. For example, a new 
27 MW utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) project in Loiza, 
Puerto Rico, was completed in 2013. Located in a hurricane-
prone area, the elevated solar array was designed to resist 
damage from both flooding and high winds (TSK Group 
2013).  
Electricity system resilience can also increase through 
diversification of the generation fuel mix to include local 
renewable resources, such as biomass, solar PV, or onshore 
wind turbines that are located inland and do not rely on 
fuel transportation infrastructure. Because electricity 
generation in Puerto Rico and Hawaii relies primarily on 
imported petroleum, electricity prices are much higher than 
in the continental United States (Figure 10-7). In recent 
years, high oil prices and low natural gas prices have 
provided a strong economic incentive for islands to diversify 
fuel sources for electric power generation. An increasingly 
diverse fuel mix that includes renewables (such as locally-
sourced biomass) will provide islands with improved 
resilience to climate change-related disruptions in 
petroleum supply. Furthermore, due to the high price of 
electricity on the islands, renewable technologies are much 
more likely to be cost competitive with incumbent 
generators. Both the Hawaiian and Puerto Rican 
governments have policies intended to help transition their 
respective fuel mixes to include larger shares of 
renewables. Hawaii has Renewable Portfolio Standards with 
a 40% target by 2030 and a 100% target by 2045, and 
Puerto Rico has a 20% goal for 2035 (EIA 2015b, Hawaiian 
Electric 2015b, PRGEF 2015).  
 
Figure 10-7. Average residential electricity prices (2012)  
(*Puerto Rico data is from 2011) 
Data source: Adapted from EIA 2014 
Puerto Rico is focusing on wind, solar, and waste-to-energy 
projects to meet its renewable portfolio standard. More 
than 400 MW of solar PV and 250 MW of wind are in 
development (EIA 2015a). Studies so far show Puerto Rico 
has limited potential for large-scale wind projects, but has 
taken advantage of the tropical sun and become a leader in 
distributed solar applications, including solar hot water 
heaters and PV (Figure 10-8). No municipal solid waste or 
other waste-to-energy facilities have yet been built, but 
PREPA has signed more than a dozen power purchase 
agreements with developers. Puerto Rico is exploring the 
use of biofuels, primarily those derived from agricultural 
wastes, and investigating ocean energy technologies. 
However, PREPA faces financial barriers to making large 
investments in new resilience measures, as existing debts 
may constrain its financing. 
  
Figure 10-8. A 286 kW solar PV installation at an industrial site in 
Puerto Rico sells excess power to the grid 
Source: USDA 2012 
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Because most island power plants already use saline 
sources for cooling water or employ recirculating systems, 
the power generation sectors in Hawaii and Puerto Rico 
may be more resilient to potential water scarcity in the 
future than U.S. mainland power plants. However, 
implementation of advanced hybrid/dry cooling systems 
that can operate with minimum cooling water could be 
considered for future thermoelectric capacity to avoid 
freshwater availability concerns. 
Reductions in peaking capacity caused by higher 
temperatures can be addressed through the addition of 
new capacity (discussed above) and through demand 
reduction measures (See Electricity Demand section).  
Electric Grid 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
The electric transmission and distribution systems of Hawaii 
and Puerto Rico are isolated from wider electricity grids, 
and the use of submarine interconnections between islands 
is limited. The majority of transmission and distribution 
lines on the islands are aboveground with limited 
undergrounding of lines.  
Puerto Rico’s electric grid is operated by PREPA, a 
government-owned corporation, and consists of 
approximately 1,100 miles of 230 kV and 115 kV lines and 
45 transmission substations that provide the grid's 
backbone and sectionalize the island into three main loops. 
In the San Juan area, 35 miles of 115 kV lines have been 
undergrounded (PREPA 2013). PREPA operates a 38 kV 
subtransmission network, primarily in and around load 
centers but also to serve remote communities in the 
island's interior. The 38 kV grid also includes 55 miles of 
submarine transmission cables connecting the main island's 
grid with the islands of Vieques and Culebra (PREPA 2013). 
PREPA's distribution grid comprises 333 distribution 
substations and approximately 31,500 miles of distribution 
lines, including approximately 1,900 miles of underground 
distribution lines, primarily in urban areas (PREPA 2013).  
In Hawaii, none of Hawaiian Electric's five island grids are 
interconnected; each island operates an independent grid 
connecting local generation to load (Hawaiian Electric 
2013). As part of its integrated resource planning process, 
Hawaiian Electric has considered interconnections between 
Oahu, Maui, and Hawaii as a solution to reduce long-run 
costs; however, no submarine lines are currently used in 
the state (Hawaiian Electric 2013).  
Climate change may increase the vulnerability of the 
electric grid in Hawaii and Puerto Rico in the following 
ways: 
 Increasing hurricane intensity and frequency of the 
most intense hurricanes in the North Atlantic, and a 
possible shift in Pacific hurricane tracks toward Hawaii, 
will put electric transmission and distribution 
infrastructure at increased risk of damage and 
disruption from coastal flooding and erosion, wave, and 
wind damage (DOE 2013, Murakami et al. 2013, PRCCC 
2013b, USGCRP 2014).  
 Rising sea levels will magnify the impacts of storm 
surge and wave action and increase risk of inundation 
of low-lying coastal infrastructure such as switchyards 
and transmission and distribution substations (OMPO 
2011, PRCCC 2013b, PREPA 2013, USGCRP 2014). 
 Increasing temperatures reduce grid capacity and may 
shorten the expected lifetime of transformers (Bérubé 
et al. 2007, DOE 2013, USBR 2000). 
Hawaiian Electric supplies power to about 95% of Hawaii’s 
population and owns about 3,000 miles of transmission and 
distribution lines, of which about 60% are aboveground 
(Hawaiian Electric 2015a). Almost all of the transmission 
and distribution circuit mileage in Puerto Rico's electricity 
system is aboveground (PREPA 2013). Historically, tropical 
storms have caused major damage and disruption to the 
Hawaiian and Puerto Rican electric grids (see sidebar: 
Hurricanes in Hawaii and Puerto Rico). Wind and torrential 
downpours threaten overhead transmission lines by causing 
direct structural damage to poles and transmission towers, 
damaging or breaking conductors, and increasing the risk of 
lines being downed by fallen trees and vegetation (DOE 
2013). Inland flooding associated with extreme 
precipitation events can erode riverbanks and uproot 
power poles. Coastal flooding, amplified by sea level rise, 
can inundate substations, transmission centers, and 
switching yards (DOE 2013, PREPA 2013). Destructive waves 
from storms, heightened by sea level rise, can also erode 
protective shorelines and cause structural damage to grid 
infrastructure located along the coast. Furthermore, the 
risks presented by climate change to Puerto Rico's grid 
could complicate ongoing efforts to address existing 
challenges in the island’s electric power system, including 
reliability issues, system security margins, voltage stability, 
and transmission losses (DISUR 2012). 
 
Hurricanes and the electric grid  
 Hawaii: In 1992, Hurricane Iniki knocked out power to 
80% of Kauai residents for four weeks. Iniki destroyed a 
quarter of the island’s electric transmission poles and a 
third of its distribution poles (Sommer 2002). 
 Puerto Rico: Recent hurricanes have caused a 
combined $336 million in damages to the Puerto Rican 
electric power system, including $36 million in 1996 
(Hortense), $240 million in 1998 (Georges), and $60 
million in 2004 (Jeanne) (PREPA 2013). Hurricane 
Georges resulted in power loss for 96% of Puerto Rico’s 
customers and at least half of the island’s electrical 
poles and cables were damaged (PRCCC 2013b). 
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Increases in average and peak temperatures can also affect 
the capacity and lifetime of transmission and distribution 
components (Bérubé et al. 2007, DOE 2013). At higher 
temperatures, transmission wires sag, increasing the risk of 
arcing between conductors, or to other objects such as 
trees. In order to reduce the risk of line outages, operators 
reduce the current carrying capacity of transmission lines 
on very hot days, typically when peak capacity is most 
needed (DOE 2013). Traditional power transformers can 
also be damaged by operating at elevated temperatures, 
requiring earlier replacement and higher costs (Bérubé et 
al. 2007, USBR 2000). Although projected temperature 
increases in Hawaii and Puerto Rico are moderate 
compared to other regions, current temperatures in these 
island regions are already elevated relative to most U.S. 
mainland locations, so even small increases in ambient 
temperatures could have significant impacts on transformer 
lifetime (Bérubé et al. 2007, Hashmi et al. 2013, NOAA 
2013, PRCCC 2013a). 
Electric Grid 
Resilience Solutions 
The resilience of island electric grids can be improved by 
building redundant and sectionalized circuits for rural areas 
to prevent widespread outages on backbone lines; by 
hardening structures including towers, conductors, and 
transformers; by undergrounding critical grid corridors; and 
by exploring the use of distributed generation capacity 
where feasible.  
Installing transmission and distribution lines underground 
can protect them from wind impacts. Although the cost of 
undergrounding lines is high, selective undergrounding can 
help protect critical corridors to maintain system stability in 
an emergency. For example, following the devastation of 
Hurricane Georges in 1998, PREPA undergrounded 28 miles 
of San Juan’s 115 kV transmission lines, as well as a 
significant number of distribution lines, to improve the 
resilience of the city’s transmission and distribution grid to 
future hurricanes, tropical storms, and other disruptions 
(Figure 10-9) (PREPA 2013). These undergrounded lines are 
designed to maintain service to the city's central business 
district in the event that overhead lines are lost (PREPA 
2013).  
Hawaiian Electric is already deploying many projects that 
will improve Hawaii’s grid resilience. Hawaii's utilities are 
acting on a strategy to further lower electricity prices, 
increase integration of the state's renewable resources, 
harden infrastructure against tsunamis or hurricanes, and 
increase the flexibility and redundancy of grid operations 
under emergency conditions (Hawaiian Electric 2013). For 
example, to protect its grid operations from the impacts of 
a tsunami, Maui Electric (a subsidiary utility of Hawaiian 
Electric) is planning to move its central dispatch center to 
higher ground outside of the anticipated inundation zone 
(Hawaiian Electric 2013). This step will have the added 
benefit of avoiding the potential coastal flooding associated 
with a hurricane. The City of Honolulu is proposing an array 
of projects to improve resilience to impacts of future 
hurricanes: hardening above-ground utility assets, 
increasing electric power generation capacity, and 
integrating new topographic wind speed maps into 
electricity distribution infrastructure planning (City and 
County of Honolulu 2012). 
 
Figure 10-9. PREPA's underground 115 kV transmission system 
for San Juan, Puerto Rico 
Source: PREPA 2013 
Connecting island grids to larger networks may also 
improve grid resilience by providing operators with greater 
flexibility if generation assets are lost or if portions of the 
grid must be sectionalized. In Puerto Rico, proposals to 
connect the island's grid to other Caribbean islands have 
been suggested (VIWAPA 2011). Similarly, Hawaiian Electric 
has considered a number of scenarios using interisland grid 
interconnections to increase resilience and decrease long-
run system costs (Hawaiian Electric 2013).  
Electricity Demand 
Subsector Vulnerabilities 
Electricity demand in Hawaii is driven by economic and 
population growth, both of which have outpaced the 
mainland (US Census Bureau 2014a, Hawaiian Electric 
2013). In Puerto Rico, the population is shrinking, and the 
economy has struggled to return to pre-recession growth; 
however PREPA projects that growth in electricity demand 
will outpace the national average by 2017 (EIA 2015a, 
PREPA 2013). 
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Climate change is projected to affect electricity demand in 
the following way: 
 Increasing temperatures are likely to increase power 
demand for air conditioning, which could have 
implications for electricity reliability if such increases in 
demand are not compensated by increased supplies or 
reduced demand elsewhere in the system (DOE 2013). 
Both Hawaii and Puerto Rico have tropical climates 
moderated by influences from the ocean, with fewer 
extremes in seasonal temperatures than most other regions 
of the United States. For example, the warmest month in 
Hawaii is August, with an average temperature of 78°F; the 
coolest month is February, with an average temperature of 
72°F (NOAA 2013). Average temperatures in Hawaii and 
Puerto Rico are projected to increase as a result of climate 
change: 2°F–5°F by the end of the century in Hawaii and 
3.6°F–9°F in Puerto Rico (NOAA 2013, PRCCC 2013c). Higher 
temperatures are likely to increase electricity system loads, 
which may cause both Hawaii and Puerto Rico to face 
electricity supply constraints. 
Most homes in Hawaii and Puerto Rico use air conditioning, 
so an increase in air temperature will likely drive an 
increase in the energy use of existing air conditioners, an 
increase in the hours of operation, or both (Champagne et 
al. 2010, PNNL 2008). In Puerto Rico, for example, most air 
conditioners are in operation between 7 and 12 hours a day 
(Champagne et al. 2010). Without demand management, 
improvements in air conditioner energy efficiency, or new 
generation capacity, increasing use of air conditioning may 
increase power sector vulnerability to service disruptions. 
Population growth is also a significant factor in total energy 
demand, amplifying the impacts on electricity demand 
attributed to increasing temperatures alone. Hawaii’s 
population is projected to expand 25% between 2010 and 
2040 (DBEDT 2012). Conversely, Puerto Rico’s declining 
population (a projected 14% reduction between 2010 and 
2040) may offset increases in demand caused by higher 
temperatures in the long-run (Pew 2014). 
Increasing electricity demand could compound 
vulnerabilities of the broader electricity supply on the 
islands, as higher temperatures coincide with reduced 
power plant and transmission line efficiency and capacity. 
Electricity Demand 
Resilience Solutions 
Both Hawaii and Puerto Rico have programs and incentives 
designed to improve energy efficiency and reduce 
demand—measures that will improve the energy sector’s 
resilience to higher temperatures.  
Hawaii has established a state energy efficiency portfolio 
standard that requires the state to achieve a 4,300 GWh 
savings in energy demand through efficiency by 2030, a 
reduction equivalent to 38% of total generation in 2008 (EIA 
2013a, HPUC 2013). The state has also decoupled the 
profits of investor-owned electric companies from total 
electricity sales, enabling companies to encourage 
efficiency (ACEEE 2014, HSEO 2015a). Hawaii has had a 
recent increase in the number of energy efficiency 
programs available to utility customers, such as the Hawaii 
Residential Direct Load Control Program, which allows 
customers to participate in demand response by installing 
“EnergyScout” load control receivers that can control hot 
water heaters and air conditioners during critical periods. 
The program has approximately 36,000 customers 
controlling 17 MW of load (ACEEE 2014, Hawaiian Electric 
2013). Similarly, PREPA offers commercial and industrial 
customers time-of-use rates that encourage large users to 
shift demand to off-peak times (PREPA 2013). 
Both Hawaii and Puerto Rico have made progress in 
replacing electric water heaters with solar water heaters, 
reducing a significant source of residential electricity 
demand from the grid. Both governments have also 
recently enacted building code standards that mandate the 
use of solar hot water heaters in newly constructed single-
family homes (HSL 2014a, PRPRA 2010). Hawaii residents 
may receive up to $2,250 in tax credits for installing solar 
water heaters, and approximately 85,000 solar water 
heaters, or one in four households, are already in operation 
(Hawaii Electric 2015b, HSL 2014b). In Puerto Rico, 
incentives and programs to deploy solar water heaters, 
combined with incentives for small-scale PV, have removed 
40 MW of load from the electric grid (EIA 2015a). 
Finally, new power generation capacity can help electric 
grid operators meet increasing demand. Hawaii and Puerto 
Rico are endowed with abundant solar resources, and 
adding more solar PV to the generation mix can help meet 
daytime increases in air conditioning demand. To 
accommodate the increasing share of intermittent 
renewables in the state’s electricity mix, both demand 
response and energy storage are expected to play 
increasingly important roles in the Hawaiian electric power 
market. PREPA is using a strategy of purchasing power from 
independently-owned renewable energy projects to 
increase its reserve margins (Hawaiian Electric 2013, PREPA 
2012). In recent years, Hawaii has also seen an increase in 
the number of distributed renewable energy systems.  
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Regional Climate Change Observations 
and Projections in Detail (Hawaii) 
Higher Temperatures 
Historical observations 
 Over the last century, average temperatures have 
increased 0.07°F per decade, equal to an increase of 
0.6°F between 1919 and 2006. The rate of warming has 
accelerated in the last four decades and has increased 
faster at higher elevations (NOAA 2013). 
 Since 1975, temperature patterns have become 
increasingly decoupled from historical drivers of 
regional climate. Before 1975, temperature was tightly 
coupled to the Pacific Decadal Oscillation. Global 
warming may be responsible for the subsequent 
decoupling (NOAA 2013). 
 Between 1958 and 2009, the number of below-freezing 
days at high elevations decreased (NOAA 2013).  
Future projections 
 Average temperatures are projected to increase: 
Increases of 2.0°F–5.0°F are projected by 2070–2099 
compared to 1971–1999 levels, depending on the region 
and greenhouse gas emissions (NOAA 2013). 
Precipitation  
Historical observations 
 A general downward trend in precipitation has 
occurred. Although there is high variation among 
leeward and windward areas, the overall decline in 
rainfall is consistent with an increase in frequency of the 
Trade Wind Inversion, a decline in trade wind 
occurrence, and associated warming at higher elevations 
(NOAA 2013). 
 Hawaii has experienced increasing drought during the 
winter rainy season. From 1980–2011, all of the major 
Hawaiian Islands have experienced longer periods of 
consecutive dry days compared to the period 1950–
1979 (NOAA 2013). 
 Extreme precipitation events have declined. A 
significant decrease in the frequency of high-intensity or 
moderate-intensity precipitation events occurred in the 
period 1980–2011 compared to 1950–1979 (NOAA 
2013). 
Future projections 
 Projected changes in average precipitation are small 
and not statistically significant. By the end of the 
century (2070–2099), precipitation is projected to 
change by -1% to more than 3% compared to the period 
1971–1999 under an A2 emissions scenario (NOAA 
2013a). Under a B1 emissions scenario, precipitation is 
projected to decrease by more than 2% in the Northern 
islands while increasing by about 2% in the Southern 
islands (NOAA 2013). 
Hurricanes and Sea Level Rise 
Historical observations 
 Pacific hurricanes are less frequent but more severe. 
Over the past 20 years, fewer hurricanes have occurred 
across the Pacific, but the number of major hurricanes 
(Category 4 and 5) has increased (NOAA 2013). 
 Sea level has increased by 8 inches since 1900. Global 
mean sea level has accelerated in the past two decades, 
rising 1.3 inches per decade. Higher rates of sea level 
rise in Hawaii compared to global sea level are partly 
attributed to changes in prevailing wind patterns 
associated with El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and 
the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) (USGCRP 2014). 
Future projections  
 The frequency of hurricanes near Hawaii is projected to 
increase. By 2075–2099, a Northwestern shift in the 
track of hurricanes in the Pacific Ocean may increase the 
frequency of hurricanes affecting Hawaii (Murakami et 
al 2013). 
 Global mean sea level is projected to rise by 1 to 4 feet 
by the end of the 21
st
 century (USGCRP 2014). 
Regional Climate Change Observations 
and Projections in Detail (Puerto Rico) 
Higher Temperatures 
Historical observations 
 Since 1900, average temperatures in Puerto Rico have 
increased by more than 2°F. The rate of measured 
temperature change has been between 0.022°F and 
0.25°F per year (PRCCC 2013a). 
 The Caribbean has seen an increase in very warm days 
and nights. Since the 1950s, the region has experienced 
an increase in the number of days above 90°F and nights 
above 75°F (USGCRP 2014).  
Future projections 
 Average temperatures are projected to increase. 
Projected temperatures for Puerto Rico show an 
increase of at least 1.4°F by mid-century and as much as 
3.6°F–9°F by the year 2100 (PRCCC 2013a). 
 Temperature increases in Puerto Rico are expected to 
be higher than the tropical average (PRCCC 2013a). 
Precipitation  
Historical observations 
 Precipitation trends in the Caribbean are unclear. Some 
regions have experienced more precipitation than the 
historical average, and others less (USGCRP 2014). 
Future projections 
 Projected changes in average precipitation are 
uncertain. Models are not consistent, but the majority 
show future decreases in precipitation (USGCRP 2014). 
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Severe Weather and Sea Level Rise 
Historical observations 
 In the past several decades, intense hurricanes in the 
North Atlantic have increased in frequency. The 
number of Category 4 and 5 hurricanes has increased 
substantially since the early 1980s compared to the 
historical record starting in the mid-1880s (USGCRP 
2014). 
 Sea level rise has contributed to coastline loss. The 
coastline of Rincón, Puerto Rico, has eroded at 3.3 feet 
per year because of sea level rise (USGCRP 2014). 
 Sea level has increased by 8 inches since 1900. Global 
mean sea level has accelerated in the past two decades, 
rising 1.3 inches per decade (USGCRP 2014). 
Future projections  
 The frequency of the strongest (Category 4 and 5) 
hurricanes is projected to increase in the North Atlantic 
(USGCRP 2014). 
 Hurricane-associated storm intensity and rainfall rates 
are projected to increase: Rainfall rates within 100 km 
of tropical storm centers are projected to increase by 
20% by 2100 (USGCRP 2014) 
 Global mean sea level is projected to rise by 1 to 4 feet 
by the end of the 21
st
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11. Discussion and Conclusions 
Climate change is already affecting the U.S. energy sector. 
In recent years, record temperatures, droughts, and floods 
have damaged energy infrastructure, disrupted energy 
systems, threatened energy security, and harmed the 
economies of affected communities and the nation. Climate 
change projections indicate the potential for more frequent 
and severe disruptions.  
While climate change impacts will vary by region, all regions 
will be affected (see Figure 11-1 and text boxes on next 
page). Region-specific impacts include increasing wildfire 
mainly in the West. The frequency of the most intense 
hurricanes are projected to increase in the Atlantic, which 
threatens the Gulf coast, Atlantic coast, and Puerto Rico. 
Permafrost thaw is a critical impact in Alaska.  
Some vulnerabilities span regional boundaries, particularly 
where climate change projections and the existing energy 
infrastructure are similar. Increasing annual temperatures 
and more intense, frequent, and prolonged heat waves are 
expected to affect electricity generation, transmission, and 
demand in nearly every region. Nearly all coastal regions 
are expected to experience effects of sea level rise on 
energy infrastructure. 
 
Figure 11-1. Potential climate change impacts on the U.S. energy infrastructure vary by region. Energy subsectors considered most 
vulnerable to projected climate impacts shown first within each region. 
Key conclusions 
 Critical energy subsectors are vulnerable to climate 
change in every region of the nation. 
 Efforts to improve climate resilience are underway 
in every region, but the severe challenges posed by 
climate change could overwhelm current resilience 
efforts unless more comprehensive and accelerated 
approaches are adopted. 
 Resilience planning can be improved with better 
informational resources such as more geographic 
detail in climate change projections and metrics to 
help evaluate the value of resilience options. 
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Climate change impacts depend on changes to regional 
climates and the types of energy systems. At least four 
critical energy subsectors in each region exhibit important 
vulnerabilities to changing climate conditions. Climate 
impacts to the electric grid, thermoelectric power 
generation, fuel transport, and electricity demand will be 
manifested in nearly every region. In Figure 11-1, the 
subsectors in each region that are considered most 
vulnerable are listed first.
1
 
As demonstrated in this report, the large majority of climate 
change impacts on the energy sector will increase the risk 
of damage to infrastructure and disruption of systems and 
services; however, some changes may prove beneficial to 
existing systems or create new energy opportunities. For 
example, warmer winter temperatures may significantly 
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 The order of subsector vulnerabilities is based on judgments by 
the report authors as well as experts from government agencies, 
national laboratories, and private sector energy companies. Key 
factors in assessing relative vulnerability include the extent to 
which the subsector is expected to be affected by projected 
climate changes, the prevalence or size of the affected subsector 
in the region, the implications of damage and disruption to the 
subsector from projected climate impacts, and the effort required 
for the subsector to adapt or respond with resilience solutions. 
reduce energy consumption for heating, especially in 
northern states, reducing the winter burden on fuel 
transport systems. Reduced sea ice in the Arctic may open 
new shipping lanes and offshore oil exploration 
opportunities. In the Midwest and Northern Great Plains, 
northern states may see expanded growing seasons that 
allow the cultivation of new crops. 
Across all regions, energy system planners, owners, and 
operators are taking steps to prepare for climate change by 
identifying vulnerabilities, investing in more resilient 
infrastructure, improving operations, and planning for rapid 
recovery from damages that do occur. In some instances, 
future climate hazards and probabilities are already being 
incorporated into risk management systems; however, the 
magnitude of the challenges posed by climate change on an 
aging and already stressed national energy system could 
overwhelm current efforts. The appendix provides an 
extensive set of resilience actions undertaken or under 
consideration by planners, owners, and operators. 
Key climate impacts regional summary 
 Increasing temperatures and more frequent and severe heat waves will affect all regions and nearly every energy 
subsector. 
 More frequent heavy rainfall events are a significant threat to infrastructure primarily in northern regions. 
 Decreasing water availability is projected to affect energy systems in most regions, particularly in western and southern 
regions. 
 Increasing wildfire impacts are concentrated in western regions. 
 Rising sea levels and greater storm surge are increasingly important in nearly all coastal regions, particularly Gulf and 
Atlantic coastlines. 
 Increasing hurricane intensity and frequency of intense hurricanes are a major hazard for regions with Gulf and Atlantic 
coastlines, including Puerto Rico. 
 Thawing of permafrost threatens important energy systems in Alaska. 
Major energy systems affected by regional climate impacts  
 Oil and gas exploration and production operations are most vulnerable to climate impacts in the Southeast, Southern 
Great Plains, and Alaska. 
 Fuel transport in every region is vulnerable to a variety of climate impacts, such as increasing heavy precipitation, heat 
waves, droughts, hurricanes, and sea level rise-enhanced storm surge. 
 Thermoelectric power generation is vulnerable to increasing temperatures and reduced water availability in most 
regions, particularly in the Midwest, Great Plains, and southern regions. 
 Hydropower is vulnerable to reduced snowpack, earlier melting, and changes to precipitation patterns, mainly in 
western regions. 
 Bioenergy crops in the Midwest and Northern Great Plains may be harmed by higher temperatures and more frequent 
droughts and floods.  
 Electric grid operations and infrastructure are threated in every region by a variety of climate impacts, including 
increasing temperatures, heavy rainfall events, wildfires, hurricanes, and storm surge. 
 Electricity demand is affected by increasing temperatures and is a key vulnerability in nearly every region. 
 
 




The design and deployment of a 21
st
-century U.S. energy 
sector that provides enhanced reliability and climate 
resilience will encounter a number of key challenges. Figure 
11-2 summarizes these challenges, which are grouped into 
four categories: technological, informational and 
behavioral, institutional, and policy-related.
2
 
Technological challenges include the increased upfront 
costs that energy asset owners are likely to incur in 
adopting new technologies that improve resilience, such as 
costs related to financing, capital, operations and 
maintenance, and business interruptions. For example, 
some technologies that can enhance resilience to reduced 
water availability, such as dry cooling or wet-dry hybrid 
cooling, may impose higher capital costs upfront while the 
benefits are distributed over several decades. Innovative 
technologies may also bring additional uncertainties about 
performance that complicates financing or insurance. In 
other situations, proven, cost-effective resilience 
technologies and systems may be limited in availability or 
may not exist. In addition, the nation’s energy 
infrastructure is an interconnected, networked system, 
which may complicate implementation of some resilience 
solutions that require the effective coordination of many 
stakeholders. 
Informational challenges prevent access to or full 
understanding of climate projections, vulnerabilities, and 
resilience solutions. Scientific uncertainty about climate 
change impacts, including the severity and geographic 
distribution of certain impacts, can significantly inhibit 
resilience investments. Planners may lack access to 
projections of local climate impacts that could support 
decision making on local resilience solutions, such as facility 
siting and hardening measures. Informational challenges 
also arise in translating climate projections into specific 
actions for energy asset planners, owners, and operators. 
Informational shortcomings about both the costs of climate 
change impacts as well as the benefits of investments in 
resilience may impede the ability of energy sector owners 
to make an attractive business case for resilience actions. 
The lack of metrics, tools, and best practice guidelines 
increases uncertainty about vulnerabilities and the 
potential value of resilience solutions. Currently accepted 
metrics may not always be appropriate to guide companies 
in planning and defending resilience investments or 
measuring progress over time. For example, several of the 
electricity sector’s broadly accepted reliability metrics (e.g., 
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 Various frameworks have been developed to help stakeholders 
understand the challenges of increased climate resilience, 
including one presented in the Third National Climate Assessment 
for the economy as a whole (USGCRP 2014).  
SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI) often exclude major outage events, 
making it harder to justify investments that would improve 
resilience to these types of events. Moreover, poor 
understanding of costs and benefits can undermine the 
ability of energy companies to make resilience investment 
decisions, which requires comparing critical infrastructure 
damage or loss that could occur in the absence of such 
actions. Behavioral challenges include overcoming and 
Technological/Financial 
 Lack of cost-effective, commercially available 
technologies: There is a lack of commercially available 
climate-resilient technologies with acceptable capital, 
operation, and maintenance costs. 
 Early mover risk: Unproven or untested performance of 
first-of-a-kind solutions increases risks and decreases 
access to, or cost of, financing. 
 Business interruption costs: Implementing resilience 
solutions at existing operations may require temporary 
downtime and loss of revenue. 
Informational/Behavioral 
 Lack of relevant information: Available information is 
insufficient to identify vulnerabilities and support informed 
decision making about climate resilience solutions. 
 Poor understanding of costs and benefits: Limited 
information is available on the costs to design, implement, 
and operate new resilience technologies and practices, and 
on how to evaluate the associated benefits. 
 Lack of trained workforce: Few personnel possess 
expertise in climate impacts, vulnerabilities assessment, 
and resilience planning and implementation. 
 Established practices: Entrenched methods and priorities, 
along with limited understanding by affected parties of 
climate change, may influence resilience decision making. 
Institutional 
 Limited knowledge-sharing platforms: The diverse, 
competitive, and fragmented energy sector impedes 
information sharing and slows technological change and 
coordination. 
 Competing objectives of different stakeholders: Differing 
incentives for participants in the energy economy can lead 
to conflicting objectives. 
Policy 
 Lack of policies that internalize social benefits: Current 
policies may not sufficiently help energy system owners 
and operators internalize the social benefits associated 
with improving climate resilience. 
 Policy uncertainty: Lack of clarity regarding future public 
policy can create uncertainty and adversely affect 
investments in climate resilience. 
 Competing policy goals: Climate resilience may conflict or 
compete with other policy goals. 
Figure 11-2. Key challenges to enhanced climate resilience in the 
energy sector 
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updating entrenched methods, proecedures, practices, and 
priorities. 
A knowledgable workforce with a better understanding of 
climate change and the real-world interactions of complex 
energy systems will facilitate successful identification of 
climate change vulnerabilities. For example, improved 
understanding of how both electricity demand and system 
capacity respond to changes in temperature in different 
regions would help utilities and markets prepare for 
potential climate change impacts. Characterizing these 
relationships would assist resource planning by the utilities. 
Similarly, planners need economic models that consider 
energy demand relative to other factors, such as population 
growth and new technology adoption. Key weaknesses in 
current climate models include the projection of non-
cyclonic storms (e.g., convective storms, winter storms, and 
tornados), which are especially important for some energy 
subsectors and regions, and detailed projections of 
hydrology-precipitation interactions, particularly in 
watersheds with significant hydropower generation.  
Improved informational resources are needed to assess the 
potential limitations of resilience actions over a range of 
spatial and temporal scales (including high-impact/low-
probability events). Improved approaches could better 
characterize both the individual and aggregate climate 
change vulnerabilities of energy systems and better 
understand the interdependencies among sectors (e.g., 
manufacturing, transportation, communications, water 
supply and treatment, and health care) that can lead to 
cascading impacts. 
Institutional challenges, such as the lack of comprehensive 
platforms for open information exchange, may impede 
organizations from sharing information. Competing 
interests among stakeholders—both internal and external—
can also hinder organized responses to climate risks. Such 
fragmentation can prevent certain resilience solutions from 
becoming more widespread.  
Policy challenges include uncertainty about future policy 
decisions or the duration of current policies that can 
undermine confidence in otherwise justified business 
decisions, diminishing the effectiveness of government 
incentives. For example, the rate of new U.S. wind power 
installations over the past two decades reflect the multiple 
lapses in and reinstatement of federal incentives for 
construction of new wind capacity. Competing objectives 
among policymakers can also inhibit resilience investments. 
For example, new transport capacity that may alleviate a 
critical chokepoint in a fuel supply chain may be opposed by 
stakeholders for environmental, safety, or other reasons. 
The federal government can help address these challenges 
and fill an important role in protecting the nation’s 
economy and natural resources, promoting sound 
management of climate risks, and supporting local efforts 
to build stronger communities and infrastructure. 
Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Energy is taking the 
following actions: 
 Facilitating basic scientific discovery 
 Enhancing research, development, demonstration, and 
deployment of innovative energy technologies that 
strengthen climate resilience 
 Providing technical information and assistance 
 Fostering the adoption of enabling policies 
 Convening and partnering with states, communities, 
and the private sector 
These actions will help to ensure that energy system 
planners, owners, and operators act on the most relevant 
and geographically-specific information available and use 
cost-effective and appropriate energy technologies to 
address climate change risks. Local and regional energy 
investments need to consider climate vulnerabilities and 
resilience options to implement the technologies and 
designs best suited to the unique needs of each region. 
While government agencies as well as non-governmental 
organizations and the academic community have roles to 
play in overcoming these challenges, companies that own 
and operate the energy systems are primarily responsible 
for proactively assessing their assets for vulnerabilities and 
implementing resilience actions. Active information 
exchange will contribute to a positive feedback loop and 
improve access to critical information needed for decision 
making (Figure 11-3). 
 
Figure 11-3. Process of increasingly effective planning and 
investments in climate resilience 
Regional Interdependencies  
Interdependencies across regions and sectors affect the 
ability of decision makers to incorporate regional climate 
projections into their risk management approaches. 
Components of the U.S. infrastructure for energy 
generation, transmission, storage, and distribution are 
growing increasingly complex and interdependent. 
Connections can span regions (interregional dependencies), 
energy subsectors (intrasectoral dependencies), and 
economic sectors (intersectoral dependencies). Energy 
 
Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions | Conclusion 11-5 
 
 
sector interdependencies can exacerbate—or ameliorate—
the vulnerability of energy systems to climate impacts. 
Table 11-1 lists examples of these interdependencies 
affecting energy sector vulnerability or resilience. 
Interregional dependencies are evident in the electric grid. 
The contiguous United States is served by three 
independent grids: the Eastern Interconnection (serving the 
Northeast, Southeast, and Midwest, as well as parts of the 
Northern and Southern Great Plains), the Western 
Interconnection (serving the Northwest, Southwest, and 
some of the Northern Great Plains), and the Electricity 
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). These three grids allow 
power generated in one part of a grid to serve loads 
elsewhere. In so doing, they spread out variations in 
demand and supply, minimizing costs and the likelihood of 
shortages. For example, annual hydropower production in 
the Northwest peaks in early summer, but that region's 
temperate climate means that few households regularly use 
air conditioning (EIA 2011, EIA 2013a); as a result, some of 
California’s peak summer air conditioning demand can be 
met by importing low-cost hydropower from the Northwest 
over the grid (EIA 2011). This interregional connection 
makes California's electricity sector less vulnerable to high 
summer temperatures. Conversely, power grids also extend 
energy system vulnerabilities from one region to another. 
For example, synchronized transmission grids must be 
carefully balanced so that disruptions at any point on these 
grids do not affect the rest of the network. In August 2003, 
high heat and transmission line outages in the Midwest 
caused power outages for 50 million customers across the 
northeastern United States and Canada (DOE 2004). 
The fuel supply network offers another example of 
interregional dependency. The Gulf Coast is home to more 
than 50% of U.S. refining capacity, supplying oil products 
across the eastern half of the country. The high density of 
oil infrastructure that supplies a large area means that a 
single event, such as a strong hurricane making landfall in 
the Gulf region, can disrupt fuel supply across several 
regions. One strategy to mitigate risks related to this 
interregional dependency may be to develop strategic 
regional stockpiles of oil and refined petroleum products to 
help respond to shortfalls. For example, the federal 
government has established regional product reserves (e.g., 
Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve, Northeast Gasoline 
Supply Reserve), and New York State, NYPA, and others are 
planning to set up a strategic fuel reserve for gasoline and 
diesel fuel to provide short-term supply in the event of a 
shortage (NYPA 2014, DOE 2015, NY Storm Recovery 2015). 
Table 11-1. Examples of regional dependencies 
Dependencies Energy Subsectors Resilience and Vulnerability Examples 
Interregional Electric Grid Resilience: Interregional power transmission allows power to be imported when local 
capacity for generation is curtailed. 
Vulnerability: The Northeast blackout of 2003 started with transmission line failures due 
to high heat in the Midwest, spreading the vulnerability across regions (DOE 2004). 
Oil and Gas 
Exploration and 
Production 
Resilience: In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita disrupted production and refining 
activities in the Gulf of Mexico, and petroleum prices increased; however, demand 
could still be met from production in other regions (EIA 2005, EIA 2015). 
Electricity Demand Resilience: Increased summer electricity demand in the Southwest is met using  
hydropower production from the Northwest, where summer temperatures are  
more moderate . 
Intrasectoral Electric Grid and 
Fuel Transport 
Vulnerability: Power outages in the Northeast following Hurricane Sandy interrupted 
both the supply of petroleum products to the region (via the Colonial Pipeline) and the 
distribution of fuel through pumping stations. 
Fuel Transport and 
Thermoelectric 
Power Generation 
Vulnerability: Damage to the Joint Line Railroad in Wyoming's Powder River Basin in 
2005 delayed deliveries of coal, forcing power plants in the Midwest to draw down 
stockpiles and reduce summer production (DOE 2007). 
Electric Grid and 
Electricity Demand 
Vulnerability: A 2007 wildfire in California halted operation of a major transmission line 
that supplies power to San Diego, requiring the area's utilities to reduce demand by 
500 MW and nearly causing rolling blackouts (PPIC 2008). 
Intersectoral Health Care Vulnerability: Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, extended power outages shut down 
New Orleans’ Memorial Medical Center for several days (Fink 2009). 
Emergency Services Vulnerability: During the northeast blackout of 2003, Detroit’s computer-aided dispatch 
system for the police and fire departments failed to operate reliably and 
communications were disrupted when cellular sites lost power (Kilpatrick 2003). 
Financial Systems Vulnerability: Power outages in New York City’s Financial District caused by Hurricane 
Sandy resulted in a two-day halt in trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)—
the longest weather-related shutdown in more than a century (Brown 2012). 
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Intrasectoral dependencies reflect the interplay between 
energy subsectors, such as power plants that rely on fuel 
delivered by gas pipeline or fuel stations that rely on the 
electric grid. The impacts of Hurricane Sandy on the 
Northeast's energy system illustrate such vulnerabilities 
(see text box on next page). Although the region's main 
sources of gasoline were temporarily disrupted following 
the storm (including petroleum terminals and the Colonial 
Pipeline), the primary cause of gasoline shortage in the area 
was the lingering power outages that prevented use of 
(electrically powered) gasoline pumps at fueling stations. 
Mitigation of energy disruptions has become increasingly 
important as interdependencies grow and put other critical 
sectors at risk. Intersectoral dependencies affect nearly 
every sector of the economy (e.g., transportation, 
communications, food and agriculture, manufacturing, 
health care, and financial systems). For example, the 
transportation sector requires energy to supply motive 
power, while the energy sector relies on transportation to 
deliver the necessary coal, oil, and natural gas to operate. 
Likewise, the communications sector requires electricity to 
operate, while the energy sector increasingly requires 
communications systems to monitor and manage the 
electric grid. As a result, disruptions in energy supply can 
lead to cascading disruptions in multiple sectors. The 
crosscutting nature of these issues may illuminate 
opportunities for improvement and collaboration across 
government agencies, state and local planning authorities, 
universities, the private sector, and other organizatons. 
 
Planning in uncertainty 
Any projection of the future carries inherent uncertainties. 
While many broad climate trends are projected with high 
certainty at a national scale (e.g., increasing temperatures), 
projections at the regional level are subject to a degree of 
uncertainty that can make it difficult for energy 
stakeholders to devise effective climate resilience 
strategies. On the other hand, planning and managing 
energy investments based on climate norms of the last 
century presents risks that could result in significant costs 
to local communities and the U.S. economy. The need to 
prepare now for a wide range of future climate impacts is 
heavily underscored by three factors: the typical service life 
of energy assets (several decades in most cases), the cost of 
the associated investments (e.g., more than a billion for 
some new power plants), and the pace and magnitude of 
the projected changes (EIA 2013b). 
Planners often need to make decisions with limited 
knowledge of future conditions, and energy sector 
managers and investors are experienced at operating in the 
presence of unknowns. Given the long service lifetimes for 
most energy infrastructure, decision makers must consider 
long-term climate trends, such as those projected for 2050 
and beyond. Recognizing this timeframe, near-term 
resilience actions should seek to extend system flexibility. 
For example, planners today might assess vulnerabilities 
and consider resilience as part of routine infrastructure 
improvement efforts (e.g., selecting less vulnerable 
locations when replacing critical energy infrastructure). 
Planners in all regions would benefit from identifying near-
term opportunities to enhance energy sector resilience to 
climate change and extreme weather. 
Resilience actions identified in this report are largely based 
on today’s technologies, which will evolve and expand over 
the next several decades. For example, advances in 
distributed generation and energy storage technologies 
may produce revolutionary shifts in the way electricity is 
generated, delivered, and used. As new technologies are 
increasingly adopted, validated, and standardized, barriers 
to their use can fall. In addition, energy demand patterns 
may change radically as a result of population shifts and 
new devices and technologies, such as electric vehicles. The 
Southwest, for instance, in addition to becoming hotter and 
significantly drier, is expected to increase its population 
68% by 2050 (USGCRP 2014), greatly increasing demand 
and load. These changes may affect both energy sector 
vulnerability and the appropriateness of specific resilience 
actions. 
A robust strategy for building energy sector resilience will 
need to be responsive to these changes. It will require 
regular dialogue and information sharing among industry, 
government, technical institutions, and non-government 
organizations active in basic and applied research, energy 
Hurricane Sandy: Example of impacts from 
intrasectoral dependencies 
Hurricane Sandy brought devastating storm surge 
flooding and high winds to the Northeast. The storm 
damaged more than 7,000 transformers and 15,000 
poles across the region, and more than 8 million 
customers lost power in 21 states (DOE 2012, DOE 
2013). The power outages caused extended fuel 
shortages, leading to fuel rationing in New Jersey, New 
York City, and Long Island. 
The storm damage included significant impacts to 
petroleum infrastructure, and the area experienced 
major gasoline shortages. Flooding caused fuel 
terminals in New York City to lose power and delayed 
shipments for a week or more. The storm also shut 
down the Colonial Pipeline (a major source of gasoline 
for the region) for four days (ICF 2014, NYC 2013). Six 
refineries were either temporarily shut down or forced 
to reduce their output (DOE 2012). Even after many gas 
stations had been resupplied with gasoline, they could 
not provide fuel to customers because they did not 
have electricity to power the pumps (Nahmias 2013).  
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system planning, siting, and resilience policy development. 
It will need to embrace multiple elements, to include: 
 Lower-carbon power generation 
 Innovative technologies for improving the efficiency 
and reliability of operations 
 Strategic rebuilding after disasters (e.g., siting key 
energy infrastructure in less vulnerable locations) 




-century energy system that is resilient to the 
impacts of climate change and extreme weather is not a 
quick or easy process; however, current and projected 
climate change impacts dictate a strong need for common 
sense to guide near-term actions and investments. Smart 
decisions today will help to provide a robust and resilient 
energy infrastructure that serves all citizens and economic 
goals at the local, regional, and national levels.
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Appendix: Illustrative List of Energy Sector Climate Change Resilience Solutions 
 
 Climate change impacts 
Type of 
Measure 
Increasing temperatures and 
heat waves 




Increasing wildfire Increasing sea level rise and 
storm surge 
Increasing frequency of 
intense hurricanes 
1. OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION 
Hardening  Engineer structures in 
permafrost areas with 
design criteria suited for 
warming 
 Insulate or ventilate 
underlying permafrost, 
such as construction of a 
gravel pad of appropriate 
depth or the use of 
thermal piles 
 Enhance levees and 
floodwalls 
 Elevate critical equipment 
 Install emergency backup 
generators for critical 
operations 
 Use alternative water 
supplies, such as degraded 
water, wastewater, 
brackish water, or 
produced water 
 Install emergency backup 
power, such as diesel 
generators, for critical 
operations 
 Install sea walls, riprap, 
and natural  barriers such 
as vegetation 
 Elevate critical equipment 
 Install emergency backup 
generators for critical 
operations 
 Incorporate more robust 
design specifications for 
equipment in hurricane 
zones 
 Locate rigs on more stable 
areas of sea floor 
 Brace vulnerable 





 Update design and 
operations guides for 
equipment operating in 
Arctic Alaska 
 Update design, siting, and 
operations plans to 
account for heavy runoff 
and possible increasing 
floods 
 
 Update plans for securing 
water to consider 
decreasing water 
availability 
 Update wildfire response 
plans to account 
increasing frequency and 
severity 
 Update siting and 
operations plans to 
account for SLR 
 
 Update design criteria for 
new equipment in 
hurricane zones to 
account for extreme wind 
loading 
 Update engineering and 
operations guidance and 
storm plans to account for 
higher frequency of 
intense hurricanes 
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 Climate change impacts 
Type of 
Measure 
Increasing temperatures and 
heat waves 




Increasing wildfire Increasing sea level rise and 
storm surge 
Increasing frequency of 
intense hurricanes 
2. FUEL TRANSPORT 
Hardening  Upgrade thermosyphons 
to avoid damage from 
permafrost thaw 
 
 Enhance berms, levees, 
and floodwalls 
 Install riprap along bridge 
piers 
 Elevate or relocate 
infrastructure, including 
railroads, pump stations, 
and bridges 
 Install emergency backup 
generators for critical 
operations such as 
pumping stations and 
refueling centers 
 Upgrade drainage systems 
and ensure culverts can 
handle increased runoff  




 Install barriers or 
vegetation above pipelines 
to reduce the risk of 
erosion 
 Use pipeline materials that 
are less likely to leak or 
rupture from impacts (e.g., 
coated steel rather than 
cast iron or bare steel)   
 Anchor tanks or add 
product to increase tank 
weight and prevent 
floating 
 Dredge critical sections of 
waterways prone to low 
water levels 
 Protect selected above-
ground pipeline segments 
with insulation and fire-
resistant jacketing 
 Install sea walls, riprap, 
and natural  barriers such 
as vegetation 
 Elevate or relocate 
infrastructure (e.g., 
railroads, pump stations, 
and bridges) 
 Install watertight doors for 
low-lying equipment 
 Use pipeline materials that 
are less likely to leak or 
rupture from impacts (e.g., 
coated steel rather than 
cast iron or bare steel) 
 Relocate particularly 
vulnerable assets 
 Anchor tanks or add 
product to increase tank 
weight and prevent 
floating 
 
 Install emergency backup 
generators for critical 
operations such as 
refueling centers 
 Install wind girders on fuel 
storage tanks 
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 Climate change impacts 
Type of 
Measure 
Increasing temperatures and 
heat waves 




Increasing wildfire Increasing sea level rise and 
storm surge 





 Incorporate future 
temperature projections 
into design when replacing 
road materials and rail 
equipment 
 Upgrade road and rail 
integrity and inspection 
programs 
 Update monitoring 
regimes for roads, 
pipelines, and other 
infrastructure located on 
permafrost 
 Reduce speed of freight 
trains on vulnerable rail 
segments during high 
temperatures 
 Update design, siting, and 
operations plans to 
account for heavy runoff 
and possible increasing 
floods 
 Upgrade road and rail 
integrity and inspection 
programs 
 Identify alternative 
transport routes for use 
during flood events 
 Increase fuel stockpiles at 
or near customer sites  
 Increase use of local 
energy resources to 
reduce dependence on 
fuel transport 
 Update design, siting, and 
operations plans to 
account for possible low-
water conditions 
 Identify alternative 
transport routes for low-
water periods 
 Update design, siting, and 
operations plans to 
account for increasing 
wildfire 
 Utilize improved 
vegetation management 
practices that keep rights-
of-way clear 
 Update design, siting, and 
operations plans to 
account for SLR 
 
 Apply extreme wind 
loading design criteria for 
critical equipment 
 Update storm plans, 
including alternative 
transport routes, to 
account for higher 
frequency of intense 
hurricanes 
 Increase fuel stockpiles at 
or near customer sites 
3. THERMOELECTRIC POWER GENERATION 




 Enhance levees and 
floodwalls 
 Install waterproofing 
measures such as concrete 
moat walls, floodgates and 
watertight doors, sluice 
gates, reinforced walls, 
pressure resistant/ 
submarine-type doors in 
deep basements, 
expansive polymer foam in 
conduits, submersible 
pumps 
 Elevate critical equipment 
 Install water-saving 
cooling technology (e.g., 
closed-loop cooling, hybrid 
wet-dry cooling, dry 
cooling) 
 Install equipment capable 
of using alternate water 
sources (e.g. brackish 
groundwater, municipal 
wastewater) for cooling 
 
  Install sea walls, riprap, 
and natural  barriers such 
as vegetation 
 Install waterproofing 
measures, such as 
concrete moat walls, 
floodgates and watertight 
doors, sluice gates, 
reinforced walls, pressure 
resistant/ submarine type 
doors in deep basements, 
expansive polymer foam in 
conduits, submersible 
pumps 
 Elevate critical equipment 
 Reinforce elevated 
structures (e.g., cooling 
towers, water towers, 
smokestacks, etc.) for 
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 Climate change impacts 
Type of 
Measure 
Increasing temperatures and 
heat waves 




Increasing wildfire Increasing sea level rise and 
storm surge 





 Update integrated 
resource plans to account 
for reduced available 
generation capacity from 
higher temperatures 
 Update design, siting, and 
operations plans to 
account for possibility of 
increasing floods 
 
 Secure back-up water 
supply in case of low flow 
conditions 
 Install monitoring systems 
on source water supplies 
 Develop operating 
procedures for low water 
conditions 
  Update design, siting, and 
operations plans to 
account for SLR 
 Develop alternative fuel 
delivery options 
 Maintain larger fuel 
inventory onsite  
 Apply extreme wind 
loading design criteria for 
critical equipment 
 Develop or update storm 
plans to account for higher 
frequency of intense 
hurricanes 
4. HYDROELECTRIC POWER GENERATION 
Hardening   Reinforce structures and 
upgrade equipment to 
accommodate high flow 
periods 
 Increase storage capacity 
of reservoirs 
 Increase turbine efficiency 
and minimize water leaks 
at existing dams 




 Update integrated 
resource plans to account 
for reduced available 
generation capacity  
 Incorporate thermal 
predictive models into 
reservoir level forecasts 
 Update design and 
operation plans to account 
for altered precipitation 




 Develop integrated water 
management plan that 
accounts for changing 
water availability 
 Manage reservoir capacity 
(e.g., maintain higher 
winter carryover storage 
levels, reduce conveyance 
flows in canals and flumes, 
and reduce discretionary 
reservoir water releases) 
 Install monitoring systems 
on rivers with telemetry to 
increase data availability, 
trending, and station 
response times 
 Develop operating 
procedures for low water 
conditions 
 Improve forecasts of 
snowmelt timing based on 
snowpack and 
temperature trends 
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 Climate change impacts 
Type of 
Measure 
Increasing temperatures and 
heat waves 




Increasing wildfire Increasing sea level rise and 
storm surge 
Increasing frequency of 
intense hurricanes 
5. BIOENERGY AND RENEWABLE POWER GENERATION 
Hardening  Increase or install 
additional generating 
capacity 
 Enhance levees and 
floodwalls 
 Elevate critical equipment 
 Use alternative water 
supplies at biorefineries 
(e.g., degraded water or 
wastewater)  





  Install sea walls, riprap, 
and natural barriers such 
as vegetation 
 Elevate critical equipment 






 Update design plans for 
increasing temperatures 
 Develop alternative fuel 
delivery options 
 Maintain larger fuel 
inventory onsite 




 Account for increased 
wildfire risk when siting 
facilities 
 Incorporate increased 
wildfire risk into forest 
management practices, 
such as frequency of 
prescribed burns and 
reduction of hazardous 
fuels to prevent 
uncontrolled fire depleting 
woody biomass resources 
 Update design, siting, and 
operations plans to 
account for SLR 
 Develop alternative fuel 
delivery options 
 Maintain larger fuel 
inventory onsite  
 Apply extreme wind 
loading design criteria 
 Develop or update storm 
plans to account for higher 
frequency of intense 
hurricanes 
6. ELECTRIC GRID 
Hardening  Limit customers affected 
by outages by installing 
additional substations and 
breakaway equipment, 
and by sectionalizing 
fuses; develop island-able 
“microgrids” 
 Upgrade transformers 
(e.g., forced-air or forced-
oil cooling) 
 Install smartgrid devices 
that to speed 
identification of faults and 
service restoration 
 Increase or install 
additional transmission 
capacity 
 Increase redundancy in 
transmission system 
 Enhance levees and 
floodwalls 
 Limit customers affected 
by outages by installing 
technology such as 
microgrids, additional 
substations, sectionalizing 
fuses, and breakaway 
equipment  
 Underground critical 
transmission and 
distribution lines 
 Install waterproofing 
measures, such as 
floodgates and watertight 
  Increase redundancy in 
transmission system 
 Limit customers affected 
by outages by installing 
additional substations and 
breakaway equipment, 
and by sectionalizing 
fuses; develop island-able 
“microgrids” 
 Replace wood poles and 
support structures with 
fire-resistant materials 
(e.g., steel or concrete) 
 Install smartgrid devices to 
speed identification of 
faults and service 
restoration 
 Install sea walls, riprap, 
and natural  barriers such 
as vegetation 
 Limit customers affected 
by outages by installing 
additional substations and 
breakaway equipment, 
and by sectionalizing 
fuses; develop island-able 
“microgrids” 
 Replace wood poles and 
support structures with 
stronger materials (e.g., 
steel or concrete) 
 Elevate or relocate critical 
equipment 
 Install smartgrid devices to 
 Increase redundancy in 
transmission system 
 Limit customers affected 
by outages by install 
technology such as 
microgrids, additional 
substations, sectionalizing 
fuses, and breakaway 
equipment  
 Replace wood poles and 
support structures with 
stronger materials (e.g., 
steel or concrete) 
 Underground critical 
transmission and 
distribution lines 
 Replace ceramic insulators 
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 Climate change impacts 
Type of 
Measure 
Increasing temperatures and 
heat waves 




Increasing wildfire Increasing sea level rise and 
storm surge 
Increasing frequency of 
intense hurricanes 
 Install breakable links and 
towers designed to 
tolerate lateral movement 
of foundation in event of 
uneven permafrost thaw 
and frost heave 
 
doors, sluice gates, 
reinforced walls, pressure 
resistant/ submarine type 
doors in deep basements, 
expansive polymer foam in 
conduits 
 Elevate or relocate critical 
equipment 
 speed identification of 
faults and service 
restoration 
 
with polymer  
 Install smartgrid devices to 
speed identification of 
faults and service 
restoration 






 Develop best operating 
practices for equipment at 
high temperatures 
 Include extreme 
temperature scenarios in 
future grid planning 
 Deploy future equipment 
and lines with higher 
design temperatures 
 Site equipment in areas 
less prone to flooding 
 Install water level 




  Site equipment in areas 
less prone to wildfire 
 Enhanced vegetation 
management (e.g., tree 
trimming, forest thinning, 
and prescribed burning) 
 Develop fire response 
plans and tools; 
coordinate with local 
partners  
 Develop firefighting 
compounds safe to use 
near active power lines 
 Site equipment in areas 
less prone to coastal 
flooding 
 Install water level 




 Update siting and 
operations plans to 
account for SLR 
 Apply extreme wind 
loading design criteria to 
critical infrastructure  
 Site equipment further 
from coast 
 Enhance vegetation  
management programs 
 Update storm plans to 
account for higher 
frequency of intense 
hurricanes 
7. ELECTRICITY DEMAND 
Hardening  Implement weatherization 
programs 
 Install energy efficient 
equipment 
 Increase generation and 
transmission capacity 
 Invest in grid-scale energy 
storage systems 
  Implement water and 
energy  efficient 
technologies and practices 
to reduce energy demand 
for water production, 
pumping, and filtration 




 Update resource plans to 
accommodate projected 
increases in CDDs and 
decreases in HDDs  
 Implement programs that 
incentivize and encourage 
energy efficiency  
 Implement load 
management and demand 
side response programs 
  Emphasize water 
efficiency in buildings, 
industrial processes, 
municipal utilities, and in 
other areas to reduce 
energy demand for water 
production, pumping, and 
filtration 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
